



00036116



00036116

Digitized with financial assistance from



HT Parekh
FOUNDATION

An Initiative by



WITH YOU, RIGHT THROUGH

on 27 November, 2018

HISTORY OF GREECE

ABBOTT

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

A History of Greece.

Part I.—From the Earliest Times to the Ionian Revolt. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Part II.—500-445 B.C. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Part IV.—From the Fall of the Thirty to the Death of Alexander.

[In preparation.]

A Skeleton Outline of Greek History.

Chronologically Arranged. Small 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Hellenica. A Collection of Essays by various writers on Greek Poetry, Philosophy, History, and Religion. Edited by EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., LL.D. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

A
HISTORY OF GREECE

BY
EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., LL.D.

JOWETT LECTURER IN GREEK HISTORY AT
BALLIOL COLLEGE

36116 *ac*
PART III.

*From the Thirty Years' Peace to the Fall of
the Thirty at Athens, 445-403 B.C.*

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
AND BOMBAY
1900

All rights reserved

P R E F A C E

IN the first five chapters of this volume I have repeated some passages from my *Pericles* (1891) with corrections and other changes. I am sorry for the delay in the appearance of the book, but owing to other work I have been unable to finish it sooner, and even now I am conscious that the labour which I have bestowed on it has been inadequate to the subject. Greek History in the Fifth Century B.C. has an interest which is as inexhaustible as it is imperishable.

I am greatly indebted to Mr. W. H. Forbes, Tutor of Balliol College, for numerous suggestions and improvements; to Mr. H. W. C. Davis, Fellow of All Souls' College, and Mr. H. Williamson, of Balliol College, for their kindness in reading over my proof-sheets; and to Mr. F. H. Dale, Fellow of Merton College, for generous help in the Index.

E. A.

OXFORD, *December* 1899.

CORRIGENDUM

P. 105, l. 7 from foot :—*For* "That the cities of the confederacy made some kind of contribution is stated by Thucydides, and the statement is confirmed," etc., *read* "That the Sicilian allies of the confederacy were expected to make a contribution to the expenses of the war is stated by Thucydides, and the statement is confirmed in regard to other allies," etc. I may add that the Spartans, after the war was ended, demanded from the Eleans their share of the cost, but for this fact we have only the authority of Diodorus (xiv. 17); Xenophon does not mention it.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
THE HISTORY OF ATHENS FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE TO THE FOUNDING OF AMPHIPOLIS, 445-437, ...	1
<i>A.</i> —Athens and the West: the Foundation of Thurii, ...	15
<i>B.</i> —The Samian Revolt: Athens and the East, ...	28
<i>C.</i> —Athens and the North: the Founding of Amphipolis, ...	37

CHAPTER II.

ATHENS IN 445-432, ...	49
------------------------------	----

CHAPTER III.

THE CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, ...	67
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

GREECE ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, ...	94
---	----

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR DOWN TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES, 431-429, ...	111
---	-----

CHAPTER VI.

FROM THE DEATH OF PERICLES TO THE END OF 427, ...	155
---	-----

CHAPTER VII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF 426 TO THE END OF 425, ...	189
--	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF 424 TO THE PEACE OF Nicias, 421, ...	223
--	-----

CHAPTER IX.

	PAGE
FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TO THE INVASION OF SICILY, 421-415, ...	267

CHAPTER X.

AFFAIRS IN SICILY, 422-413, ...	295
---------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XI.

FROM THE END OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO THE FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, 413-411, ...	365
--	-----

CHAPTER XII.

FROM THE FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED TO THE FALL OF THE THIRTY, 411-403, ...	420
--	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT TO THE PEACE WITH CARTHAGE, 413-405, ...	476
--	-----

CHAPTER XIV.

LITERATURE, ART, SOCIETY, ETC., ...	490
---	-----

APPENDIX I.

EXPENDITURE ON THE WAR, ...	530
-----------------------------------	-----

APPENDIX II.

THE REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, ...	532
---	-----

INDEX, ...	541
------------------	-----

LIST OF MAPS—

PLAN OF THE ISLAND OF SPHAGIA (SPHACTERIA) AND THE HARBOUR OF NAVARINO, ...	206
SYRACUSE DURING THE ATHENIAN SIEGE, ...	327

CHAPTER I.

THE HISTORY OF ATHENS FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE TO THE FOUNDING OF AMPHIPOLIS, 445-437.

I. By the terms of the peace of 445 Athens was deprived of all the advantages which she had acquired in the preceding fifteen years. She was no longer the greatest power in Central Greece, with garri- Loss of Athens under the Peace of 445. sons at Pegae and Nisaea to secure the isthmus of Corinth; she no longer held points of vantage in Achaea and at Troezen, from which she could keep in check the most enterprising of the allies of Sparta—Sicyon, Corinth, and Epidaurus; she was confined within the limits of her own territory, between two sections of the enemy. It is true that she retained Naupactus, through which she might still hope to exercise some influence in Western Greece; it is true that Aegina, the “eyesore of the Peiræus,” though an independent, was nevertheless a tributary ally, and without a fleet of her own; but this was a sorry salvage from the wreck of a land empire, which enabled Athens to employ Boeotian hoplites in the field and place her ships in Megarian harbours, which gave her the command of the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs. The collapse becomes the more remarkable when we compare the present and the previous conduct of the Athenians. In 456, two months after the defeat of Tanagra, they were again in the field, and by the victory of Oenophyta placed the whole of Boeotia at their feet; but no attempt Want of vigorous policy at Athens. had been made to retrieve the disaster of Coronea. Thebes gathered the cities of Boeotia round her in a close and hostile confederation; the Phocians and

Locrians threw off their allegiance, but Athens never called out a single soldier. Since 449 there had been no war—either Hellenic or foreign—to exhaust her resources, and but a small part of her army had been engaged at Coronea. By a vigorous dash at Tanagra, which lay within two days' march of the city, she might have secured captives to hold as hostages for those Athenians who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and, the balance thus restored, a second contest would have been possible, but she preferred to abandon her position in Central Greece without a struggle. In the peace which Cimon concluded with Sparta in 451 (vol. ii. p. 338), she was allowed to retain her acquisitions in the Peloponnesus and the Megarid; but now, after five years of undisturbed possession, she is called upon to renounce them all, and she obeys the call without any attempt at resistance.

The conduct of the Spartans is hardly less astonishing. The invasion of Attica by Plistoanax was obviously part of a prearranged scheme, in which Euboea was deeply concerned. In their revolt the Euboeans must have relied, not only on the Boeotians, whom they had helped to freedom, but even more on the Lacedaemonians, who invaded Attica in order to divert the Athenians from active operations in the island. For however impregnable the walls of Athens might be, Pericles could not venture to leave the city while the Lacedaemonian army was in Attica. Yet suddenly, at the most critical moment in the fortunes of Euboea, Sparta throws her over, and the invaders return home. It is not difficult to produce instances of Lacedaemonian treachery when the safety of Lacedaemonians was involved (*infra*, p. 197), but in the present instance the Lacedaemonians were in no danger, and they gained no advantage—at least none to which we can point—by returning home. The Lacedaemonians explained the mystery by the commonplace that Plistoanax had been bribed; but can we suppose that the ephors of Sparta allowed their policy to be so easily thwarted?

Extraordinary
conduct of the
Lacedae-
monians.

Archidamus was at Sparta, and he at least was above suspicion. Why was the experienced soldier left at home, and a mere youth placed in command of the expedition? Why was no effort made to persist in the policy by which Plistoanax was sent into Attica? Why was Euboea allowed to fall back into the hands of Athens?

2. If we had fuller information we should no doubt be able to explain the action of Sparta and Athens in this period; but in our present ignorance we cannot go beyond conjecture, and of the causes here suggested it is impossible to say which is the true one.

(a) The first symptoms of a decline of vigour, or, at any rate, of a change of policy, at Athens are seen immediately after the death of Cimon. The Athenians were victorious at Salamis; but no attempt was made to gain Cyprus for the Delian confederacy; the island was abandoned to its

Change of
policy at
Athens after
Cimon's death.

fate; war with Persia was dropped. The death of the great soldier, whose life had been dedicated to foreign wars, seems to have brought with it a cessation of warlike enterprise. In the next four years the two commanders who stood next to Cimon in reputation—Tolmides and Myronides—also passed away. The extension of Athenian power on land had been largely due to their victories, and Tolmides fell in endeavouring to maintain what he had helped to win.¹ Their places were taken by men of as little capacity as ambition, whom the citizens distrusted and the enemy despised. Pericles himself was by no means a distinguished general; his caution amounted to timidity, and unless in command of an overwhelming force, he shrank from the risk of an engagement. From this period we trace a decline of the Athenian army, of which the last stage was reached on the fatal field of Delium in 424—a decline for which Pericles

¹ The date of the death of Myronides is unknown, but we never hear of him after the expedition to Thessaly in 454. Tolmides, of course, fell at Coronea.

was himself largely to blame. But without an efficient army, carefully trained, and led by able generals, Athens could not hope to maintain her position in Central Hellas.

(b) In Cimon Athens also lost the citizen who was most influential at Sparta. It was he who concluded the peace of 451; and though he had been unable to prevent the breach between Athens and Sparta after the affair of Ithome, and had shown himself loyal and patriotic in the conflict which followed, his presence at Athens was at least a guarantee that Lacedaemonian interests were not overlooked. After his death there was no one to take his place in this respect, and we may conjecture that in the interval between 449 and 445 a spirit of distrust and suspicion arose among the Lacedaemonians, who might suppose that Athens abandoned war with Persia merely to renew the war in Greece with greater vigour. Under such circumstances they would in 445 insist on severer terms than those which they accepted in 451.

(c) Other and more important causes of the change in the spirit and policy of Athens may be sought in the attitude of the allies and the influence of Pericles. The calamitous reverse which overtook Athens in Egypt could not fail to have an effect on the cities of the Anatolian coast; those which were discontented with their position were more inclined to seek aid from Persia; and the Persian satraps began to renew their hopes of collecting the tribute at which the cities were assessed to the Great King. In 450 there had been troubles at Miletus, Erythrae, and Colophon, which could only be composed by the presence of Athenian garrisons and commissioners. In 446 followed the revolt of Euboea, the largest of all the allied islands, the nearest to Athens, and the most important for the supply of the city. In this period also, so far as we can draw conclusions from the quota-lists, the tribute received from the allies was constantly diminishing: in 450 the total amount was reduced from 520 talents to 470 or 480; and by 440 it amounted to 454 talents only, of which

Change in the
relations of
Athens and
Sparta.

Attitude of the
allies towards
Athens.

not more than 400 were paid. In the years 447-445 twelve cities in the Carian district, two in the Ionian, and two in the Thracian, disappear from the list of those paying tribute to Athens.¹ Such indications of decline were not lost on Pericles, for even if he did not anticipate so serious an outbreak as he was soon to experience in the revolt of Samos, he could not fail to perceive that if the Athenian empire was to be maintained, Athens must keep her allies well in hand; she must concentrate her power on the sea; she must be invincible in the Aegean, or the cities would rebel and the tribute remain unpaid.

With this object in view he allowed the old policy of war with Persia to drop, for experience had shown how fatal was a reverse in the east, and how little could be gained by further conquests. A maritime power could inflict no serious injury on the territory of the king, while the occupation of Cyprus, which was, perhaps, possible, would involve unceasing conflict with the Phoenician fleet. The revolt in Egypt, if not wholly suppressed, was so far crushed that no reasonable hope of success remained, and it would be the worst folly to waste the resources of Greece in supporting projects so chimerical as the resuscitation of the Pharaohs. On the other hand, the traditional policy of the Delian League—the object for which it had been founded—could not be abandoned without danger. When war with Persia was discontinued, the allies might claim that their contributions should be discontinued also. Their arguments must be met; their irritation soothed, or, if not soothed, suppressed. The change from the Delian confederacy to the Athenian empire was an undertaking which might well absorb the energies of the statesman and the resources of his city.

At the time of the defeat of Coronea, Pericles was engaged

¹ Busolt in *Philologus*, 1882, pp. 714, 710, 701, 684. *G. G.* iii. 1. 556.

War with
Persia dropped:
the league be-
comes an
empire.

in this difficult undertaking, and in his judgment Athens was unequal to the double task of maintaining her ground in Boeotia and the Aegean. Athens was safer without her possessions on land, which were not so much strongholds of her power, as positions inviting attack and provoking resentment. It was better to send out Athenian citizens to hold the allies in check as "cleruchs," than to waste their lives in garrison duty. And when, owing to the apparent tameness of his policy, Athens was attacked by a general conspiracy,

Pericles secures the empire of Athens by the peace.

Pericles showed that he was prepared for still further concessions; he was willing not only to withdraw from Central Greece, but to abandon the Athenian possessions in the

Peloponnesus also, if, by so doing, he could secure his principal object and maintain the power of Athens at sea. In this policy he was entirely successful, owing to the selfish-stupidity of the Lacedaemonians, who were content that Euboea should be subject to Athens, if only the Peloponnesus were freed from the presence of Athenians; who, regardless of Corinthian interests, allowed Naupactus to remain in the hands of Athens, and regardless of their own, did not even stipulate that the Messenian garrison should be removed, while Aegina, the great Dorian island, famous alike in legend and history, so far from being rescued for the Peloponnesian confederacy, continued to be a helpless ally of Athens, paying tribute which went to increase the Athenian fleet. In the calculations of Pericles such concessions were not too dearly bought by the evacuation of Troezen and the Megarian ports.

3. From this point of view the peace of 445 becomes intelligible. It marks the end of an old policy, and the beginning of a new one. Greece is now divided into two sections, each of which takes its own line; the Athenians on sea, the Peloponnesians on land. The division corresponded roughly with the division of Dorians and Ionians, a division which had long been keenly felt in the colonies of the east and west. Such a

Greece now divided into two halves.

partition might seem to offer the fairest prospect of lasting peace. The Athenians, by renouncing their acquisitions in the Peloponnesus, withdrew into the circle of the Delian confederacy, which they had administered for more than thirty years, with the tacit acquiescence, at any rate, of the Peloponnesians. The Lacedaemonians by abandoning Euboea, when she was struggling for independence, made it plain that they were not prepared to look beyond the Peloponnesus, or enter on a war with Athens in the cause of the oppressed allies. The prospect was delusive; on the one hand, complete partition was impossible, and on the other, Pericles still cherished ambitions, which, if realised, made a collision with the Peloponnesians inevitable. Athens still retained Naupactus, which was not only the key of the Corinthian gulf, but an outpost in Western Greece, where Corinth traded through her numerous colonies; and she garrisoned the town with Messenians, who were the deadly enemies of Lacedaemon. Among the cities of the Delian League were some who were bound by a double allegiance to rival sovereigns, such as Potidaea, which was not only a Corinthian colony, governed by officers sent from Corinth, but a subject ally of Athens, engaged to the payment of tribute. Such a situation was delicate, if no more, and nothing but consummate tact could prevent a collision. Worse still, for the hope of lasting peace, was the infatuated passion for Sicily, which haunted the Athenians, and increased in violence when the war with Persia no longer occupied their minds. For conquest in Sicily meant conquest of the Dorians, of the colonies of Corinth, which were closely connected with their mother-city, and formed the foundation of her prosperity.

The partition
imperfect, and
likely to lead to
a collision.

4. In this new policy Pericles had the support of the poorer classes in the city and Peiraeus, whom he had taught to look on the empire as a convenient source of subsistence (vol. ii. p. 405). And the names of Callias and Andocides, who are mentioned among the plenipotentiaries for conclud-

ing the peace, indicate that some of the oldest and richest families in Athens followed his lead. The Cimonian party

Parties at
Athens. Os-
tracism of
Thucydides.

took another view. They were dissatisfied at the cessation of war with Persia, with which the name of their great hero was so inseparably connected; and still more dissatisfied at their

own position in the city, where Pericles was carrying all before him. The party had been organised by Thucydides as it had never been organised before, but the result was merely a deeper cleft between the aristocrats and the demos. In eloquence Thucydides was no match for Pericles, and among the Athenians eloquence outweighed argument; but the disasters of the last few years, and the strong feeling which many of the citizens entertained about the use made of the contributions of the allies, inspired the oligarchical party with confidence. Was it not possible to throw the blame of the agitation among the allies, and of the shameful peace, which the agitation had made necessary, on the all-powerful Pericles, and by this means to create a reaction? On these grounds, in the winter of 445 ostracism was proposed in the city, and the proposal being accepted, the usual arrangements were made for voting in the following spring. But when the day came for decision, the sentence fell, not on Pericles, but on Thucydides.¹

Plato informs us that Thucydides was "of a great family and a man of influence, not at Athens only, but throughout Hellas." He belonged to that class to whom Athens owed so much, and on whom, in the days of extreme democracy, she looked back as the saviours of the city. To call him an oligarch is unjust, unless we limit the meaning of the word, for he was not an oligarch in the sense in which Antiphon or Pisander were oligarchs. He was an oligarch in the sense in which men

Thucydides: his
character and
policy.

¹ Vol. ii. p. 414; Plut. *Per.* 14, 15. Curtius, and Grote (more doubtfully) support the view that the ostracism was the work of the oligarchical party: Curt. *Griech. Gesch.* ii. 186; Grote, iv. 160 (1862).

are oligarchs who believe that the masses require leaders and that the leading spirits in any community at any one time are few. He was an oligarch in his opposition to Pericles who used the public revenues to win the favour of the mob for his own purposes, in his friendly feeling towards Sparta, and in his desire to preserve something of a paternal government at Athens.¹ But he was also a sincere friend of the demos, and a patriot, who endeavoured to establish the greatness of Athens on the only basis on which it could endure, by treating the allies with strict and scrupulous justice.

5. With the ostracism of Thucydides the opposition of the oligarchs was silenced. Pericles was now supreme, and could carry out his aims with a free hand. He had cleared the ground on every side. In Hellas he had secured peace and the recognition of Athens as mistress of an empire; war with Persia was at an end, at any rate *de facto*; and Athens was united under one party as it had never been united before.

Pericles occupied a unique position. He wielded an almost absolute authority in a state where every one was an enthusiast for civil and personal freedom. He ruled, but it was by the will and with the support of the people. In the language of Aristotle we might say that he was superior to the people, and therefore their natural king, but in the constitution he was merely a magistrate who could be deposed from his position at any moment, dependent on the popular will, and on his own power to control it. He administered resources far greater than those of any other city in Greece, and he administered them as he pleased, if he could persuade the people to support his measures. The city of which he was the head was in some respects the most civilised which the world has ever seen. Pericles could avail himself of the services of Phidias in art, and of Sophocles in tragedy; Anaxagoras and Herodotus were

Position and
aims of
Pericles.

¹ Arist. *Athen. Pol.* 28, and Sandys' note; Plato, *Meno*, 94.

among his friends. He could appreciate all that was excellent in literature ; his ideal of government was among the highest which have ever been proposed. Fortunate indeed should we be, if we had before us a full and accurate record of the years during which he ruled Athens ; we should then understand what were his aims at home and abroad, and by what means he sought to realise them. Unhappily we possess nothing more than a record of a few isolated facts, mostly of uncertain date, which rest on indifferent evidence, and stand in doubtful connection with one another.

6. Pericles is often spoken of as a man of wide Panhellenic views, who sought to unite Hellas by welding the various states, Dorian and Ionian, into one nation. This view is only true to a very limited degree. He did indeed attempt, as we shall see, to bring the Hellenes together in various ways, and to break down some of the barriers which divided them, but these attempts, which were a subordinate part of his policy, ended in failure. His chief aims were not Pan-

The Athenian
empire as con-
ceived by
Pericles.

hellenic but Panathenian. He wished to create an Athenian empire which should embody as large a part of Hellas as possible. At first he may have dreamed of an empire by land and sea, but, if he did, he was compelled to abandon the idea as beyond the strength of Athens, and from 445 he confined himself to the sea, as we have shown. He had no intention of going back to a confederacy, or of governing the Athenian empire on the old basis of the Delian League. Athens was not to be the leader of a number of equal states, but an imperial city exacting tribute from subjects, and using the tribute for her own purposes. With the exception of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, all the cities which had once enjoyed the privilege of an equal vote as allies, were now reduced to the condition of subjects, who paid tribute to the common chest, but had no voice in a common council ; their means of defence were taken from them ; their walls pulled down. Some were allowed to manage their own affairs ; in others there were Athenian garrisons and commissioners, maintaining

institutions which had been established in the interests of Athens ; and nearly all were compelled to carry their most important cases at law to Athens to be decided by an Athenian jury. Such a political condition was, from a Greek point of view, little better than slavery ; and, from any point of view, it implied a loss of independence.

The Athenian empire was an outrage on Greek political feeling ; it was a tyranny, and felt to be a tyranny, though exercised by a city which claimed to be the most advanced of Greek democracies. Imperialism, in any form, was inconsistent with the Greek love of autonomy, with the march of Greek politics ; and Athens was detested by Greece for the same reason that Pisistratus was detested by the Athenians. When she deprived the subject allies of their means of defence, she acted as the tyrant who deprived his citizens of their arms ; when she thrust her institutions upon them, she acted as the tyrant who made his will the law of the state ; in deciding their cases in her courts she acted as the tyrant who constituted himself the judge of his citizens ; and the democratical institutions of Athens only made more galling the contrast between her freedom and the subjection of the allies. The problem which lay before Pericles was undoubtedly one of great difficulty—so difficult, indeed, that in the world's history it has not been solved more than three or four times. To combine a number of independent communities into one whole, without destroying, on the one hand, the independence of the several cities, or limiting, on the other, the effective force of the combined body, is perhaps the highest achievement of political wisdom. Our own statesmen, and our own generation, are deeply conscious of the difficulties which attend such a task, and in the Grecian world the difficulties were greatly increased owing to the intense love of autonomy which prevailed in Greek cities, and the jealousies which divided them. Pericles did not even attempt such a combination, but, on the contrary, by suppressing the Delian synod, he removed the means through

which the cities might have been brought together on an equal footing, and by dropping the war with Persia he destroyed the motive which made union possible.

7. Politically, then, and as a step in the development of constitutional history, the empire was a blunder on the part of Athens, and it was a blunder which the Greeks never forgot. What can be said on the other side? The empire of Athens is often defended, even by writers of liberal opinions, on the ground that it brought to a large part of Greece the blessings of security and civilisation. It is argued, and with truth, that under the rule of Athens the Aegean was cleared of Persians and pirates; that the cities prospered, and trade developed; that the mutual quarrels and jealousies of the cities were held in check. All this is true; but the same may be said with equal truth of the despot's rule over his slaves. They also eat and drink and sleep in security—from every danger but one. A despotism is often the best means of attaining material comforts, but it is nevertheless a despotism involving the destruction of civil growth and freedom. It is no support to this line of defence to show that the contributions which Athens demanded from her allies were, as a rule, very light—that Byzantium and Miletus paid sums to the Athenian treasury which would not have sufficed to maintain a dozen ships at sea for a summer's cruise. Slavery may be cheaper than freedom, but few will come forward to defend it on that ground. The amounts paid to Athens were certainly small, but Athens raised or lowered them much as she pleased, and was strict in exacting arrears.

It is true, too, that Pericles, while maintaining the empire for the benefit of Athens, sought to give the allies a share of the good things which the Athenians enjoyed. Athens was to become a centre of light and leading throughout Hellas; her subjects were to be attracted to her by splendid festivals; they were to be instructed and amused by her orators and poets; they were

Defence of the empire: it ensured the security of the Aegean.

The empire a means of diffusing civilisation.

to find in the Athenians examples of the highest refinement, to copy Athenian manners, to talk Attic like Athenians, and win the admiration of their countrymen by their metropolitan polish. Athens was to be the school of Greece.¹ She was to be the home of art, poetry, and thought; the glorious city to which every eye in Hellas turned with pride. That was the aim of Pericles, and a noble aim it was; but in endeavouring to accomplish it, he fell into the same error which in previous generations had misled the tyrants of Greece and Sicily. They too had filled their courts with poets and artists in the hope that by splendour and refinement they might blind the world to the essential narrowness of their government, forgetting that culture can take no root where it is merely an exotic, a gift and not an acquisition.

8. On the ground then that it was a source of security and civilisation to Hellas, we can only defend the Athenian empire by arguments which may be used in defence of despotic rule. Shall we take up another line, paradoxical perhaps, but Hellenic, and claim for Athens the right to rule her allies, because she was their superior, just as on the Aristotelian theory the best man in the city is the natural ruler of his fellow-citizens? If there is one lesson of history more valuable than another it is this: that the world owes almost every advantage which it has gained in its onward course to its greatest men. From them, and from no other source, have we derived law and religion, political and social order: the great thoughts which animate mankind, and the great actions which live for ever. Shall we deny to states what we grant to law-givers and philosophers? If among a number of communities there exists one community which is supreme in civilisation and advanced beyond the rest in political institutions, has it the right to rule over them? Not the right surely, unless, perhaps, in cases where the disparity between the ruling

Athens ruled
by right of
superiority.

¹ Thuc. ii. 41; vii. 63.

city and the subjects is overwhelming, and the blessings which her rule confers are indisputable. But between Athens and the cities which sank to be her subjects, there was no very great disparity except in power. Down to the Ionian revolt the cities of the Asiatic coast, and the islands of the Aegean, were far in advance of Athens, or any other city of the peninsula; and though they never fully recovered from the disasters of the Persian war, they were still active homes of commerce and thought, and they cherished the memory of a glorious past. Nor was Athens chosen by her subject allies to govern them; she often forced her rule upon unwilling cities, and sought her own advantage in doing so.

There is yet another plea which may be urged in support of the Athenian empire. It may be said that Athens was

Athens formed
a support to
democracy.

always ready to support the cause of the oppressed against the rich and powerful. There was not a down-trodden "demos" in any allied city, however insignificant and remote, which did not feel that they were at least within reach of help. In any struggle with the oligarchs they could count on the sympathy and support of Athens. At Mytilene the people were no sooner in power than they placed the city in the hands of the Athenians; and the history of Samos is still more striking in this respect. The tyranny of Athens was, at any rate, a refuge from a tyranny more crushing and immediate, and Athenian ships, even when they came with the tax-gatherer on board, brought to many a message of hope. To ardent democrats the Athenian empire from this point of view will be more than justified. But democracies are sometimes as selfish as they are inconsistent. The support which Athens gave to democracy perpetuated the intestine strife of cities, a strife which she used for her own purposes, and some of the most cruel scenes in the Peloponnesian war arose out of her ill-timed intervention.

So we may argue for and against the Athenian empire without coming to a definite conclusion. The empire was raised on an insecure foundation; and for this reason it was

foredoomed to perish, not from external attack, but from its own internal want of coherence. "Politics," said Burke, "ought to be adjusted, not to human reasoning, but to human nature," and among the Greeks both reason and nature were opposed to imperialism in any form. Yet the blessings which the empire conferred on Greece were great: security, humanity, sympathy with the oppressed—these were not common qualities in ancient Hellas, but at least they existed at Athens in a larger measure than elsewhere.¹

9. In the ten years which followed the peace of 445 we can distinguish three important events in the history of Athens—the founding of Thurii, the revolt of Samos, and the colonisation of Amphipolis. Of these I will now give an account, including in the story some details of the relation in which Athens stood at this time to the west, the east, and the north.

A.—ATHENS AND THE WEST: THE FOUNDATION OF THURII.

In the years when Athens was at the height of her power, that is, in the years from 459 to 451, Pericles had striven to acquire the command of the Corinthian gulf.

The Messenians from Ithome had been placed at Naupactus, which commanded the entrance ;

Attempts to
secure the
Corinthian gulf.

Achaea had been received into alliance, Athenians had been placed at Pegae, at the head of the gulf; repeated attempts had been made to gain possession of Sicyon, and Pericles had himself led a force against Oeniadae in Acarnania. The object of these acquisitions and attempts is not difficult to discern. Through the Corinthian gulf lay the way to those

¹ In Thucydides the Athenians defend the acquisition of their empire by their conduct in the Persian wars; they maintain it from motives of security and interest: *μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέοις, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῇς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας*. . . *πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθορον, τὰ ἐνυμφρόντα τῶν μεγίστων περὶ κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι*—i. 75; cp. vi. 82, 83. The extreme point is reached in Cleon's speech, iii. 37 f, and the Melian dialogue, v. 85 f.

western regions in which Greek enterprise had reached a height far surpassing the prosperity of peninsular and even oriental Greece. In the first third of the fifth century the tyrants of Syracuse and Agrigentum were the largest figures in the imagination of the Greeks. In the west, too, the difficulties which stood in the way of the colonisation of the Aegean were not present; there was no Persian monarch animated by hereditary hatred, and master of innumerable forces, which seemed to rise superior to every disaster. The ancient enemies of the Grecian race, the Phoenicians and the Tyrrhenians, had been beaten back, for a time, and confined within narrow limits, and the greatest danger which threatened the Greek cities in Italy, the advance of the native tribes of the interior, was not yet fully perceived.

The quarrels of the cities of Magna Graecia had left some of the most fertile sites in that fertile region unoccupied. Croton and Sybaris had united for the destruction of Siris, and not long afterwards Sybaris herself was destroyed by Croton. The land thus laid waste remained unappropriated and uncultivated, and in 480 Themistocles quoted an oracle

Themistocles and Magna Graecia. which commanded the Athenians to colonise Siris, a command which he threatened to obey by sailing thither with his two hundred ships,

if the Greeks refused to fight at Salamis. The same interest in the west is indicated by the names Sybaris and Italia, which he gave to two of his daughters, and perhaps it influenced his verdict in favour of the Corcyraeans in their dispute with Corinth, in which he anticipated the policy of a later day (vol. ii. pp. 181, 268). However this may be, Athenian commerce, even in the days of Themistocles, extended along the Italian coast as far as Campania, and many of the products of the west were doubtless to be seen in the market-place of Athens.¹ In the years which followed, the comparative weakness of the Greek colonies in Italy,

¹ See Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* iii. 1, 519 f.

owing to the death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, the expulsion of the Pythagoreans, and the defeat of the Tarentines in 473, tended yet more to attract ambitious adventurers to the country; and it was about this time that the Athenians were seized with that longing for enterprise in the west, which, in the end, cost them so dear. In 450, envoys from Segesta appeared at Athens asking for assistance in some local quarrel (vol. ii. p. 468), and, four years later, if we may trust the dates of Diodorus, the descendants of the old inhabitants of Sybaris came to Hellas asking the Greeks to take a part in refounding their city.

10. After the destruction of Sybaris by the Crotoniates in 510, the remnant of the inhabitants had found a home in Scidrus and Laus, colonies of their city.¹ Here they dwelt for fifty-eight years, during which a new generation took the place of those who had seen the destruction of their city, and new hopes arose in the younger hearts. In 453-452 the Sybarites were collected by Thessalus, and conducted to the site of the old city, between the rivers Sybaris and Crathis. A new town was built, and, owing to the extreme fertility of the site, the inhabitants prospered as of old, but the hatred of the Crotoniates was not satisfied by sixty years of desolation. Five years after its foundation, they attacked the new city and destroyed it.²

Sybaris re-
founded and
again destroyed
by Croton,
452-446.

After this expulsion, the Sybarites abandoned the attempt to found a city for themselves, and sent to Hellas for assistance, offering a share in the colony to all who were willing to join. The Lacedaemonians turned a deaf ear to the appeal, which they may have regarded as dangerous to the interests of their own colony at Tarentum; but at Athens

¹ Herod. vi. 21; *Hist. of Greece*, ii. 503.

² Diod. xi. 90; xii. 10; in the first passage he says, *Θερταλὸς συναγαγὼν τοὺς ὑπολοίπους τῶν Συβαριτῶν ἔκτισε τὴν Σύβαριν*; in the second, *Θέρταλοι συνῆκισαν*.

the project was warmly taken up, especially by Lampon, one of the numerous prophets of the day, who at this time was very influential with the people, and in favour with Pericles.¹ The god of Delphi, when asked for his sanction, defined the site of the new colony in terms as alluring as they were

The foundation of Thurii. ambiguous. It was to be planted where men drank water by measure, but ate their meal unmeasured!

Colonists came forward not from Athens only but from various parts of Peloponnesus; from Elis, Arcadia, and Achaea; from Boeotia and Central Greece, and even from the islands of the Aegean. Ten ships were fitted out at Athens and despatched under the guidance of Lampon and Xenocritus, with whom sailed Dionysius, known as the "Copper" from his desire to introduce copper money at Athens. On arriving in Italy, the emigrants discovered, at a short distance from the site of the ancient town, a spring fitted with a bronze tube which the inhabitants called the bushel. This seemed to indicate the measurement of water, while the well-known fertility of the region promised an inexhaustible supply of grain. The conditions imposed by the oracle being thus fulfilled, a wall was built round the fountain, and a new city arose, called Thurii, from Thuria (gushing), the name of the spring (443).²

The town which thus arose was not a mere collection of houses, each built as the fancy of the owner might suggest; it was carefully laid out under the supervision of the most famous architect of the day. Among those who went from Athens to Thurii was Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, of Miletus,

The new city built by Hippodamus.

¹ We first hear of Lampon in the days when Pericles and Thucydides were in opposition, i.e. before the ostracism of Thucydides: Plut. *Per.* 6; *infra*, p. 56.

² Diod. xii. 10; Plut. *Nic.* 5. For the fertility of the region see Metagenes, *Thuriopersae*, in Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* i. 706:—

ὁ μὲν ποταμὸς ὁ Κράθις ἡμῖν καταφέρει
μάζας μεγίστας αὐτομάτους μεμαγμένας,
ὁ δ' ἕτερος ὠθεῖ κύμα ναστῶν καὶ κρέων
ἐφθῶν τε βατίδων εἰλυμένων αὐτόσε, κ.τ.λ.

a man of remarkable powers, speculative and practical; whose eager curiosity no department of knowledge escaped. We may picture him to ourselves as the friend of his countrywoman Aspasia, and brought by her into the Periclean circle. In the next century he was remembered as a man, whose abundance of long hair, and warm clothing, worn in summer no less than in winter, had drawn on him the eyes of all; as a student who posed as an authority in every department of natural philosophy; as a theorist who wrote about politics without being himself a politician; and as an architect who set a mode in the laying out of a city. The account which Aristotle gives of his political theories has many points of interest. He wished to establish a supreme court of appeal, and to allow juries to give a modified sentence—but the distinctive feature of his speculations was a certain mathematical precision. Hippodamus wished to have triplets everywhere; in his ideal city the land, the citizens, and even the law-suits fell into three classes. A similar spirit governed his architecture; in all the towns which he planned, he introduced straight streets, running at right angles to each other. Before he left Athens, he had “cut up” the Peiræus in this manner, and he now applied his principles in the building of Thurii. The town formed a square or oblong; four streets ran from end to end of it—the streets of Heracles, Aphrodite, Olympus, and Dionysus, which were crossed at right angles by the street of Heroes, the Thuria, and the Thurina. The whole was thus composed of twenty blocks of houses, conveniently intersected, and forming a striking contrast to the confusion of the ordinary Greek city.¹

¹ For Hippodamus, see Aristot. *Pol.* ii. c. 8, § 5 f.; and for the Hippodamean style, *ib.* iv. (vii.) c. 11=1330 b, 21 f., ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκησέων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομιζέται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἢ εὐτομος ἢ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον. This “mode,” however convenient, was thought to render a city less defensible in case of attack.

II. But neither convenience of plan nor fertility of soil could save the new colony from the defects which arose inevitably out of its constitution. In founding their city the descendants of the Sybarites had attracted settlers by lavish offers; but when the town was built, and its existence assured, they showed a less generous spirit. They claimed to be the rightful owners of the soil, the real founders of the colony; the rest were a foreign and subordinate class. In the division of the land they took the territory adjacent to the town for themselves, leaving only the most distant parts for others; the most honourable offices were reserved for them, and in offering sacrifice to the gods, their women had precedence. Such intolerable pretensions quickly led to an outbreak, in which the new colonists slew nearly all the Sybarites, and expelled the rest.

This new victory left the conquerors in possession of an abundance of fertile land. They immediately invited a number of colonists from Greece to occupy it on terms of equality:—an invitation widely accepted. The city now rapidly increased in power: the Crotoniates, after the expulsion of the Sybarites, were, for a time at least, on friendly terms with the settlers, and a popular form of government was devised, in which all the inhabitants had a share. Ten tribes were established as at Athens, in three of which were included the colonists of the Peloponnesus; these were the Arcadian, Elean, and Achaean tribes; three others comprised the settlers from Boeotia and Central Hellas; these were the Boeotian, Amphictyonian, and Dorian tribes. In the remaining four were collected the colonists from Athens, Euboea, and other Ionian cities; these were the Athenian, Euboean, Ionian, and island tribes. Further details are unknown to us, but it is obvious that the city was a Hellenic colony; a settlement designed to prove that the jealousies of race and city could be forgotten; that Dorian and Ionian, Athenian and Boeotian could dwell together

Internal quarrels at Thurii; expulsion of the Sybarites.

Fresh colonists invited: constitution of the city.

in unity. And in founding this colony Athens had taken a leading part.¹

12. Whatever were the views with which Pericles encouraged the foundation of Thurii—whether he saw in it the realisation of some Panhellenic scheme, or regarded it chiefly as a centre of Athenian influence in the west—they were doomed to disappointment. In a very few years the colonists were involved in wars, which arose apparently from their own aggressions. With Cleandridas, the exiled Spartan, to lead them, they not only besieged Terina, a colony of old Sybaris, on the western coast of the peninsula, but endeavoured

Cleandridas at Thurii; growth of the Dorian element.

to acquire the fertile territory of Siris, a step which led to a conflict with Tarentum.² Each city ravaged the lands of the other without any decisive advantage, but indirectly the war was damaging to Athenian interests, for Cleandridas, as he rose to power, favoured the Dorian element at the expense of the Ionian. In 434 there were seditions in the city, and question was raised:—Who was the true founder of the colony?—a clear proof that the colonists were no longer loyal to the Athenians. An appeal was made to Delphi;

¹ Diodorus marks three stages in the foundation of Neo-Sybaris or Thurii: (1) The Sybarites gather together and found a city on the site of the old town; this is in the archonship of Lysicrates, 453-452. (2) Six years afterwards this city is destroyed, and envoys are sent to Greece to invite colonists, who are established at Thurii. (3) The colonists quarrel; the Sybarites are expelled, and fresh settlers invited. The last two events are placed in the same year—in the archonship of Callimachus, 446-445. But it is very improbable that the colonists were sent out, the town built, the Sybarites expelled, and additional colonists collected in one year. Nor is 446-445 a year in which the Athenians were likely to give much time to Italian affairs, at any rate till the peace with Sparta was settled. Moreover, we are told in *Plut. Vit. Dec. Or. Lysias*, that Thurii was founded in the archonship of Praxiteles, 444-443, and this agrees with Dionysius, *Lysias*, who puts the foundation twelve years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war (431 + 12 = 443). Diodorus, then, has put together in one year a series of events which began in 446, but were not concluded till three years later. See Busolt's exhaustive note, *Griech. Gesch.* iii. 1. 523.

² Diod. xii. 23.

and the god set aside the claims of Athens by declaring himself and no other to be the founder. This was a gain for the Dorians, and a still greater gain was the settlement of the war with Tarentum by a friendly arrangement under which Thurians and Tarentines united in planting the new colony of Heraclea on the site of Siris, which was now for ever lost to the Athenians.¹ With the ascendancy of the Dorians the democratic government of Thurii was changed into an oligarchy, and when in 415 Athens sent her fleet to the west, the city was closed against her.²

The last remnant of the unfortunate Sybarites, after their expulsion from Thurii, had settled on the Traeis, a river already memorable for the defeat of their ancestors. Here they were attacked and destroyed by the Lucanians, who, following the example of the Campanians in Central Italy, began from this time forward to molest the cities of Magna Graecia. Thurii only saved herself from a like fate by hard fighting and the skill of Cleandridas.³

Some scanty notices have been preserved of other Athenian connections with Italy besides the colony at Thurii. In 413 Athens renewed "an old alliance" with the king of the Messapians, and as such an alliance would be useful to the inhabitants of Thurii in a contest with Tarentum, we may conjecture that it was originally formed when the two cities were at war for the possession of Siris.⁴ There was also a settlement of Athenians at Neapolis, and coins were issued from the

Advance of
the native
tribes.

Other Athenian
connections
with Italy.

¹ Diod. xii. 35, 36; Strabo, 264.

² Aristot. *Pol.* viii. (v.) 7, 6 = 1307 a, 27 ff. Thuc. vi. 44. The anti-Athenian party was subsequently driven out by a revolution (Thuc. vii. 33), and help was given to Eurymedon and Demosthenes, but afterwards Thurian ships joined the Lacedaemonians in Asia.

³ Diodorus places the rise of the Campanians to power in 440 (xii. 31); Cumae fell into their hands in 423 at the latest. For the Sybarites, see Diodorus, xii. 22, who, however, calls the Lucanians Brutii. For Thurii, see Polyaeus, ii. 10.

⁴ Duncker, *Gesch. Alt.* ix. 277; Thuc. vii. 33.

Neapolitan mint, bearing the head of Pallas with a helmet crowned with olive. The coins and the colony may be due to commerce; it is more difficult to account for the presence of Diotimus, an Athenian admiral, who is said to have sacrificed to Parthenope, the guardian goddess of Neapolis, and to have established a torch race which the Neapolitans afterwards maintained as a yearly festival.¹

13. We have spoken of the colonisation of Thurii as due, at least in part, to the wish of Pericles to bring the Greeks together under the lead of Athens, and perhaps we may follow the unity of subject so far as to mention here two other attempts of a similar nature, "Panhellenic schemes," they are sometimes called, which owed their origin directly in the one case, and indirectly in the other, to Pericles. In these he not only endeavoured, as in the foundation of Thurii, to break through the division into Dorians and Ionians, which would range the Dorians on the side of Sparta in any contest with that city, but he also sought to regain for Athens the position which she was losing by abandoning the war with Persia, and to attract to Attica the same religious veneration which gathered round Olympia and Delphi.

Our knowledge of the first of these schemes is derived from Plutarch, who tells us that at the time when the Lacedaemonians were beginning to be greatly distressed at the rise of Athens, Pericles encouraged the people to aim at a still higher position. With this object he brought forward a decree that all the Greeks, whether in Europe or in Asia, should be invited to send envoys to a conference at Athens for the purpose of discussing some questions of national interest. The temples which the Persians had destroyed were still un-restored; the offerings vowed in the great war had not been fully rendered; no definite arrangement had been made for

Panhellenic
schemes of
Pericles.

Proposed con-
gress of the
Greeks.

¹ Strabo, p. 246; Head, *Historia Num.* p. 32; Timaeus, *Frag.* 99 M. The date is uncertain: Διότιμος δὲ εἰς Νεάπολιν ἦλθεν, ὅτε στρατηγὸς ὢν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπολέμει τοῖς Σικελοῖς, Tim. loc. cit.

the control of the sea or the preservation of peace. These were matters in which every Greek had an interest, and they could only be discussed in a Panhellenic conference. Twenty Athenians, men of more than fifty years of age, were chosen as envoys, of whom five visited the Ionians and Dorians in Asia, and the islands as far as Lesbos and Rhodes; five more were sent to the Greeks in the Hellespont, and in Thrace as far as Byzantium. Other five went to Boeotia, Phocis, and the Peloponnesus, whence they passed through Locris to Acarnania and Ambracia; the remainder visited the Oeteans of the Maliac gulf, the Achaeans of Phthiotis, and the Thessalians. But the scheme fell to the ground; nowhere was there any response to the invitation; not a single envoy appeared at Athens, and the attempt to make the city a centre of Hellas completely failed. We cannot satisfactorily explain the collapse, because we do not know at what date the proposal was made; but if it is rightly placed after the peace of 445, the Lacedaemonians must have received with some amusement a project in which Athens claimed to take a leading part in Hellenic affairs, and to resuscitate for her own interests that national antipathy to the barbarians, which, when her own interests seemed to demand it, she had so readily allowed to subside. The Thebans also, who, after many years of decline, were again becoming a power in Greece, were very unlikely to support a scheme which would place their past conduct in an unfavourable light, while the allies of Athens were aware, from their experience, that no project of national unity would lighten their subjection to the imperial city. If the Athenians were in earnest in asking their advice, why had they allowed the Delian synod to perish? ¹

¹ Plutarch, *Per.* 17, is our only authority for this scheme, which he represents as a decree proposed by Pericles. He explains the failure of it by the opposition of the Lacedaemonians, *Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπεναντιωθέντων, ὡς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τῆς πείρας ἐλεγχθείσης*. Duncker, on general grounds, puts the date at 444-443.

14. The second scheme was a project for associating the Greeks more closely with the sanctuary at Eleusis. In spite of traditions which spoke of it as an alien, or even a hostile community, Eleusis had long been cherished by the Athenians as a sacred place, the home Eleusis. of those holy goddesses whose mysteries were revered throughout Hellas. In the sixth century the Athenians seem to have fallen peculiarly under the influence of mysticism (vol. i. p. 463); Musaeus, Orpheus, and other soothsayers became at that time equal authorities with Homer on religious doctrines, or even superior authorities, because they dealt with subjects which do not find a place in the Homeric poems, and they also claimed to be of greater antiquity. The interest in mystical lore, the curiosity about a future life, and the desire for purification from this "muddy vesture of decay," were still further developed by the Pythagorean doctrines, which began to spread in Greece during the first half of the fifth century (vol. ii. p. 488). Legends also glorified the part which the deities of Eleusis had taken in the struggle against Persia; and it was in the precinct of Demeter, both at Plataea and Mycale, that the barbarians were finally defeated.¹

In the years which followed the Persian war, the popularity of the mysteries seems to have greatly increased. In an inscription which is certainly anterior to the Popularity of
the mysteries. Thirty Years' peace, we find traces of elaborate arrangements for the reception of foreigners at Athens during the mysteries. From the full moon of Metageitnion to the 10th of Pyanepsion (August-October) a sacred truce prevailed, of which any city might avail herself whose citizens wished to share in the holy rites; and while the truce lasted, the benefits extended equally to aliens at Athens and Athenians dwelling in alien cities. To receive the visitors a great temple was planned at Eleusis, which, though unfinished in the lifetime of Pericles,

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 192, 233, and Herod. ix. 65, 101.

ranks next to the Parthenon among the buildings with which he adorned Attica. Hence the poet Sophocles in his *Antigone* could speak of the vale of Eleusinian Deo as a place where all found a welcome.¹

But the mysteries were not the sole attraction of Eleusis; not through them only had blessings been conferred upon Greece by the holy goddesses. It was in the adjacent Rharian plain that corn had first been sown; it was from Eleusis that Demeter sent forth Triptolemus to till the earth, and teach mankind the art of agriculture. This legend was treated by Sophocles in the *Triptolemus*, one of the three plays with which in 469 he had obtained a victory over the veteran Aeschylus, and it was a subject peculiarly gratifying to Athenian pride. The Greeks with instinctive wisdom saw in agriculture the foundation of law and civilisation; Demeter, the earth-mother, was to them Demeter Thesmophoros, Demeter the founder of ordinances, the protector of house and home, married life and society. All the Hellenes, therefore, owed a debt to Eleusis, and Pericles was not slow to remind them of their obligation.²

The scheme was supported by the Delphian god, who commanded the Athenians to bring thankofferings from their harvests to the goddesses at Eleusis—a request which was afterwards extended to all the Greeks. Such oracles could not, of course, be neglected, and a commission was issued to report on the best means of giving effect to them. This report and the proposals which followed the publication of it have been preserved in the following inscription³ :—

¹ Hicks, *Inscript. British Mus.* i. 2; *C. I. A.* i. 1; iv. l. 1; and iv. 3. 1. Kirchhoff puts the inscription before 456. For the temple, see Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, Eleusis; Duncker, *G. A.* ix. 254; Busolt, *G. A.* iii. l. 473. *Soph. Ant.* 1120.

² Cp. Isocrates, *Panegyrr.* § 29 f.; Dionys. Halicarn. i. 12.

³ For the oracles, see Isocr. *l.c.*; Aristides, i. 167, *Schol.* 3. 65.

"The Athenians are to make offerings of their fruits to the two goddesses as their fathers have done, and as the response from Delphi commands: not less than one-sixth of a bushel from every hundred bushels of barley; and not less than half a sixth from every hundred bushels of wheat—and this proportion is to be kept throughout, whatever the yearly produce may be, whether less or more. These offerings the demarchs must collect in the demes, and deposit them with the ministers at Eleusis. Three pits must be built at Eleusis in the manner of our fathers, wherever the ministers and the architect think fit, out of the funds belonging to the goddesses; and in these pits the corn received from the demarchs is to be placed. The allies must also bring offerings in the same manner, and the cities must choose collectors of the corn in whatever manner will, in their opinion, help the collection of it; and when collected they must send it to Athens, and those who bring it must deposit it with the ministers at Eleusis. . . . The Council must elect heralds and send them to the cities to announce the resolutions. . . . At these mysteries the Hierophant and the Torchbearer must call on the Hellenes to make offerings of their fruits as their fathers have done, and as the oracle from Delphi commands. . . . With all the rest of the cities of Greece the Council must communicate as it finds opportunity, telling them how the Athenians and their allies are making offerings of their fruits, and inviting them to bring offerings in the manner of their fathers, and according to the oracle from Delphi—but inviting only and not commanding. The contributions from these cities, if any are brought, are to be collected by the minister in the same manner as the rest."¹

This report was adopted on the motion of Lampon, and written on two stone pillars, of which one was placed in the temple at Eleusis, the other at Athens in the acropolis.²

To what extent the Greeks who were not allies of Athens responded to this invitation we cannot say. In the next century Isocrates asserts that the majority of the cities of Greece sent yearly to Athens some memorial of the benefits received in ancient days by the gift of agriculture; those

¹ The remainder of the inscription refers to the use which is to be made of the offerings.

² Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 13. The date is after 446 (? 439).

cities which neglected to do so were often commanded by the oracle at Delphi to send fruits as their fathers had done in old days. Yet Eleusis seems to have suffered much in the Peloponnesian war, for it lay on the high road of invasion, and the invaders were not debarred by any sense of piety or obligation from laying waste the harvests from which the resources of the temple were drawn. For the eight or nine years during which Agis was encamped at Decelea (413-404) the procession from Athens to Eleusis, which was a conspicuous part of the celebration of the mysteries, was entirely suspended, with the exception of one year, when it was conducted under the protection of an armed force. We may conclude, therefore, that the sacred associations which the Athenians connected with Eleusis were but slightly felt by the rest of the Greeks, and the attempt to create in Attica a holy place, which might rank with Olympia and Delphi, met with little success.

B.—THE SAMIAN REVOLT: ATHENS AND THE EAST.

15. In the midst of his schemes for consolidating the power of Athens, and raising the city to a higher position, Pericles found himself engaged in a conflict which threatened the existence of the Athenian empire.

During the years which followed the expulsion of the Persians from Samos, an oligarchical government was in power, but their rule was not acceptable to all the Samians; there was a strong democratical party in the state, who were only waiting for a favourable opportunity to overthrow the government with the help of the democracy of Athens. Such an opportunity came in the spring of 440. In the sixth year of the peace, Thucydides tells us, the Samians and Milesians went to war about Priene, and the Milesians were defeated. The cities were not on good terms; they were rivals in trade, and such near neighbours that each seemed to

Eleusis never became a sacred place for all the Greeks.

Internal factions at Samos.

Quarrel with Miletus.

prosper at the expense of the other. What gave rise to the quarrel about Priene, or what object each city had in view, is not recorded; we do not even know which of the two was the aggressor in the contest. Priene, though a comparatively unimportant city, was charged with the maintenance of the Panionian festival, which was held on the northern slopes of Mycale, and it is possible that Samos wished to attain this privilege for herself. Or the Samians may have sought to plant a firmer foot on the mainland, and in fact they had already gone to war with Priene for the possession of some towns in the neighbourhood. Whatever the cause, it is surprising to find two cities of the Delian League going to war about a third, without consulting the wishes of the imperial city; and as Samos still retained her independence, while Miletus was a subject city, we must suppose that Samos was the aggressor. Her action threatened the liberty of Priene, which Miletus strove to protect.¹

The Milesians repaired to Athens, where their complaints were listened to with eagerness. The cities were on excellent terms, and we know of two Milesians at least who were members of the Periclean circle—Aspasia and Hippodamus. And with the Milesian envoys came a number of the Samian party, who wished to get rid of the oligarchical government in their city. Such The Milesians
apply to
Athens. overtures would be received with the greater readiness because the Athenians were not satisfied with the position of affairs in Samos and the neighbouring continent. Ever since the defeat of the Egyptian expedition Athenian power had been declining in the east, especially in Caria. Between 454 and 441 the Carian tribute, so far as it can be calculated from the lists, fell from about 75 talents to 53 talents; and the number of cities which paid it, from 60 or more to 43—"a certain proof how varying even before the Samian revolt

¹ In 450 Miletus was occupied by an Athenian garrison, and Athenian interests were represented by an ἐπίσκοπος. This may have been the case in 440 also.

was the dominion of the Athenians in a large part of the Carian district." ¹

The Athenians at once despatched forty ships to Samos, under the command of Pericles. What steps were taken with regard to Priene and the quarrel with Miletus we are not told; these were matters of little importance; in sending a fleet across the Aegean the Athenians had other objects in view than the settlement of a local dispute. The oligarchy at Samos was suppressed, and the obedience of the party was secured by a hundred hostages, fifty men and fifty boys, who were placed in Lemnos; a democratical form of government was established and protected by a garrison of Athenian soldiers; after which the fleet returned to Athens. ²

Samos was not inclined to submit. She could not forget that she had once ruled the eastern Aegean, and that her fleet was still a great power; her walls were strong, and help might be expected from Persia. Of the deposed oligarchs, some had sought refuge on the continent, others remained in the city. The fugitives communicated with their friends in the island, and with Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis. Collecting a body of 700 mercenaries, they crossed over to Samos in the night, and attacked the demos, most of whom fell into their power. They also captured the Athenian garrison and

¹ Busolt, *Philol.* xli. 683, who enumerates twelve cities which paid for the last time in 447-445. Diodorus, xii. 27, goes so far as to say of the Samians: ὁπάντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ταῖς ἐννοίαις διαφέροντας πρὸς Μιλησίους, i.e. the Athenians preferred the subject to the independent city. That they watched Samos seems implied by the words of Aristoph. *Vesp.* 282, λέγων ὡς φιλαθηναῖος ἦν καὶ τὰν Σάμω πρῶτος κατεῖποι. The subsequent action of the Samian oligarchs justified the Athenian suspicions.

² Thuc. i. 115; Plut. *Per.* 25; Diod. xii. 27. Plutarch asserts that the Athenians before resorting to force called on the Samians to submit to arbitration, which they refused. Thucydides does not mention Pericles in connection with this first visit of the Athenians to Samos, but Diodorus and Plutarch agree that he was in command. Diodorus further speaks of a fine of 80 talents which was imposed on the Samians. Plutarch, 25, adds some gossiping details.

officers, and recovered the hostages from Lemnos. Their fetters thus broken, they openly renounced their allegiance to Athens.

Athens now found herself face to face with the revolt of a powerful ally. The danger was great; greater even than at the revolt of Euboea. The war with Persia might break out again, and Athens might be alone in the contest: Sparta certainly would not join her, and who could tell whether the allies would remain faithful? Samos was doing her utmost to strengthen her position; the Athenian captives were placed as hostages in the hands of Pissuthnes; the aid of the Peloponnesians was invoked. To cut off any assistance from Miletus, an expedition was sent against that city; if they could defeat the Milesians or capture Miletus before the arrival of the Athenians, such a signal success might induce all the cities of Asia Minor to join in the revolt. Byzantium had come in already, and much might be hoped from the cities of Caria.¹

the contest: Sparta certainly would not join her, and who could tell whether the allies would remain faithful? Samos was doing her utmost to strengthen her position; the Athenian captives were placed as hostages in the hands of Pissuthnes; the aid of the Peloponnesians was invoked. To cut off any assistance from Miletus, an expedition was sent against that city; if they could defeat the Milesians or capture Miletus before the arrival of the Athenians, such a signal success might induce all the cities of Asia Minor to join in the revolt. Byzantium had come in already, and much might be hoped from the cities of Caria.¹

16. The whole policy of Pericles was at stake; if the revolt was not suppressed, the Athenian empire was at an end. Sixty ships at once left Athens for Samos, and all the generals of the year, with Pericles at their head, were in command.² Part of the fleet was sent towards Caria to watch for the Phoenician ships, which were reported to be coming up from the south, part to bring reinforcements from Lesbos and Chios—which would also serve as hostages for the fidelity of those islands. With the remaining vessels (forty-four in number) Pericles attacked the Samians, who hurried home from Miletus, off the island of

were reported to be coming up from the south, part to bring reinforcements from Lesbos and Chios—which would also serve as hostages for the fidelity of those islands. With the remaining vessels (forty-four in number) Pericles attacked the Samians, who hurried home from Miletus, off the island of

¹ Thuc. i. 115, 116; Plut. *Per.* 25, who says that Pissuthnes stole away the hostages. For the appeal to the Peloponnesians, ep. Thuc. i. 41.

² Thuc. i. 116: Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγούντος. Eight of the ten generals of the year were Socrates, Sophocles (the poet), Andocides (grandfather of the orator), Creon, Pericles, Glaucon, Callistratus, Xenophon; see Androt. in Müller, *F. H. G.* iv. 645. The ships were sent out before July 440, for afterwards we have a new set of generals, who would come into office in that month.

Tragia, to the south of Samos. The Samian fleet was the more numerous, but after a severe engagement the Athenians defeated it and gained possession of the harbour.¹

The Samians at once sent to summon the Phoenician fleet to their aid. Meanwhile Pericles was reinforced by twenty-five ships from Chios and Lesbos, perhaps under the command of the poet Sophocles,² and by forty from Athens, with which he was able to land on Samos, and drive the Samians into their walls. He now built three forts, and blockaded the city strictly by land and sea.³ The ships which had been sent towards Caria returned with the news that the Phoenician fleet was approaching. Pericles sailed to intercept it with sixty ships, for it was better to call off half his forces from the blockade than to engage with the Phoenicians off Samos, where the Samians would be at hand to take part in the battle. The alarm was false; the Phoenician fleet did not appear, but in the absence of Pericles, the Samians were able to break through the blockade, and for a fortnight they were masters of the sea—a respite which they used to carry into the city whatever provisions they required. Then Pericles returned. The Samians attempted to cut him off from the island, but in vain; they were defeated, and the city was once more closely invested by land and sea.⁴

It was now July 440, and the generals for the year

¹ Thuc. i. 116; Diod. xii. 27; Plut. *Per.* 26, ἀμα δὲ τῇ νίκῃ καὶ τῇ διώξει τοῦ λιμένος κρατήσας. For the situation of the island of Tragia or Tragaeae (Strabo, 635), see Pflugk-Hartung, *Perikles als Feldherr*, Excursus.

² See Ion, *Frag.* 1; Athen. xiii. 603.

³ If we count the sixteen ships which had been sent to Caria, etc., Pericles had now 60+40+25, i.e. 125 vessels at command, or, without these, 109.

⁴ Thuc. i. 117; Diod. xii. 28. Why the Phoenician fleet did not appear we do not know. We may suppose: (1) that the news of its coming was but a ruse to call off Pericles from Samos; (2) that it remained off the Carian coast, encouraging the cities on the mainland to revolt, but leaving Samos to her fate. It is not mentioned again in our authorities.

came into office. Pericles, being re-elected, remained with the fleet, but the rest of the commanders at Samos were replaced by new officers, who brought out large reinforcements. Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio sailed with forty ships, and were quickly followed by Anticles and Tlepolemus with twenty. Chios and Lesbos also added thirty triremes to those already sent. The total amount of the Athenian fleet was more than two hundred ships. It was apparently an overwhelming force, yet the Samians defied it. Samos at length capitulates. Their walls were strong; their city well supplied with provisions; they might still hope that assistance would come from Persia or Peloponnesus. So they held out, month after month. The Persians failed to seize the opportunity; the Peloponnesians decided, on the motion of the Corinthians, that they would not interfere; every city must be allowed to punish her own revolted allies. Nine months had passed, and the supplies in Samos were exhausted, when the city agreed to capitulate. The terms were severe; all the triremes of Samos were to be given up to Athens; the walls of the city were to be thrown down; the cost of the war was to be defrayed by the Samians; and hostages placed with the Athenians as sureties for good behaviour. The oligarchs, to whom the revolt was due, were expelled from the city—we find them afterwards at Anaea on the mainland—and a democracy was established¹ (439).

¹ Diodorus, xii. 28, says explicitly, *τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταστήσας*, but Thucydides does not mention this change; it is, however, unlikely that the Athenians should have left the oligarchs in power, and we know that the extreme oligarchs were established at Anaea in the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. iii. 19, 32; iv. 75). Fränkel, *De Condicione*, etc., p. 27, contends that a democracy was not established, and of course we find an oligarchy at Samos in 412. See also Holm, *Hist. Greece*, ii. 192, E. T.; and, on the other side, Duncker, *G. A.* ix. 212; Busolt, *G. G.* iii. 1. 553. Ephorus states that Pericles was assisted in his attack by the siege-engines devised for him by Artemon of Clazomenae, this siege being in fact the first in which "rams" and "tortoises" were brought into use. By their help the walls were broken through and the city taken. But as Artemon appears to have been a con-

The cost of the war had been enormous. For eight full months after the second investment of the city, more than two hundred triremes had been engaged at Samos. So far as we can judge from a mutilated inscription, 1276 talents were paid out of the accumulated treasure of Athens for the war, and the total cost is put at 1400 talents. An indemnity of even half this amount would be a crushing burden on the island for many years.¹

17. The first visit of the Athenians to Samos probably came as a surprise on the oligarchs; and to this cause we may attribute the ease with which the democratical revolution was carried out. Deceived by their success, the Athenians allowed many of the oligarchs to remain in the city, the hostages were placed in hands which could not protect them, and an insufficient garrison was left behind. Pericles altogether mistook the situation, and his work was undone as quickly as he had done it. The news of the revolt showed him the true nature of the forces opposed to him, and the measures which he took were rapid and clear-sighted. The attempts to cut off the Samians on their return from Miletus, and to intercept the Phœnician fleet, were strokes of sound strategy. Yet we must allow that he was highly favoured by fortune. Had

temporary of Anacreon, who resided at Samos in the days of Polycrates, and as the city was not taken by storm but compelled to capitulate by famine, the statement of Ephorus is probably erroneous. The siege of Plataea is the first occasion on which "rams" are mentioned; and the "tortoise" was not known till after the Peloponnesian war. Diod. xii. 28; Plut. *Per.* 27; see Droysen, *Die Griech. Kriegsalterthümer*, p. 208.

¹ Thuc. i. 117; cp. *C. I. A.* i. 177. Diodorus, xii. 28, puts the indemnity at 200 talents, which is far too little; Nepos, *Timoth.* 1 at 1200; Isocrates, *Antid.* 111, at 1000 talents. We cannot fix the amount of the instalments by which the sum was paid; see Duncker, *G. A.* ix. 215, n. 3; Beloch, *Rhein. Mus.*, 1888; Busolt, *G. G.* iii. 1, 559, note. The Samians never appear in the Quota-lists, but Thucydides calls them tributaries, vii. 57. Hill, *Sources for Greek History*, p. 104 f.

the Persians taken up the cause of the Samians, as it was their interest to do; had the Chians and Lesbians joined in the revolt, or even refused to send ships to subjugate an ally; had the Corinthians been less short-sighted in their advice to the Peloponnesian confederacy, the issue of the war would probably have been different. It is interesting to know that the defence of Samos was conducted by a man whose name is remembered in another sphere. Melissus, who defeated Pericles, and defied his forces so long, Melissus. was a philosopher of the Eleatic School—who, like Parmenides and Zeno, pondered over the problem of the many and the one, striving to find beyond and behind the change of all visible things a reality which was always and everywhere the same.¹

With the fall of Samos, Byzantium also came in and resumed her place as a subject state of Athens.² But a number of Carian cities broke away from Athenian control at this time, and were never Effect of the
revolt of Samos
on the east. recovered. In 436 the Ionian and Carian districts, which had been divided in 442, were again united, but while forty-three Carian cities pay tribute in 440, the total of Carian and Ionian cities in 436 cannot have amounted to more than forty-six, of which not more than thirty were Carian. The rebellious towns were those which lay at some distance from the sea, in the neighbourhood of Mylasa, and in the valley of the Indus. There is also reason to suppose that the Rhodian cities, Lindus and Ialysus, refused their tribute at the time of the revolt; and in the Thracian district difficulties arose, which, though composed for the present, were a source of disquiet and eventually of disaster to Athens.³

¹ For Melissus, see Isocr. *Laud. Hel.* 3:—Μέλισσον, ὃς ἀπείρων τὸ πλῆθος πεφυκότων τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ παντός ἐπεχείρησεν ἀποδείξει εὐρίσκειν. Plut., *Per.* 26:—Μέλισσος ὁ Ἰθαγένης, ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος, στρατηγῶν τότε τῆς Σάμου.

² Byzantium paid tribute in 438.

³ Busolt, *Philol.* xli. 685; *G. G.* iii. 1. 554; *C. I. A.* i. 239, 244. For Thrace, *infra*, p. 41.

Pericles, on his return to Athens, was at the height of his reputation as a general. For the second time he had saved Athens at a dangerous crisis. Agamemnon, he said, had spent ten years in reducing Troy, but in ten months he had brought the greatest of Ionian cities to submission. When the last rites were paid to the dead who had fallen in their country's cause, he was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over them. He dwelt on the immortality of the illustrious dead; on the fair promise of the lives that were ended: "The loss of the young was as the loss of the spring-time of the year." But they had fallen in a noble cause, and their glory was great. When he descended from the tribune, widows and orphans crowded round him with flowers and garlands; but Elpinice, the now aged sister of Cimon, turned away, saying bitterly, "Why these flowers and crowns? Not in war against Medes and Phoenicians, as my brother, but in conflict against a friendly and allied state, has Pericles led our citizens to death."¹

The long resistance which Samos had offered to the whole force of Athens, the great danger into which that resistance had brought the empire, were lessons not to be forgotten. The resistance was chiefly due to the fortifications of the city, which defied the skill and bravery of the besiegers. Similar difficulties had been experienced in the reduction of Thasos and Aegina, and so long as the allied cities retained their walls, Athens would find it necessary, in case of revolt, to employ her ships and men in the slow process of reducing them by famine. She resolved to prevent this evil, and, by a single stroke of tyrannical power, to bring the cities, or at least those of Ionia and the adjacent islands, to her feet. She decreed the destruction of their walls, and

Athens insists
on the destruc-
tion of the walls
of the allies.

¹ Plut. *Per.* 28; Pericles retorted with a quotation from Archilochus (οὐκ ἂν μύροισι γρᾶς εἶναι ἡλείφεο), which gives us a poor idea of the manners of himself and his time. Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 7. 34; iii. 10. 7.

the decree was executed. The precise date is unknown, but about the fact there is no question. At the beginning of the fifth century the Ionic cities were protected by walls; at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war "Ionia is unfortified."¹ The change can only have been carried out at the command of the Athenians, for the allies were not likely to destroy their own walls, and there was no other power which could compel them to do it. This was the last and greatest step in the tyrant's progress, by which Athens made herself undisputed mistress of the subject cities.²

C.—ATHENS AND THE NORTH. THE FOUNDING OF AMPHIPOLIS.

18. At the time when Athens was engaged in conflict with Samos, her allies in the Thracian district of the League were a cause of some anxiety, and she found it necessary to make considerable changes, both in the amount of tribute paid by the cities, and in the manner of payment. But in order to explain the position of affairs in the north, we must go back in the narrative and review the changes which had taken place in Macedonia and Thrace since the Persian wars.

When the Persian attempt to subdue Greece was finally wrecked at Plataea, Alexander of Macedon, who succeeded his father Amyntas in 498, was once more an independent prince, and he sought to turn to his own advantage the mischief which the Persian invasion had wrought. It was far easier to consolidate his power when such a wave of desolation had rolled over the country. Herodotus tells us how the king of the Bisaltians and Crestonice retired before the Persians into Mount Rhodope, strictly forbidding his six

Alexander's conquests after 480; his relation to Athens.

¹ ἀτειχίστου οὐσης τῆς Ἰωνίας, Thuc. iii. 33, and the same is said in detail of a number of cities.

² In the case of Samos and Thasos we know that the Athenians caused the walls to be destroyed. Cp. also the demand made on Potidaea, *infra*, p. 82. The Chians were forbidden to rebuild these walls; Thuc. iv. 51.

sons to follow Xerxes. They disregarded his wishes, and, joining the king, they were fortunate enough to return home in safety, but the savage father put out the eyes of every one of them in punishment of their disobedience. After this it is not surprising that the Macedonian monarch was able to annex the Crestonaeans and Bisaltians, conquests which brought him to the right bank of the Strymon, and put him in possession of those mines near Lake Prasias, from which he received a talent of silver a day.¹ Alexander was more than a successful conqueror at the head of a barbarian host. He claimed to be descended from Greek ancestors, from the Heraclids of Argos (vol. i. p. 312), and as a Greek he was allowed to compete in the Olympian games. In the Persian war he showed himself a warm friend of Athens—whenever he could do so with safety. It was he who warned the Greeks to retire from Tempe, and leave a post where they must be trampled underfoot by the myriads of the enemy; who advised the Athenians to save themselves by accepting the terms of Mardonius; who at Plataea encouraged the Greeks to persevere in resistance, and informed them of the Persian plans. For these services he received the title of “proxenus,” and “benefactor” of Athens.² Afterwards his relations with the city were less cordial. The formation of the Delian League was a fatal blow to his hopes of annexing the Greek cities of the coast, for, though he succeeded in acquiring Therma and Pydna, Methone and the cities of Chalcidice were saved from his clutches. The conquest of Eion and the attempts to colonise Amphipolis and the neighbouring region brought Athens and Macedon into so close a rivalry that a collision of interests was inevitable.

¹ Herod. viii. 116; v. 17. For Bisaltia see Herod. vii. 115, and for the Crestonaeans who lay on the sources of the Echidorus, vii. 124, 127.

² Herod. vii. 173; viii. 136; ix. 44 ff. For the title cp. Xen. *Hell.* vi. 1. 4, where Polydamas of Pharsalus, in speaking to the Lacedaemonians, says: *πρόξενος ὑμῶν ὢν καὶ εὐεργέτης ἐκ πάντων ὢν μνημέθα προγόνων*. It often occurs in inscriptions. See Dittenb. *Syll.* 33.

If he did not aid in the destruction of the Athenians at Drabescus (464) Alexander made no effort to save them, and on their part the Athenians expected Cimon to crown his victory over Thasos by acquiring a portion of Macedonia.¹ From 464 onwards the Athenians and their "benefactor" must have regarded each other with suspicion; on the one hand Alexander might tamper with the allies of Athens; on the other it was certain that Athens intended to plant a foot on the lower Strymon, and control the passage from Macedonia into Thrace.

19. Alexander died in 454, leaving four sons—Perdiccas, Philip, Menelaus, and Alcetas. Which of the four was the eldest is uncertain, and we do not know what partition of his kingdom Alexander made among them, if indeed he made any.² When we begin to see our way clearly, we find a triple division of the Macedonian dominions. Derdas, the nephew of Alexander, is sovereign of the Elimiotæ; the land east of the Axios, adjacent to the Strymon and the Greek cities of Chalcidice, is governed by Philip; and Perdiccas is ruler of Macedonia in the narrower sense, of the territory between the Haliacmon and the Axios.²

Death of
Alexander:
partition of
his kingdom.

¹ Plut. *Cim.* 14.

² In a matter so obscure we must expect a difference of opinion. Abel, *Makedonien*, p. 166, confesses that his account is merely conjectural, and Duncker, *G. A.* ix. 225, note, is not convincing. The dates given for the reign of Perdiccas vary from 23 to 41 years; and Abel considers that this is best explained by supposing that in one calculation the whole period from the death of Alexander to the death of Perdiccas is reckoned; in the other, the time during which Perdiccas was actually king of the whole country. Perdiccas died in 413; but $413 + 41 = 454$, the date of the death of Alexander; and $413 + 23 = 436$, a probable date for the expulsion of Philip by Perdiccas. Theopompus puts the reign of Perdiccas at 35 years, i.e. it began in $413 + 35 = 448$, which may have been the date of a division of the kingdom between Philip and Perdiccas. But what happened in 454-448? Abel thinks that in this period Alcetas may have been king of all Macedonia, for in Plato, *Gorg.* 471 A, Perdiccas is said to have taken the kingdom from Alcetas. By promising him a share in the kingdom, Perdiccas induced Philip to join him in deposing Alcetas, and having obtained his object, set about depriving Philip

By this division of the Macedonian monarchy the position of affairs was greatly altered. For the moment the Macedonian power was paralysed; the Greek cities had nothing to fear from their neighbour. If Philip attempted to extend his borders, the aid of Perdiccas could be invoked against him. On the other hand, the Greeks, freed from the fear of attack by Macedon, were less subservient to the Athenians, and their position became more independent.

The situation was complicated by the growth of the Odrysian empire in Thrace. The Thracians, no less than the Macedonians, had regained their liberty on the retreat of the Persians, and in Thrace, as in Macedonia, the invasion made it easier for an ambitious prince to extend his power. Teres, the king of the Odrysians, who lay in the valley of the Artiscus, seized the opportunity. He began with subjugating the Thracian tribes as far as the Haemus, from which, by the conquest of the Getae, he pushed his borders to the right bank of the Danube. Beyond the river lay the vast territory of the Scythians, which extended to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, the mouth of the Sea of Azov. Teres secured himself from attack in this direction by marrying his daughter to Ariapithes, the king of Scythia, and, recrossing the Haemus, advanced his kingdom towards the east, till he almost touched the gates of Byzantium.¹ At the death of Teres in 440 this great empire seems to have been divided between his two sons, Sitalces and Sparadocus, and though Sitalces in a short time united the whole power in his own hands, there was a period during which Thrace, no less than Macedon, was distracted by the claims of rival monarchs.

of his share, in which he was at length successful. Duncker thinks that Alexander divided his kingdom between two of his sons, Perdiccas and Philip, but cannot give any reason why the others were passed over. Alcetas and Menelaus are mentioned in *C. I. A. i.* 42, 43 as sons of Alexander. Abel, however, regards Amyntas as the fourth son, but only on the authority of Syncellus (p. 262).

¹ See Thuc. ii. 29, 96, 97; *infra*, p. 148.

20. Thus the cities of Chalcidice and Thrace were relieved from any danger on the side of the tribes of the interior, at the very time when Athens was engaged in suppressing the revolt of Samos. A spirit of rebellion arose among them. Byzantium, as we know, joined Samos (though she does not seem to have taken any active part in assisting her); and from an examination of the Quota-lists of 440-436 it appears that a number of cities in the Thracian district refused to pay tribute in those years.¹ Athens endeavoured to meet the resistance by various changes. From the year 437 onwards we find in the lists a number of cities which, with one or two exceptions, appear there for the first time, ranged separately as cities "which tax themselves," and "which private citizens have enrolled to pay tribute"; and of the twenty-four cities in these lists, seventeen are situated in the Thracian district. The inference has been drawn from this, and with probability, that a number of small towns which had hitherto paid as tributaries to larger cities, such as Aenus, Potidaea, and others, were now detached, and not only allowed to pay tribute independently, but to fix their own tribute in the one case, or, in the other, to be enrolled at the wish of some of their citizens in the Athenian empire.²

What was far more important than these changes and

¹ The number of cities which paid tribute in 454-442 is about 45; but in 441 we have spaces for 35 only, and in 440 for 37 only. In 438 the cities of Aenus, Argilus, Galepsus, Scapsa, and Stelus do not appear; in 436 eight cities are missing. Between the years 439-436 the tribute was raised at Spartolus, Potidaea, Scabala, Mecyperna, Sane, Mende, Scione, Aegae, Aphytis, cities lying close together on the west coast of Chalcidice, and in Pallene.

² See Busolt, *Philol.* xli. 667, etc.; *C. I. A.* i. 239-244. The new headings in 437 are: (1) *Πόλεις αὐταὶ ταξάμεναι*, (2) *πόλεις ἃς οἱ ἰδιῶται ἐνεγράψαντο φόρον φέρειν*. Busolt's explanation of these headings is conjectural, but it is probable. He also points out that some of the cities which were called upon to pay a higher tribute—Potidaea, Spartolus, Scione, Mende, Stelus—rebelled in 432, or subsequently joined Brasidas. Cp. vol. ii. Appendix iii. 9.

redistributions of tribute, Athens seized the opportunity of the disaffection among the Greek cities and the division in Macedonia to secure the prize for which she had so long striven. About three miles above its mouth the Strymon widens into a broad lake, the *Lacus Cercinitis*, which, along its whole length, effectually prevents communication between the two banks of the river. North-east of the lake stretches the valley of the Angites, through which runs a road, skirting Mount Pangaeus on the landward side; other roads also converge on the river at the point where it issues from the lake; and the bridge by which the Strymon is there crossed is the key of the communication by land between Thrace and Macedonia. The whole region abounded in timber, always a rare commodity in Greece; the plains of the Angites and the Strymon were fertile, and through them were brought the products of the interior. But what gave a peculiar value to the district was the abundance of gold and silver which was procured from Mount Pangaeus and other mines in the neighbourhood. From the produce of these mines the Thasians had derived their ample resources, and as we have seen, Alexander lived to receive a talent a day from his mines near Lake Prasias.¹

Athens had long been in possession of the mouth of the Strymon, and since 464 she had worked the mines of the Thasians on the mainland.² But all attempts to secure the territory between Lake Cercinītis and the sea, the valley of the Angites, and the inland slopes of Mount Pangaeus, had ended in failure. The story of Athenian hopes and disappointments has been preserved by the Scholiast on Aeschines,³ who enumerates nine disasters which had befallen the Athenians in this region; and there are few calamities in Athenian

¹ When Alexander conquered the Bisaltians he took over their coinage. See Head, *Hist. Num.* Introd. xlv., and pp. 178, 180.

² Thuc. i. 101.

³ Aesch. 2. 31.

history more disastrous than the slaughter of 10,000 colonists at Drabescus in 464 (vol. ii. p. 314).¹ In 464 Alexander and Teres were still alive, and their kingdoms were undivided; by 437 the situation was changed. Athens had also brought her struggle in the east to an end, though at the cost of resigning a number of Carian cities, and the action of the Greeks in Thrace made it clear that a strong centre was needed from which to control them. Philip of Macedon could not offer serious opposition from beyond the Strymon, owing to his relations with his brother Perdicas, who would readily join the Athenians against him; and the Odrysians were too much occupied with the contentions of their rival monarchs to render him assistance, even if they wished.

In 437 a new colony was sent out under Hagnon, the son of Nicias, who had held command in the war against Samos.² Of the constitution of the city nothing is recorded, beyond the statement that the colonists were partly Athenian citizens, and partly collected from the neighbouring towns.³ The new city was called Amphipolis, a name apparently derived from the situation. It lay on the slope of a hill, visible from the sea, on the left bank of the river, which is diverted from its course so as to circle round three sides of the hill. Where the river ran no fortifications were needed, but a wall was built from bank to bank across the slope. At some distance from the city lay the bridge over the Strymon.⁴

Founding of
Amphipolis in
437.

¹ The region was known as Phyllis, a name derived in legend from Phyllis, the wife of Demophon, the son of Theseus, with whom, it was believed, the country came as a dower to her husband. Phyllis is said to have visited the Strymon nine times, hence the name "Nine Ways," to meet her lover, who failed to come, and in her anger she pronounced upon the Athenians the curse that they should suffer disaster nine times in that region.

² Diodorus, xii. 32, who gives the date 435, but cp. Thuc. iv. 102.

³ Thuc. iv. 106; Diod. l.c.

⁴ For Hagnon, whose father was Nicias of Steiria, not to be confounded with Nicias, the statesman and general, see Thuc. v. 11. The district is described in Leake, *Northern Greece*, iii. 181 ff. It

21. With a view of securing their position, the Athenians entered into an alliance with Perdiccas, from whom they had Athens and for the time nothing to fear,¹ but in a few years Macedon. Perdiccas succeeded in expelling Philip and uniting Macedonia; the territory east of the Axios, as far as the Strymon, was added to his own dominions, and he became the neighbour of Athens on the Strymon, at hand to help the Chalcidian cities! His brother was driven to seek refuge with Derdas the prince of the Elimiotae.

In Thrace also the kingdom of the Odrysians was by this time united in the hands of Sitalces. The king of Scythia, Ariapithes, had been treacherously murdered by Spargapithes, king of the Agathyrsi,² probably in the attempt to annex, by force or by fraud, the territory of his neighbour towards the Danube. He left three sons: Oricus, by his native wife Opaea; Octamasades, by the daughter of Teres; and Scyles, by a Greek woman of Istros. Scyles succeeded his father, and with the throne he also received his father's Scythian wife. He was half a Greek by birth, and this natural bent had been strengthened by education. From his mother he learned the Greek language and letters, thus imbibing a love of Greek manners and life which proved his ruin. When he ascended the throne, he found the barbarous Scythian customs intolerable; his Scythian wife was odious to him; and whenever he could, he stole away to indulge his Hellenic inclinations. As often as he visited Olbia, the Milesian colony on the Borysthenes, he left his Scythian retinue in the suburbs, and entered the city, attended by

Scyles, King of Scythia: his love of Greek civilisation.

seems to be doubtful whether the bridge lay above or below the wall which Hagnon built; that it did not lie within it, is clear from Thucydides, iv. 103. Leake, *l.c.* p. 196, considers that the ancient bridge was probably in the same situation as the modern one, *i.e.* just below the lake, and above the city, but Grote places it below, vol. iv. p. 547. The present bridge is 300 yards long. For the device by which Hagnon was supposed to have driven away the Edonians, see Polyæn. *Strateg.* vi. 53.

¹ Thuc. i. 57 says of Perdiccas: *σύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος*.

² Herod. iv. 78.

his Greek bodyguard only. The gates were then closed and securely kept that no native Scythian might watch the conduct of his king. Scyles laid aside his Scythian dress, and, clad in Hellenic garments, mixed with Hellenes in the market-place, living a Hellenic life among Hellenes, and sacrificing to Hellenic gods. These habits he would indulge for a month at a time, after which, resuming the native dress, he left the city. He even built himself a magnificent palace in Olbia, surrounded with sphinxes and griffins of white marble, and brought home an Olbian Greek as his wife. In time this modest indulgence failed to satisfy him; he insisted on initiation in the orgiastic mysteries of Dionysus. His palace was struck by lightning and burned to the ground, but the evil omen was sent in vain: Scyles was not to be diverted from his purpose. He joined the sacred procession, and hurried round the city in the Bacchic rout. As these orgies were a common subject of reproach on the part of the Scythians against the Greeks, a citizen of Olbia revenged himself by taunting the Scythians with the conduct of their king, and finding them incredulous, he led them to a tower whence they could see the procession. They reported what they had seen to the Scythians in the suburbs of the city, and no sooner had Scyles returned to his kingdom than a rebellion broke out, by which Octamasades, his half-brother, was raised to the throne. Scyles sought refuge at the court of Sitalces.¹ Meanwhile, Sitalces had succeeded in expelling his brother Sparadocus from his kingdom, and Sparadocus had taken refuge in Scythia with his nephew Octamasades. When Octamasades marched to the Danube with the intention of invading Thrace, and recovering Scyles by force of arms, he was met by Sitalces with the proposal that the fugitives should be exchanged; he would surrender Scyles

Scyles is initiated in the Dionysiac rites.

He is deposed, and seeks refuge with Sitalces,

who surrenders him in exchange for Sparadocus.

¹ Herod. iv. 78-80.

on condition that Octamasades gave up Sparadocus. The proposal was accepted. What treatment Sparadocus met with we do not know, but his son Seuthes lived at the court of Sitalces, and succeeded to the Odrysian throne. Scyles was at once put to death.¹

Sitalces was now without a rival—the undisputed master of an empire second only to that of the Scythians. On the sea coast his dominions reached from Abdera to the Danube, and towards the interior, from Byzantium to the source of the Strymon.² In this region were included not only the rude barbarians of Thrace, but the Hellenic cities on the western shore of the Euxine, and tribute was exacted from both by the Odrysian king. The amount paid to Sitalces is not recorded, but in the reign of his nephew and successor Seuthes, who raised it to the highest sum ever reached, it amounted to 400 talents (£80,000). This was by no means the whole of the king's revenue; at least as much more was derived from the presents made to him in gold and silver, in addition to which he received gifts of furniture and "smooth" and brodered cloth. Similar gifts, though of less value, were made to the powerful princes who stood next in rank to the king, for in Thrace it was more honourable to receive than to give, and one who refused to grant a request incurred greater disgrace than one who failed to obtain what he desired. Nothing indeed could be done without a liberal outlay in presents.

These changes in Thrace and Macedonia brought about a change in the policy of Athens. She had nothing to fear from Philip, who was no longer her neighbour at Amphipolis, but a fugitive in Elimia, beyond Macedonia. It was from Perdiccas and Sitalces that danger was to be appre-

¹ Herod. l.c.; Thuc. ii. 101; iv. 101. Herodotus does not mention Sparadocus, but we never hear of any other brother of Sitalces.

² Thuc. ii. 97. Measured in Kiepert's map of the Turkish empire the distance from Abdera to the Danube is a little less than 400 miles; and from the Strymon to Byzantium, a little less than 350 miles.

hended. Perdiccas was not likely to regard the founding of Amphipolis with satisfaction, and the Odrysians would look with suspicion on the advance of the Athenians beyond the Strymon, or into the interior. If Macedonia and Thrace were to combine, the position of Athens in Chalcidice would be shaken. From the sea she might retain her hold on those cities which lay upon the coast, but those which lay inland could rely on the protection of their neighbours. Athens then must weaken Macedonia, if possible; above all she must prevent Thrace and Macedonia from entering into combination. With the first object in view she resolved to support the claims of Philip, and aid him in recovering his kingdom; with the second to form an alliance with the Odrysians. It was easy enough to break with Perdiccas and give a "moral support" to Philip, but to win the Odrysians was a more difficult task. At this time, *i.e.* about 435, Sitalkes was under the influence of Nymphodorus, a Greek of Abdera, whose sister he had married, and unfortunately for Athens, Nymphodorus was far from friendly to the city. For the moment nothing could be done, but in a few years, by personal attentions to Nymphodorus, and perhaps by remission of tribute to Abdera, Athens was able to overcome this hostile feeling, and secure the Odrysian alliance. But her position in the north continued to be a cause of grave anxiety. Perdiccas was an enemy—if for the time a concealed one—the Odrysians were uncertain, and the Greek cities were far from contented.¹

Policy of Athens
towards Macedonia
and Thrace.

22. About the time that she sent out the colony to Amphipolis, Athens found an opportunity of extending her influence in Western Greece. On the shore of the bay of Ambracia lay the city of Amphilocheian Argos, so called from the founder, Amphilocheus of Argos, who, according to a tradition preserved by Thucydides, founded the city on his

The Athenians
in Western
Greece :
Amphilocheian
Argos.

¹ Thuc. ii. 29; *infra*, p. 123.

return from Troy. It was the most important city of that region. At a date which we cannot fix, the Amphilochians, being in great distress, invited the inhabitants of the neighbouring town of Ambracia to join in the settlement. The Ambraciots came, and after a time, finding themselves superior in power, they drove out the Argives and took possession of the city. The Argives sought the protection of the Acarnanians, with whom they appealed to the Athenians. Athens responded by sending out a fleet of thirty ships under the command of Phormio, who had recently served as a general in the war against Samos. Argos was taken by storm, and the Argives and Acarnanians were established together in the city. This was the beginning of the alliance between Athens and Acarnania, which we find subsisting at the time of the Peloponnesian war.¹

Unfortunately for Athens, the attempts which she made to extend and strengthen her power in the north and west brought her into closer proximity with the most enterprising of the cities of Peloponnesus—with Corinth, whose deadly hatred had already been once roused by the conduct of Athens towards Megara in 460. The animosity had slumbered in the meantime, and in the Samian war Corinth with a short-sighted policy had prevented Sparta from sending help to the rebels, but the sleep was light and could be broken by a touch. Interference with the west, where her trade chiefly lay, or in the north at Potidaea, could not fail to excite her suspicions, and it was in these regions that the quarrels began which led to the Peloponnesian war.

¹ Thuc. ii. 68.

CHAPTER II.

ATHENS IN 445-432.

I. The peace of 445 had divided Greece into two halves, and the failure of the schemes of Pericles had made it clear that this division could not be healed by sentimental appeals to the feelings of the Greeks. Neither as the leader in the conflict with the barbarian, nor as a source of culture and civilisation was Athens to receive the homage of the Greeks. If she were resolved to be the foremost city of Greece, she could only gain that position by another conflict; and if she was to be victorious in another conflict, she must consolidate her power, and put an end to political strife at home. The forces of the empire must be the forces of the city and within her absolute control; there must not be a Laconian party to limit and weaken her action. Athens must follow a line of policy which would promote unity in the city, and that policy must carry with it opposition to Sparta. This was as much as to say that Athens must be more democratical than she had ever been. It was the aristocratical party who clung to old traditions and saw in Sparta the leader of the Hellenes; so long as this party, or anything like it, had influence in Athens, the city would not be unanimous in support of Pericles. The party must be rendered powerless. By the ostracism of Thucydides it had been deprived of its leader, but more was needed than merely to cut off the tallest heads; the citizens must be made to feel that the new order was in every way as good as the old. Cimon had been rich and successful; he had brought back large spoils from his victories; much had been spent on public buildings, and his

Position of
Athens in
Greece.

own personal expenditure was lavish. Pericles was not inclined to a profuse outlay of his own means; if he gave money away, he did it in a manner more useful than ostentatious. Yet money must be spent if the people were to be brought over to his side. So long as the war with Persia lasted, the soldiers and sailors of Athens had found employment, and received good pay, but when, on the advice of Pericles, the war was dropped, this source of income was dried up, and unless others were opened, the discontent at Athens would be great. The authority of Pericles would be shaken and his policy condemned.

2. At this crisis he was urged by his friend Damon, the celebrated musician, and as some thought the equally celebrated "sophist" of the time, "to give the people what was their own," or, in other words, to spend the contributions of the allies in paying the Athenians—not for military service, as had been done on foreign expeditions—but for political service rendered at home.¹ This advice Pericles followed; he boldly converted the revenues of the Delian League to domestic purposes; and thus supplied with funds, he was not only able to recompense many services, which previously had been rendered gratuitously (vol. ii. pp. 398-409); but even to create occasions for employing the people. He adorned Athens and Attica with the great buildings which have won the admiration of the world; he also arranged to keep sixty ships at sea for some months every year, thus improving the seamanship of the Athenians at the same time that he provided pay for the sailors. Nor was this all. Plutarch vaguely observes that Pericles bribed the people by giving them money for festivals and service in the courts, and by payments of various kinds, thus inducing them to support his attacks on the Areopagus.² On this evidence it is commonly asserted that Pericles introduced the payment of festival money, and it is not improbable that he did.

¹ *Ath. Pol.* c. 27 (Damonides).

² *Plut. Per.* 9.

so; it was part of his policy to make the public festivals a sort of education to the Athenian citizens, and he would certainly wish to remove any hindrance which prevented them from enjoying to the full what he was at so much pains to provide.¹

By all who were opposed to Pericles and his policy such measures as these could only be regarded as a shameless bribing of the people with funds which were supplied for quite different purposes. The view is certainly tenable, but we must also allow that Pericles, if he bribed the people, had ulterior views in doing so. When he paid the jurors to attend the law-courts, he also made the law-courts an instrument by which he could govern the subject allies. Their lawsuits were brought to Athens to be settled by Athenian juries, who by this means came to have a direct interest in tightening the grasp of Athens on her empire, and securing the revenues from which they were themselves paid. The payment of the jurors had also another effect, which helped Pericles to maintain his position. It brought to the city all those who preferred the juror's fee to wages for other work; the old, the inactive, the idle flocked to Athens from the country demes, and from their numbers and their irresponsible powers they became of importance. In the law-courts they were supreme, and they formed no inconsiderable part of the Assembly. Pericles could count on their votes, and on ordinary occasions, when there was nothing before the assembly of sufficient importance to bring up the people from the country, their votes decided the question. The same was the case with the rest of the public expenditure of Pericles. Large sums were spent on the public buildings of Athens, but

Criticism of
Pericles'
measures.

¹ If, however, this "festival money" is the same as the "two-obol fee"—*διωβελία*—and two obols was at one time the price of a seat in the theatre—there is clear evidence that the payment does not date from Pericles, but was first introduced after his death by Cleophon, an extreme demagogue, who rose to power towards the end of the Peloponnesian war. *Ath. Pol.* c. 28: Κλεοφῶν ὁ λυροποιός, ὃς καὶ τὴν διωβελίαν ἐπόρισε πρῶτος. *Infra*, c. xii.

the Parthenon and the Propylaea were not built merely to find employment and wages for the artisans and masons of the city. They were the visible embodiment of the greatness of Athens, and intended to impress the Grecian world, and above all the allies of Athens, with a sense of her power. In all that Pericles did the ideal and the practical were united; while establishing his own position, he sought to strengthen the supremacy of Athens; the citizens who received pay from the city were to be improved and ennobled by their work; and if the empire was to be the mightiest power in Greece, it was also to be a centre of civilisation, and admired of all.

From the ostracism of Thucydides down to the year 430, when he was deposed from his command, Pericles was the ruler of Athens. This position he owed of Athens. mainly to the measures of which we have just spoken, but also in a considerable degree to his gift of eloquence. Eupolis, the comedian, said that "Persuasion sat on his lips, and alone of the orators of his time, his words left a sting behind them in the ears of those who heard him."¹ Others spoke of him as the Olympian who bore upon his tongue a terrible thunderbolt.² With this weapon he overcame all opposition in the assembly, and bent the people to his will. Elected every year to the office of general, he was the foremost executive magistrate in the city, and of the two bodies in which the sovereign power resided, the Assembly was carried away by his eloquence, and the jurors were indebted to him for their pay.

The success which, with very few exceptions, attended his enterprises, confirmed him in his position. His administration of the empire left nothing to be desired—from an Athenian point of view. In spite of his large expenditure, he could point to a surplus of ready money stored in the Acropolis, larger by many times than the public fund of any other city in Greece. This was also an answer to those

¹ Frag. (*Dem.*) 94 K.

² *Plut. Per.* 8: δεινὸν δὲ κεραυνὸν ἐν γλώσσῃ φέρειν: cp. *Arist. Ach.* 504.

who complained that the money of the allies was wasted. Athens could at any moment declare war, not only on a rebellious subject—though this was painfully apparent to the allies—but on any power which attempted to injure an ally. The Aegean, under Athenian rule, was free from pirates and Persians.¹

3. Of the internal history of Athens from the fall of Samos to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, few details have come down to us. We can trace a gradual change in the attitude of the people to Pericles, answering to a change in his attitude to them. Their thoughts were of present enjoyment; he had ulterior views in all his measures; and it was inevitable that a point should be reached when the people and their ruler were no longer in harmony. He used his high authority to check their wishes; they submitted, not without resentment. The life which he led, the associates whom he gathered round him, also tended to separate him from the Athenian multitude quite as much as the line which he pursued in politics separated him from the party to which by birth he belonged.

In his youth he had married the wife of the wealthy Hipponicus, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. By what arrangement the marriage was brought about we do not know, but the harmony of the two great families does not seem to have been in any way disturbed. In such matters Athenian feeling was widely different from our own. The connection thus formed did not prove lasting. Whether Pericles failed to engage the affections of his wife as Hipponicus had failed before him, or whether he was overcome by a new passion—

¹ If in 435 there was a surplus of 9000 t. in the Acropolis, this amounts to an average annual saving of 450 t. for twenty years. The sums paid by the allies were not enough to account for such a total, even if preserved intact, and there is no doubt that Pericles spent the money of the allies on his public buildings and in paying the Athenians, before 435. Did the savings come from Laurium and the mines opposite Thasos?

they separated, and the high-born Athenian lady consented to become the wife of a third husband. Pericles was now free to bring to his home the celebrated Aspasia, a Milesian lady, who seems to have come to Athens shortly before the Samian war. She belonged to the class of "companions," but, by general consent, she was the first of her class. All ancient writers agree about her beauty, her genius, and her accomplishments; and when she became associated with Pericles, her circle was, in some respects, the leading circle at Athens. Socrates listened eagerly to her conversation; Anaxagoras, an Ionian like herself, entered into discussion with her on subjects religious and philosophical; and the friends of Pericles even brought their wives to listen to the wise sayings of the Milesian.¹

It has been suggested that Pericles, in forming this connection with Aspasia, was endeavouring to establish a better position for women in Athenian society.² The
 Woman's life at Athens. Athenian wife was the mistress of a house, the mother of children, treated with the greatest respect, and influential in her own sphere, but she was restrained within narrow limits. She was taught to read and write, and instructed in all manner of household duties, but she seldom ventured beyond the precincts of the house, or was seen in any society but that of her relations. In the country the wives of neighbours visited each other; in the city it was only on some public occasion, a festival or a funeral, that a woman of position left her home. Mixed society was unknown among women of reputation; they were rigidly excluded from all entertainments, and for a

¹ See Plut. *Per.* c. 24. That she ever became the wife of Pericles is neither proved nor credible. By his own law, Pericles had made marriage between an Athenian and a Milesian impossible; and her son, Pericles the younger, was regarded as illegitimate.

² Holm, *Hist. of Greece*, ii. 344, E. T. "Is it likely that a serious-minded and highly educated man like Pericles would not have come to the conclusion that his own example ought to be generally followed in Athens, if the social life of so gifted a people was to be placed on a satisfactory basis?"

man to enter the house of a friend in his absence was contrary to custom.

It is impossible to lay down any general rules in such matters, or to judge of the motives which induced Pericles to take Aspasia into his house. But if Athenian society stood in need of reformation, he did not go the right way to reform it. He was not, indeed, the man to undertake such a task. He was by no means delicate in his relations to women,¹ and though we need not give credit to scandal, we must allow that he laid himself open to attack by this new connection, while he lost the sympathy of what was soundest and best at Athens. Those who lived the life which Xenophon has described in his *Oeconomicus*, whose sons were trained in the education which Aristophanes has sketched in the *Clouds*, could not fail to regard with horror Aspasia and her circle.

4. This was not the only point at which Pericles came into conflict with the prevailing sentiment at Athens. We are apt to regard the Greeks as audacious Religion at Athens. thinkers, whose minds wandered freely over every department of human thought, and this is, to a great extent, true of Greek literature, but it is by no means true of Greek life. The Greek was religious to an extraordinary degree; in every action he felt himself dependent on the gods, whose support he was therefore anxious to obtain in all his plans and purposes. He appealed to the oracles about the most trivial matters: about a purchase, about a strayed sheep, or a stolen ox; nothing monstrous or uncommon occurred but it was regarded as a portent, having an influence on human life. Athens was filled with diviners who interpreted signs and omens of every kind; oracles were collected from every source—not only from Delphi or Dodona, but from local prophets in Boeotia or Acarnania, from Bacis, or Glanis, “the elder brother of Bacis.” An earthquake caused an adjournment of an important assembly, and a formal ceremony delayed an execution.

¹ Plut. *Per.* 10, 13, 28.

With such modes of thought the emancipated circle of Pericles had nothing in common. Early in life he seems to have fallen under the influence of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, a philosopher of the Ionian school, from whom he is said to have acquired the stately reserve which was so remarkable a trait in his character. From him he learned to differ from the common opinion of his day, and to substitute natural causes for supernatural. In the teaching of Anaxagoras the world is the work not of chance or necessity, but of an organising intellect which, out of a preceding chaos, brought together similar particles capable of combination, and thus formed the world as we know it.¹ Such a philosophy could not fail to come into collision with the religious beliefs of the Greeks. There was no room in it for that variety of powers with which they had peopled earth and sea and sky. The sun in the eyes of the Greeks was a holy god, a living, personal deity, who traversed the heavens daily from east to west in his bright chariot, but Anaxagoras openly affirmed that the sun and stars were red-hot stones and nothing more. Such views were regarded not merely as impious; they were dangerous, and would offend the gods, whose vengeance would fall on the city. For of course Pericles and his friends were quite unable to move the convictions of the common people on these matters. Before the ostracism of Thucydides, a ram with one horn was brought to Pericles, and Lampon at once interpreted the portent: it signified that the whole power of the city would pass into the hands of one man. It was in vain that Anaxagoras had the head opened, and pointed out that the single horn was due to a malformation. Thucydides was ostracised, and Pericles became sole ruler of the state, and Lampon's prophecy was confirmed. Plutarch, who records the incident, though strongly in favour of natural philosophy, is driven to

¹ Plut. *Per.* 4: τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος οὐ τύχην οὐδ' ἀνάγκην διακοσμήσεως ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστησε καθαρὸν καὶ ἄκρατον ἐν μεμιγμένοις πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποκρίνοντα τὰς ὁμοιομερείας. *Infra*, c. xiv.

confess that the cause and the meaning of a portent may differ.¹

5. In the new movement two elements were combined—the philosophy of Ionia and the rhetoric of Sicily. For more than a century the phenomena of nature had been made a subject of inquiry in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, and Anaxagoras was one of the last and greatest representatives of this school of inquiry. The negative results of such philosophy were, of course, more cogent than the positive; no two thinkers agreed in their explanation of the universe, but they were all of one mind in denying truth and reality to the changing phenomena of the outward world. The same criticism was in time applied to ethics and politics. The various forms of government were discussed, and with them the object and purpose of all government; a distinction was drawn between nature and ordinance, between universal and particular laws. It was but a short step to pass on to ethics, and ask: What is the measure of right and wrong? What is the value of custom? What weight should be given to authority? Is truth the same for all, or does it vary according to circumstances and temperament?

This spirit of inquiry passed from the extreme east to the extreme west of the Grecian world. The speculations current at Miletus and Ephesus were repeated in the cities of Magna Graecia and Sicily, but owing to peculiar circumstances politics became of more importance than physics in the Sicilian cities, and philosophy tended to pass into rhetoric. Not only were these cities constantly engaged in "setting their house in order," in reconciling the claims of various settlers, and harmonising the customs of various

¹ Plut. *Per.* 6. In *Nicias* 23 he gives a short account of the progress of natural philosophy in Greece. Of Anaxagoras he says: ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος σαφέστατόν τε πάντων καὶ θαρραλεώτατον περὶ σελήνης καταναγασμῶν καὶ σκιάς λόγον εἰς γραφὴν καταθέμενος Ἀναξαγόρας οὗτ' αὐτὸς ἦν παλαιὸς οὗτ' ὁ λόγος ἐνδοξος ἀλλ' ἀπόρρητος ἔτι καὶ δι' ὀλίγων καὶ μετ' εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἢ πίστεως βαδίζων.

tribes, but more especially on the expulsion of the tyrants and the restoration of the old inhabitants to their homes and possessions, numerous questions arose which could only be settled in the law-courts. It was by the art of speech that men hoped to regain their lost position. Often, no doubt, the claims put forward were of a very uncertain kind, and there was a great temptation to "make the worse the better cause." This had not been the attitude of the older inquirers, but now philosophy and sophistry parted company; they stood as far asunder as the student of jurisprudence and the successful pleader. While Anaxagoras was in danger of starvation, had not Pericles come to his help, and Socrates lived on less than the laziest citizen could earn, the new teachers, such as Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontini, were well paid for their instruction. The wandering life of these sophists, who went from city to city as lecturers, emancipated them from civic traditions, and thus a prejudice was raised against them in cities where morality came to men through the state and was bound up with state institutions. Among them were men of great ability and knowledge, who played a useful part in stimulating the minds of their pupils, and imparting to them knowledge which was new and valuable; but even the best of them hardly perceived the true effect of his teaching, and the second-rate were mere intellectual gladiators, ready to maintain any thesis for the sake of display and profit.

6. The appearance of the "sophists" and the spread of "sophistical" teaching seems for a time to have revolutionised education at Athens. In more than one play the comic poet Aristophanes contrasts the old and new, the young man as he was when moulded by the best traditions of Athens, and as he became in the hands of sophists. In mind and body the change was for the worse; dignified obedience and decorous self-control were succeeded by a noisy argumentative conceit, which claimed to be infallible on every subject. "I will tell you how our quarrel began," says Strepsiades in the *Clouds*,

The sophists'
teaching.
Scene from
Aristophanes.

speaking of his son; "we were at dinner, and I asked him to take his lyre and sing me Simonides' song about the combing of the ram. He at once replied that it was not the fashion now to play the lyre and sing over one's wine, 'like an old wife grinding parched barley.' 'Yes!' rejoins Phidippides; 'and did you not deserve to be kicked and beaten for asking your guest to sing, as if you were entertaining grasshoppers?' Just so," Strepsiades continues, "that is the language he used, and he said that Simonides was a bad poet. With much ado I kept my temper, and asked him to take a branch of myrtle and repeat some lines of Aeschylus. He replied: 'Aeschylus is bombastic, harsh, immature, and rugged.' How my heart went pit-a-pat; still I curbed myself and said: 'Well! well! sing me one of these smart songs which are in fashion.' Forthwith he chanted a lay from Euripides, God help us all! about the incest of a brother and sister. I broke out at this and roundly abused him. He retorted, and word brought up word, till at last he sprang upon me and beat me."¹

This scene is of course intended to be a caricature of the effect of "sophistic" teaching, but of the hold which that teaching obtained on the minds of the younger citizens there is no doubt. We have no reason to suspect exaggeration in the description given in the *Protagoras* of Plato of the excitement caused by the visit of an eminent sophist to Athens.

"Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door";—it is Socrates who is speaking—"some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out, 'Socrates, are you awake or asleep?'"

"I knew his voice, and said, 'Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any news?'"

"'Good news,' he said; 'nothing but good.'"

"'Delightful,' I said; 'but what is the news? and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?'"

¹ Aristoph. *Clouds*, 1354 ff. Cp. also the well-known passage 950 ff.

"He drew nearer to me and said, 'Protagoras is come.'

"'Yes,' I replied; 'he came two days ago; have you only just heard of his arrival?'

"'Yes, by the gods,' he said; 'but not till yesterday evening.' At the same time, he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said: 'Yesterday, quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe, whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave, Satyrus, as I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the way, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said to me, "Protagoras is come." I was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.'

"I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said, 'What is the matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?'

"He replied, laughing, 'Yes, indeed, he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps from me.'

"'But surely,' I said, 'if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.'

"'Would to heaven,' he replied, 'that this were the case. He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him (when he visited Athens before I was but a child); and all men praise him, Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias, the son of Hipponicus; let us start.'"¹

7. The older men at Athens watched this movement with anxious eyes. More especially were the young orators regarded with suspicion—striplings who came forward with the new equipment of logic and dialectic. They were thought to be entirely without moral principles; and an orator of the new school was at once assumed to be a man of bad character. With Pericles and his friends the sophists and their doctrines found a welcome. Aspasia herself was known as a composer of

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 310, Jowett's translation.

clever speeches ; and Pericles is said to have spent a whole day in arguing with Protagoras the case of a competitor in the Pentathlon, who was accidentally killed by a spear. Who was really to blame—the thrower of the spear, or the spear, or those who arranged the contest? In the new enthusiasm for discussion such absurdities may have occurred ; at any rate they were believed, and Pericles brought on himself a part of the dislike which the plain Athenian felt for intellectual hair-splitting.¹

Even in his conduct of the city, he inevitably became the object of a good deal of criticism. By taking the management of everything into his own hands, he made himself the common mark for discontent. If any interest was harassed, or any scheme went wrong, Pericles was to blame. We have seen that his expenditure on public works brought upon him the severe reproaches of his political opponents, who considered, not without reason, that Athens was thereby placed in a false relation to the allies, and though Pericles knew how to deal with such criticism, his position was slowly shaken.

The change was inevitable. Pericles himself no longer showed the same conciliatory temper towards the people. In his conception of democracy there was always the reservation that it must be under control. He meant to rule, not to be ruled. He refused to accede to the wishes of the people when their wishes did not coincide with his own. A man of aristocratic birth and temperament, when he attempts to lead a mob, is always in a difficult position. He has broken from his natural supports, and yet he is not wholly in sympathy with his new *clientèle*. At first he can make concessions without endangering those restrictions which he knows to be necessary for the maintenance of the state, but in time the democratic spirit, evoked by him in his own interests, as well

Change in the attitude of Pericles towards the people.

¹ Cp. Plut. *Per.* 36 ; Aristoph. *Clouds*, 1073 ff. Compare the procedure at the Prytaneum described in Demosthenes, 23. 76. At the Buphonia the Athenians solemnly passed sentence on the axe by which the ox was slain ; Paus. i. 24. 4.

as in those of the state, demands more than he can give. So it was with Pericles; he was willing that the money of the allies should be spent on Athens and on Athenian institutions, but, as we have said, he had ulterior aims in view in this expenditure; he allowed the rich to be heavily fined for public purposes, and took his part in such payments; but he did not wish the finance of Athens to pass into the control of demagogues, who would use the funds, as he had done, to win the people, but without those aims by which he justified his own course. The demagogues could not be expected to make such fine distinctions; they sought to gain for themselves the authority which seemed to be slipping from the hands of Pericles. They wished to lead the people against him if they could, and cared little about the means which they employed in attaining their object. Foremost among them was Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, a man of low birth and vulgar manners, but of great energy and ability, whose appearance and occupation (he was a tanner) made him the favourite butt of Aristophanes.

8. In this manner a combination was formed against Pericles, and parties which usually stood far apart were united, not indeed in a common policy, but in the attempt to put an end to the domination of their rival. The first attack seems to have been made through Phidias. He was the chief adviser of Pericles in the adornment of Athens, and he was therefore peculiarly obnoxious to those who were opposed to expenditure on such objects. That Phidias had failed in the charge entrusted to him could not be maintained. Nothing existed in Greece more beautiful than the temples which rose under his direction, and the statues executed by him and his school. But it was easy to insinuate that all the sums which had passed into his hands had not been spent honestly. Some years previously he had constructed the great statue of Athena in ivory and gold for the Parthenon, and he was now charged with keeping back part of the money. Fortunately he was able to

The attack on
Phidias.

repel this accusation. On the advice of Pericles, the statue had been so constructed that the gold could be removed without injury to the work. It was now taken off and weighed, and no deficiency was found. The charge of dishonesty was thus conclusively disproved, but the accusers were not to be shaken off. The public mind was already disquieted on the subject of religion, and a charge of impiety might succeed where a charge of peculation had failed. In the figures which he had depicted on the shield of Athena, it was found that Phidias had introduced portraits of himself and Pericles. This was declared to be an offence against the majesty of the goddess. Phidias was at once thrown into prison, and all the efforts of Pericles to procure his release were in vain. Before the day of trial arrived he was found dead in his cell.¹

The next attack was directed against Anaxagoras. A proposal was made by Diopithes, a friend of Nicias, who was the most orthodox and religious of Athenians, that those who disbelieved in divinities, and passed their time in discussing the nature of the heavenly bodies, should be impeached before the Assembly. The proposition was accepted, but whether Diopithes carried the matter further, and personally attacked Anaxagoras, is not known. A late writer informs us that Cleon brought a charge of impiety against him; others said that Thucydides, who had now returned from ostracism, accused him of treason. Whatever may have been the precise nature of the charge, it seems certain that Anaxagoras was condemned, and was thrown into prison. In a short time he escaped, or was allowed to go free, and a few years later he died at Lampsacus.² Protagoras was also banished from the city about this time; and Damon, who was the chief political

¹ Plut. *Per.* 31: ὁ μὲν οὖν Φειδίας εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπαχθεὶς ἐτελεύτησε νοσήσας, ὡς δὲ φασιν ἔνιοι, φαρμάκοις, ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τοῦ Περικλέους τῶν ἐχθρῶν παρασκευασάντων. Ap. Schol. Aristoph. *Pax*, 588. According to Philochorus, Phidias was exiled, and retired to Elis, where he was subsequently executed.

² Plut. *Per.* 32.

adviser of Pericles, was ostracised, but neither the date nor the cause of his ostracism can be fixed with certainty,

For some years the comedians had amused themselves at the expense of Aspasia. She was the "new Omphale," the "concubine of the Olympian Pericles," the "child of Lewdness." And now Hermippus, a comedian whose power lay in the coarseness of his satire, weary, perhaps, of his own abuse, or believing that the ground had been well prepared, ventured to bring a public charge against her. She also was accused of impiety, a subject on which the Athenians were easily roused, but in her case impiety was only the cover for a still more odious imputation. She was brought before the court as an atheist and procuress. As an alien she could not appear at the trial; her cause was left in the hands of Pericles, and the Athenians looked on with delight, while their great statesman, overcome with emotion, pleaded for his mistress with the entreaties and tears which Athenian custom permitted in a court of law. Aspasia was acquitted.¹

9. The enemies of Pericles were baffled, but his victory did not strengthen his position. The acquittal of Aspasia was merely a concession to his personal influence. It was clear that he had felt the attack; and his opponents now ventured on a direct accusation. Dracontides proposed in the Assembly that Pericles should give before the fifty Prytaneis an account of his expenditure of the public money, and that, in this case, the judges should give their votes before the altar in the Acropolis. The proposal was subsequently altered on the motion of Hagnon, a friend of Pericles, and the case was to be brought before a court of 1500 jurors, voting in the usual way, by dropping pebbles into an urn, as a charge of bribery or maladministration.² Nothing came of the proposal; the case appears never to have been brought into court, unless indeed it was subsequently revived in the year 430. The

¹ Plut. *Per.* 32.

² Plut. *Per.* 32: εἴτε κλοπῆς καὶ δώρων, εἴτ' ἀδικίου βούλοιτά τις δομάξῃ τὴν δίωξιν.

attention of the Athenians was drawn away by the impending war with the Peloponnesians, which also created a new division of parties in the city. The iniquities of Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Aspasia were forgotten in the question whether Athens should go to war, and what were her chances of success. To Pericles war was certainly an advantage; in war a leader is needed, and he was undoubtedly the leader of Athens. By some, indeed, he was thought to have forced the points at issue between Sparta and Athens to a climax in order to recover his lost position, and we may at least allow that, convinced that war must come, he wished it to come while he was still able to direct the Athenian state. He was well aware that his monopoly of power had been such that he would leave no successor. And for years he had been looking forward to a great struggle, which should place the empire on a still firmer foundation. With war in view he had so organised the empire that all the resources of it lay at the disposal of Athens; by the law-courts, before whom the cases of the allies were tried, by the sixty ships which year by year he put in commission, by garrisons and wardens established in every city where there were signs of disloyalty, by destroying the walls of the cities, by accumulating an enormous treasure, he had secured Athens against the greatest danger which could overtake her — the revolt of her allies. On land she was not a match for the forces which could be brought against her, but this difficulty Pericles was prepared to meet by allowing the enemy to do their worst; the loss of the crops and cattle of Attica could easily be replaced so long as Athens was mistress of the sea.

So Pericles "watched war coming from the Peloponnesus." Parties were divided on the question. There were still many who wished that their city should be on good terms with Sparta, and were opposed to any action which rendered this impossible. Such were Nicias and his following, men absolutely loyal to Athens and democracy, but also friendly to Sparta, partly

as the inheritor of great traditions, partly as a pattern of military organisation. Such, too, were those Athenians who lived in the country—rich men who owned fine houses and large estates; poor men who cultivated a few ancestral acres, on which they lived in comfort, holding in much contempt the city and the ways of the city. They remembered that in 445 Plistoanax had marched without opposition as far as Eleusis. They knew that war meant invasion. The pleasant houses, the orchards, olive-groves, and highly cultivated farms, the growth of two generations of peaceful possession, would then be destroyed, and they would have to find such shelter as they could within the city walls. In Aristophanes we have pictures—instructive if exaggerated—of these country folks in Dicaeopolis, Strepsiades, and Trygaeus. They are rough yeomen, gross in their tastes and enjoyments, yet not without a homely goodness, a love of simplicity, and an inborn appreciation of what is beautiful in art and literature. They are men of sound sense, cherishing a lively hatred of the new culture and its special product, the youthful orator, who always had them at an advantage, and took a peculiar delight in exhibiting his smartness at their expense.

On the other hand, the inhabitants of the city, with Cleon to lead them, were eager for war. They were not moved by the prospect of the disasters which would fall on Attica—they would not share in them. They were pleased with the excitement of war, and confidently expected a solid result in additions to the empire. There would be more land to occupy as colonists, more tribute to spend on amusements. In any case, there would be a large outlay from the public funds, which would go into the pockets of those who served the city. The risks they disregarded; and indeed there was little risk at sea, and on land Athenian generals were careful not to expose their fellow-citizens, to whom they were responsible, to unnecessary danger. On this question, therefore, the influence of Cleon was thrown on the side of Pericles, who, with this support was able to turn the scale in favour of war.

CHAPTER III.

THE CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

I. Thucydides, who, as a contemporary writer, is most competent to judge of the motives which guided his own generation, informs us that the real cause of ^{Thucydides'*} the Peloponnesian war was the growing fear of ^{view of the} the Athenian power. ^{cause of the} "The real reason," he ^{Peloponnesian} says, "which led to this great conflict, though ^{war.} it was rarely mentioned, was, I believe, that the power of the Athenians alarmed the Peloponnesians, and forced them to go to war; but the causes commonly put forward on either side were two": the part which the Athenians took in the Corinthian war, and their treatment of Potidaea. The same view is repeated in other passages. "In deciding to go to war, the Lacedaemonians were influenced not so much by the arguments of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians, and of their increasing power."—"The Athenians were growing too great to be ignored, and though the Lacedaemonians were unwilling by nature to go to war if they could help it, they could remain inactive no longer. Their allies were suffering from the aggression of the Athenians, and therefore they had no other course but to do their best to destroy the Athenian power."¹

The Greek mind was not satisfied with this general predisposing cause. Careful as the Greeks always were to assign to the right author the guilt of the first step in wrongdoing, they naturally asked, not ^{Other causes:} what was the general or the remote cause of ^{the Megarian} the war, but what was the immediate and particular cause—^{decree.}

¹ Thuc. i. 23, 88, 118.

what was the precise act which brought about hostilities, and who was guilty of it? To this question various answers were given.

A quarrel, of which the exact nature is obscure, had broken out between Athens and Megara. The Athenians charged the Megarians with tilling the sacred land, which, as forming the boundary between the two states, was no man's land, and might not be cultivated. They sent a herald, by name Anthemocritus, to complain, but the Megarians slew him, in defiance of the sacred and universal law of nations. The anger of the Athenians knew no bounds. Charinus proposed in the Assembly that there should be "truceless and unproclaimed" hostility between the two cities; that any Megarian found on Attic soil should be put to death; and that the generals, when taking the customary oath on their admission to office, should further pledge themselves to invade the Megarian territory twice a year.¹

Whether these details, which come to us on late authority, are true in every particular, we cannot say, but in some important points they are confirmed by Thucydides. He tells us that the Athenians had passed a decree—supported, certainly, by Pericles, if not proposed by him—by which the Megarians were excluded from the market of Athens, and the ports of the Athenian empire; and when the Peloponnesians demanded the cancelling of this decree under a threat of war, the Athenians replied that the Megarians had tilled the border land, and received fugitive slaves. And after the outbreak of the war the Athenians invaded the Megarid every year till the capture of Nisaea. Thus, even on the evidence of Thucydides, the "Megarian decree," was the immediate pretext of the war. The demand that it should be cancelled was put forward in such a manner that if the Athenians had yielded, the outbreak of the war would have been deferred. But what was the real cause of the decree and of the attitude of Pericles towards it?²

¹ Plut. *Per.* 30.

² Thuc. i. 139; ii. 31.

The contemporary comedians dwell on neither of the two reasons given by Thucydides, though the motive which they ascribe to Pericles may rest on a perversion of the incident of the "fugitive slaves." In their view, the real grievance was the theft by the Megarians of two women belonging to Aspasia. This insult Pericles felt himself compelled to punish; hence his refusal to make any concession. "In his fury the Olympian thundered and lightened, turned Hellas upside down, and passed laws after the style of catches, that the Megarians must not in the land abide, nor on the sea, nor in the markets, nor the continent."¹

In the *Pax*, a play written four years after the *Acharnians*, Aristophanes gives another reason for the attitude of Pericles towards the Megarian decree. "The mischief began with the ruin of Phidias, for Pericles, fearing to be involved in that disaster, set the city in a blaze with the tiny spark of the Megarian decree; and blew up such a war that the eyes of all the Greeks were filled with tears owing to the smoke." This account of the true cause of the Peloponnesian war is regarded as a revelation from Hermes, and it comes as a surprise to the Chorus and Trygaeus, who had never heard that Phidias was in any way connected with it. In the next century it was regarded as historical. Ephorus tells us that Alcibiades, who was brought up in the house of Pericles, once found his uncle in great distress; and on inquiring the cause, was informed that he had been asked for an account of the money which he had spent, and was at a loss how to give it. "Would it not be better," observed Alcibiades, "to invent some reason for giving no account

The Megarian
decree: account
of Aristophanes.

The war due to
the peculations
of Pericles.
Aristophanes.
Ephorus.

¹ Aristoph. *Acharn.* 504 ff. In the words "in the style of catches," there seems to be an allusion to the "catch" of scolion of Timocreon:—

ᾧ φελέν σ', ᾧ τυφλὲ Πλούτε,
μήτ' ἐν γῆ, μήτ' ἐν θαλάττῃ
μήτ' ἐν ἡπείρῳ φανῆμεν, κ.τ.λ.

at all?" Pericles took the hint, and being at the time greatly harassed by the prosecutions of his friends Phidias and Anaxagoras, he decided to give the Athenians something to occupy their minds; they would be less critical in time of war. For this reason he insisted that the Megarian decree should not be cancelled.¹

That Aristophanes was serious in attributing the Megarian decree to the theft of Aspasia's women, or to the dishonesty of Pericles, is highly improbable. To the comedian all is grist that comes to the mill, and why should he be more just to Pericles than to Socrates? In the *Acharnians* he may have merely parodied the cause which was supposed to have brought about the great war of Grecian legend,² and in the *Pax*, as we have seen, he hints that he is giving a new and paradoxical account of the conduct of Pericles. Yet the historians of the next century, though they had Thucydides before them, accept these grotesque stories, and make history out of them. It was to their minds unintelligible that Pericles should have insisted on such a trifling point as the Megarian decree at the cost of a great war; and we may share in their astonishment while disregarding their explanations. We need not suppose that Pericles was guilty of speculation, or the obsequious slave of Aspasia; we know that he was over-logical, and would not listen to a compromise, when a principle was involved. He believed that the demand for the cancelling of the Megarian decree was merely intended to test the tenacity of the Athenian purpose—that if any concession were made, other demands would follow, and in that belief he resolved to make a firm stand at the very outset.

2. If the immediate cause of hostilities was the refusal

¹ Aristoph. *Pax*, 588 ff. Plut. *Alc.*, 7. Diodorus, xii. 38-40; cp. *ibid.* 41: αἱρίαι μὲν οὖν τοῦ Πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου τοιαῦτα τινες ὑπῆρξαν, ὥς Ἐφορος ἀνέγραψε. So Thucydides suggests that Cleon's knaveries would be detected in a time of peace, v. 16.

² Cp. Herod. i. 1 ff.

to cancel the Megarian decree, and the immediate author of the refusal was Pericles, the chief part in bringing the hostile feeling of the Peloponnesians to a head was taken by the Corinthians. It was they who impressed on the Lacedæmonians the dangerous growth of the Athenian empire; they were the allies whom that growth most nearly touched. Before the Athenians and the Corinthians met in the waters of the Ionian sea, war was still in the future; it might have been deferred, if not prevented; but after that collision the Corinthians felt that their only hope lay in a general attack on the Athenian empire. In old days, before the Persian wars, Corinth and Athens had been on such friendly terms, that when Athens needed ships to enable her to meet Aegina on the sea, Corinth was ready to supply them (vol. ii. p. 103); and though in the great war of 480 there was some jealousy between the cities—for Adimantus, the Corinthian leader, was a bitter enemy of Themistocles, and the Athenians had strange stories to tell of the cowardice of the Corinthians—though the Corinthians followed the lead of the Lacedæmonians in retiring from Byzantium, and doubtless saw with displeasure the building of the walls of Athens and the growth of her fleet—the cities continued to be on friendly terms till the revolt of Megara in 460 (vol. ii. p. 324). The action of Athens in receiving the rebellious Megarians into her protection laid the foundation of a fierce hatred between the cities, which could not fail to be increased by the attempts of Pericles to acquire the control of the Corinthian gulf. The settlement of the Messenians at Naupactus, the attacks on Oeniadae and Sicyon, the occupation of the Megarian harbours of Pegae and Nisaea,—all these threatened the position of Corinth in Western Greece. Her fears were shared by others, and under the terms of the Thirty Years' truce, Pericles was compelled to withdraw from every position which Athens held in the Peloponnesus. For a time Corinth was pacified, but her suspicions were afterwards roused by the policy which Athens pursued in

Part taken by
the Corinthians
in bringing on
the war.

Northern and Western Greece, and an incident now occurred which showed only too clearly what the intentions of the Athenians were.

Corcyra had been colonised by the Corinthians in the eighth century. The island—the modern Corfu—enjoyed a most fortunate situation. It was sufficiently distant from Greece to lie outside the currents which disturbed the politics of the peninsula, and yet it formed a convenient station on the route from Greece to the west. For a generation after the founding of the city, Corcyra and Corinth were on the usual terms of colony and mother-city; but as the colony grew in power, quarrels arose between them, and by the middle of the seventh century, Corcyra had shaken off her allegiance, and defeated the Corinthians in a great naval engagement (vol. i. p. 345). It was in vain that Cypselus, the first tyrant of Corinth, strove to bring the island into subjection; the utmost that he could do was to check the extending commerce of the Corcyraeans by establishing maritime colonies on the shores of Acarnania. His son Periander was more successful; he brought the rebels back to their allegiance, but on his death they established their independence once more. These conflicts left bitter memories behind them. In their festivals and sacrifices the Corcyraeans would not allow the Corinthians the customary privileges of founders. Such conduct on the part of a daughter-city towards her “metropolis” was considered contumacious; it was a renunciation of the bond which linked her to the old home.

* At the time of the Persian invasion, the Corcyraeans possessed a navy of sixty ships, while the Corinthians had but forty; in the next fifty years they had increased the sixty to one hundred and twenty, a number far in excess of any navy in Greece but that of Athens. When called upon to assist in the deliverance of Greece, they had played a double game—promising assistance to the patriotic side, but delaying to send it, and waiting for the event (vol. ii. p. 144). In the subsequent quarrels between Athens and Sparta they had

taken no part; they were allies of neither side. They considered that their position enabled them to stand alone; and it was not to their interest to favour one party more than the other. In the thirty years which elapsed between the flight of Themistocles to Corcyra, and the outbreak of the "Corinthian war," nothing is recorded of the island.

3. From Corcyra a colony had been sent out (626) with a Corinthian founder, to Epidamnus, a valuable site on the Illyrian coast, through which the Corcyraeans secured a trade with the interior (vol. i. p. 347). The Corcyraean Colony at Epidamnus. The new colony rapidly grew into a wealthy and populous town. The original settlers appear to have kept both the government of the city and the trade with the neighbouring barbarians in their own hands. We hear of a supreme council, formed out of the heads of the tribes, of whom one was chosen to be the "Administrator" of the city (*διοικητής*), and of a "Poletes," whose duty it was to control the traffic with the Illyrians. The artisans were slaves. This constitution was subsequently modified by the creation of a less exclusive council; and finally, about the year 435, the people succeeded in driving the oligarchs out of the town, and establishing a thoroughgoing democracy.¹

The exiled oligarchs at once joined the neighbouring barbarians, and with their aid plundered the property of their opponents. So serious were the injuries which they inflicted, that the Epidamnians were at length compelled to send to Corcyra for assistance. Their request was received with the greatest apathy; the Corcyraeans had no inclination to enter into the domestic quarrels of Epidamnus. After this repulse, the Epidamnians sought the advice of Delphi: Should they give up their city to Corinth, the home of their founder Phalius, and ask there for the help which Corcyra refused? The response was favourable, and to Corinth they

¹ Cp. Aristot. *Pol.* ii. 7 = 1267 b 18; iii. 16 = 1287 a 7; viii. (v.) 1 = 1301 b 21; and for the Poletes, Plutarch, *Quaest. Graec.* 29.

went, repeating the command given at Delphi, and offering to place the city in the hands of the Corinthians. Their overtures were warmly received. The Corinthians were not inclined to forego any claim, however slight, which they had on Epidamnus; they wanted the colony; they hated Corcyra. They at once invited any Corinthian who pleased to settle at Epidamnus, without any regard to the claims of Corcyra; and a force of troops was sent to protect them in the city.

Upon this the oligarchs went to Corcyra, and begged to be restored to their home. The appeal came at the right moment. When the Corcyraeans found that the colony had gone over to Corinth, and had received Corinthian troops and settlers, they were highly indignant. Taking the exiles with them, they set sail for Epidamnus. The city refused to receive them; and they at once began to invest it with the aid of the exiles and neighbouring barbarians.¹

The Corinthians were not less active; they no sooner heard of the investment of Epidamnus than they proclaimed a new colony to the town. Any Corinthian who chose might go, and he would be an equal among equals in the new city; those who did not wish to leave Corinth at once could secure a place by depositing a sum of money. Appeals were also sent round to friendly cities for money and ships. A large force must be despatched, and a large fleet would be required as a convoy. The Corcyraeans now appeared at Corinth with loud complaints. The Corinthians, they said, had nothing

Corcyra and
Corinth: pre-
parations for
war.

¹ It is difficult to say with certainty what was the form of government at Corcyra at this time. Grote and Duncker regard it as a democracy, but we may observe: (1) that the demos of Epidamnus was repelled at Corcyra, the oligarchs were accepted; (2) that in the subsequent battle, out of more than 1000 Corcyraeans who were captured, 800 were slaves, and 250 are described by Thucydides as *δυνάμει οἱ πλείους πρόωτοι ὄντες τῆς πόλεως*. They must therefore have commanded or served in the fleet; (3) that, in their appeal to Athens, the Corcyraeans say nothing of any similarity of government; (4) that the Epidamnian oligarchs appeal, when at Corcyra, to the tombs of common ancestors, which seems to imply that they were addressing oligarchs like themselves.

to do with Epidamnus. Let them choose any Peloponnesian state as arbitrator, or refer the matter to Delphi. The Corinthians demanded the withdrawal of the Corcyraean troops from Epidamnus as a condition of further negotiations; the Corcyraeans replied with a similar request. But negotiations were useless; the Corinthians were resolved upon war, and sent their fleet to sea. A great battle was fought off Actium, at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, seventy-five Corinthian ships against eighty Corcyraean, in which the Corinthians were severely defeated, with a loss of fifteen vessels. On the same day Epidamnus was compelled by the besieging force to capitulate. Such disasters were overwhelming, and though hostilities went on for the rest of the year (435), the Corinthians did not venture on a second naval engagement.¹

The "Corinthian war"; defeat of Corinth. Epidamnus capitulates.

4. The old quarrel had broken out once more; once more the mother-city had been defeated by the ungrateful daughter. The humiliation was intolerable; the Corinthians were bursting with desire for revenge. Through the whole of the year 434 they went on building ships, and preparing to renew the struggle. The Corcyraeans became alarmed. They were without allies, while the Corinthians were members of a great confederacy. It was necessary to seek assistance from the second great power in Greece. In 433 Corcyraean envoys appeared at Athens, asking that the island might be admitted into the Athenian alliance. Their position was difficult, for they had to clear themselves of two charges to which their conduct was open. Was it not inconsistent for a city which had refused to join others to be now seeking an alliance? Was it not ungrateful for a colony to be engaged in war with her mother-city? They confessed that their policy of isolation had been a mistake, but a mistake was pardonable when it proceeded from no bad

New preparations: 434-433. The Corcyraeans at Athens 433.

¹ Thuc. i. 24-31.

motive. It was now impossible to adhere to a policy which left them alone, for the Corinthians could bring all Peloponnesus against them. The war with Corinth had been forced upon them in spite of their appeal to arbitration, and, though it was the duty of a colony to treat her mother-city with all proper respect, she could not submit to injustice. The colonists were the equals of those who remained at home, and claimed to be treated as such.

The Athenians were not greatly concerned with the conduct of the Corcyraeans; for them the all-important question at the present moment was this: Would they be guilty of a breach of the treaty with Lacedaemon in receiving the Corcyraeans as allies? So far as the letter of the treaty went, it was undoubtedly open to either side to receive as allies states which were as yet the allies of neither. But the Corcyraeans wanted something more than a mere alliance; they wanted help—help against a city now bound by the Thirty Years' Peace to Athens; and how could the Athenians help them without coming into collision with the Corinthians, and through the Corinthians with the Spartan confederacy? This question the Corcyraeans could not meet with a direct answer; they made light of treaty obligations, and professing to believe that war between Athens and Sparta was inevitable and imminent, bade the Athenians choose whether they would enter into it with the navy of Corcyra, the second largest navy of Greece, as an ally or an enemy. At the same time, they pointed out that Corcyra was a most convenient station for controlling the route to Sicily, if it should be necessary to send ships thither, or intercept those which came from the west.

In reply to these arguments, the Corinthians, who had at once sent envoys to Athens to oppose the request of their
 Reply of the
 Corinthians. enemies, had much to say of the iniquity of the Corcyraeans, both in their general conduct and in their treatment of their mother-city. They had, of course, to veil, as they best could, their own refusal to submit the dispute to arbitration; but, on the other hand, they had

no difficulty in showing that an alliance between Corcyra and Athens must lead to a breach of the peace between Athens and Corinth. They could not deny the great advantage which Athens would derive from the acquisition of the Corcyraean fleet, but the war in which these ships were to be of such signal service was still in the future, and it might not come at all. Would it not be wiser for the Athenians to diminish the suspicion which they had incurred by their previous conduct about Megara, than to take a step which must turn the ill-feeling of Corinth—now undefined—into a real and active hostility? In old days, when Athens had need of help against Aegina, Corinth had lent ships to her, and it was owing to her action that Sparta had not sent aid to Samos. The Corinthians at that time maintained that each sovereign power must be allowed to punish her own revolted subjects, and they asked that the same principle might be applied in the present case. Whatever the balance of immediate advantage might be, a consistent and honest policy would be found to be the best.¹

5. Opinions at Athens were divided. The wise counsel of the Corinthians could not fail to impress their hearers; and every one must have felt that an alliance with Corcyra was a step towards war with Peloponnesus. On the other hand, it was clear that no real friendship with Corinth was possible. On the advice of Pericles, therefore, we may assume, the Athenians resolved to admit that the Athenians decide for a
Corcyraeans to a defensive alliance; they would not join them in any attack on the Corinthians, - alliance with Corcyra.
for that would involve a breach of the treaty of 445, but if the Corinthians attempted to land on Athenian or Corcyraean territory, each was bound to assist the other. By this measure the Athenians hoped to gain three advantages. In the first place, without any formal breach of the treaty, they secured the friendship of the Corcyraeans; in the second, they acquired a station on the

¹ Thuc. i. 32-43.

way to Sicily ; in the third, they hoped to see the navies of Corcyra and Corinth destroying each other, and thus leaving the control of the sea more completely in the hands of Athens. For in spite of her great fleet, Athens was not a power in the western seas of Greece ; the navies of Corinth and Corcyra, if united, would prove a serious obstacle to any operations in the Ionian sea, in Sicily or Italy. And if these navies, or even the Corinthian navy, were joined by the fleets of the Dorian colonists in Italy or Sicily, the resources of Athens, great as they were, would hardly be equal to the double task of engaging them, and retaining a strong hold on the allies in the north and east. To keep these navies apart, and wear them out, one upon the other, was clever policy—too clever. And to suppose that a merely defensive alliance with Corcyra could continue, or that the Corinthians would fail to see the true meaning of an arrangement, which, if it kept the letter, certainly broke the spirit of the treaty, was only possible to those who believed what they wished. The Corinthians, at any rate, regarded the decision of the Athenians as a step towards war.

In accordance with the resolution ten ships were sent to Corcyra under the command of Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, and two others. The generals received instructions to take no part in any engagement with the Corinthians, unless an attempt were made to land on Corcyra or any place belonging to the Corcyraeans. Soon afterwards, thinking this detachment insufficient for any effective purpose, the Athenians despatched twenty more ships under the command of Glaucon and Andocides.¹

¹ Thuc. i. 45-52, *C. I. A.*, i. 179 and suppl. iv. part i. Forbes, Thuc. i. p. 125 notes. The names of the leaders of the second expedition are given differently in Thucydides (Glaucon and Andocides) and the (emended) inscription (Glaucon, Metagenes, and Dracontides). The first expedition was sent out in the first prytany of the year of Apseudes, July-Aug. 433 ; the second later in the same Attic year. See Holzapfel, *Beiträge zur Griech. Gesch.* p. 175 ; Forbes, Thuc. i. p. 32 notes and p. 125 ; Hicks' *Manual of Greek Hist. Ins.*, No. 41 ; Freeman's *Hist. of Sicily*, iii. 619 ff.

What induced the Athenians to send out so small a contingent as ten ships was a puzzle to antiquity and is a puzzle to us. Plutarch gives a foolish explanation: that Pericles purposely sent out the son of his old opponent Cimon with an inadequate force, in order that he might fail, and fall into contempt. Pericles never sank to such a device as this.

Why did the Athenians send so small a force?

It is more natural to suppose that the Athenians were at first very doubtful about their policy, and wished to keep strictly within the limits of a defensive alliance, but when they learnt more of the preparations of Corinth, and the inequality of the fleets, the danger of the situation impressed them. Half-measures were impossible. If the Corcyraean fleet were destroyed the chief advantage of the new alliance would be lost; they would have incurred the enmity of Corinth for nothing. A second and larger contingent was therefore sent in the hope of saving the Corcyraean fleet from destruction.

It was unfortunate for Hellas that no Hermocrates arose at this moment to point out the disastrous effects of the policy on which Corinth and Corcyra had embarked. If the Corinthians, the most far-sighted of the Greeks, had not been blinded by passion, they would have perceived that a union with Corcyra was the best means of restraining the aggression of Athens. A conflict was fatal. Every ship which they lost was a ship gained by Athens. But all far-sighted policy was forgotten in the exasperation of the moment. To punish the rebellious city, which had so long defied them, which competed with them in every western port, and controlled the route to Sicily, was so dear an object that they forgot their usual wisdom. In old days they had acted the honourable part of peacemakers between Agrigentum and Syracuse, between Athens and Plataea, but now they were prepared to plunge all Hellas in war to satisfy their hatred.

Mistaken policy of the Corinthians.

6. When their envoys returned with the intelligence that Athens had decided to support Corcyra, the Corinthians

prepared for the renewal of the war. Collecting a fleet of 150 vessels they sailed to Chimerium, a promontory in Thesprotia near the mouth of the Cocytus. Preparations for battle. On hearing of their approach the Corcyraeans advanced with 110 vessels to one of the islands off the coast of Epirus, known as Sybota; and with them were the ten Athenian vessels. Both fleets were supported by a force of infantry: the Corinthians by an army of the barbarians of the mainland, who were at all times their friends; the Corcyraeans by their own infantry and some Zacynthians, stationed on the promontory of Leucimne, in the south of the island of Corcyra.

When their preparations were completed, the Corinthians set sail in the night from Chimerium, and as morning broke they discovered the Corcyraeans in the open sea bearing down upon them. The battle of Sybota. The battle was the greatest which had yet taken place between two Hellenic fleets. It was not a sailor's battle, but a "conflict of landsmen at sea." The decks of the ships were crowded by soldiers, heavy and light armed, and when ship joined with ship the two crews fought together as if on land. The Athenian vessels, without taking any part in the fighting, rowed up wherever they saw the Corcyraeans in difficulties, hoping by their presence to scare away the enemy. The Corinthian right wing was defeated by the Corcyraeans, who pursued them to the mainland, and even went ashore to burn and plunder the tents in the camp, thus wasting precious moments, when their help was needed elsewhere. For on the left the Corinthians put the Corcyraeans to flight, and pressed them so hard that the Athenians, forgetting their orders, joined in the battle and engaged with the Corinthians, who in their fury cared neither to capture men, nor tow away disabled ships, but sailed through the wrecks, cutting down every one upon them. When they had driven the Corcyraeans to land they collected their damaged ships, and the dead, and conveyed them to Sybota—not the island, but a deserted harbour on the mainland;

after which they returned to the conflict. The Corcyraeans advanced to meet them, and the signal had already been given for a second attack, when the Corinthians suddenly retired. Twenty vessels were seen approaching, which proved to be the second squadron from Athens. These joined the Corcyraean fleet.¹

Though they had destroyed seventy of the enemy's ships, and lost but thirty of their own, the Corinthians did not venture to renew the attack on the following day. Enough, if they could convey their prisoners home in safety. In order to ascertain what opposition would be offered, they sent a few men in a boat, without a flag of truce, to the Athenians, upbraiding them with their action and calling upon them, if they were at war with Corinth, to take the crew of the boat, and deal with them as enemies. The Athenians replied that they were merely defending their allies; if the Corinthians sailed against Corcyra, resistance would be offered, but not otherwise. The Corinthians then sailed home, and on their way Anactorium was betrayed to them. Among their captives, who numbered more than a thousand, were two hundred and fifty of the most influential men at Corcyra. These they treated with the greatest respect, in the hope that by their influence the city might yet be won over; the remainder, who were slaves, were sold.

The Athenians
prevent a
second
engagement.

"Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and the Athenian fleet returned home. This was the first among the causes of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians alleging that the Athenians had taken part with the Corcyraeans, and had fought against them in defiance of the treaty."²

7. A second cause of hostilities soon arose, and in this case also it was the Athenians and Corinthians who came

¹ The date of the battle is uncertain; Holzapfel, *l.c.* p. 75, 86 f. gives May 11-13, 432. In that case ten months or thereabouts were occupied in preparations. See *supra*, p. 78 n. The account of Diodorus, xii. 33, differs in some respects from Thucydides.

² Thuc. i. 46-55.

into collision. Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the isthmus of Pallene, was a tributary ally of Athens, but governed by Athens and Potidaea. officers sent annually from Corinth. The Athenians, aware of the hostile spirit now prevailing in that city, were afraid that the Potidaeans might be induced to revolt. They had the greater reason for alarm, because Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, their former ally, had now become their enemy, eager to bring about war between Athens and Sparta, and was entering into negotiations with Corinth and the Chalcidian Greeks (*supra*, p. 44). Under such circumstances the revolt of Potidaea would be followed by the revolt of Chalcidice. To prevent this disaster, the Athenians demanded that the Potidaeans should send away the Corinthian officers, and refuse to receive them for the future; raze their city wall towards Pallene; and also give hostages for their good behaviour. They happened at the time to be sending a fleet to act against Perdiccas, and the generals in command were ordered to put in at Potidaea and see these demands carried out.¹

The Potidaeans in their distress sent envoys to Athens to obtain, if possible, some remission of the sentence, but as the Athenians proved inexorable, other envoys were taken by the Corinthians to Lacedaemon. Here they received a promise that if the Athenians attacked Potidaea, the Peloponnesians would invade Attica. Upon this the Potidaeans resolved to revolt. They were joined by the Chalcidian Greeks, and their neighbours the Bottiaeans. Perdiccas also supported them, and on his advice, the Chalcidians abandoned their settlements on the coast, and established a common centre at Olynthus.

The Athenian fleet, on arriving off the coast, found it

¹ Thuc. i. 56, 57. The text has *τριάκοντα ναῦς ἀποστελλοντες καὶ χιλίους ὀπλίτας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ, Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Λυκομήδους μετ' ἄλλων δέκα στρατηγοῦντος*. If the numeral is right we have here eleven generals, not to mention the four who were subsequently sent out (c. 61), but see Forbes, *ad loc.*

impossible to make a combined attack on Perdiccas and the revolted cities in Chalcidice. For the moment they left the cities to themselves, and in concert with their allies, Philip, the brother of Perdiccas, and his cousins, the brothers of Derdas (see *supra*, p. 39), they made war on Perdiccas.

The Corinthians were much alarmed by the movements of the Athenians, and at once took steps to counteract them. By the exertions of Aristeus, the son of Adimantus, a warm friend to Potidaea, a volunteer force was enrolled, and mercenaries were hired

Corinth sends
help to
Potidaea.

from the Peloponnese, amounting in all to a force of 2000 men, who, with Aristeus in command, arrived at Potidaea forty days after the revolt of the city. The Athenians replied by sending out an additional force of 2000 heavy armed. The previous army, which was still engaged in Macedonia, had captured Therma and was besieging Pydna, when it was joined by the reinforcements. Terms were arranged with Perdiccas, for it was now impossible to remain longer in Macedonia, and the two armies marched overland to Gigonus, a town not far from Potidaea. Aristeus, in expectation of their arrival, had taken up a position on the neck of the isthmus between Potidaea and Olynthus. He was aided by a detachment of cavalry under Perdiccas, who, when he had got the Athenians out of his country, at once broke faith with them, and by allies from the Chalcidian cities. He divided his forces into two parts; Perdiccas and the allies were stationed at

Battle of
Potidaea.

Olynthus, while he remained with his own troops on the isthmus. By this means he hoped to bring the Athenians under a double attack. But Callias, the Athenian general, met the manœuvre by sending a force to keep Perdiccas in check, while he marched on Potidaea. In the battle which followed, Aristeus and his wing were completely victorious, breaking the enemy's line and pursuing them for a considerable distance, but the rest of the army was defeated and driven into the walls of the city. When Aristeus returned he found himself cut off from Potidaea; but by gathering his

forces into as small a compass as he could, he succeeded in making his way along the breakwater into the town, though with difficulty and some loss of men. The forces at Olynthus took no part in the battle; and on neither side were the cavalry brought into action.

Immediately after this victory the Athenians built a wall across the isthmus, cutting Potidaea off from the mainland; and when a new contingent arrived from Athens under the command of Phormio, a second wall was built, severing the city from the peninsula. Potidaea was now completely invested, and Aristeus, seeing that there was little hope of saving the town without reinforcements, after a vain attempt to persuade the larger part of the garrison to join him in an effort to escape by sea, slipped himself through the Athenian lines, and opened negotiations with the Peloponnesus for the relief of the city.¹

The Athenians and Corinthians, though allies under the truce of 445, had met in battle. They were practically at war with one another. But as the Corinthians had sent out their forces independently of the Peloponnesian confederacy—they were in fact mainly volunteers or mercenaries—the rest of the Peloponnesians were not bound by their action; nor were the Spartans compelled to regard the hostilities as a breach of the peace between themselves and Athens.

8. The excitement at Corinth was great; it was unfortunate for the peace of Hellas that of all the cities of the confederacy it was Corinth who felt herself injured, for in energy and capacity she was quite the leading city of the Peloponnesus. Aegina and Megara had felt the weight of Athenian oppression, but they had taken no active steps to obtain redress, and might have taken none, had not the Corinthians set the example by inviting the injured allies to meet them at Sparta. There they attacked the Athenians sharply, declaring that they

¹ Thuc. i. 58-65.

had broken the treaty by their proceedings at Corcyra and Potidaea. They called on the Lacedaemonians to rescue the cities of the confederacy, which looked to them for help. Sparta herself had no special reason for going to war; Athens had not in any way injured her, or shown the least inclination to attack the Peloponnesus. But it was impossible to turn a deaf ear to the complaints of so important a city as Corinth. Any other members of the confederacy who had similar charges to make, were requested to appear at Sparta to state their case before the Lacedaemonian assembly.¹ Among others the Megarians came forward, declaring that they had been excluded from Athens and the ports of the Athenian empire contrary to the provisions of the Thirty Years' Truce. The Aeginetans also, though they did not venture to send envoys to the conference openly, complained bitterly in secret of their lost independence. Others followed with the story of their wrongs, and last of all, the Corinthians, relying on the indignation which these tales of oppression had excited, came forward. In the speech which Thucydides has put into their mouths on this occasion, they severely reproach the Lacedaemonians for their supine and inactive policy. Athens had been allowed to enslave one Grecian community after another; her aims were no secret, yet no measures had been taken to counteract them. She had been allowed to gain Corcyra by fraud and retain it by force, and to besiege Potidaea; yet Corcyra would have brought a larger number of ships into the confederate navy than any other city, and Potidaea was the most convenient base for operations in Thrace. Such was Sparta's way; ever since the Persian war she had allowed Athens to advance, step by step, even though her own allies fell beneath the yoke. A city which had the power to prevent the

The allies
present at an
assembly of the
Lacedae-
monians.

Speech of the
Corinthians.

¹ Thuc. i. 66, 67. The Corinthians *παρακάλουν εὐθὺς ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα τοὺς συμμάχους*: then the Lacedaemonians *προσπαρακάλεσαν* *τες τῶν συμμάχων καὶ εἴ τις τι ἄλλο ἔφη ἡδικῆσθαι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων*, *ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν ποιήσαντες τὸν εἰωθότα λέγειν ἐκέλευον*.

enslavement of her allies and failed to do so, was in truth guilty of their slavery, and the more so if she invited confidence as the champion of freedom. "At last we have met, but even now you do not seem to recognise the danger; you alone are inactive; you do not crush an evil in the bud, but allow it to develop and increase. You are regarded as a tower of strength, but your conduct belies your reputation. When the Persian invaded Greece, he was allowed to advance as far as the Peloponnesus before he met with any serious resistance, and as he perished by his own blunders, so it is by the mistakes of the Athenians, rather than by any help received from you, that we have hitherto escaped." Hope in you is a delusion which has already proved the ruin of some.

"A power like that of Athens needs constant watchfulness, constant innovation and improvement in army and fleet. Changes must be made when necessary, for a state which is never changing cannot meet one that is always progressing. So let there be an end to your inactivity. Do not compel us to seek a new alliance, which we must do, if you abandon us—and we can do it without offence before God or man; for the real truce-breakers are those who fail to fulfil their obligations."¹

9. Some Athenian envoys, who happened to be at Sparta on other business, requested permission to come forward and address the meeting. They did not wish to make any reply to the charges which had been made against their city, but rather to point out the gravity of the situation, and by calling to mind the past history of Athens to moderate the prevailing eagerness for war. They spoke of the services which their city had rendered to Hellas at Marathon and Salamis. In that great struggle they had sacrificed everything in the cause of freedom, leaving their lands and houses to be wasted by the enemy. Had they gone over to the Persians, an engagement at sea would have been

¹ Thuc. i. 68-72.

impossible, and Greece would have fallen without a struggle into the hands of the invader.

If any city could have a claim to empire, Athens had such a claim, and she acquired her position, not by force, but as a gift—a prize which the Lacedaemonians deliberately abandoned. Once placed in this position Athens had no choice but to remain in it; security, honour, profit, all pointed in one direction, for, as time went on, some of her allies became alienated, others had been reduced after revolt; and Sparta, no longer friendly as before, was ready to receive the rebels.

It is the fate of those who govern to be disliked; and had she become an imperial city, Sparta herself would not have escaped censure. She also would have found it necessary to rely on force. It is human nature to keep what we have got; it is an universal law that the weaker must submit. Sparta had been willing to allow the claims of Athens until her interests induced her to talk about justice—an argument by which no one was ever restrained, when he had power on his side.¹ The outcry against Athens was due not so much to her violence as to her moderation. The allies were allowed so much equality that they resented the slightest exercise of authority; they forgot their privileges, which were many, and thought only of their losses, which were few. Wrongs done to equals cause more bitterness than the open violence of oppression. The rule of another is at all times burdensome; and the Lacedaemonians would soon lose their popularity if they were in the position of Athens, and even more so because they were less fitted to deal with strangers. A Lacedaemonian, when away from home, lost his native virtues and could not acquire new ones.

“Do not let yourselves be driven into a war of which the end is uncertain. No one knows what course events may take in a long struggle. Let discussion come first; action last. Do not break the existing treaty, but rather let our

¹ Cp. what is said in the Melian Dialogue, Thuc. v. 89 f.

quarrel be settled by arbitration as our agreement provides.”¹

10. When the Athenians had spoken, all strangers were bidden to withdraw while the Lacedaemonians discussed the matter among themselves. The ecclesia had been summoned to take note of the complaints of the allies, not to decide on peace or war; there was no formal meeting of the allies, many of whom were not represented. At Sparta there were two parties in the state; those who, though aware of the danger, and anxious to save their allies from Athens, were not less aware of the advance which Athens had made during the last fifty years in comparison with Sparta; and those who, regarding Spartan institutions as perfect, considered her the foremost power in Greece. The first party were represented by Archidamus, who had now been on the throne about forty years, and had rendered the state signal service at a time of imminent danger (vol. ii. pp. 266, 317), a man who could look beyond the Peloponnesus, and was indeed on intimate terms with the leading men at Athens, with Thucydides, the son of Melesias, no less than with Pericles. The leader of the Tories, if so they may be called, was Sthenelaidas, one of the ephors of the year.

Archidamus spoke with the experience of age. He knew what war was, and, so far as he could judge, the war which was now impending would be as great or greater than any in the past. The Athenians were not neighbours within easy reach; they lay at a distance; they were sailors, not landsmen, with a great experience of maritime warfare, and possessed of ample resources. “We cannot rely on our ships,” he said, “for they are too few; nor on our wealth, for in this we are even more deficient.”—“Yes! but we are superior in numbers, and we can ravage their territory.” “To what purpose, when they can draw supplies

¹ Thuc. i. 73-78. On the historical value of the speeches of Thucydides, see the Essay of Prof. Jebb in *Hellenica*.

ERRATUM

Page 88, sidenote, *for* 'Parties and party traders at Athens,' *read* 'Parties and party leaders at Sparta.'

from their empire?"—"But we can induce their allies to revolt." "Even for that a fleet is necessary. And do not suppose that the Athenians will yield when they see us in their territory. Far from it; an invasion will only exasperate them into more stubborn resistance. If we rely upon invasion for success, we are likely to bequeath the war to our children."

"Yet we must not let their conduct pass without notice. We must send envoys to demand satisfaction, and in the meantime push on our preparations and procure money or ships from any source, Greek or barbarian, for there is no dishonesty in that. In a year or two, if they will not listen to us, we can attack them; but when they see that we are ready, they will probably give way, and save their land from injury. To many this may seem a new instance of our slow and dilatory policy. But let us not be shamed out of our habits. 'The more haste, the worse speed,' is at times a true saying. To what do we chiefly owe the greatness and glory of our city? We owe it, without doubt, to that national slowness, which acts prudently and deliberately, which neither praise can beguile nor reproach can sting into precipitate conduct—to that orderliness and self-respect which teach us to rise above dishonour, but to obey the laws. In war, criticisms and comparisons are of little use; it is wise to assume that one nation is as good as another; and that chance is beyond calculation.

"Let us, then, follow the example of our fathers; and instead of being hurried into war after a short day's debate, let us consider the question quietly, and meanwhile send to the Athenians to remonstrate. This it is our duty to do, as they offer to settle the matter by arbitration."

Such were the arguments of Archidamus. Foreseeing the future, and estimating the struggle at its true magnitude, he sought to defer the momentous decision. But Sthenelaidas was of another temper.

"The lengthy speech of the Athenians passed my comprehension," he said; "they spent a world of words in praise

of themselves, but they could not deny the wrongs which they were doing to our allies in Peloponnesus. If they were so virtuous in their conduct in the Median war, and now act like rogues, they deserve a double punishment; they have lost a good character and got a bad one. We at least have made no such change; and if we are true to ourselves, we shall not allow our allies to be injured, or delay to help them, for there is no delay on the other side. Other nations may have ships and money, but we have brave allies, and we must not abandon them. Why discuss outrages, of which no one disputes the reality? We must put forth our strength at once. It is not for us who suffer to deliberate, but those who plot iniquity may well take time about it. I call on you, Lacedaemonians, to vote for war—for immediate war—the only vote worthy of you. Do not allow the Athenian power to increase; do not abandon your allies; let us help the injured, and God will help us.”

The question was now put to the Assembly, whether the Athenians had broken the treaty or not. It was the custom at Lacedaemon to decide by acclamation, but on this occasion, under the pretence that he could not distinguish which was the louder cry, Sthenelaidas divided the Assembly, directing those who said “Aye” to go to one side, and those who said “No” to go to the other. The result was thus placed beyond doubt. A large majority voted that the treaty had been broken. The decision was at once communicated to the allies, who were then dismissed to their cities.¹

II. After passing this vote, the Lacedaemonians consulted the oracle at Delphi, where they received a favourable response: “If they did their best in the war, they would gain the day; and the deity would himself take their part, invited or uninvited.” They now formally summoned all the members of the confederacy to Sparta, and put the question of peace and war before them. On this occasion, as before, the

¹ Thuc. i. 79-87.

Corinthians were most energetic; they did their utmost to excite their allies, and, when all the rest had spoken, they came forward themselves, insisting that immediate war was necessary to put an end to the growing power of Athens. Those who had been brought into contact with the Athenians need not be warned against them, and those who supposed that their inland position placed them beyond the reach of danger must remember that on the control of the seaboard rested the free export and import of commodities; if they were negligent now, their own turn would soon come. True, they were now at peace, but war was to be preferred to peace if it secured permanent freedom; better war with the prospect of victory and peace, than peace with the risk of war and subjection. The present was a favourable opportunity for taking up arms, and the grounds were adequate. There was a good chance of success. On land the Peloponnesian confederacy had greater numbers, superior skill and organisation; and, though the Athenians had money and ships in abundance, the Peloponnesians could contribute to the expense of the war, or borrow funds from Olympia or Delphi. When they had money, it would be easy to build ships, and buy up the foreign sailors who rowed in the Athenian fleet. Or the allies of Athens might be induced to revolt. At any rate, the risk must be run, for submission simply meant slavery.

General meeting of the allies at Sparta: speech of the Corinthians.

The Lacedaemonians, having heard what their allies had to say, called on each of those present to give his vote, and the majority were in favour of war. But so ill prepared was the confederacy, so unwilling, we may perhaps add, were the Spartans themselves, or at least a considerable party among them, to take any active measures—for no wrong had been done to them by the Athenians—that nearly a year elapsed before they invaded Attica.¹

The allies decide for war.

¹ Thuc. i. 119-125. ὁμῶς δὲ καθισταμένοις ὧν ἔδει ἐναντὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβη, ἔλασσον δὲ, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀρᾶσθαι φανερώς. This second Assembly at Sparta must have taken

12. In the interval, embassies went to and fro between Sparta and Athens in the hope that war might be averted; or, if this were impossible, that the Athenians might be clearly put in the wrong. The Lacedaemonians first called on the Athenians to banish the "accursed," by whom were meant the Alcmaeonidae, who had been guilty of sacrilege in the matter of Cylon (vol. i. p. 296). Had the Athenians agreed to this demand, Pericles must have gone into exile, and the greatest obstacle to peace would have been removed. But so far from yielding, the Athenians retorted by bidding the Lacedaemonians expel the "curse of Taenarus," and the "curse of Athena of the Brazen House" (vol. ii. p. 261). In a second embassy the Athenians were requested to raise the siege of Potidaea, and restore Aegina to independence. They could reply that the allied states of Sparta had already agreed to the principle that each confederacy should deal as it chose with its own subject allies; and in the position of Aegina there had been no change whatever since the peace of 445 was concluded. Once more, the Lacedaemonians insisted that the decree which excluded the Megarians from trading in the markets of Athens and the Athenian empire should be cancelled; if this were done, there would be no war. To this the Athenians answered: first, that the Megarians had tilled the border land between the two countries and sheltered fugitive slaves; and secondly, that the Lacedaemonians were in the habit of expelling strangers from their own city. If they would admit strangers to Lacedaemon, the Athenians would admit the Megarians to their markets; but in the truce there was no stipulation on these matters. A final embassy came with a demand which swept away all these minor differences in one general request. The Lacedaemonians, they said, desire peace, and peace there will be if

place soon after the previous meeting, not later than October 432, and if the invasion took place about the beginning of June 431, *infra*, p. 117, the "somewhat less than a year" is equivalent to only eight or nine months. See Forbes, *ad loc.*

you will restore the Hellenes to independence; if not, there will be war—a broad condition, which commanded universal sympathy. It was one thing to go to war for the interests of Aegina and Megara, or for the deliverance of Potidaea, and quite another to come forward as the champion of freedom throughout Greece. The Athenians replied, on the advice of Pericles, that they were willing to settle the matters in dispute by arbitration, as was provided in the terms of the treaty, but they would do nothing upon compulsion.¹

¹ Thuc. i. 126, 139, 144, 145.

CHAPTER IV.

GREECE ON THE EVE OF THE WAR.

I. In the Peloponnesian war two states were brought into collision, which stood in sharp contrast to each other at every point. Ionian was matched with Dorian, a maritime power with a land power, the mistress of an empire with an ill-organised confederacy; Athens was a democracy, Sparta was an oligarchy; Athens was progressive, Sparta held to the past and resisted innovation in every form; Athens trusted to the free impulses of her citizens for the fulfilment of civic duty, Sparta never allowed her citizens to be out of training; Athens is the pattern of development, Sparta of "regimentation."

What was implied in the contrast of Dorian and Ionian we cannot fully appreciate. Dorian differed from Dorian, and Ionian from Ionian. The Dorians of Sparta and Crete, trained in peculiar institutions, and to a great extent shut off from intercourse with other nations, were very unlike the Dorians of Corinth or Megara, who were maritime nations, living by commerce and trading in every port of Greece. The Ionians of Athens, though they acknowledged kindred with the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, occupied a unique position, and attracted an admiration which was not granted to the citizens of Miletus or Samos. Yet in spite of these differences the contrast between the two tribes was so deeply felt throughout Greece that they were regarded as natural enemies.¹ Each had distinct customs (*νόμιμα*) by which they ordered their

¹ Thuc. vi. 82.

lives. The Dorians were the harder race, and the more capable of discipline; their ordinary habits were severe, and they were thought to make better soldiers, because they did not shrink from laborious training. The Ionians were less solid, and less sombre. Theirs was a pleasure-loving nature; they delighted in festivals; their habits tended to be luxurious, as their clothing was delicate.¹ Even at Athens, in spite of the development of democratic sentiment, the luxurious style and dress of the old Ionians continued to be in use long after the time when Sparta had adopted simpler habits; and of the Athenians of his own time Pericles proudly says: "We have not forgotten to provide ourselves with many relaxations from toil: we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; at home the style of our life is refined, and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy."² For these reasons the Ionians were regarded as unwarlike, without any real force of character, and incapable of supporting toil or privation.³ Yet such judgments must have been founded on partial evidence. The Ionian sailors, when on duty, at any rate in the Athenian fleet, submitted to severe training, and the Corinthians describe the Athenians as the most energetic of men, who made the performance of duty a kind of festival. Pericles, also, when comparing the Spartans with the Athenians, claims for his countrymen that they discharge the duties of citizenship as fully as the Spartans, though they do not oppress themselves with the same laborious training.⁴

2. A contrast more easily realised is that between Athens, as the mistress of an empire, a single city with all her forces

¹ Thuc. i. 6.

² Thuc. ii. 38.

³ Cp. Hdt. vi. 12.

⁴ The common Greek opinion of the Spartans is given in Thuc. iii. 57; cp. vi. 80; in v. 105 the Athenians criticise this view; cp. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 289, οἶσιν οὔτε βωμὸς οὔτε πύρρις οὔθ' ὄρεος μένει, and *Pax*, 623 f. Thucydides describes the Spartans as the most convenient enemies whom the Athenians could have had, i.e. the least capable of taking advantage of their mistakes, yet there are no Athenians who can be compared for efficiency and resource with Brasidas, Gylippus, and Lysander

under her own control, and Sparta, the head of an ill-organised confederacy, comprising a number of cities, with very various, and at times conflicting, interests. Before war could be declared, the Lacedæmonians must be persuaded to summon the allies, and the allies, or a majority of them, must be persuaded to agree. At Athens, a vote in the Assembly was enough to set all the forces of the empire in motion. Here Athens would seem to have had greatly the advantage of Sparta; yet many circumstances concurred to diminish her superiority. The great extent of her empire made it difficult to concentrate her forces at any one point, and in the Peloponnesian war this difficulty was increased by the revolt of Potidaea, by which the forces of Athens were divided at the very beginning of the war. The danger of revolt in the Asiatic cities could never be left out of sight; the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf must be kept in Athenian hands, and the Euripus carefully watched; other ships were required to collect the tribute, and keep piracy in check. But the resources of Athens were ample, and, if they had been at the disposal of one man, they would have been more than sufficient for the demands made upon them. This, however, was not the case, even in the days of Pericles.

The Athenian empire; its extent a difficulty. The great administrative power at Athens was the Assembly, and not even Pericles could always carry the Assembly with him. He had opponents who attacked him from all sides, and when he had carried his measures about the war, and the plan of campaign, he was still liable to be outvoted in matters of detail. After his death the evil increased tenfold; no clear and consistent plan of operations was ever formed; at one moment there was an inclination to peace; at another, to recover power in central Hellas; at another, ships were sent to Sicily. Worse still was the publicity which attended discussions in the Assembly; unless large powers were delegated to the generals, who could then form and carry out some scheme of their own, the plans of the Athenians were known to their enemies

The Athenian Assembly.

almost as soon as they were formed. If, on the other hand, large powers were granted to one man, however capable, the people became suspicious that he might use them for his own purposes, and the cry of "tyranny" was at once raised. Even in the Assembly itself a patriotic Athenian had to encounter the greatest difficulties. If the picture drawn by Thucydides in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus is to be accepted (*infra*, p. 170), it was almost impossible for a man to come forward honestly. His motives in speaking were always suspected, and a sound proposal could only be carried by deception. At the same time the Athenians were strict in their ideas of responsibility; though the whole meeting was unanimous in supporting a proposal, the mover of it was held responsible, and if by any accident the result was unfortunate, the Assembly were ready to visit the failure on the head of the adviser, who, if he had opposed their wishes, would have been suspected of treachery to the state.¹

Worse still was the relation of the general to the Assembly. In the days of Cimon, the general and the "orator" were one and the same. The general came before the Assembly and explained his views; if the Assembly voted in his favour, he carried out what he had proposed. But as time went on, the general was rarely a leader in the Assembly. Younger men, without experience of war, and men of the people, who neither wished to be generals nor were qualified for the post, became prominent in the Assembly, while the generals were more and more confined to their official duties. Hence they were often employed to carry out plans of which they were not the authors, and which, perhaps, were not even practicable. More especially was a general in danger when, like Demosthenes, he had sacrificed Athenian lives in vain. The office

The position of
the Generals at
Athens.

¹ See Thuc. iii. 43, νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἥντινα τύχητε ἔστιν ὅτε σφαλόντες, τὴν τοῦ πείσαντος μίαν γνώμην ζημιούτε, καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλαὶ οὖσαι ξυνεξήμαρτον: viii. 1, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι: cp. also ii. 64.

was, in truth, one which could not be undertaken without risk. Even Nicias, who enjoyed the confidence of his citizens as no other general did after the death of Pericles, was unable to act freely in Sicily, for fear of the trial which he knew would await him on his return; and when the wisest course open to him was to save the remnant of the forces under his command, he could not bring himself to do what he knew to be his duty as a general and a citizen, for fear of the trial which would await him before judges unacquainted with the facts, and influenced by every passing breath of oratory.¹

3. Thus, owing to the nature of the empire, and the form of her constitution, Athens could not exercise to the full the advantages which she derived from her imperial position.

The Spartan confederacy. The difficulties with which Sparta had to contend were of another kind. The Peloponnesian confederacy was made up of a number of cities, some maritime and some inland, whose interests and policy could not be the same; and Sparta's authority over them was not easily defined or enforced. Being essentially a land power, she stood in a different relation to Corinth and Megara on the one hand, and to Arcadia and Elis on the other. She could prevent the Mantineans from extending their dominion over the neighbouring Arcadian tribes, but she could not save Potidaea for Corinth. The constant dread of a rising of the helots—the memory of Ithome—sank even deeper into the minds of the Lacedaemonians than the memory of Samos into the minds of the Athenians, and made them unwilling to send out their best troops in large numbers on distant service. When Brasidas marched to Thrace he took with him 1700 heavy-armed, of whom 700 were helots, men of whom the Spartans wished especially

¹ Thuc. vii. 48. Nicias says: εὖ γὰρ εἶδέναι ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν ταῦτα οὐκ ἀποδέχονται ὥστε μὴ αὐτῶν ψηφισαμένων ἀπελθεῖν. καὶ γὰρ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψηφιεῖσθαι τε περὶ σφῶν καὶ τὰ πράγματα, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ, ὁρῶντας καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων ἐπιτιμῆσει ἀκούοντας γνῶσεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις εὖ λέγων διαβύλλῃ, ἐκ τούτων αὐτοὺς πείσεσθαι.

to be rid; the remainder were collected from the rest of Peloponnesus, but none were Spartans.¹—The conduct of war, when once war had been declared by a vote of the Spartan people and the allied cities, rested chiefly with the ephors, who could call out the forces and send them whither they chose, under the command of the Lacedaemonian kings. This was a gain in the direction of rapidity and concentration of movement, but though at Sparta there was no discussion of details in the Assembly, and certainly no public discussion in the Gerousia, there were parties there as well as at Athens; jealousies and enmities often fettered the action of successful generals. The energetic policy of Brasidas was not acceptable to those in authority. "They would not second his efforts because their leading men were jealous of him."² The same feeling is shown in the treatment of the admirals. The kings were not allowed to command the fleet, and therefore precautions were taken to prevent an admiral from obtaining too much power. His office was annual, and the same man could not be sent out twice; and though in the case of Lysander this difficulty was overcome by appointing him second in command to an admiral of no ability, even Lysander was taught that he must not enter into rivalry with the kings.

Jealousies and
enmities at
Sparta.

The Spartan commanders, whether admirals or kings, were allowed great freedom of action in the field. The king, at any rate, could lead the army whither he chose, per-
haps in secret understanding with the ephors; he could make peace without reference to the authorities at home; and when Agis was stationed at Decelea, he acted almost as an independent power. Unlike the Athenians, the Spartans were very unwilling to condemn their officers for incompetence. Of the admirals in office during the early years of the war, Cnemus failed disgracefully on sea and land in the west of Greece; and Alcidas not only failed to aid the Mytilenaeans, but behaved with such cowardice and cruelty

Spartan
commanders.

¹ Thuc. iv. 78, 80.

² Thuc. iv. 108.

that there was no further attempt at revolt among the Athenian allies till Brasidas had produced a different impression. Yet both were retained in their command, commissioners being sent out to advise and support them. At Athens such failures would have been punished by death or banishment, but in the mind of the Spartans a soldier was a carefully prepared instrument, which was not to be destroyed or thrown aside.¹

4. The allies on either side at the beginning of the war were as follows:—The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the nations within the Isthmus except the Argives and Achaeans. These were friendly but neutral; and from the first the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians; afterwards their example was followed by the rest of the nation. Beyond the limits of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Opuntian Locrians, Boeotians, the Acarnanians of Oeniadae, Leucadians, and Ambraciots were on their side. Of these allies the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy; the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry; the other states infantry only. The allies of Athens were Chios and Lesbos, members of the old Delian League, who still retained their independence, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus. Besides these were the subject cities in the following regions:—The seaboard of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, and the islands which lay north-east of a line drawn from Peloponnese to Crete, except Melos and Thera.² Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra furnished ships, the rest soldiers and money.³

¹ See Thuc. v. 54, 60, 63, for the position of Agis as commander of the army, and for Agis at Decelea, viii. 5. "While he was with his army at Decelea, Agis had the right to send troops whithersoever he pleased, to raise levies, and to exact money." There must have been far abler and more experienced naval officers at Corinth and other maritime cities than could be found at Sparta, but owing to old tradition the command of the fleet was retained by Sparta.

² Thera paid tribute in 427 or 426.

³ Thuc. ii. 9.

Unfortunately Thucydides has not followed up this list of the allies on either side with a comparative statement of their respective armaments. He tells us what were the resources of Athens as estimated by Pericles, and what expectations the Peloponnesians, or, at any rate, the Corinthians, formed of success, but he never gives any clear account of the forces which Sparta and her allies could bring into the field. In regard to ships, the Athenian fleet is put at 300 vessels, a number which can be reached by the total sum of the ships in service in the first year of the war, and is never exceeded.¹ The Peloponnesians amused themselves with the fancy that they would be able, with the assistance of the Dorian cities in the west, to put on the sea a fleet of 500 ships.² But they never reached anything near this amount; the Corinthians in their great struggle with Corcyra were able to get together 150 ships, of which 90 were their own; but the united fleet of the Peloponnesians amounts to 100 ships only in 430. No more than 42 ships are sent to Lesbos; and 60 is the largest number sent to Corcyra, and also the number surrendered at Pylus in 425, after which the Lacedaemonians built no more ships till 413. Even with the assistance of the Persians they found it difficult to match the numbers of the Athenians.³

In the army, of course, the preponderance was very largely in favour of Sparta. Athens is credited with 29,000 heavy-armed, of whom, perhaps, 3000 were resident aliens. Of the number of troops furnished by the allies we have no statement. When he went to Pylus, Cleon took with him no citizens from Athens at all,

¹ In Thuc. ii. 23, 100 ships are sent round Peloponnesus; in c. 24, 100 are set apart with their trierarchs; in c. 26, 30 are sent to Locris, and 70 are at Potidaea (i. 61)=300. In iii. 17 the distribution is different, and the total only 250. The Lesbians and Chians, who send 50 ships in 430, send none in 431, and Pericles does not mention their contingents. (Xenophon) *Rep. Ath.* iii. 1 speaks of 400 trierarchs as appointed each year at Athens.

² Thuc. ii. 7.

³ Thuc. i. 46; ii. 66; iii. 26; iv. 2.

but only "the Lemnian and Imbrian forces who were at Athens at the time, the auxiliaries from Aenus, and 400 archers from other places"; and of the total of 5100 hoplites who went to Syracuse in 415 only 2200 were Athenians.¹ Whatever the number was at the beginning of the war, it was greatly diminished towards the close. At the siege of Potidaea there were 7000 Athenians under arms at one time; but 3400 is the number sent out in both the expeditions to Sicily; and we know from Thucydides that 4400 perished in the plague.²

The number of the Peloponnesian army which invaded Attica is given by Plutarch³ at 60,000. But, even if the Peloponnesian light-armed are included, this number is excessive. At the battle of Tanagra the allies had furnished a force of 10,000 men; Sparta could furnish about 5000 in round numbers, and Boeotia about 8000. This amounts to 23,000, and if we add 15,000 for the light-armed Boeotians, and the helot who accompanied every Spartan, we get 38,000 only. This is perhaps too low an estimate, and we may suppose that Sparta could count on the support of about 45,000 troops.⁴

5. The Athenians availed themselves of the services of bowmen and cavalry to support their infantry, but they had

¹ Thuc. ii. 13, 31; iv. 28; vi. 43. The Lemnians and Imbrians were however Athenians who had settled as *κληροῦχοι* in those islands.

² Though Alcibiades asserts that "Hellas has been singularly mistaken about her heavy-armed infantry," we may presume that Thucydides could obtain an accurate account of the number of heavy-armed at Athens. Yet his statements are hardly credible. The military age extended from 20 to 60, but the numbers given are 13,000 for those of military age, and 16,000 for those over or below military age (and the resident aliens). If from this sum we deduct 3000 for resident aliens, we have as many men from the two years 19, 20 and the years over 60 as for the years 21-60! ³ *Per.* 33.

⁴ At the battle of Delium (424) the entire Athenian force of heavy-armed is put at 7000—a striking contrast to the estimate of Pericles. See Delbrück, *Die Strategie des Pericles*, p. 82. Duncker, *Gesch. Alt.* ix. 405. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* i. 524, puts the invading army of the Peloponnesians at 20,000-25,000 heavy-armed. This was two-thirds of the whole force. (See also his *Bevölkerung*, p. 151.)

no organised light-armed force. The Spartans, on the other hand, had a force of light-armed ready to hand in their helots, but they had no cavalry. For these they trusted to the Boeotians, until the year 425, when they organised a body of 400 horse for the protection of Laconia.¹

In their mode of warfare the two armies differed greatly. The Spartans, trusting to their admirable skill and organisation, sought a fair field in which to fight the struggle out, and were able at Mantinea to retrieve even so great a disaster as a breach of their line. The Athenians displayed more versatility. Demosthenes, for instance, won the battle of Olpae by an ambuscade, and the battle of Idomene by a surprise, marching through the night, and attacking the enemy while still asleep. The greatest confusion often prevailed; at Delium the Athenians slew one another by mistake, and it frequently happened that one part of an army drove the enemy off the field, only to find on their return that the rest of their forces had been irretrievably defeated. The combination of different nationalities in the same army also gave rise to difficulties. In the night attack on Epipolae the Athenians were in terror of their own Dorian allies, whose war-cry, given in Doric, resembled that of the enemy. At Argos we find the nucleus of a standing army in the select thousand "whom the city had long trained at the public expense in military exercises"²; and in the course of the war the use of mercenaries became more common; even the Athenians, when they found out by experience the value of light-armed troops, did not hesitate to take into their pay the "most bloodthirsty of barbarians."³

When addressing the allies at Sparta before the beginning of the war, the Corinthians claimed for the Peloponnesians a superiority over the Athenians in courage, but acknowledged their inferiority in seamanship. This inferiority,

¹ Thuc. iv. 94, 55.

² Thuc. v. 67.

³ Thuc. vii. 29. For light-armed troops, cp. ii. 79; iii. 98; iv. 33 f.

they predict, will be removed by practice.¹ If we compare the position of the Athenian navy at the beginning and the close of the war, we find that the Corinthians were right. In the sea fights of 429 the skill of Phormio was irresistible, and the arrangements which Cnemus made to defeat the dreaded manœuvres of the Athenian ships were rendered entirely useless. With the progress of the war the balance passes over to the other side. The Corinthians show far greater genius in adapting themselves to the new conditions of naval warfare than the Athenians, who did not perceive when they entered the harbour of Syracuse that they were throwing away all opportunities of displaying their seamanship. Still, even after the destruction of her best ships and her best sailors, Athens held her own; the victories of Cyzicus and Arginusæ were greater than any previously gained in the war, and it was owing to treachery or to the foolish self-confidence of his enemy that Lysander was able to seize the entire Athenian fleet at Aegospotami.

6. In financial resources the Athenians had greatly the advantage of their opponents. We cannot, indeed, say that Athens was the only city in which there was any systematic finance, for we do not know how the navies of Corinth were supported, but from the time that the management of the Delian League passed into her hands, and still more from the time when the League became the Athenian empire, her position was quite different from that of any other city in Greece. In the year 435, before the outlay on the Propylæa and the siege of Potidaea, a sum of 9700 talents had been accumulated in the Acropolis, and at the beginning of the war 6000 t. were still at the disposal of the city. The income from the allies is put by Thucydides at 600 t.,² and if Xenophon is right in

¹ Thuc. i. 121.

² This perhaps includes more than the mere *φόρος*; cp. Thuc. iv. 108, who says that Amphipolis was useful to the Athenians *χρημάτων προσόδῳ*, but Amphipolis paid no tribute.

placing the total income of Athens at the beginning of the war at 1000 t., there was a further sum of 400 t. coming in from tolls, dues, mines, and other sources.¹ Considerable sums could also be obtained by borrowing from the temples, which had incomes of their own, distinct from the public revenues. When necessary, a property-tax could be levied, and though the Athenians were averse to taxing themselves directly, this particular burden, as it fell mainly on the rich, was regarded as tolerable by the sovereign Many.² A good deal of the cost of war was met by private expenditure. To every ship was attached a trierarch, whose business it was to keep the vessel in repair, and pay a large part of the maintenance when in service. The knights also spent money on their horses in addition to the allowance made by the state. There was an honourable and even extravagant spirit of emulation among the richer Athenians in these matters, which was stimulated by the reflection that a wise expenditure was the best means of winning popular favour. The Athenian was taught in a severe school that property has its duties as well as its rights and pleasures.

Against these large resources the Spartans and their allies had little to set—at least in public funds. That the cities of the confederacy made some kind of contri- Peloponnesian
finances. bution is stated by Thucydides, and the statement is confirmed by an inscription, but no details have been preserved.³ The amount was probably inconsiderable. Pericles says distinctly that the Peloponnesians had no money, either in private fortunes or in public treasuries.

¹ See Xen. *Anab.* vii. 1. 27. Aristoph. *Wasps*, 657 ff. enumerates the sources of Athenian income. He puts the total at 2000 t., but this is probably exaggerated, and in any case the *Wasps* was written after 425 when the tribute was raised.

² The rich suffered most in a war; Thuc. viii. 48.

³ Thuc. ii. 7. Hicks, *Historical Inscriptions*, 43. Plut. *Reg. et Imperial. Apophth.*, 'Αρχίδαμος ἐν τῷ Πελοποννησιακῷ πολέμῳ, τῶν συμμαχῶν ἀξιούντων ὀρίσαι τοὺς φόρους αὐτοῖς, εἶπεν, ὁ πόλεμος οὐ τεταγμένα σιτεῖται. The same is said of a younger Archidamus, the son of Agésilas, ζηρεῖ being substituted for σιτεῖται.

Even the Corinthians, who as a mercantile nation must have had a clear eye for finance, allow that the confederacy is without public funds; the deficiency must be met by borrowing from Delphi or Olympia. What amount of treasure was to be found in these temples is unknown, but they were banks to which money was taken for safety, and Elis was certainly a wealthy country, with little or no public expenditure. In Thebes, also, there were rich men, from whom contributions might be received; but the smallness of the Peloponnesian fleet, which depended on such sources, shows that Pericles was right in saying that the Peloponnesians would be more ready to risk their lives than their money. Another source from which funds might be obtained was the King of Persia; but, apart from the difficulty of sending envoys to Susa while the Athenians had command of the sea, it was quite uncertain which side the Great King would take. Till the year 412 nothing was received from his satraps, but from that time forward the Peloponnesian fleet was chiefly maintained at the expense of Persia, and it was by the gold of Pharnabazus and Cyrus that it was enabled to recover from the defeats of Cyzicus and Arginusæ.

7. Thus Athens was rich and powerful at sea; her fleet was beyond comparison superior to any force which could be brought against it, and she had the means of supporting it for years. Her army was also larger than that of any other Greek city. On the other hand the Peloponnesian confederacy could bring into the field a greater number of soldiers, the majority of whom were as good or better material, and better trained than the Athenian. That they had very little money to expend on war was not of much importance, so long as operations were restricted within narrow limits, for their army, when in the field, was to a large extent self-supporting.¹ Between belligerents so dissimilar, what plan of campaign

Plan of campaign—what was possible?

¹ Thuc. ii. 23: χρόνον ἐμμένοντες ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὅσου εἶχον τὰ ἐπὶ τῇδεῖα, if this means "so long as they could draw supplies from the country" (cp. iv. 6).

was possible? In previous wars the Athenian army had engaged the Lacedaemonians and their allies, partly in the region of the Isthmus, and partly in Boeotia—and the final result was the disaster of Coronea, and the renunciation of empire in Central Greece. But her fleet had sailed unchallenged round the Peloponnesus; she had burnt the Lacedaemonian docks at Gytheum, and established herself at Naupactus—a point from which she could exercise great influence in Western Greece. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, by the mere threat of invading Attica, had compelled Athens to withdraw from the positions which she held in the Peloponnesus, and they had seen the Athenian empire severely shaken by the revolt of Samos. From the experience of the past, plans were formed for the future. Pericles entirely abandoned the attempt to meet the enemy in the field. “They are more in number than we are,” he said; “if we defeat them they will come again in undiminished numbers, and if we are defeated our allies will break into revolt.”¹ What was worse still, the loss in every engagement, whatever the event, would fall wholly on Athens and her subject allies, while in the allied army, it would be divided among the various states.² The Athenians must not enter into the war with any hope of recovering their lost position in Central Greece; on the contrary, they must be prepared to sacrifice Attica itself and remain within the walls of the city, while their lands were being laid waste and their houses destroyed. “If only we were islanders,” Pericles said, “we should be impregnable; and we must feel as much like islanders as we can.” By this means the invasion of Attica, the most formidable instrument in the power of the enemy, would be rendered ineffective. The fleet was to be used with vigilance and caution. Athens must be supplied with food; the allies must be kept well in hand, the coasts of the Peloponnesus harried, but there must

¹ This actually happened after the battle of Delium.

² Cp. Thuc. iv. 73, where the Athenian generals refuse to enter into an engagement on this ground.

be no attempt to enter on distant expeditions—no enterprise that would distract the city from her immediate object, or waste her strength. He even persuaded the Athenians to set aside 1000 t. and withdraw 100 ships from active service to form a reserve against any great emergency, thus robbing the city of a large part of her resources at the very moment when he was entering on war. He trusted to the deficiencies of the enemy rather than to any active measures on his own part. The Peloponnesians had no money, and without money they could have no ships, and without ships they could not reach the allies of Athens. So long as her empire and revenue were safe, the city was really invulnerable. For war was, above all, a matter of money. If the Athenians clung to this principle, they could look with contempt on the operations of the enemy. If the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, the Athenians would attack the coast of the Peloponnesus; the attempt to establish a city which should control the supplies of Athens could be met by a counter-stroke—a fortress which should control Laconia. “It is a greater calamity to them to have a portion of Laconia ravaged than it is for us to have the whole of Attica laid waste, and no frontier fortress of theirs can prevent us from sailing out where we please, and inflicting damage on them. A naval force can do more in attacks on land than a land force can do in engagements at sea.”¹

The Peloponnesians trusted chiefly to their large and well-organised army. With the help of their allies in Boeotia, they could invade Attica whenever they chose. Plan of the Peloponnesians. Archidamus, indeed, though he did not suppose that the Athenians would sacrifice their empire to save Attica, hoped to the last that the threat of invasion would bring them to listen to terms, as had been the case in 445. Others, less familiar with the Athenian spirit, could not believe that they would submit to invasion year after year, and hoped by this means to bring the

¹ Thuc. i. 142.

war to a speedy issue. Beyond this the Peloponnesians had no clear plan of campaign. They expected to get ships from the west, and they would build others for themselves, which they would man with sailors tempted from the Athenian service by superior pay. With these they would aid the Athenian allies to revolt and cut off the revenues of the city. They spoke of establishing cities or fortresses which should be a constant source of annoyance to Athens, but these were schemes only, for which the means and the opportunity had yet to come.¹ Happily for them a great soldier and a great traitor came forward at Sparta, who saw where the blow must be struck and how to strike it.

8. We cannot but ask ourselves—Was Pericles right in his view? The conduct of the war down to his death, with the exception of the victories of Phormio, is on the whole a pitiable record. Would it not have been better to have risked a little more? Between the seizure of Plataea and the invasion of Attica there was an interval of nearly three months; in which, had the Athenian army been what it was in the days of Cimon, a blow might have been struck at Boeotia, or measures taken to secure the passes over the isthmus of Corinth. Pericles did not bring the siege of Potidaea to an end before engaging in the great struggle; and instead of dividing the forces of the enemy, he allowed his own to be divided. Even of his fleet he did not attempt to make the full use: he set aside a large portion of his available force. If with every ship at his command he had destroyed the commerce of Corinth, captured Cythera, and burned the docks at Gytheum, the war would have been finished almost as soon as it was begun. There was no

Criticism
of Pericles'
strategy.

¹ Cp. Thuc. i. 122, where we see how vague the plans of the Peloponnesians were: ἐπιτειχισμός τῇ χώρᾳ, ἀλλὰ τε ὅσα οὐκ ἂν τις νῦν προΐδοι. ἤκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥήτοϊς χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνᾶται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον. The Spartans threatened Euboea by colonising Heraclea in 426, but Athens replied effectively by taking Pylus in 425.

reason whatever why Athens should not have stood at the end of the first year of the war in the position which she occupied at the beginning of 424; but, in the hands of Pericles, the greatest Athenian fleet which ever sailed round Peloponnesus returned after devastating a miserable hamlet. In his infatuated belief that Athens, owing to her wealth, could wear out the enemy, he forgot that ships rapidly decay; that Athens was carrying on war at enormous cost with little or no result, while the Spartan operations were comparatively inexpensive. The invasion of Attica in the spring, when the Peloponnesians had nothing else to do, was little more than an excursion bringing a pleasant variety into life, at little expense and less risk.¹ In war delays are dangerous—*καί ποὶ οὐ μὲν τοί*—and with every year that passed it was more probable that some “accident would happen”: a powerful ally might revolt; the Great King might interfere; or a Spartan of genius find a weak point in the Athenian panoply,².

¹ In the busy season of the year the Peloponnesians were unwilling to invade Attica: Thuc. iii. 15.

² On the strategy of Pericles, see Duncker, *Gesch. Alt.* ix. 417 ff.; Pflugk-Hartung, *Perikles als Feldherr*. Delbrück, *op. cit.*, defends him.

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR DOWN TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES

431-429.

I. The Thebans had taken no part in the dispute which had arisen between Athens and the Peloponnesus, but they were allies of the Spartans, and for three-quarters of a century they had been on bad terms with the Athenians. About the time when the Pisistratidae were expelled from Athens, the inhabitants of Plataea, the city on the northern slopes of Cithaeron, had applied to Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, for protection against Thebes. Afraid of their neighbour's growing power—Thebes is six or seven miles to the north of Plataea, beyond the Asopus—they wished to break loose from the Boeotian confederation, of which Thebes was the head, and attach themselves to Sparta. Cleomenes pointed out that his city lay at a great distance from Plataea; before assistance could arrive from Peloponnesus the Thebans would have time to lay waste the Plataean territory, and enslave the city. He recommended the Plataeans to apply to Athens, their nearest neighbour, who could render effectual help. On this advice the Plataeans placed themselves under Athenian protection. A quarrel with Thebes followed, and though the Corinthians, who were called in to settle the matter, decided that Plataea should be allowed to choose her own alliance, the Thebans never acquiesced in the arrangement. They looked on Plataea as a Boeotian city, and only waited for an opportunity to enforce her allegiance to the Boeotian confederacy.¹

¹ Hdt. vi. 108. See vol. i. p. 442; *infra*, p. 177.

2. Such an opportunity seemed now to have arrived. At the beginning of spring, in the year 431, a force of more than three hundred Thebans, under the command of two of the Boeotarchs, entered Plataea by night. No watch had been set, for war had not yet been openly proclaimed, and the Plataeans had no reason to apprehend an attack. But the Thebans did not stand on ceremony when their interests were at stake, and here, as was only too often the case in Greece, treachery had been at work. There was a party in Plataea which hoped, by detaching the city from Athens, to get the chief power into their own hands. With this view they negotiated with Eurymachus, the son of Leontiades, an eminent Theban, for the despatch of the force, and when it arrived, they opened the gates and received it into the city. Their wish was to cut down their enemies at once, and so clear the ground for their own advancement; but the Thebans took a more conciliatory course. Grounding their arms in the market-place of the city, they called on those who wished to return to the ancient constitution of Boeotia to join them, and become their allies. It was not in the interest of a party, but in order to consolidate Boeotia, that they wished to recover Plataea.¹

The delay was fatal. At the first entrance of the Thebans, in the darkness of night, the Plataeans were panic-stricken; they could form no estimate of the number of the enemy, and, believing them to be far more numerous than they really were, they listened to their proposals. By degrees they discovered that the force was not so overwhelming, and, as the Plataean people were

¹ Thuc. ii. 2-4. For Leontiades see Hdt. vii. 233. The date of the attack is fixed by the words *τελευτῶντος τοῦ μηνός*—there was a new moon on March 9, and again on April 7 in 431—and the date of the invasion of Attica, which was eighty days after the attack on Plataea, *τοῦ θέρος καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος* (c. 19). As the harvest in Greece falls about the beginning of June, the new moon of March must be preferred to that of April.

strongly attached to Athens, they determined to attack the invaders. They reflected that the Thebans were strangers in the city, of which every street, house, and gateway was familiar to themselves. It was easy to surprise them if the attack was made in the dark. The plan was carried out. Just before daybreak a furious onset was made, and though for a short time the Thebans were able to resist, they were soon driven in confusion along the streets, seeking their way out of the city. The only gate open was that by which they had entered, and even this was quickly closed. The Plataeans met them at every turn; even the women threw down tiles and stones from the roofs of the houses; the largest and most compact body of the whole force rushed blindly into a great room adjacent to the city wall, mistaking the door for one of the city gates, and were thus at the mercy of the Plataeans. When day returned, one hundred and eighty Thebans, including Eurymachus, the chief author of the plot, had been taken captive; of the rest the majority had been killed.

It had been arranged that the main body of the Theban army should march out to support the attack. But in the night a heavy storm of rain had caused the Asopus to rise, and the river could not now be crossed without difficulty. Before the Thebans reached the Plataean territory, they were met with the report of the disaster which had befallen their countrymen. They pressed on, hoping to seize men and property as a compensation for their own citizens, who were in the hands of the Plataeans; the Plataeans, however, warned them by a herald that, if any damage were done to their property, the Theban captives would be put to death; if they retired, the captives would be given up. On this the Thebans went back into their own country. The Plataeans at once brought in their property from the fields, and when all was secured, they slew the whole of their prisoners.

The Plataeans
put their prisoners
to death.

News of the surprise of Plataea had been conveyed to Athens, and a second messenger had reported the capture of

the Thebans. The Athenians at once issued an order for the arrest of every Boeotian who happened to be in Attica, and despatched an envoy to Plataea, requesting that the prisoners should be kept for further instructions. The request, unhappily, came too late. The prisoners had already been put to death when the envoy arrived, and the Plataeans were preparing the city against attack.

Such was the first act of the great drama. It forms a striking instance of the insecurity of Greek life, and the furious passions to which this insecurity gave rise. In Plataea there is a party of traitors waiting for an opportunity to destroy their opponents with the help of the Thebans; the Thebans attack a city secured by treaty without waiting for any formal declaration of war; the victorious Plataeans, in spite of the promise by which the Theban army is induced to retire, put all the captives to death. The question was indeed debated whether the promise was or was not confirmed by an oath. Their cruelty and perfidy the Plataeans could not deny, but they resented the accusation of perjury; a refinement which merely proves the superstition and sophistry in which the Greeks of the time were sunk. A hundred years had yet to pass; Plataea had twice to be levelled to the ground, before this neighbourly quarrel was finally settled by the utter destruction of Thebes at the hands of Alexander.¹

3. The thirty years' truce had now been openly broken. Had the Plataeans, instead of acting with more folly if possible than cruelty, preserved their prisoners alive, the Thebans might have been brought to terms; Sparta might have disowned the action of her ally in violating the treaty. But the murder of one hundred and eighty Thebans made it impossible to draw back. On both sides preparations were now made for immediate war. There were doubtless many who hailed the outbreak as a relief from intolerable tension;

¹ Thuc. ii. 2-6. Diodorus, xii. 41, differs in some points.

many more who, from mere ignorance and love of change, were weary of peace. All Hellas thrilled with excitement at the impending contest of the greatest of Hellenic cities. Prophecies and oracles passed from mouth to mouth, and the ingenuity of diviners was tasked to the uttermost. Every uncommon phenomenon of nature was noticed and recorded. Quite recently for the first time in the memory of man the island of Delos had been "shaken." Public feeling was strongly on the side of the Spartans; they were looked on as the liberators of Hellas, while Athens was hated and feared as an aggressive and tyrannical city.¹ In their enthusiasm, men allowed their judgment to be swayed by their sympathies. "At the beginning of the war, the prevailing opinion in Hellas was that the Athenians would not be able to hold out more than two or three years at the most, if the Lacedaemonians invaded Attica year by year."²

The Athenians had not taken an active part in the incident of Plataea; no additional complaint could be brought against them on this ground, except the arrest of the Boeotians in Attica, which was merely a measure of precaution. Sparta was still without any clear and well-defined *casus belli*, so far as she herself was concerned. But the spirit of war had been aroused, and even those who regretted the outbreak of hostilities were compelled to go with the stream. Immediately after the affair of Plataea, the ephors of Sparta sent round to the allies, bidding them furnish troops—two-thirds of their whole force—equipped for a foreign expedition; and at the time appointed, some time before midsummer, the contingents assembled at the isthmus of Corinth, for the invasion of Attica. Each contingent was commanded by its own generals, but the whole expedition was under the command of Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon.

Archidamus had endeavoured to dissuade the confederacy from immediate war; and even now he cherished

The Peloponnesian troops assemble at the Isthmus. June 431.

¹ Thuc. ii. 7, 8.

² Thuc. vii. 28.

the hope that the last and irrevocable step might be avoided. He impressed his army with the necessity of caution in attacking so powerful an enemy, who might at the last moment be stung into desperate resistance; and even despatched a Spartan envoy to Athens in the hope that some concession might still be made. The Athenians stood firm. The envoy was not even admitted into the city, for Pericles had induced the citizens to refuse to listen to any overtures as long as the Lacedaemonians were in the field. He was denied a hearing, and bidden to cross the frontier before sunset; if the Lacedaemonians wished to negotiate with the Athenians, they must disband their army. When he arrived at the frontier and was about to take leave of the escort which had accompanied him, the envoy, impressed with the greatness of the war which was now inevitable, uttered these words of melancholy prophecy: "This day will be to the Hellenes the beginning of great calamities." On learning that no concessions would be made, Archidamus prepared to enter Attica.¹

Meanwhile, in accordance with the plans of Pericles, the country people of Attica left their pleasant homes and cultivated farms, and came to Athens with their wives and children and household goods. They brought with them even the woodwork of their houses, which in Attica was of far greater value than stone or brick. The removal was not accomplished without much discomfort and vexation. Many families had lived in the country for generations; they were leaving the tombs of their race, and the shrines where they worshipped, for a strange city where they had no home. When they arrived in Athens, there were no houses to receive them. They had to obtain such shelter as they could in vacant spaces, or temples, or in the turrets of the walls. The sudden immigration of so large a population was naturally a cause of the greatest disorder, and the sanitary conditions which it

¹ Thuc. ii. 10-12.

created must have been revolting. That Pericles should have contemplated the removal of such numbers into the city without making due provision for them was, of course, a gross oversight, of which no practical man would have been guilty. He could discuss physical phenomena with Anaxagoras, and arrange with Phidias and Ictinus for the construction of beautiful buildings, but the prosaic details of life were forgotten. The day of vengeance was not long in coming.¹

4. On leaving the Isthmus, Archidamus led his forces over Mount Geranea into the territory of Megara, where two routes lay before him: he might turn to the right and pursue the coast road to Eleusis; or he might continue his march in a north-easterly direction till he reached the confines of Boeotia, and then strike into the direct road which connects Thebes and Athens. He chose the second, and when we next hear of him, he is besieging Oenoe, the fortress which severed the communication of Athens and Plataea. In taking this course he may have been influenced by his Boeotian allies, for, if this fortress were in his hands, the Thebans would not only be able to pass in and out of Attica as they pleased, but Athens would be prevented from coming to the aid of Plataea. At the same time he would open a more convenient route between the northern and southern sections of the Peloponnesian alliance than the usual road by Aegosthena and Creusis.

The fortresses which guarded the passes into Attica were held by garrisons formed chiefly of young men in the earliest years of their military service. Of the fortifications of Oenoe we know nothing, but, whatever they were, they sufficed, with the natural strength of the place, then held by such troops, to bid defiance to the whole strength of the Peloponnesian army. After a delay which brought on him the suspicion of intentional lingering,

Archidamus in-
vades Attica.
June 431.

He is repulsed
at Oenoe.

¹ Thuc. ii. 14-17; Aristoph. *Knights*, 789 ff.

Archidamus was compelled to leave the fortress in his rear. Eighty days had already elapsed since the Thebans entered Plataea. Descending down the valley of the Eleusinian Cephissus, he ravaged Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, from which he advanced over the ridge of hills to Acharnae, the largest of the "demes" of Attica, and barely seven miles from Athens. Here he encamped for some time, devastating the immediate neighbourhood, but not entering the central plain.

In thus holding his hand while within sight of the city, he sought to draw the Athenians out of the walls. He had Archidamus at Acharnae. hoped, though in vain, that they would come out to meet him at Eleusis, and when he encamped within sight of Athens, in a town which furnished a large proportion of the heavy-armed soldiers in the Athenian army, he confidently expected to reap one of two advantages. Either he would exasperate the enemy into fighting in the open field, or the Acharnians, knowing that their own property was destroyed, would be less eager to fight for that of others, and Archidamus would be at liberty to ravage Attica as he pleased.

His plans were not ill-laid, but they were frustrated by the great personal ascendancy of Pericles. So long as the Peloponnesian army lay at Eleusis, the Athenians still cherished the hope that the rest of the country would escape. Those who knew the history of the past were aware that Cleomenes of Sparta had once led an army as far as Eleusis, only to see it disperse. And many would remember that fourteen years before the present invasion, Plistoanax had reached the Thriasian plain and then retired. But when the invaders were actually in sight, and the fairest lands in Attica were at their mercy, the situation seemed intolerable.

Discontent at Athens. "The whole people, and especially the younger men, were eager to go out and put a stop to it." The sight was new to them; they had no experience of the Spartan soldiers' courage and skill. Men gathered in the streets, abusing Pericles and his cowardly policy; the excitement was increased by oracles, remembered or invented for the

occasion. The Acharnians, as was natural, were in the last stage of exasperation. They were a hardy race, the colliers of Attica, who got their living by manufacturing charcoal, "hearts of maple," tough as the logs which they burned. Forgetting all the counsels of Pericles, the whole people called on him to do his duty as a general. The situation was difficult, but Pericles was equal to it. He appears at this time to have exercised an extraordinary Action of degree of authority, by which he was enabled Pericles. to prevent any public meeting at which the popular excitement might find expression. He did what he could to soothe the prevailing irritation; and meanwhile he sent out parties of horse to restrain the invaders from coming too close to the city walls. The Thessalians, true to their old alliance, had sent cavalry to the aid of Athens, and these with the native horse proved themselves at least a match for the Boeotians in the Peloponnesian army.

These measures seem to have had some effect upon Archidamus. It is at any rate remarkable that when he broke up from Acharnae on finding that the Athenians Archidamus would not come out against him, he directed his retires. course to the north, and contented himself with devastating the country between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus. Here his provisions began to fail, and he found it necessary to retire. Passing through the coast land near Oropus to the north-east of Parnes, and wasting the country as he went, he entered Boeotia by this route.¹

5. The Athenians suffered severely by the invasion, but Pericles found means in the course of the year to compensate them in some degree. In spite of opposition he held on his way. His plans for the war were still accepted as the best,

¹ Thuc. ii. 18-23. Thucydides says plainly (c. 22) that Pericles *ἐκκλησίαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα*. As a general he could summon an extraordinary meeting through the Prytaneis—and therefore he could omit to summon it: but how he could prevent the people from giving expression to their discontent in the ordinary meetings of the Assembly, I do not understand.

and in the conviction that Athens, and not Attica, was the vulnerable part of the state, a decree was passed that a thousand talents should be set apart out of the reserve in the treasury, and a hundred of the best triremes selected every year, with trierarchs appointed for each, to be ready for instant use, if an attack was made by sea on the Peiraeus. So earnest were the people in the matter, that it was made a capital offence to propose to use the money or ships for any other purpose. Measures were also taken for securing the safety of the country from unexpected attack by establishing guards on the frontiers.¹

While the Lacedaemonians were still in their country, the Athenians sent out a fleet of a hundred vessels to ravage the shores of the Peloponnesus. Fifty ships were also sent by Corcyra, and the combined fleet attacked Methone, a fortress on the coast of Messenia, a little to the south of Pylus (Navarino), which in the days of Tolmides had been captured and soon afterwards abandoned by the Athenians. Had the attack succeeded, the Athenians would have anticipated the position which they gained six years later by the capture of Pylus. They would have established a place of refuge in Messenia for any helots who could find an opportunity of joining them, and a convenient station for the union of the contingents coming from east and west. But the attempt failed. In this, their very first landing on the shores of the

¹ Thuc. ii. 24 : φυλακὰς κατεστήσαντο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ὥσπερ δὴ ἐμελλον διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου φυλάξειν. In iii. 17 we are told τὴν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὐβοίαν καὶ Σαλαμίνα ἐκὰτον (νῆες) ἐφύλασσαν. Previously the Peiraeus was ἀφύλακτος καὶ ἄκλῆστος, εἰκότως, διὰ τὸ ἐπικρατεῖν πολὺ τῷ ναυτικῷ (ii. 93), and again, *ibid.* οὔτε ναυτικὸν ἦν προφυλάσσειν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδέν, and on the promontory of Salamis towards Megara there was a fortress (φρούριον) and a guard of three vessels only. One would like to know much more about these measures of precaution. Where were the hundred vessels employed? What was gained by the φυλακαὶ κατὰ γῆν, when it is clear that the Peloponnesians marched in and out of the country as they pleased?

Peloponnesus, they were met by a Spartan, whose courage and genius proved more than a match for the plans of Pericles and the power of Athens—Brasidas, the son of Tellis. He was on guard in the neighbourhood—for the Spartans sent out parties of their citizens to keep watch on the outlying districts of their dominions—and knowing the weakness of the place, he hastened up with a hundred men, broke through the scattered troops of the Athenians, and secured the town for Sparta. The Athenian fleet sailed on to Elis, where it was joined by a few ships from Naupactus. Some successes were gained at Phea, near the mouth of the Alpheus, but on the approach of the Elean army, the Athenians re-embarked. More important by far was the conquest of Sollium, a Corinthian town in Acarnania, and the acquisition of the whole of the island of Cephallenia as an ally of Athens. This success was achieved without a single blow, and not long afterwards the fleet returned home. No attempt appears to have been made by the Peloponnesians to intercept the progress of the Athenians, or to meet them on the seas; but, after their return, the Corinthians ventured out as far as Astacus in Acarnania. The town had been captured by the Athenians, who had expelled Evarchus, the reigning tyrant, and added it to their alliance. It now fell back into the hands of Corinth, and Evarchus was restored to his throne. An attempt to recover Cephallenia failed completely.¹

While thus engaged on the shores of the Peloponnesus, the Athenians sent a smaller fleet into the Euripus, to cruise off Locris and keep watch over the island of Euboea. The expedition was successful; the Locrian coast was ravaged, the town of Thronium was captured, and the Locrians defeated in an attempt to relieve it. To secure their good behaviour, a number of hostages were taken, and the island of Atalanta, hitherto uninhabited, was fortified and held by an Athenian

The Athenian
fleet in the
Euripus.

¹ Thuc. ii. 23, 25, 30, 33. Brasidas received public commendation.

garrison. By these measures, any designs which the Locrians or Phocians may have had upon Euboea were entirely frustrated, and a check was put upon their piracy.¹

6. These successes were accompanied by others nearer home, from which the Athenians reaped a more tangible advantage. Soon after the return of the Peloponnesian army from Attica, the Athenians expelled from Aegina, crossed over to Aegina, and, on the ground that the Aeginetans had been the main cause of the war, entirely expelled the inhabitants from the island. The long quarrel between the cities was drawing to a close, though unhappily even this severe punishment did not satisfy Athenian hatred. Most of the Aeginetans were received by the Lacedaemonians and settled in the Thyreatis—the beautiful coast land on the western bay of the shore of Argos, which so long formed a bone of contention between that city and Sparta. The farms, houses, and other property in the island the Athenians divided among their own citizens, who now occupied Aegina as colonists (“cleruchs”).² Later in the summer, Pericles led out the entire force of the city into the territory of Megara to lay waste the country. The army was joined by the fleet, which had just returned from Western Greece, and thus the largest force which Athens ever had in one place was occupied in devastating the territory of an unresisting and insignificant adversary, already reduced to semi-starvation by the decree which excluded all Megarians from trading in the ports of the Athenian empire. The same display, though on a smaller scale, was repeated twice a year for the next seven years. The exasperation of Athens against Megara was extreme, passing even the measure of neighbourly hatred in Greece. In addition to more recent causes of hostility, it was vexatious to find so small a state so obstinate in its attachment to the Peloponnesian cause; the more so as Megara had once been the friend of Athens. Her forts

¹ Thuc. ii. 26, 32.

² Thuc. ii. 27.

had been garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; her Long Walls had been built by Athenian citizens, even before Athens had Long Walls of her own. While Megara was the ally of Athens, the direct route from the Peloponnesus into Attica had been closed, and Pericles was not likely to forget that in the hour of danger Megara had deserted Athens and opened the isthmus to Plistoanax. She must be made to feel how powerless Sparta was to aid her, and coerced, if possible, into becoming once more an ally of Athens.¹

In addition to these expeditions Athens had been sustaining for a whole year the burden of the siege of Potidaea, where no fewer than three thousand of the The siege of Potidaea. citizen-soldiers were permanently encamped, besides a large additional force, subsequently despatched under the command of Phormio. In spite of the invasion of Attica, the Athenians had not withdrawn a single soldier; yet the besieged city held out, and in fact not one of the revolted Chalcidic towns returned to its allegiance. In these circumstances it was tempting to try what could be done by negotiation with the princes of the barbarian nations in the neighbourhood. Could they be induced to Alliance with Sitalces. assist the Athenians against their rebellious subjects? With this object, Nymphodorus of Abdera, whose sister Sitalces, the king of the Odrysian Thracians, had married (*supra*, p. 47), was not only appointed by the Athenians to be their representative at Abdera, but invited to Athens with a view to an alliance with his brother-in-law. Sitalces was not unwilling to avail himself of the support of the Athenians in extending and strengthening his kingdom; the Athenians were not less willing to obtain his alliance against Chalcidice. Their expectations were fulfilled. Nymphodorus not only brought about the desired alliance, but also set on foot a peace between Athens and Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, to whom, on his persuasion, the Athenians restored Therma. For some time past Perdiccas had been

¹ Thuc. ii. 31; *cp. supra*, p. 68 f.

at war with the Athenians, but now he joined Phormio, the Athenian general, in fighting against the Chalcidians. That the alliance might be the more lasting, the Athenians gratified Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, by making him a citizen of their city. Other and more brilliant promises which Nymphodorus held out during his stay at Athens—that Sitalces would send forces to Chalcidice and bring the war to an end—were only partially fulfilled.¹

7. So ended the first year of the conflict in which Pericles had involved his city. The Athenians had acquired

The first year of the war: loss and gain.	some distant and uncertain allies; they had repulsed the Peloponnesian army at Oenoe; they had acquired Cephallenia for the alliance, and they had gained some successes at the mouth of the Corinthian gulf. On the other hand, the Peloponnesians had defeated the attack on Methone; they were in as good a position at the end of the year as they had been at the beginning; and they had laid waste a great part of Attica. We can imagine with what bitterness the country people revisited their ruined homes and desolate fields. Their vexation became greater when they reflected that the same thing would happen from year to year. What was gained, they asked, by such a sacrifice? The empire must be maintained, no doubt, but why force matters to such an extremity with Sparta? The two cities had drawn together in old days; why should there not be concessions now? Sparta had shown a great desire to avoid war; why should Athens be so obdurate?
--	--

In previous speeches Pericles had explained his plans of war, and stated the reasons which led him to hope for success.

Pericles chosen to pronounce the funeral oration on the dead.	He had now an opportunity of inspiring his fellow-citizens with a higher idea of their duties to the city. It was the custom at Athens to bring home the bones of those who perished in the service of their country and bury them, at the public
--	--

¹ Thuc. i. 59, 61, 64; ii. 29. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 141-150.

expense, in the Ceramicus, or Potter's Field, the most beautiful suburb of the city. A day was appointed in the winter, when military operations were over, for the funeral; the strictness of Athenian habits was somewhat relaxed on the occasion; the funeral procession was accompanied by any one who chose, whether citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the dead were present at the sepulchres to make lamentation. When the remains had been laid in the earth, some man "of known ability and high reputation" was chosen by the city to pronounce an oration over those who had fallen in her cause. In accordance with this custom, Pericles was chosen to speak over those who fell in the first year of the war, and he availed himself of the opportunity to put before the Athenians a picture of their life and institutions, which was to them a proof that they were suffering in a worthy cause, and to the world has become an ideal description of democratic society and government.

"Our institutions," he said, "are not borrowed from those of other cities; they are our own, the creation of Athenian statesmen. We are called a democracy, because with us the people govern, and there is one law for rich and poor. But we are also an aristocracy; not of birth, nor of wealth, but of merit; a state in which every one who can benefit the city may do so without hindrance.

*The Athens of
Pericles.*

"Such is the freedom of our political life, and in society we are equally without constraint. Every one does what he pleases, without suspicion or offence; we do not banish a man from our company because his ways are different from our own. But along with this unconstrained liberty there goes a spirit of reverence which pervades every act of our public life; authority is maintained; the laws are obeyed, not from any fear of punishment, but from principle; and of all ordinances the most sacred in our eyes are those which protect the injured, who cannot retaliate; and the unwritten laws, which, though enforced by no legal penalty, bring reproach to the transgressor.

"First, then, we have striven to be free, and next we seek to be happy. We have provided ourselves, to a greater degree than any other city, with festivals and public games, to be a rest and refreshment after toil; in our own homes we are surrounded by elegance

and refinement, as a charm against melancholy; and, owing to the greatness of our city, to which the produce of all the earth is brought, we are as familiar with the gifts of the most distant regions as we are with the fruits of Attica.

"In the same spirit we approach the severer duties of the citizen's life. Our resources are not a mystery to be concealed from every eye, but any one may visit our city and learn from us what he can. We do not afflict ourselves with laborious training, and yet, in the hour of trial, our courage does not fail. Free and light of heart, trusting to habit rather than law, we are yet as ready for action as those who spend their lives in anticipating danger and preparing to meet it. So much the greater is our gain.

"Once more: we dare to think as well as act; we live for ourselves, while living for the state. With us a love of what is beautiful is consistent with economy, and a man is a man though he cultivates his mind. Yet we do not separate the citizen from the statesman; when a man has no time to give to public affairs, we do not merely say that he is minding his own business, but we call him an unprofitable servant. If we cannot always set a policy on foot, we can form a good judgment about it, for we look on discussion as the best preparation for action; our courage is not due to ignorance or stupidity, but we go into danger with our eyes open, and counting the cost. Yet our policy is not a mere calculation of self-interest. More than any other nation, we have drawn our friends to us by kindly actions, and we have assisted others, without hope of advantage, in the confidence of freedom. From such a city the Hellenic world may take a lesson. Of all men the Athenian citizen is the most accomplished and versatile; his parts are many, and he is admirable in each. Of all cities, Athens alone is greater than her fame. She needs no poet to sing her praises; every land and every sea can furnish proofs of her enterprise and success. Her enemies, when defeated, are not disgraced; her subjects confess that she is worthy to rule them."¹

8. With the return of spring (430) the Peloponnesians were again in Attica. After desolating the central plain, they passed on towards Sunium, laying waste the coast land on either side of the promontory; but before many days had passed, they were informed

¹ Thuc. ii. 34 ff.

that the plague had broken out at Athens, and it is said that their invasion was cut short on this account. However this may be, they remained not less than forty days, the longest stay they ever made, and ravaged the entire country. During the whole of the time the plague was raging in the ill-fated city.¹

This new and terrible disease was imported, as is commonly the case with such disorders, from the east. From Ethiopia and Egypt it was brought to Persia and Greece. The plague at Athens. It first appeared in the Peiræus, from which it spread rapidly to the upper city. For a time it was thought that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the water-tanks and wells, but the disease was soon discovered to be of an infectious nature, entirely unknown to the Greek physician, and beyond the reach of help, human or divine.

Athens was ill prepared for such a visitation. The city was crowded with the inhabitants who had been brought in from the country, and as they had no houses of their own, the new comers were closely packed together in stifling huts, among which the disease raged with terrible effect. The dead lay in heaps; the dying wallowed in the streets, or crawled round the fountains, consumed with an unquenchable thirst. The very temples were filled with corpses. There was no organised service for the removal of the dead; each man buried his own as he could, and often the survivors, owing to the number of the corpses, made use of burial-places not their own, or threw the dead on funeral pyres which were burning for others.

In the Peloponnesus the plague did little harm. That it appeared there we know, but we do not hear of it in any of the great cities. Only in the remote town of The plague at Phigalea. Phigalea, in the south-west corner of Arcadia, have we any record of its presence. There, in the glen of Bassæ, surrounded by rocks and old knotted oaks, stands the temple of Apollo the Helper, the most perfect ruin in

¹ Thuc. ii. 47, 55, 57.

Greece next to the "Theseum" at Athens, which was built as a thankoffering for the assistance rendered by the god when the plague raged at Phigalea.¹

The horrors which surrounded him did not turn Pericles from his purpose. Even in the early days of the invasion, before the Peloponnesians had left the central
The Athenian fleet. plain for the coast, he had equipped a fleet of one hundred vessels, carrying an army of no fewer than four thousand Athenian hoplites. A number of old ships were also converted into transports for the conveyance of three hundred horses, a new feature in the naval equipment of Athens. This armament was then joined by fifty ships from Chios and Lesbos. At the head of this imposing force, Pericles set sail for the Peloponnesus to make reprisals for the damage done to Attica. From the coast land, into which they now moved, the Peloponnesians would see the fleet standing across the bay, a convincing proof that Athens was not yet crushed by her misfortunes.

Arriving off the coast of Argolis, the fleet attacked Epidaurus, but, though the country was laid waste, the town could not be taken. Similar descents
Descents on the Peloponnesian coast. were made at Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, cities on the same coast, which were allies of Sparta, and with a similar result. At Prasias, an insignificant place on the coast of Laconia, the expedition was so far successful that it took and plundered the town, but no attempt at a permanent occupation seems to have been made. The fleet then returned to Athens, whence it was immediately sent out again, under the officers who had served with Pericles, to take part in the siege of Potidaea. It had hardly arrived at its destination before the plague broke out among the troops, spreading from the new comers to the soldiers previously engaged in the siege. Every

¹ For the plague, see Thuc. ii. 47 ff; Jowett, Thuc. ii. 143 ff. For the temple at Bassae, Paus. viii. 41, § 7 f.; Leake, *Morea*, ii. 1 ff., etc. The architect of the temple was Ictinus, who built the Parthenon at Athens.

attempt to take the city failed, and the fleet returned to Athens, after a stay of forty days, with a loss of more than a fourth of the four thousand hoplites.¹

9. A change came over the spirit of the Athenians. In the city the plague was raging, and no one could deny that its effects were greatly increased by the crowding of the Athenians within the walls. Had they been scattered over Attica in garrisons, the danger of infection, at any rate, would have been less. Outside the walls, the whole of Attica from Athens to Sunium, from Sunium to Marathon, from Marathon to Eleusis, was utterly laid waste. Every proprietor and farmer was deprived of the income which his lands brought him. At the same time the richer men, on whom the chief burdens of the navy and cavalry fell, had been called upon to furnish a large force. The fleet had sailed round Peloponnesus, and visited Potidaea, and what had been accomplished? A few patches of coast land had been ravaged in Argolis, a Laconian hamlet had been captured. At Potidaea the expedition had not only failed, but the plague had been carried into a healthy army, and, we may suppose, into the homes of Athenian allies in Chios and Lesbos.

The first effect of the change of feeling was seen in the despatch of envoys to Sparta with proposals for peace. But the Spartans, who probably believed the plague to be worse than it was, would listen to no overtures. They thought that Athens would soon be driven to submission. Or they may have distrusted proposals which did not come to them with the authority of Pericles. Whatever the reason, the envoys entirely failed in their mission. The greater was the exasperation against the author of the war; Pericles became the most unpopular man in Athens. He had hitherto prevented the people, so far as he could, from meeting for the discussion of public affairs, but he now summoned an Assembly, in the hope of bringing them into

¹ Thuc. ii. 56, 58.

a better mood. He had no confessions of error to make; it was the people, not himself, who had changed; with the exception of the plague, which was beyond human foresight, nothing had happened of which they had not been forewarned. If they had been right in deciding for war, they were wrong now in wishing to discontinue it. The change was unworthy of them, and more unworthy still was the determination to make one man responsible for a policy to which all were pledged. War was a great evil, which no city would bring upon herself if it could be avoided, but loss of independence was a greater evil by far, and when the choice lay between the two, there was no room for hesitation.

Pericles then pointed out that the evils which had overtaken the Athenians, however disastrous to individual citizens, had left the strength of the city unimpaired. Their chances of victory were as good as ever. Their navy was still the greatest in the world; they were absolute masters of the sea; and not even the Great King could prevent them from sailing wherever they chose. What was the loss of houses or lands to men who possessed such a power? So long as they preserved their freedom, they could quickly recover what was lost; but if they became the servants of others, they would lose everything. Their ancestors had won a great empire; were they unable even to maintain it? That would be an intolerable disgrace.

It was the possession of this great empire which made the position so critical. "Do not imagine," Pericles said, "that you are fighting for a simple issue—freedom or slavery. You have an empire to lose; you are exposed to the hatred which your imperial policy has brought upon you. Your empire is a tyranny, which, in the opinion of the Greeks, has been unjustly acquired, and which you cannot safely surrender. It is too late to play the honest man; and those who advise such a policy will bring the state to ruin. . . . To be hateful and offensive has ever been at the time the fate of those who have aspired to empire.

But he judges well who accepts unpopularity in a great cause."

We cannot but admire the undaunted spirit of the man, who in the teeth of a powerful opposition, amid the desolation of Attica, and the horrors of the plague, could present such a front to his enemies. Yet throughout this speech—the last recorded of Pericles—there breathes a love of domination which was dangerous to the freedom of Greece; it nourished the most selfish passions of the Athenian people. They had long been taught to regard the money of the allies as their own, and the Delian confederacy had been reduced to submission by the contributions which were made to ensure its freedom. Now they were taught that Athens was a tyrant city, hated like a tyrant, and compelled like a tyrant to rely on force for protection. Not only were the interests of Hellas regarded as subordinate to the interests of Athens, but honesty was confessed to be a dangerous policy. Such was the "bad eminence" to which Athens had been raised by Pericles; and great indeed is the contrast between this declaration of foreign policy and the ideal picture of social and political equality sketched for us in the Funeral Speech.¹

10. The Athenians were so far moved by the advice of Pericles that they sent no more embassies to Sparta, and resolved to go on with the war. Their private feelings towards him were not so easily satisfied. Rich and poor alike regarded him as the author of their mis- Fall of fortunes, and combined for his overthrow. Pericles. When the time arrived for electing the generals for 430-429, he was not re-elected, and subsequently he was condemned to pay a fine of 50 t. on a charge of embezzlement of the public funds. The condemnation was, of course, a party stroke, for embezzlement was of all offences the one which could not be proved against Pericles. But it was an offence readily believed in all public men at Athens, and that was enough.²

¹ Thuc. ii. 60 ff; see Jowett's translation of c. 64.

² Thuc. ii. 65. It is not quite certain whether Pericles was deposed from his office (*ἀποχειροτονηθείς*) or not re-elected. Nor is

For the first time for fifteen years, Pericles was without office as general; he was compelled to look idly on while the management of the state passed into the hands of others. The bitterness of his fall was rendered more acute by the private misfortunes which now overtook him. Of his two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus (*supra*, p. 53), Xanthippus had long been on bad terms with his father, owing to his own worthless character, and that he fell a victim to the plague was perhaps no reason for regret. So much the deeper was the affection lavished on Paralus, and when he also was carried off by the remorseless pestilence, Pericles was entirely crushed by the blow. The Athenians were touched by his calamities, and passed a decree, under which his son by Aspasia, Pericles the younger, was made an Athenian citizen, and his house saved from extinction.¹

II. The war went on as before. The extreme democrats, who, though opposed to Pericles, were in favour of the war, proved stronger than the oligarchical party, who would have combined his overthrow with negotiations for peace; and the inhabitants of the country, who were the worst sufferers, seem to have been unable to turn the scale. The operations were chiefly in Western Greece. This was no doubt mainly due to the Corinthians, who were anxious to destroy the Athenian power in those regions, and make the new alliance between Corcyra and Athens of no effect, while the Lacedaemonians gladly embraced an opportunity of revenging themselves for the recent Athenian expedition round the Peloponnesus. A hundred ships were sent against Zacynthus, the ally of Athens, but though the island was ravaged, the Zacynthians could not be brought to terms. Later in the year the Ambraciots summoned a force of Chaonians and other "barbarians" to aid them in

it clear whether he was out of office for a whole year, or for a shorter time.

¹ Plut. *Per.* 24, 36, 37.

an attack on Amphiloehian Argos, with which they had been on bad terms for years, but in this case also the city could not be taken, and after laying waste the country the army dispersed.¹ The Athenians may have expected that the Corcyraeans would support their interests in the west, but in this they were deceived. No help came from Corcyra to Zacynthus or Argos, perhaps none could come after her heavy loss in the battle with Corinth; and it was clear that Athens must have a force of her own in those regions, or the Ionian sea would be closed against her. At the end of the summer twenty ships were sent to Naupactus, under the command of Phormio, one of the generals of the year. The appointment was a most happy one. Phormio had already delivered Argos from the aggression of the Ambraciots (*supra*, p. 48); he was well known in the west, and was soon to prove himself the ablest naval officer at Athens.²

Phormio
sent to
Naupactus.

At the same time, six triremes were sent to Caria, under Melesander, to collect arrears of tribute, and put an end to the piracy of the Peloponnesians in those waters. The city of Phaselis, in Lycia, which was a subject ally of Athens, was the centre of the trade from Phoenicia and Cyprus to the Aegean. On their way to and from this port, Athenian vessels were seized by Peloponnesians who issued from convenient positions on the southern coast of Asia Minor. The expedition was a failure. Melesander fell in battle while attempting to penetrate into the interior of Lycia.³

Eastern
Greece:
Melesander
in Lycia.

12. In the north all went well with the Athenians. A number of envoys from the Peloponnesus with Aristeus of Corinth at their head, whom the Athenians regarded as the main cause of their troubles in Chalcidice, had been despatched to Asia in the hope of persuading the Great King to take part in the war. On their way they visited the

¹ Thuc. ii. 68. See also Oberhummer, *Akarnanien*, p. 97.

² Thuc. ii. 69.

³ Thuc. ii. 69.

court of the Odrysian king, Sitalces, thinking that he might be brought to abandon the Athenians, or at least to convey the envoys across the Hellespont. The visit proved a fatal mistake. Two Athenians who happened to be with Sitalces at the time persuaded his son Sadocus to seize the envoys as they were about to cross the straits, and deliver them into their hands. The captives were at once carried to Athens, where they were put to death on the very day of their arrival, without any trial, and their bodies thrown down precipices. This savage act was justified as a retaliation on the Lacedaemonians, who, at the beginning of the war, slaughtered all their captives at sea, whether allies of the Athenians or neutrals. And at this time Athenian feeling was much excited against Persia. The "Medising" party in Colophon, with the aid of the satrap of Sardis, had recently seized the city for the King, compelling the patriots to take refuge in the harbour of Notium. A bad act cannot justify a worse, but it was certainly a gain to the Athenians to have got rid of Aristæus, and to have given a check to Spartan negotiations with Persia. The alliance with Sitalces was beginning to bear fruit.¹

More important was the surrender of Potidaea, which took place towards the end of the year. For more than two years the heroic defenders had successfully defied the utmost efforts of Athenian skill and energy. But the invasions of Attica, from which so much had been expected, had brought no relief, and at last supplies ran short. Still the city held out, and it was not till the extremity of famine, "even to the eating of human flesh," had been endured, that the final overtures were made. The besiegers had suffered much, and they had before them the prospect of a third winter in their exposed situation, while the expenses of the siege had run up to about £400,000 of our money. On both sides there was an eagerness to bring

¹ Thuc. ii. 67; iii. 34. The seizure of Colophon took place about the time of the second invasion of Attica.

the long conflict to an end, and the terms proposed were accepted by the Athenian generals. The Potidaeans, with their wives and children and even the foreign troops, came out of the city, the men with one garment, the women with two; besides which they received a certain sum of money for their journey. They dispersed among the cities of Chalcidice, or wherever they could find a home, and Potidaea was occupied by Athenian colonists.¹

13. The Peloponnesian army had twice invaded Attica in the hope of saving a Corinthian colony; the Peloponnesian fleet had been sent into the Ionian sea to support Corinthian interests, but for Boeotia nothing had been done. The war began with an attempt on the part of Thebes to seize Plataea, an attempt which failed, and after two years of war the Thebans were as far from attaining their object as ever. They would wait no longer, and at their request, in the spring of the following year (429), Archidamus, instead of invading Attica, led his forces into the Plataean territory. He was about to ravage the country, when he was met by envoys from the city, who reminded him that after the great battle which finally broke the power of the Persians in Greece, Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian, had offered sacrifice in the market-place of Plataea to Zeus, the god of Freedom, and had solemnly declared Plataea an independent city and territory; no one was to make war on the Plataeans unless injured, or to attempt to enslave them, and all the Greeks then present pledged themselves to resist any attack upon their liberties (vol. ii. p. 232). Regardless of these oaths Archidamus was now invading their territory, to aid the Thebans, the worst enemies of the city, in bringing about her enslavement.

The Peloponnesians invade the territory of Plataea.

Archidamus acknowledged the justice of the Plataean

¹ Thuc. ii. 70; Diod. xii. 46. In Aristoph. *Knights*, 436, the sausage-seller declares that Cleon has received 10 talents from Potidaea—but what is meant it is difficult to say. The Athenians were displeased with their generals for accepting such easy terms.

claim, but professed to believe that their actions did not correspond to their words. Their independence had indeed been guaranteed to them, and he was willing, as he was bound, to respect it; but the Plataeans had put themselves in a false position. While claiming the help of all the Hellenes in securing their own independence and freedom, they had deserted their former allies, and joined the Athenians in enslaving Hellas. It was to emancipate the enslaved Greeks that the war had been undertaken; let them join in it, or at least remain neutral, aiding neither side but receiving both as friends—a course already once proposed to them. The Plataeans replied that they could do nothing without the Athenians; their wives and children were now at Athens, and under the proposed terms the Athenians might come as friends and compel them to remain in their alliance; so, too, the Thebans might come, taking advantage of the peace as before, and renew their attack. Archidamus offered to be surety for Plataea and everything in the city, or in the territory: let the Plataeans go where they chose, and on the return of peace they should receive their own; meanwhile the Lacedaemonians would till the ground and pay rent for it. These proposals the Plataeans were willing to put before the Athenians, and with their permission they would do as Archidamus wished. Archidamus then granted a truce for the negotiations. The envoy returned from Athens with a message calling on the Plataeans to stand firm; the Athenians never had abandoned them in the past, and they would aid them now to the utmost of their power. Upon this the Plataeans resolved to remain true to their alliance, and let the Lacedaemonians do their worst: answer was made from the walls to this effect. Archidamus, after a solemn appeal to the gods to favour his enterprise, which was justified because the Plataeans had not only deserted the Hellenic alliance for that of Athens, but had refused to accept his overtures, began the siege.¹ All the

¹ Thuc. ii. 71-74. Diodor. xii. 47 merely says: *μελλόντων δ' αὐτῶν δρῶν τὴν χώραν, καὶ παρακαλούντων τοὺς Πλαταιεῖς ἀποστήναι τῶν*

resources of engineering skill were brought to bear upon the city, but in vain; when a huge mound—the work of seventy days—had been raised against the wall, in order to capture the town by this primitive method ($\chi\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$),¹ the Plataeans rendered it useless, partly by raising the wall, partly by removing the earth through a mine, but most of all by building a second, crescent-shaped wall within that part against which the mound was raised, so that if this were captured, the besiegers would still have another wall to surmount, and at the same time be exposed to a cross fire. Engines of assault were also brought up, among them battering-rams, but the Plataeans broke off the heads of these by dropping heavy beams upon them.² The Peloponnesians then attempted to set the town on fire, but the plan failed of success owing to the stillness of the weather and an opportune storm of rain. Finding his efforts useless, Archidamus was driven to invest the city; a double wall was built round it, and garrisoned partly with Peloponnesian, partly with Boeotian, soldiers.³

These operations occupied the Peloponnesians from May to October. During the whole of this time Athens took no steps whatever to deliver those who had shut themselves up in their city and allowed their country to be ravaged in reliance on promises of Athenian help. For these promises Pericles, if it is right to assume that he was not now in office, was not himself responsible, but those who gave them must have been aware that they could not now assist the Plataeans without meeting the Boeotians, at least, in the open

¹ *Ἀθηναίων, ὡς οὐ προσεῖχον αὐτοῖς, ἐπόρθησε τὴν χώραν.* Duncker, *G. A.* ix. 474 n., thinks it impossible that Archidamus, as the ally of Thebes, can have offered neutrality to the Plataeans, or security for their possessions. This part of the story he regards as an invention of the Spartans, who wished to justify their action as far as possible.

² See Herod. i. 162: *αἶρεε τὰς πόλιας χῶμασι.*

³ This is said to be the first occasion on which engines were used; see *supra*, p. 33 and note: Droysen, *Die Griechischen Kriegsalterthümer*, pp. 208, 209, and notes.

⁴ Thuc. ii. 75-78. For the difficulties connected with the siege, see below.

field, a policy which had been renounced at the very beginning of the war. The abandonment of Plataea to her fate was the inevitable result of the line taken by Pericles since the peace of 445. Nothing but an effective army could have saved the town, and the Athenian army in the hands of Pericles became eminently ineffective. Some years later, the Athenians tried their strength against Boeotia in the battle of Delium, but only to meet with a most disastrous defeat.

14. About the time of the attack on Plataea, the Athenians sent out an expedition of 2000 heavy-armed and 200 cavalry to Thrace. They were anxious to follow up their successes there, and put an end to the revolt of the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans.

Defeat of the Athenians at Spartolus. From Potidaea, where they disembarked, the troops marched to Spartolus, hoping that the town would be given up to them. In this they were deceived; aid arrived at Spartolus from Olynthus, and an engagement took place under the walls, in which, though the Chalcidian heavy-armed were defeated, their cavalry and light-armed gained some advantage over those of the Athenians, who had been joined by a small body of targeteers from the neighbourhood. Further reinforcements having arrived, the light-armed troops of Spartolus were encouraged to renew the attack on the Athenians. They drove them back to their baggage, and finally, aided by their cavalry, routed them with severe loss. All three generals perished and a fifth of the force; the rest escaped to Potidaea, and returned home.¹

The news of this defeat seems to have caused a reaction at Athens in favour of Pericles. At the next election of generals,

Reaction in favour of Pericles. May 429, he was replaced in his old position, "and everything was put into his hands." The reaction came too late. At the time when he returned to office (July) he was already, perhaps, stricken

¹ Thuc. ii. 79. Cp. Diod. xii. 47, who reduces the Athenian forces to 1000. The generals were Xenophon and Phanomachus, who had been in command in the previous year, and Calliades (Diod. l.c.; Plut. Nic. 6).

with the disease which in three or four months brought him to the grave. Under such circumstances, he can hardly have taken any very active part in public affairs, but his last days were cheered by reports of the most brilliant exploits ever achieved by the Athenian fleet.

15. Though the Ambraciots had failed to capture Amphilo-
chian Argos in the preceding summer, they had not
abandoned their designs on the city. They
now came forward with a plan for subjugating
the whole country of Acarnania, and detaching
it from the Athenian alliance. A combined attack was to be
made by land and sea, so that the Acarnanians might be
unable to unite their whole forces for resistance. With this
view, the Ambraciots requested the Lacedaemonians to send
a fleet, with a thousand hoplites on board. On their own
part they would bring into the field their army, and also
obtain the help of the barbarian tribes of Epirus, with whom
they had a large and extensive connection. If the plot
succeeded, and Acarnania were conquered, Zacynthus and
Cephalenia, and perhaps even Naupactus, would fall into
the hands of Sparta, and it would no longer be easy for the
Athenians to cruise round the Peloponnesus.

Attack on Acar-
nania, which is
defeated.

This scheme, attractive in itself, and warmly supported by
the Corinthians, was readily taken up at Sparta. Cnemus,
the admiral who had conducted the attack upon Zacynthus
in the previous year, was at once despatched with a thou-
sand hoplites in a few vessels, and the fleet was ordered to
assemble at Leucas. Cnemus succeeded in crossing to Leucas
unobserved by Phormio, the Athenian officer stationed at
Naupactus, and was there joined by the ships from Leucas,
Ambracia, and Anactorium. With these he sailed to Am-
bracia, expecting that the contingents of ships which were
coming from Sicyon and Corinth would overtake him there.
On his arrival, he found a large force of Chaonians and other
Epirotes ready to obey his orders; even Perdiccas, the king
of Macedonia, though ostensibly at peace with Athens,
secretly sent a thousand soldiers (who arrived too late to be

of service), and an equal number came from Antiochus, the king of the Orestae. Feeling himself sufficiently strong to open the game without waiting for the ships from Corinth and Sicyon, Cnemus at once began his march to the south. The route lay along the eastern edge of the Ambracian gulf, through the territory of Argos, to Stratus, on the Achelous, which was the largest city of Acarnania.

The Acarnanians, on hearing of the threatened invasion, had at once sent to Phormio for help; but as he was daily expecting to see the Corinthian ships sail down the gulf, he could not leave Naupactus. Meanwhile the combined forces were approaching Stratus. They advanced in three divisions, of which the barbarians formed the centre. The Hellenic soldiers marched in good order as they had been trained to do, but the barbarians rushed on at full speed, thinking that they had only to be first on the scene to capture the town. The Stratiots saw their opportunity; if they could destroy the barbarians before the Greeks came up, the whole expedition would receive a very sensible check. They placed some of their forces in ambuscades outside the city, and when the assailants were close to the walls, a combined onset was made from the city and from the ambuscades. The Chaonians were at once seized with a panic; many were slaughtered; the rest, carrying the other barbarians with them, rushed back to the Greeks, who received their first news of the disaster from the defeated fugitives. Here a stand was made for the remainder of the day, but when night came on Cnemus withdrew to the Anapus, and from thence to Oeniadae, where he disbanded his army.¹

16. This was not the worst. Almost on the very day of the engagement at Stratus, the fleet from Corinth, which should have co-operated with Cnemus and the land army, was utterly defeated by Phormio at the mouth of the gulf. From his station at Naupactus the Athenian commander saw

¹ Thuc. ii. 80-82; Diod. xii. 47.

the ships moving along the Peloponnesian shore. They had no intention of attacking him, and no fear that he would attack their forty-seven vessels with his twenty, when they suddenly saw the Athenian ships off the opposite coast of Aetolia, and when in the dim light of morning they attempted to cross over from Patrae in Achaea towards Acarnania, they were met by Phormio, who bore down upon them from the mouth of the Evenus. It was impossible to avoid an engagement.

Defeat of the
Peloponnesian
fleet by
Phormio.

The Corinthian commanders knew that their seamen were not a match for the Athenians in point of skill. To be forced into battle was bad enough; to be attacked outside the strait, where there was room for every manœuvre, was still worse. They resolved to arrange their fleet in such a manner that the ordinary tactics of sailing through the line of vessels and then charging from the rear would be impossible. With this object they drew up their ships in a circle, turning the prows outward, and keeping them sufficiently close to avoid any inlet. The smaller craft were collected in the central space, where also were placed five of their swiftest triremes, ready to run out at any point where the enemy attacked.

On seeing this formation, Phormio at once arranged his plan. Placing his vessels in a single line, he bade them pass round the enemy's fleet in ever narrowing circles. By this means he brought their ships into the smallest possible compass, and kept them in constant expectation of an attack. He continued this movement till the time at which the morning breeze from the Corinthian gulf made it impossible for the Peloponnesian ships to remain steadily in their position. Ship began to dash against ship; the attention of the sailors was occupied in keeping them clear of each other, the more so as the rough water made it difficult for unpractised rowers to manage their oars. Then Phormio gave the signal for direct attack. The first vessel sunk was one of the admirals', but the havoc soon became universal; no resistance could be made; in wild disorder the whole fleet ran for the Achaean

coast, hotly pursued by Phormio, who captured twelve vessels with most of their crews. The rest escaped to Cyllene in Elis, where they were joined by Cnemus and the ships from Leucas.¹

17. At the news of this disaster, the Lacedaemonians were highly indignant. They could not understand how a few ^{Commissioners} ships could defeat so many, or recognise that ^{sent to Cnemus.} their own fleet was so vastly inferior to the Athenian as it had been proved to be. They did not indeed recall their admiral and fine or banish him, as the Athenians would have done under similar circumstances, but, while sending him orders to fight again, they also sent three commissioners, one of whom was Brasidas, to advise with him. Supported by their help, Cnemus sent round to the Peloponnesian allies for more vessels, and refitted those which had been damaged in the engagement.

Intelligence of these preparations was brought to Phormio, who at once sent to Athens for reinforcements; a battle ^{Reinforcements} might take place any day, and he would have ^{sent to Phormio.} to meet the whole Peloponnesian fleet with no more than twenty vessels. From Corcyra, whose fleet was to be of such advantage to Athens in her operations in Western Greece, not a single ship had been sent to aid Acarnania or Phormio, who was thus left entirely to his own resources or help from Athens. The greater is our astonishment to find that the reinforcement voted at Athens amounted to twenty vessels only, and that even these, though every day was of the greatest importance, were bidden to sail to Crete before they joined Phormio! Who was responsible for this extraordinary order we do not know; the Athenians could have gained nothing by the most brilliant success in Crete—which, so far as we know, they never revisited in the course of the war; while, on the other hand, the position of Athens in Western Greece was in peril. It

¹ Thuc. ii. 83, 84; Diod. xii. 48. For details, see Grote, iv. 313, notes.

was a grave blunder, and nothing but the skill and bravery of Phormio saved Athens from irretrievable disaster.¹

When all was ready, the Peloponnesian fleet left Cyllene for Panormus in Achaea, where the land forces were assembled to support it. Phormio, meanwhile, who was resolved not to fight in the narrow channel, sailed from Naupactus to the promontory of Antirrhum, anchoring outside it. The Peloponnesians, who were as anxious to fight in the gulf as Phormio was to fight outside it, met him by moving to a point exactly opposite, but just inside the gulf, where the distance from shore to shore was not more than a mile. The number of their vessels had been raised to seventy-seven, while Phormio had no more than his original twenty. For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite each other, until at length Cnemus and Brasidas, finding that Phormio would not enter the strait, determined to draw him into it. Before going into action they thought it necessary to raise the courage of their sailors, — who, in spite of the disparity of numbers, were far from confident of success, — partly by dwelling on the increased chances of victory, and partly by hinting that any want of courage would be noticed and punished.²

Phormio also, though he had hitherto trained his sailors to the belief that no superiority of forces on the enemy's side could justify a retreat on theirs, on seeing them dispirited by the odds which they had now to face, gathered them together and encouraged them in a brief address. He pointed out that the enemy had assembled in such force because they were

Phormio also, though he had hitherto trained his sailors to the belief that no superiority of forces on the enemy's side could justify a retreat on theirs, on seeing them dispirited by the odds which they had now to face, gathered them together and encouraged them in a brief address. He pointed out that the enemy had assembled in such force because they were

¹ Thuc. ii. 85. The force was sent to Crete at the request of Nicias, a citizen of Gortys and proxenus of the Athenians, ostensibly to conquer the hostile city of Cydonia, but really to interfere in some neighbourly quarrel between Polichna and Cydonia. It did nothing beyond ravaging the territory of Cydonia, and was delayed by contrary winds on its return. Nicias was a friend of the Polichnitae, and Arnold, *ad loc.*, suggests that the Athenians would naturally be ill-disposed towards the Cydonians, who were, in part, colonists from Aegina.

² Thuc. ii. 87.

afraid of defeat, and their courage was due, not to experience at sea, but to experience on land. It would fail them when they saw that the Athenians were ready to attack in spite of the disparity of numbers.¹

18. Forming their vessels four abreast, the Peloponnesians now fronted north-east or east, and sailed along the shore of Achaea into the gulf, twenty of their fastest vessels leading the way. Phormio at once saw the danger; he had left Naupactus unprotected, for even the Messenians of the town had followed him on shore to support his vessels, and if the Peloponnesian fleet got ahead, they would reach the place before he could save it. He embarked at once, and bidding the Messenians follow, sailed in single file along the coast with all speed for Naupactus. This was exactly what Brasidas wished; the Athenian ships had now no room for any exhibition of their dreaded skill. Changing front, he suddenly brought his whole line four deep upon the flank of Phormio's vessels.

The engagement off Naupactus: Phormio's victory.

It was an excellent manœuvre, and well carried out; but owing to the superiority of the Athenians in rowing, it was only partially successful. Eleven of Phormio's vessels escaped the swiftest Peloponnesian ships; the remaining nine were forced aground; one ship was taken with its crew, others were being towed away, when the Messenians dashed into the water and saved them.

So far the victory was on the side of the Lacedaemonians, who might reasonably have thought that they had redeemed their previous failure. But half the Athenian fleet remained. Of the eleven ships which escaped the attack, ten reached Naupactus, and ranged themselves in a position of defence, should the enemy attempt to force them ashore. One remained behind the rest, unable to keep up in the race. In their wake came the twenty Peloponnesian vessels, of which one, a Leucadian, far in advance of the rest, was chasing the Athenian laggard. In the line of pursuit lay a merchantman,

¹ Thuc. ii. 89.

anchored in the deep water off Naupactus. The Athenians saw their opportunity. At full speed they rowed round the anchored vessel, and, bearing down on the ship by which they were themselves pursued, struck her amidships, and so injured her that in a short time she sank. Timocrates, one of the Peloponnesian admirals, who was on board, seeing that his ship was sinking, drew his sword and slew himself. The Peloponnesians were dismayed; they had come on in loose order, singing the paeon of victory, but their temper changed in a moment, and checking their pursuit, they waited for the body of the fleet to come up. The delay was fatal; the Athenians, cheered by the brilliant success of their ship, and seeing the disorder of the enemy, sailed out and fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were without any settled plan of battle. After a short resistance they fled to Panormus, whence they had started, pursued by the Athenians, who captured six of the enemy's vessels, and recovered the eight of their own which had been driven on shore. On the following night the Peloponnesians stole away to Corinth.¹

19. The attempt to acquire control of the Corinthian gulf had entirely failed, but before the ships dispersed from Corinth, the Peloponnesian commanders re- Proposed attack on the Peiræus. solved, at the suggestion of the Megarians, to make an attack in another direction. The harbour of Peiræus was neither closed nor guarded, and, though forty ships of war lay in the port of Nisaea, the Athenians, secure in the mastery of all the adjacent seas, considered that three ships of war stationed at Budorum on the promontory of Salamis which looks toward Megara, were sufficient to keep them in check. Here was an opportunity for a sudden surprise, an attack on the very centre of the Athenian power. Preparations were at once begun; the sailors were bidden to take the rowing tackle out of their own ships, and march by

¹ Thuc. ii. 90. How the fifty-seven ships of the Peloponnesian fleet which had forced Phormio's nine ships aground were put to flight is not clear.

night across the isthmus from Corinth to Nisaea. On their arrival, they at once launched the forty vessels, as had been arranged, but at this point their courage failed them; the risk seemed too great, and changing their course, they sailed to Salamis, where they captured the three ships before the Athenians had time to man them, and ravaged the island, of which for nearly a hundred and fifty years the Athenians had been in secure possession.

Fire signals at once conveyed information of the attack to Athens. The excitement was intense. The inhabitants of the upper city thought that the enemy had already sailed into the harbour; the inhabitants of Peiraeus feared that Salamis was captured, and an attack on the harbour imminent. At daybreak the Athenians rushed to the shore, manned their vessels in all haste, and crossed to Salamis, while others remained on guard in the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians had no intention of risking an engagement; the memory of their defeat was too recent, and the ships in which they put out from Nisaea were old and unseaworthy. With their captives and spoil, including the three ships from Budorum, they returned to Megara and dispersed. The Athenians also returned home, but the lesson was not lost on them; from this time onwards the mouth of the harbour was closed and a strict watch kept.¹

In defence of their conduct, the Peloponnesians asserted that they were prevented by adverse winds from entering Peiraeus;² but in the judgment of Thucydides, this was a mere excuse, and there was nothing in the weather to prevent resolute men from entering the harbour. It is, however, doubtful whether an unsupported attack in forty unseaworthy ships on the harbour of Athens, even if successful at first, could have ended in anything but disaster; and as Brasidas was one of the commanders of the Peloponnesian

¹ Thuc. ii. 93, 94.

² "Phalerum, they say, is the right harbour, because it is so hard to tack into Peiraeus."—Clough, *Life and Letters*, p. 248.

fleet, we must suppose that other reasons, and not a want of courage, determined the abandonment of the plan.

A few weeks later, Phormio sailed with a considerable force from Naupactus to Astacus, which, in spite of the restoration of Evarchus in 431,¹ seems now to have been favourable to Athens, and marching into the interior, he expelled from Stratus and Coronta and other towns any citizens who

Phormio in
Acarnania.
His return to
Athens and
death.

were likely to oppose Athenian interests. Oeniadae was unapproachable owing to the floods of the Achelous, and Phormio returned to Naupactus for the winter. In the following spring (428) he sailed to Athens, taking with him his ships and captives; but such is the vexatious reticence of Grecian historians, that, in spite of his brilliant services to his country, we never hear of this officer again; we conclude that he died soon after his return home, or he would certainly have been sent out in the following summer to take the command at Naupactus, a post which was given to his son Asopius.²

20. Meanwhile the whole of Northern Greece had been terrified by a gathering of the tribes of Thrace. Two years previously, in the summer of 431 (*supra*, p. 123), Sitalces, the king of the Odrysians, had become an ally of the Athenians, who wished to obtain his assistance in reducing the revolted cities in Chalcidice. About the same time Perdiccas had prevailed upon him to bring about a reconciliation between himself and the Athenians, and to abandon the idea of restoring Philip to his kingdom. In the interval, Perdiccas, having obtained his object, forgot his promises, while Sitalces took no steps towards assisting the Athenians. This neglect was now brought to his notice by some envoys sent from Athens for the purpose, who also would not fail to remind him that Perdiccas had treacherously sent 1000 Macedonians to operate against

Movements
in Thrace:.
Sitalces.

¹ Thuc. ii. 33.

² Thuc. ii. 102, 103. Phormio was one of the heroes of Athenian story: cp. Aristoph. *Knights*, 560; *Lysistr.* 804.

Athens in Acarnania. Sitalces resolved to put forth his whole strength. Perdiccas was to be deposed from the throne of Macedon, and in concert with Hagnon, the Athenian general, whose name was well known in Thrace as the founder of Amphipolis, a combined attack on Chalcidice was planned, in which the Athenians, according to their agreement, were to take part with as large a force as possible.¹

The empire of Sitalces has been described (*supra*, p. 46). It was the greatest power between the Ionian Sea and the Euxine. The levy of Sitalces. The tribes included in it were numerous and warlike, and only required competent leaders to make them a formidable army. These tribes Sitalces now called out. He first summoned those adjacent to his own territory—the Thracians who dwelt between Mount Haemus and Mount Rhodope, extending to the shores of the Euxine and Hellespont; then the Getae from beyond the Haemus, and other tribes as far as the Danube—nations which, like their Scythian neighbours, fought in battle as mounted archers. He paid or persuaded a number of Dii from the heights of Rhodope, the most warlike of all the Thracians, and armed with their native dirks,² to join his ranks, though they did not acknowledge his supremacy. From the banks of the Strymon he summoned the Agrianes and Laeaei, and other Paeonians; from the northern slopes of Mount Scœmbrus the Treres and Tilataei. This mighty host was still increased by many independent tribes who joined it in the hope of plunder, until it reached a total of 150,000 men, of whom one-third were mounted soldiers.³

In a previous expedition against the Paeonians, Sitalces had cut a road over Mount Cercine, and by this he now advanced to Doberus, from which he could descend the valley of the Axios, into Macedonia.⁴ As he carried with him Amyntas, the son of Philip, who was now dead, intending to make him king of Macedonia

¹ Thuc. ii. 95, 96.

² Thuc. vii. 27.

³ Thuc. ii. 96, 98.

⁴ For the geography, see esp. Abel's *Makedonien*, p. 60 f.

in the room of Perdiccas, he purposely led his forces into the district on the left of the Axios, the part of the kingdom over which Philip had previously ruled. The banks of the river were defended by a number of walled cities, founded by the races which had held the country before the Macedonian conquest. Of these Eidomene was taken by storm, but others opened their gates to Amyntas, whom they regarded as their legitimate king, and it was not till they reached Europus that the invaders met with a resistance which they could not overcome. Even this did not put an end to their depredations; they ravaged Mygdonia, Crestonaea, Anthemus, and all Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cynrrhus.¹

The resources of Macedonia were unequal to repelling such a host. The country had not yet been provided with the numerous strongholds and excellent roads by which Archelaus subsequently strengthened his kingdom—doing more for Macedonia in his single reign than all the kings before him. The people made the best of their position, retiring into their castles, and keeping up a series of attacks on the Thracians with their excellent and well-armed cavalry. Their best hope lay in the numbers of the invaders; it was impossible for such a horde to remain long in one place, or risk the dangers of a winter campaign; and when on reaching Chalcidice, Sitalces found that the Athenians did not appear according to their agreement, he decided to return home. He had already entered into negotiations with Perdiccas, who had won over Seuthes, the nephew of Sitalces and next in power to the king himself, by the promise of the hand of his sister Stratonice.

The Athenians fail to meet Sitalces, who retires and makes terms with Perdiccas.

The cause of Amyntas was abandoned, and after a raid into Chalcidice and Bottice the Thracian withdrew his army. Nothing important had been achieved. The Chalcidic cities

¹ "Left," that is, of the Axios; they did not enter Pieria and Bottiaea. For Bottiaea and Bottice, see Forbes, *Thuc.* i. 51.

had not been reduced, and Perdiccas was in a better position than ever.¹

The movement of so great a host filled the neighbouring nations with alarm. The Thessalians, on the south, prepared to meet invasion, and on the north the Thracian tribes who were still independent feared that they would have to fight for their freedom. All the enemies of Athens, aware of the alliance between that city and the Thracian king, expected to see the hosts of the north launched upon their territory. The alarm was not unnatural. Had the Athenians kept their promise, the skill and energy necessary to conduct so great an undertaking might have been supplied; and a larger army would have been brought against the rebellious cities in Thrace than had been seen since the Persian invasion. In their absence the invasion of Macedonia was conducted without any definite aim or fixed purpose, and though the hosts of Sitalces seemed powerful by their numbers, it was their numbers which formed the chief difficulty in the way of success.²

21. At the time when these events were taking place in the west and north of Greece, Athens was mourning the loss of her great leader. In September 429, two years and a half after the outbreak of the war, Pericles died.³ He sank under a lingering disease, which Plutarch regards as an insidious form of the plague, unaccompanied by the violent symptoms. The mind sympathised with the body; and so low was he brought that to a friend who visited him in his sickness, he showed the

¹ Thuc. ii. 100, 101. See also Abel, *Makedonien*, p. 179. The Macedonian cavalry were *τεθωρακισμένοι*.

² See Aristoph. *Acharn.* 148 ff. (425):

ὁ δ' ὤμοσε (Sitalces) σπένδων βοηθήσειν, ἔχων
στρατιὰν τοσαύτην ὥστ' Ἀθηναίους ἐρεῖν,
ὅσον τὸ χρῆμα παρόπων προσέρχεται.

³ Thuc. ii. 65: *ἐπεὶ τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη . . . ἐπεβίω δύο ἔτη καὶ ἑξήμηνες*. The date is, however, uncertain, because we do not know whether Thucydides reckons from the affair of Plataea, or the invasion of Attica—in the latter case the death of Pericles must be put in November.

amulet which he had allowed the women of his household to hang about his neck. Yet something of the old Pericles remained: a few days before his death, when the friends who gathered round him praised his greatness and his victories—the nine trophies which he had erected over the enemies of the city—believing him to be quite unconscious of their presence, Pericles, who had followed their words, found voice to express his wonder why they selected for praise what was partly due to fortune, and had fallen to the lot of many other generals, while they left unrecorded his best and greatest claim to renown. “No action of mine,” he said, “has ever caused an Athenian to wear the garb of a mourner.”¹

To the sickness and death of Pericles we may, without hesitation, ascribe the unsteadiness of plan and weakness in execution which marks Athenian policy during the second half of the year 429. Had he retained his old vigour, the ships sent to aid Phormio would not have been allowed to visit

The death
of Pericles:
results of it
on Athenian
policy.

Crete, when their presence was so urgently needed at Naupactus. Nor would the Athenians have failed to perform their part of the compact with Sitalces, and appear on the coast of Chalcidice, with an adequate fleet, when the Thracians were ravaging the interior. And we cannot but hope, for the honour of Athens and her leader, that in spite of his disinclination to take the field, Pericles would have made some attempt to relieve Plataea, whose condition, in the summer of the year, was as great a proof of Athenian incompetence and ingratitude as it was of the devotion of her allies.

His death was a calamity to Athens. From the first his influence had been personal. He had not built up a structure, social and political, which would continue to exist when the creating spirit had passed away; he had not launched Athens on a new line in which she could move forward without his

¹ Plut. *Per.* 38. The first story is taken from Theophrastus, the scholar of Aristotle, *circ.* 300; for the second no authority is given.

guiding care; he had not even left a party behind him. He ruled alone, and when the reins dropped from his hand, no one else could take them up. A democracy ruled by a great man is an admirable form of government; but a democracy with rulers absorbed in maintaining their own position is incapable of governing itself or others: at home it is distracted by parties; abroad it is inconsistent or tyrannical. The Athenian empire was an outrage on the autonomous rights of the allies, and the plan of campaign with which Pericles entered into the war was not likely, under any circumstances, to lead to a final settlement between Athens and Sparta; but, however true this may be, in his views on the position of Athens towards her allies, and in the conduct of the war, Pericles displays the great quality of moderation. He did not oppress the subject cities as they were oppressed after his death; he did not seek to aggrandise Athens in the war. He dreamed, not of an empire stretching from Crete to Carthage, but of an impregnable Athens, a city so strong that her enemies would desist for very weariness from attacking her. To this policy he would have clung, and neither defeat nor success would have drawn him from it. Those who came after him were of another temper; they used every success as a basis for new demands, and when defeated they were in despair. There were times when the war was carried on better after his death than during his life, but it was carried out without a settled plan. Nicias hoped for one result, Cleon for another; and the policy of Athens varied as one or other was in the ascendant. The mischief which showed itself in the last two years of Pericles' life became fixed and constant. In the internal politics of the city we see a rapid decline. Cleon, if an unworthy successor of Pericles, was at least a man of energy, with a clear eye to the point at issue. When he died, the influence of Nicias became paramount till he met with a rival in Alcibiades, and the management of the state fell into the hands of the two men, who in opposite ways were equally a source of disaster to Athens.

Pericles died, and the glory of Athens died with him; in part, through him. He has no claim to be counted among the statesmen who have put new life into their nation. He was neither a legislator like Solon, nor a constitutional reformer like Clisthenes. Yet we feel that by universal consent of friend and enemy, he was the foremost man of his day, to whom all turned in the hour of distress. Persuasion sat on his lips, not merely because he was a great orator, but because he was as wise as he was eloquent, and as honest as he was wise. We must also allow that he cherished nobler ideals than any other Greek before or after him. In the State of Plato the higher life is confined to a few of the citizens; little or nothing is done for the "working classes" as we should call them. Even in Aristotle's State, this class, though more clearly recognised than in Plato, is shut out from the true life of the citizen. Pericles sought to bring all within the influence of the state; all were to share in the blessings which it had to bestow; all were to be inspired and ennobled by its influence. If we ask what the state can do for the individual, hardly any other answer can be given but the answer of Pericles. A state cannot equalise property, or efface personal distinction, and the attempt to do so is fatal. It can secure to every one, at least in a large measure, the power to shape a life and character, and the sense of this power is the best possession of a man.

The practical result formed a melancholy contrast to this noble ideal. When Pericles died, a large part of the citizens were pauperised by the means which he had taken to provide them with leisure. Their hereditary interest in their fields and farms was broken, and it was not replaced by anything better. Their thoughts were absorbed in a struggle which was anything but ennobling; a struggle which embittered existing hostilities, destroyed the hope of any national union, and fixed the interest of Athens on the maintenance of her empire. The Persian war had been the highest impulse of the fifth century in Greece; it sent a thrill through the nation, and in the years which follow we reap

a harvest of the best which Greece could give. The Peloponnesian war destroyed Hellenism. The delicate bloom faded ; it became more and more clear that Hellenic politics were a failure, and that new forms of union must be devised. With these new arrangements and altered conditions of life, the old Hellenic feeling, so intimately bound up with the city-state, could not co-exist.

CHAPTER VI.

FROM THE DEATH OF PERICLES TO THE END OF 427.

I. In the next summer, immediately after the Peloponnesians had made their usual invasion of Attica, Athens was startled by the news of the revolt of Lesbos (428). The island had been one of the ^{Lesbos revolts} ^{from Athens.} first to join the alliance after the battle of Mycale in 479; it had remained faithful to Athens when Samos broke into revolt, and amid the general subjugation of the cities of the league, it still retained, like Chios, an independent position. Since the outbreak of the war it had furnished a contingent to the Athenian fleet; and, indeed, at the moment of revolt, ten Mytilenaeen ships were lying in the harbour of Athens. But a secret discontent had long been spreading through the island. Before the war, overtures had been made to Lacedaemon, and though these were rejected, owing no doubt to the inadequacy of the Peloponnesian fleet, the design was not abandoned. The Mytilenaeans, who led the movement, set about filling up the mouths of the harbours of their city, strengthening or restoring the walls, and building ships; vessels were despatched to the Euxine for supplies of corn; and a force of Scythian bowmen was hired. In the island they attempted to centralise the administration of the island at Mytilene, hoping by this means to put an end to internal dissension. Negotiations were opened with the Boeotians, who, as Aeolians, were akin to the Lesbians, and a second appeal was made to Lacedaemon.

The Athenians were at once informed of these movements. The inhabitants of the adjacent island of Tenedos, owing to

a quarrel with the Lesbians, were only too ready to betray them; the city of Methymna, which ranked next to Mytilene in Lesbos, was opposed to the policy of consolidation, and retained her loyalty to Athens; and even in Mytilene itself domestic strife had arisen, which rendered united action impossible.¹

The Athenians were at first incredulous. They were unwilling to believe that a new disaster, calling for prompt action in a distant part of the empire, was added to their domestic calamities—to the plague and the desolation of Attica. Envoys were sent in the hope of persuading the Mytilenaeans to abandon their plans and preparations, but in vain; Mytilene would yield to force, and force only. Nothing remained but immediate action. Forty ships, which had been equipped to sail round Peloponnesus, were despatched to Lesbos. It was known that a festival would shortly be held at Mytilene, at the temple of Apollo Maloeis, outside the walls of the city, and this appeared to offer a favourable opportunity for seizing the place in the absence of the citizens. If this plan failed, the Athenian commander was instructed to call on the Mytilenaeans, under a threat of war, to surrender their fleet and dismantle their walls. Meanwhile the ten Mytilenaeon ships which were at Athens were detained, and the crews thrown into prison.²

2. Had the Athenians arrived unexpectedly at Mytilene, they might have succeeded in surprising the town, but in little more than two days their plans were made known to the Lesbians. The festival was, of course, abandoned; the Mytilenaeans began to barricade and guard the unfinished parts of their harbour-defences and walls, and when the Athenians appeared their demands were refused. But the Mytilenaeans were not in a condition to resist an Athenian fleet; "a show of fighting" which they made in front of the harbour was

¹ Thuc. iii. 2; cp. Arist. *Pol.* v. 4=1304 a 4 ff.

² Thuc. iii. 3.

at once repulsed, and without waiting for a second defeat, they made proposals to the Athenian generals, in the hope of procuring the recall of the fleet for a time. The Athenians were conscious that their force at Mytilene was too small to reduce the island if driven to extremities, and a cessation of arms was agreed upon, during which the Mytilenæans were allowed to send one of the informers, who had repented of his action, and other envoys to Athens. They offered to abandon their revolutionary designs if the Athenians would withdraw their ships, but their hopes of success were slight; and while these negotiations were going on, they thought it prudent to send envoys secretly to Lacedaemon for assistance. As the Athenian fleet lay at Malea, to the south of the city, the envoys slipped out to the north, and after a difficult voyage across the open sea, they reached their destination.¹

As was expected, the Mytilenæans' envoys failed to persuade the Athenians to withdraw their forces, and on their return hostilities were resumed, Mytilene being supported by the whole of Lesbos except Methymna, which aided Athens. The Mytilenæans were still without any real confidence in their enterprise; and after a general attack on the Athenian camp, in which they were certainly not defeated, they retired into the city to wait for the assistance which they hoped would come from Peloponnesus. In this attitude they were confirmed by Meleas of Lacedaemon and Hermæondas of Thebes, who had just succeeded in entering the city, and on their advice a second trireme with envoys was sent to Sparta.² Such inaction naturally encouraged the Athenians, and many of the allies, who may have been watching the event, when they saw the weakness of the Lesbian resistance, came readily to their help. They now brought up their ships from Malea and anchored round the

The Mytilenæans appeal to Sparta for help.

¹ Thuc. iii. 3, 4. The words *πρὸς βορέαν τῆς πόλεως* are to be taken with *ἀποστέλλουσι*.

² Thuc. iii. 5.

south side of the city, establishing two camps, one on either side, and blockading both the harbours.¹

3. Meanwhile the envoys who had left Mytilene in the first ship arrived at Lacedaemon. It was close on the time of the Olympic games and they were bidden to repair to Olympia, in order that they might the more easily make their case known to all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy. When the games were over, a meeting was arranged, at which they came forward. Like the Corcyraeans at Athens in 432, they had to defend their conduct, and clear it from the stain of unprovoked rebellion. They insisted that in deserting Athens they had not forsaken an equal in the hour of danger; they had risen against a tyrant at a favourable moment. The blame rested with the Athenians, who had been false to their principles in the management of the Delian League. That League was founded to preserve the freedom of Hellas, but it had been perverted to the destruction of it, and no member could continue faithful to the dominant city without betraying the liberty of their allies. It was true that the Lesbians occupied a favoured position in the alliance; they were still, as they had been at the first, free and independent, supplying ships by agreement, and paying no tribute; but this position was better in appearance than in reality. By allowing one or two allies to remain independent, the Athenians gave a colour of justice to

¹ Thuc. iii. 6. Mytilene was originally built on an island, and, therefore, like Syracuse, the city possessed two harbours, one on the north, the other on the south. The northern harbour, which was probably Μαλόεις, was the harbour for ships of war, of which it would contain fifty; it could be closed if necessary. The southern harbour was larger and deeper, and defended by a mole (Strabo, p. 617). The strait which divided the island and city is called Euripus by Pausanias, iii. 30 (Smith, *Dict. Geog. s.v. Mytilene*). The promontory of Malea is seventy stades distant from the city to the south, and if by it is meant the Malea at which the Athenians had their "docks and market," we must suppose that they retired there while negotiations were going on. See Jowett, *Thucydides, ad loc.*

their conduct, of which it was greatly in need, and they wisely left the strongest allies to the last, when there would be no one to help them. Even this favoured position was retained by a subservience almost slavish to the Athenian people and their leaders. All real equality was gone; the alliance rested on fear, and fear only; the Lesbians were afraid of the Athenian power; the Athenians were afraid that Lesbos might combine her fleet with another and become a centre of disaffection. On these grounds the city resolved to meet the danger, and secure whatever advantages might be gained by those who made the first move.¹

In revolting from Athens, Mytilene had followed the advice of the Boeotians, and if the revolt was premature, there was the more reason that assistance should be sent. No better opportunity would occur. The Athenians were prostrate with the plague; their ships were occupied; their funds were exhausted. A second invasion of Attica could not fail to create a diversion of their forces. Let no man think that in fighting for Lesbos he was risking his life in another man's quarrel. The interests of Lesbos and the Peloponnesians were the same, and Athens could be injured more deeply in Lesbos than elsewhere. Not Attica, which had been harried over and over again, but the countries from which Attica drew her resources, were the real support of the war. Strip Athens of her allies, and her power was ruined. Provide Peloponnesus with ships, and her efficiency was doubled. "Think," they concluded, "think of the hopes which the Hellenes repose in you; think of Zeus Olympius, in whose temple we appear, not otherwise than suppliants, and receive us into your alliance. We are risking our lives in a great struggle; if we win, all will share in the gain; if we lose, the loss will be felt by all."²

4. The appeal was not without effect. The Lesbians were received into alliance by the Lacedaemonians, and to divert the Athenian fleet from Mytilene, the Lacedaemonians requested

¹ Thuc. iii. 8-12.

² Thuc. iii. 13, 14.

their allies to assemble at the Isthmus for a second invasion of Attica. They were themselves most energetic, and

The Lesbians
received into
alliance: pro-
posed invasion
of Attica.

arrived first at the rendezvous, where they began preparations for the transport of ships from the Corinthian to the Saronic gulf; but the allies were less forward, being busy with

their ingathering. Meanwhile the Athenians, by a display of their force, made it clear that they could meet the danger at home without recalling a single ship from service.¹

Manning a hundred vessels, with sailors taken from every class of citizens except the two highest, and even from the resident aliens, they stood out to sea along the Isthmus and made descents upon the coast. The Lacedaemonians, finding that the Lesbians were mistaken in their estimate of the

The invasion
of Attica
abandoned.

Athenian strength, and that their own allies did not assemble, returned home, where their presence was needed to protect their own

territory against the depredations of an Athenian fleet, which had been sent out earlier in the year. Yet they did not wholly forget their pledges to the Lesbians, for they called upon their allies to furnish forty vessels for service at Mytilene. When the Athenians saw that the invasion was abandoned, they also recalled their ships.²

Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans made an attack upon Methymna, the only city in Lesbos which had not joined them.

Movements
in Lesbos.

The attack was unsuccessful, but the Mytilenaeans were able to strengthen their position

in the other cities of Lesbos, and it was clear that the Athenian blockade was ineffective; a larger force was

Paches sent
to Mytilene.

necessary to prevent the rebels from marching to and fro in the island as they pleased. At

the beginning of autumn the Athenians despatched Paches with 1000 Athenian hoplites. He at once surrounded the

¹ Thuc. iii. 15. The καρπὸν ξυγκομιδῇ cannot have been the corn harvest, which had long been over, but refers to the vintage, fruits, etc., or possibly millet, and other grain of that kind; see Leake, *Northern Greece*, iv. 158.

² Thuc. iii. 16.

city with a wall, thus cutting off all communication by land as well as sea.¹

5. The revolt of Lesbos carried the centre of operations to eastern Greece. In the west little was done. Early in the summer Asopius, the son of Phormio, was sent out, at the request of the Acarnanians, with a small fleet, but the greater part of his ships returned home after ravaging the coast of Laconia. With the remainder he sailed to Naupactus, and resumed the plans of Phormio by an expedition against Oeniadae. He was supported by the whole force of the Acarnanians, who attacked the city by land and devastated the country round, while he brought his ships up the Acheloüs. But Oeniadae could neither be seduced nor coerced, and Asopius was compelled to retire. A subsequent attack on Leucas cost him his life and the loss of a large part of his force. The remainder seem to have returned to Naupactus.

Asopius in
Western
Greece.

A memorable incident marked the close of the year. Since September 429 the garrison at Plataea had been closely shut up, and nothing had been done by Athens to relieve the distress of her brave allies. When supplies began to fail, the besieged resolved to force their way if possible over the wall; and though about half the number withdrew from the enterprise, 220 men were found willing to risk the danger. The first necessity was to provide scaling ladders of a sufficient length to reach the top of the wall. By counting the layers of bricks in a part which had not been plastered over, a tolerably correct calculation of the height was made (the bricks being, no doubt, of a standard and familiar size). When the preparations were complete, the garrison waited for the advantage of a dark and stormy night; for it was the custom of the besiegers to pass the night when fine on the battlements, and when wet, to retire for shelter into the towers, of which there was one at every tenth battlement extending to the inner and outer face of the double wall, but with a passage through it,

Plataea: part
of the garrison
escape.

¹ Thuc. iii. 18.

the intervening spaces being then unprotected. In darkness, wind, and rain the gallant band set out on their forlorn hope. They successfully crossed the ditch round the town, and arrived at the wall. Their armour had been lightened in order to impede their movements as little as possible, while the right foot was left unshod to gain a firmer hold on the slippery mud of the ditches. The ladders were no sooner planted in a space between two towers than they were mounted by soldiers armed with dirks and corslets, who immediately parted right and left to the towers at either end. After these came others armed with javelins only, their shields being carried by their comrades behind. A considerable number had ascended when the noise of a falling tile aroused the enemy. The alarm was at once raised, and the besieging army rushed out on the wall. They did not know what had happened, and their attention was distracted by an attack which the Plataeans in the city made from the opposite side. No one moved from his post lest he should abandon the place where he was most needed; only the body of Three Hundred, who had been set apart for emergencies, ventured to march along outside the wall to the place where the alarm had been given. Fire signals were at once raised to give information to the Thebans, but they were rendered useless by the beacons which the Plataeans lighted on the wall.¹

Meanwhile the Plataeans had slain the guards of the towers at either end of the space where they had mounted the wall, and not content with occupying the passages through the towers, they planted their ladders against these and sent a body of men to the top. From the towers and from the wall they kept up a constant discharge of missiles, while their comrades planted more ladders against the intervening space, cleared off the battlements, and passed over the wall to the outer ditch. Each man, as he reached the further side, halted and shot arrows or javelins against any of

¹ Thuc. iii. 20-22. It has been urged that signals from Plataea could not be visible at Thebes, but they might be very well seen at some place where the Thebans were watching.

the enemy who came in sight. When all had crossed, those in the towers descended and advanced to the ditch. They were at once attacked by the Three Hundred who had provided themselves with torches, a precaution of doubtful advantage, for the Plataeans, standing on the further edge of the ditch, saw the enemy by the lights which they carried, and could discharge their missiles with effect, while they themselves were in darkness. But the crossing of the outer ditch was a difficult task; for owing to the rain it was filled with water, and the frost had spread a film of ice on the surface, thick enough to be an impediment without affording a safe pathway. The difficulties were successfully overcome, and out of the whole number one archer alone was captured by the enemy. After crossing the ditch, the fugitives took the road to Thebes, on which pursuit was least likely to be made—and in fact they could see the enemy hurrying along the road up Cithaeron to the pass which led to Athens. When they had gone about a mile, they turned sharply round and made for the hills, and so escaped to Athens. Of the 220, 212 had made good their escape, seven had abandoned the attempt, and one was captured. The Plataeans in the city, hearing from those who turned back that their comrades had been cut down to a man, sent a herald in the morning to ask for the bodies of the slain.¹

In the autumn of 428 the war had gone on for three

¹ Thuc. iii. 23, 24. Those who doubt the veracity of Thucydides' account of the siege of Plataea point to the fact, among others, that while the historian dwells on the difficulties created by the water in the ditch outside the wall, he says nothing of any water in the ditch round the town. If there was water in the one, there would be water in the other. Under certain conditions of soil and situation, the objection would, no doubt, be serious; but as we know nothing of the situation of the ditches at the point where the wall was crossed, we cannot ascribe much weight to the objection. In any case the area of rainfall inside the wall would be less than the area outside, and it is easy to imagine conditions in which there would be a good deal of water in the outer ditch and little or none in the inner. On the position of Plataea, see Forbes, *Thuc. i. xcvii. f.*; G. B. Grundy, *The Battle of Plataea*.

years and a half, and already the pressure of the expense began to be felt heavily at Athens. For the first time a tax was imposed on the property of the citizens, which realised 200 talents (about £40,000), a sum equal to one-third of the annual receipts from the Delian confederacy. At the same time twelve ships were sent out under Lysicles, a demagogue who had obtained some transient power after the death of Pericles, to collect money from the cities in Caria and the adjacent region, cities of whose loyalty the Athenians were at no time very secure. The expedition ended in disaster. Lysicles fell in battle against the Carians, aided by the Samians of Anaea, and a large number of his soldiers with him.¹

In the course of the winter a Lacedaemonian envoy, Salaethus by name, who had been despatched, after the meeting at Olympia, with intelligence that Attica was to be invaded and a fleet sent to the relief of Lesbos, succeeded in making his way into Mytilene. He encouraged the Mytilenaeans to persevere in their plans, and any thoughts which they had entertained of coming to terms with the Athenians were now entirely abandoned.²

6. With the spring of 427 began a year which was the most terrible of the whole ten years of the war which preceded the peace of Nicias—a year marked on both sides by excesses of savage cruelty, indicating too truly the passions which the war had let loose.

After despatching the forty vessels, under the command of Alcidas, to Lesbos, the Peloponnesians made their usual invasion of Attica. They were no longer led by Archidamus, who was either dead or in his last illness, but by Cleomenes, who was regent for his nephew, king Pausanias. Expecting to hear of some success gained by their fleet at Mytilene, and with the hope

¹ Thuc. iii. 19. For Lysicles see Aristoph. *Knights*, 132, 762; Plut. *Per.* 24. After the death of Pericles he married Aspasia, and became a successful orator.

² Thuc. iii. 25. For the Samians, *infra*, p. 166.

of preventing the Athenians from sending any additional force to Lesbos, the Peloponnesians remained in Attica as long as they could, carrying their devastations into the remote districts which had escaped in former invasions, and destroying all that had grown up since the previous spring. But the expected news did not arrive, and when their supplies were exhausted, they returned home.¹

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian ships, instead of sailing directly to Lesbos, wasted time off the coast of Peloponnesus, and then slowly passed across the Aegean to Alcidas in the Delos, which they reached before the Athenians Aegean. in the city were aware of their movements. From Delos they put in at the islands of Icarus and Myconus, where, to their astonishment, they were informed that Mytilene had fallen. At first they were incredulous, but on reaching Embatum, in the territory of Erythrae, they found the news confirmed. Mytilene surrendered a week before their arrival on the Asiatic coast.²

Supplies had run short in the unhappy city, and when all hope of the ships promised from Peloponnesus died away, it became necessary to have recourse to desperate measures. With the intention of making an attack on the Athenian lines, Salaethus gave shields and spears to the populace; who hitherto had served as light-armed soldiers only.³ They were no sooner in possession of arms than they refused to obey their officers, and gathering together in knots, demanded that all the corn in the city should be brought out and divided equally; if the demand were refused, they would give Surrender of up the city to the enemy. Reflecting that they Mytilene. were quite unable to prevent the action of the people, and that their own position would be one of great danger if they were excluded from any agreement made with the Athenians, the magistrates of the city joined with the people in coming to

¹ Thuc. iii. 26. Thucydides here speaks of forty-two ships in the fleet of Alcidas, though previously, c. 16 and 25, he has mentioned forty only, and so in c. 29.

² Thuc. iii. 29.

³ Thuc. iii. 27.

terms with Paches. They placed themselves unconditionally at the mercy of Athens, and agreed to receive the army into the city ; merely stipulating that they should be allowed to send envoys to Athens to plead their cause, and that till they returned Paches should not imprison, nor enslave, nor put to death any of the citizens. Those who had taken a leading part in the negotiations with Lacedaemon sought the protection of the altars, but on receiving an assurance that they should suffer no injury, they also put themselves into the hands of Paches, who placed them in Tenedos.¹

7. When the Peloponnesians found that Lesbos was indeed taken, a council of war was held to decide on their movements. Alcidas off the coast of Asia. Teutiaplus of Elis urged an immediate attack on Mytilene ; the enemy were not aware of their presence, and by a sudden descent they might take them off their guard in the careless confidence of their recent victory. Such vigorous action was quite beyond Alcidas. Nor would he listen to the advice of the Ionian exiles and the Lesbians in his fleet, who suggested that he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolis, as a base of operations from which to excite a revolt in Ionia, an attempt in which he could rely not only on the feeling of the Asiatic Greeks, but on the help of Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis. His only wish, now that Mytilene had fallen, was to return whence he came. Sailing from Embatum he put in at Myonnesus, where he slaughtered most of the captives taken on the voyage, a barbarous and foolish act, which could only alienate those whom he was sent to assist, and damage the Spartan cause. As he lay off Ephesus, the Samian oligarchs, who had established themselves at Anaea, on the mainland, after their expulsion from the island (*supra*, p. 33),² protested against his conduct, declaring that he had an ill way of liberating Hellas, if he put to death men who made no resistance and were not even enemies, but allies of Athens

¹ Thuc. iii. 28.

² Thuc. iv. 75.

under compulsion. Alcidas then set at liberty all the surviving Chians in his hands, and some others.¹

Before arriving at Ephesus, he had been sighted by the *Salamina* and *Paralus*, the two state galleys of the Athenians. Pursuit was now inevitable, and, indeed, information of his presence had already been conveyed to Paches. Alcidas had no intention of being caught; from Ephesus he struck across the open sea, "not wishing to touch on any land till he reached Peloponnesus, if he could help it." Paches followed as far as Patmos, without coming in sight of the fleet; upon which he returned to Notium near Colophon, while Alcidas, fleeing far to the south, was carried by a storm to Crete, whence his vessels straggled home.²

If Alcidas was cowardly, Paches was treacherous. In the spring of 430 there had been a revolution at Colophon, in which the oligarchical party, aided by Itamenes Paches at
and a number of Persians, drove out their Notium.
opponents, and seized the upper city for themselves. The exiles settled in Notium, which was the port of Colophon, where, in a short time, a second faction broke out. A new Persian party was formed, which, of course, had the support of the similar party in Colophon, and a number of Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries were sent to their aid by Pissuthnes. They were now able to drive their opponents out of Notium, and, to secure their position, the mercenaries were placed under the command of one Hippias, in a part of the town which was walled off into a fortress. The Athenian party summoned Paches to their assistance, who induced Hippias to visit him, on the assurance that, if terms were not arranged, he should be sent back uninjured. But no sooner had Paches got him in his power than he made an unexpected attack on the fortress and slew all who were in

¹ Thuc. iii. 30-32. His captives were the more numerous because the Ionians, far from attempting to escape, came to his ships under the impression that they were Athenian. No one in the eastern Aegean expected to see Peloponnesian vessels in those waters, so long as the Athenian empire lasted.

² Thuc. iii. 33, 69.

it. He then took Hippias back into the fortress, as he had promised, and caused him to be slain. The Persian party were of course expelled from Notium, and not long afterwards the Athenians sent out a number of commissioners to establish the town as a colony under Athenian laws. Any Colophonian who might be in exile among the neighbouring cities was recalled, if he were of the democratic party, and enrolled in the new settlement. Owing to its situation on the shore, Notium was in the range of Athenian protection; Colophon, on the other hand, which lay on a hill at some little distance inland, remained in the hands of the Persians.¹

8. From Notium Paches returned to Mytilene. He lost no time in acquiring the two cities of the island, Pyrrha and Eresus, which were still independent, and then he despatched to Athens the Mytilenaeans whom he had placed in Tenedos, and any others who seemed specially implicated in the revolt, including Salaethus. The disturbance was now so utterly crushed that he was able to dismiss the larger part of his forces.²

When the captives arrived at Athens, Salaethus was at once put to death.³ The fate of the Mytilenaeans was then brought before the Athenian Assembly. Cleon, who by this time had completely won the ear of the people, pressed for an extreme penalty. He proposed to execute, not only the prisoners who had been brought to Athens—who were, in fact, the ringleaders in the revolt—but all the grown-up citizens of Mytilene, and to sell the women and children into slavery. To this atrocious sentence he brought the people to consent by dwelling on the unprovoked nature of the revolt—for Lesbos was not a subject state, but an equal ally—and pointing out the unexpected and unparalleled circumstance that a Peloponnesian fleet

¹ Thuc. iii. 34; Xen. *Hell.* i. 2. 4.

² Thuc. iii. 35.

³ He endeavoured to save himself by offering to get the Peloponnesians withdrawn from Plataea, but the offer was rejected.

had crossed the Aegean to support the revolt. Such audacity was thought to imply an extensive plan for the alienation of the Asiatic cities—a plan which must be repressed by the most vigorous measures. At the close of the meeting a trireme was sent to Paches, announcing the resolution, and bidding him execute it without delay. But when the citizens had retired to their homes, and the excitement of a public meeting had subsided, a change came over their feelings. The decree which had seemed just and politic a few hours before was now regarded as cruel and monstrous. A review of the whole circumstances of the revolt showed that there were different degrees of guilt; and the populace of Mytilene, who were involved in one sentence with the oligarchs, had practically been the cause of the surrender of the city to the Athenians. The Mytilenaeans present in Athens, and those of the citizens who sympathised with them, were not slow to notice the change of sentiment. They appealed to the magistrates to call a second Assembly, and bring the matter before it once more. It is doubtful whether it was strictly legal to reopen a question which had been decided by a former vote in the Assembly. But, as the Assembly was itself the sovereign power, an act which received its approval could not be called in question by any other body, and there was no standing ordinance which forbade the sovereign power to cancel its own decrees. On the next morning notice was given of a second Assembly, and the people were once more gathered in the Pnyx.¹

Cruel decree of the Athenians: a second meeting called.

Cleon was furious. It was his motion which was being rediscussed; his policy was being challenged; his authority shaken. In the speech which Thucydides has put into his mouth on this occasion, we have a sketch of the attitude of the demagogue to the Athenian allies abroad and to his own opponents at home. It was useless, he said, to apply the principles which prevailed in the democracy

Cleon's speech.

¹ Thuc. iii. 36.

of Athens to the government of her empire. That was a tyranny, and must be maintained as such. As for these changes of purpose—they were odious and ruinous too. Let the law be maintained; innovations were clever, no doubt, but there was something better for a state than cleverness, and that was consistency. “Can any one show that the revolt of the Mytilenaeans is a benefit to the state? Of course he can not; the mere attempt to do so means that the speaker has been bribed to persuade you out of your senses. And when can we punish with a truer sense of the injury than when the injury is fresh in our minds? The love of fine speeches is the ruin of you Athenians, for when straightforward action on recognised principles is needed, you are always listening to the last argument. Nothing can be worse than the conduct of the Mytilenaeans. They were safe from the enemy; they had a fleet of their own, and enjoyed a favoured position; yet this did not prevent them from taking sides with our bitterest enemies. The truth is, we have been too lenient with them. We ought to have reduced them to subjection long ago, and treated them like the rest. It is not too late to let them feel the weight of your arm, and the opportunity must not be allowed to pass. And we must make no difference between nobles and people. They were all of one mind about attacking us. If you give way to foolish considerations of mercy, all your allies will revolt. Remember that your empire is involved in the sentence; for if you spare the Mytilenaeans, you confess that your rule is unjust; you cannot take up an ideal line about virtue and retain that. Think, too, how they would deal with you, if they had the opportunity, and deal so with them. Remember the feelings which came over you when first you heard of the revolt, and punish them as they deserve.”

That his opponents are bribed—that argument is sophistical when opposed to his own views—that the Athenian power is a despotism which can only be supported by despotic measures—that justice is revenge—that mercy and equity

are out of the question in dealing with the allies—that tory stupidity is better than liberal discussion—these are the principles on which Cleon wishes to lead the Athenians of his day. Such ideas were clear and intelligible, and likely to commend themselves to the meanest citizen.

9. The leader of the opposite party was Diodotus, of whom, unfortunately, we know nothing. He began with some allusions to Cleon. The two greatest The speech of Diodotus. impediments to wise counsel were haste and

passion, of which the first was a sign of folly, and the second implied a vulgar and narrow mind. A man who wished to prevent discussion was either one who had not the sense to see that in no other way could light be thrown on the future, or he had a discreditable proposal to make, and knowing that it would not bear examination, he endeavoured to silence opposition by the virulence of his abuse, or by hints of corruption. But discussion was quite a different thing from slander, or invective, and those who demanded it ought not to be suspected of dishonesty and corruption; there was no better citizen than the man who tried to convince his fellows of what was right by fair argument. If a speaker could not venture to come forward openly with his opinion, he was compelled to deceive his audience; and thus the patriot and the traitor were on the same level. This was a great evil and a great mistake too, for those who came forward to advise the people were men who had taken unusual pains to form a sound opinion, and moreover they were responsible for what they said.

“The present question is merely one of policy. Is the severe sentence likely to do us harm or good? Cleon’s proposal may be just in the abstract sense of justice—but is it politic? I say it is not. The fear of death does not deter men from crime; men have gone on increasing the severity of sentences—for in earlier times they would naturally be milder—but crimes are still committed. The present outweighs the future; and hope suggests escape. It is impossible, and simply absurd to suppose, that human

nature when bent upon some favourite project can be restrained either by the power of law or by any other terror. Such a sentence as that which we are met to discuss will only drive our enemies to despair. They will resist to the last man, for there is no hope if they yield. Our wars will be fought to the bitter end, and when we are victorious there will be nothing left for us to gain. Let us be as cautious and vigilant as you will; but avoid extremity in punishment. In the present case we must make a distinction. The popular party are our friends everywhere; the people of Mytilene took no part in the revolt. If you destroy them equally with the guilty, you will alienate your friends; besides, if guilty and innocent share the same fate, no one will care to be innocent. Cleon may insist that his proposal is just, but justice and expediency cannot always be combined. I do not speak to you of lenity or mercy, words which are out of place in a discussion of this kind. I only advise what is most politic. You have the guilty men in your hands: pass sentence on them as you will; but leave the rest of the inhabitants untouched."¹

In this remarkable speech we observe that hardly a word is said in condemnation of the *cruelty* of the decree, though many of the audience were painfully conscious of this. Diodotus accepts the sentiment of his audience, and endeavours to show how far it can be rightly indulged. The proposal of Cleon is even allowed to be just, *i.e.* it corresponds fairly to the degree of resentment which the Athenians might be expected to feel towards the Lesbians. The only point in question is the expediency of such a wholesale execution. And here it is interesting to notice that Diodotus uses arguments of which the world has been very slow to recognise the value. That severity of punishment, far from preventing, tends to aggravate crime is now a commonplace; but it has only become so after a long series of judicial atrocities.

Another feature of these speeches, less striking, but

¹ Thuc. iii. 42-48. See Jowett's translation.

perhaps even more significant as an indication of Athenian feeling, is the view taken of the political adviser or speaker. We see an audience delighting in displays of rhetoric, who can be influenced and carried away by a clever speech; and as a natural consequence we find a class of orators growing up who make it their sole business to lead or mislead the Assembly. They were masters of argument and disputation; men with whom subtlety was far above sincerity. They drew upon themselves the hatred of both the sections of conservative feeling at Athens; we find them denounced as bitterly by Aristophanes as they are by Cleon. Both alike warned the people against unprincipled leaders, who were either bribed to play their part, or spoke as "sophists" from a mere love of discussion. There was, no doubt, some truth in this point of view, but the means taken to destroy the influence of these "orators" were not without evils. It was unfair to charge every speaker who happened to oppose the popular feeling with corruption and dishonesty. As Diodotus points out, the suspicion thus created stood in the way of those who honestly wished to give good advice to their citizens. At the best, the politician had enough responsibility, for often he alone was made to suffer, when the people had eagerly supported him, or even when the failure of his plan was due to others.¹

10. The excitement in the Assembly was great, and no one knew on which side the decision would fall. The show of hands appeared to be nearly equal in favour ^{Mytilene} of either proposal, but the amendment of ^{is saved.} Diodotus was carried by a small majority. A trireme was immediately despatched to overtake the ship which had been sent out twenty-four hours previously. The envoys*

¹ It is remarkable that Aristophanes, though opposed to the war, and to any severe treatment of the allies, never directly alludes to the atrocities which made the Athenian name odious in Greece, but cp. *Knights*, 1025, *Κέρβερον ἀνδραποδιστήν*; and indeed the massacre of the Mytilenaeans "is alluded to among the crimes of the Athenian people but two or three times in the whole of ancient literature." —Forbes, *Thuc.* I. ci.

from Mytilene provided the crew with wine and meal, and promised a large reward if they arrived at Lesbos in time to prevent the execution of the decree. The sailors rowed without stopping, eating meal kneaded with wine and oil as they sat at the oar, and giving up their places to a fresh relay of men when they required sleep. As there was happily no opposing wind, and the first trireme did not hasten on its dismal errand, the race was won, and Mytilene was saved. Paches had already read the decree of the Athenians, and was preparing to carry it into execution, when the second vessel arrived to countermand the orders.¹

Even now the sentence was severe enough. All the Mytilenaeans who had been sent to Athens, more than a thousand in number, were put to death; the **Massacres and confiscations.** walls of the city were pulled down; the ships carried away. The whole of the island, with the exception of the territory of Methymna, was then divided into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were set aside for the temples, and the rest assigned to Athenian citizens. The new owners, though sent out to the island, did not permanently reside on their property, but leased it at an annual rent of two minae a lot to Lesbian tenants. Such an income would be welcome to many who had lost all their property in the repeated invasions of Attica, and enabled many more to qualify for the hoplite class who had hitherto fallen below it. The total sum brought each year into Athens was 5400 minae, or about £18,000.

On his return to Athens, Paches was brought to trial by Cleon, and so shameful was his conduct proved to be that he slew himself in open court.²

¹ Thuc. iii. 49. There could not, of course, be two sets of rowers in one ship, for the space would not admit of this. But we may suppose that the room ordinarily occupied by the officers of the ship, or assigned to hoplites, was on this occasion given up to men who rowed.

² For the death of Paches see Plutarch, *Nic.* 6, who says that it occurred when he was being tried for his conduct in office. Another account attributes it to his treatment of two Lesbian women; see the

II. From the punishment of Mytilene at the hands of the Athenians we pass to the punishment of Plataea at the hands of the Peloponnesians, a punishment The surrender of Plataea. more severe, more indefensible, and more disgraceful to those who inflicted it. Soon after the recovery of Lesbos the supplies of the besieged Plataeans were utterly exhausted, and they had to choose between starvation and submission. The city was, indeed, reduced to such weakness that resistance to a vigorous attack from the besiegers would have been impossible, but such an attack was strictly forbidden by the Lacedaemonians, who, looking forward to peace with Athens, did not wish Plataea to come under the category of towns taken by force—which it might be necessary to restore—but under that of towns yielded by agreement, which either side would claim to keep. For this reason the general in command of the siege was instructed to send a herald to Plataea, which was now in the last stage of exhaustion, and inquire whether the garrison would submit themselves to the judgment of the Lacedaemonians; “the guilty would be punished, but no injustice would be done.” In the belief that they would receive a fair trial, and would be, at any rate, in the hands of the Lacedaemonians, not of their bitter enemies the Thebans, the garrison gave up their city. Food was immediately supplied to them until the commissioners who were to decide their fate should arrive from Sparta.

On the arrival of the judges the hopes of the Plataeans were dashed to the ground. No accusation was brought against them; they were merely asked, one after the other,

epigram of Agathias (A.D. 570, *Anthol.* vii. 614). Paches slew their husbands, but the women escaped him and made their way to Athens, where they denounced his conduct. Cleon probably had a grudge against Paches for his want of promptness in executing the first decree. See Beloch, *Die Attische Politik*, pp. 30, 33. Cp. Plut. *Aristid.* 26. For some difficulties connected with the revolt, see Forbes, *Thuc.* i. ci., f. When Thucydides says that the somewhat more than 1000 who were put to death were *αἰσιώτατοι τῆς ἀνοστούσεως*; one is inclined to doubt the numeral.

the short and simple question, whether they had rendered any assistance to the Lacedaemonians or their allies in the present war. Of course, as they were allies of the Athenians, there was but one answer; an answer which implied immediate condemnation. In the hope that they might move their judges to take a more favourable view, they requested leave to address them through two of their number, Astymachus, and Lacon, who was the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians at Plataea.

The head and front of the offence of the Plataeans was their alliance with Athens. Originally a member of the Boeotian League, the city had broken away from the confederacy, to which, both by race and territory, she naturally belonged, and associated with the Athenians (*supra*, p. 111). But the Plataeans were able to prove that they had taken this step on the advice of the Spartan king, Cleomenes, and therefore—whether they were right or wrong in abandoning their Boeotian friends—the Spartans could not justly condemn them. And though they had joined in the general alliance formed in 481 to resist the Persians, this did not cancel the alliance with Athens already existing. In taking the Athenian side they were only fulfilling obligations which every city was bound to fulfil. In the present war their city had been attacked by Thebes without notice or provocation, even at a holy season, a proof that without the support of the Athenians they would have lost their independence. Instead of reproaching them for their fidelity to allies who had aided them in a time of trouble, the Spartans should remember their services to the cause of Hellas. In the great invasion they alone among the cities of Boeotia had fought for liberty. They had even gone on board ship as seamen, leaving their city to destruction. How different was the conduct of the Thebans, who had done their best to enslave Hellas to the barbarians. At Plataea the decisive battle had been fought; in their country were the memorials of victory, the tombs of the slain, and the temples in which the conquerors offered prayer and thanksgiving; it was they

who, year by year, made offerings to the dead who had fallen in the glorious struggle; their land was sacred, pledged by the oath of Pausanias to be inviolate and independent. And were they then to be rooted out from the soil of Greece to satisfy the revenge of their most bitter enemies? That would be a stain on the honour of Lacedaemon, which now stood first in Greece; a denial of the protection due to them as to all suppliants. But if the Spartans were indeed obdurate, let them at least put the garrison back in the city and leave them, if perish they must, to perish of hunger. Terrible as such a fate would be, they would rather die so than fall into the hands of the Thebans.¹

The language in which Thucydides has clothed these thoughts is touching and pathetic. We cannot read it without realising what terrible dangers beset a small city in Greece at the hands of powerful neighbours; what sacrifices were made in the passionate desire for "independence." We are also deeply impressed with the honourable attachment of Plataea to Athens—an attachment ill repaid by the selfish policy which, while urging resistance, abandoned the city to the enemy. On the other hand, we cannot but lament the presence in this brave and faithful people of that spirit of division which caused it to break away from a union in which alone it would have found protection. Odious as was the conduct of Thebes, we cannot say that her efforts to create a united Boeotia were unjust or impolitic, and to these efforts Plataea was the greatest obstacle. There was also the danger that Plataea might become, as happened in other cities of Boeotia, a centre for democratic intrigues in the interest of Athens.

12. The Thebans thought it necessary to make a reply to this appeal. There were points in their own past which required excuse, and they wished to put their case against Plataea as strongly as they could. It was true that in the Persian invasion they had

¹ Thuc. iii. 53 f.

joined the invader, but Thebes was not her own mistress at the time; she was in the hands of a few leading families, who managed everything in their own interests, and when she got back her constitution, she acted very differently. By the victory of Coronea Hellas was freed from the dominion of Athens. It was true, too, that they had seized Plataea at a time of peace and in a holy season; but they were not the first to move in the matter; they merely accepted an invitation sent by the leading citizens in the town. The Plataeans, on the other hand, had acted with the greatest perfidy in attacking the Thebans who came with peaceful intentions, and slaying their captives, though pledged to spare their lives. As for their fidelity, it was merely another name for perfidy. They had forsaken the alliance which they made with the Peloponnesians, and joined Athens in enslaving cities which they were bound to aid, such as Aegina. Their boasted patriotism in the Persian war was due to their alliance with Athens; it did not arise from any regard for Hellas, as their subsequent conduct showed. And their present isolation was entirely due to their own obstinacy. Had they accepted the offer of Archidamus, no harm would have happened to them. Were they to go unpunished for such conduct, and claim to be free from the operation of the common laws of Hellenic warfare?¹

The Spartans took the view that Plataea, by refusing the neutrality which Archidamus offered, had fallen back into her original position as an ally of Sparta. The luckless Plataeans were brought forward once more, one by one, and the same question was put to each: "Had he done any service to the Lacedaemonians or their allies in the war?" and each one, as he answered "No," was taken away and put to death. The total number thus murdered amounted to two hundred Plataeans and twenty-five Athenians. The women who had remained in the city were sold into slavery. For about a year the Thebans

Massacre of
the Plataeans.

¹ Thuc. iii. 60.

allowed the deserted town to be the home of some Megarian exiles; but afterwards they razed it to the foundations. The territory was converted into public land and leased to citizens of Thebes. For many years the site of the city remained desolate, and the survivors of the citizens continued to live at Athens, whence a number of them were subsequently sent as colonists to occupy Scione.¹

13. At Plataea and Mytilene we have examples of the principles upon which the war was conducted by the leading cities on either side. The course of our narrative now leads us to Corcyra, to be present at scenes which illustrate the nature of domestic strife in Greek cities. We cannot affirm that this ferocious spirit was engendered by the war, but, as we shall see, the opposition of Athenian and Peloponnesian interests afforded opportunities to the conflicting parties, oligarchical and democratic, of which they were not slow to avail themselves.

When the Corcyraean envoys appeared at Athens in 433, they pointed out the advantage which Athens would derive in a war with Sparta from the union of the Corcyraean and Athenian fleets. The greater Corcyra sends
little aid to
Athens: is our surprise to find that, when the war broke out, Corcyra furnished little or no assistance. In the summer of 431, notwithstanding the crushing defeat of 433, fifty Corcyraean vessels joined the fleet which sailed round Peloponnesus, but after this no ships were sent till 426, when fifteen came to the help of Demosthenes. When the Corinthians restored Evarchus to Astacus, when Phormio was engaged at such fearful odds with the Peloponnesian fleet, and in urgent need of reinforcements, the Corcyraean triremes lay inactive in the harbour of the city.

The explanation is to be sought in the changes which took place at Corcyra in the interval between 431 and 427. In the

¹ Thuc. iii. 68; v. 32; Diod. xii. 76. The restoration came forty years later, after the peace of Antalcidas in 387, but the town was again destroyed (Diod. xv. 46; Paus. ix. 1). For the Plataeans at Athens, see Gilbert, *Handbuch*, i. p. 178 (=187 E.T.).

naval engagement of 432 a number of Corcyraeans, belonging to the foremost families in the island, had been captured and carried to Corinth. They were treated with the greatest consideration while detained in the city, and at some time, which we cannot fix, were allowed to return at a nominal ransom of eight hundred talents, for which their proxeni at Corinth became security. It was not intended that such an enormous sum should ever be exacted; on the contrary, the captives were really sent back in the Corinthian interest, to detach Corcyra from Athens; and on their return the city was thrown into great confusion.¹

The condition of parties at Corcyra at this time is uncertain. As many of the oligarchs in the city had either been slain or taken captive, the democrats The Corcyraean oligarchs. must have gained in power, and perhaps it was owing to their ascendancy that the Athenians received a contingent of fifty ships in 431. However this may be, the captives, on their return, endeavoured to estrange Athens and Corcyra, and so great was their influence, that the Athenians and Corinthians each sent envoys to the island, the first to maintain their position, the second to take advantage of the new movement. A public assembly was held, in which it was resolved that the Corcyraeans, while continuing allies of the Athenians as before, should renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians.

The oligarchs were not content with this success; they aimed at nothing less than the suppression of the Athenian or democratic party in the city, and with Peithias. this view they summoned Peithias, the leader of the people and proxenus of the Athenians, to take his trial on a charge of attempting to enslave Corcyra to Athens. The people refused to condemn their leader; and in revenge Peithias charged five of the richest citizens with cutting stakes for their vineyards in the sacred wood of Zeus and Alcinous, a practice forbidden by law, under a fine of a

¹ Thuc. iii. 70; cp. i. 55, *supra*, p. 81.

stater (3s.) for each stake. The accused were condemned, and found themselves burdened with a ruinous fine. In vain they took refuge at the altars of Zeus and Alcinous, entreating to be allowed to pay their debt by instalments; at the instigation of Peithias, the council insisted on immediate payment. The oligarchs were desperate; they knew that the democratic leader was in favour of a strict alliance, offensive and defensive, with Athens, and, as he was all-powerful in the council, their own ruin was imminent. Rushing with daggers into the council-chamber, they struck him down, and others to the number of sixty, some of whom were not even councillors.¹ The oligarchs summoned the people, and told them that what they had done was done to free Corcyra from the dominion of Athens. The city would now go back to her old neutrality, and stand aside from the quarrel which divided Greece. Athenians and Peloponnesians would be received without distinction, if they came in one ship only, and with peaceable intentions. The people had no alternative but to sanction this arrangement; the oligarchy then sent envoys to Athens to put their conduct in the best light, and to dissuade the democrats, who had set sail in the Athenian trireme, from organising any opposition. But their envoys no sooner arrived than they were arrested and carried over to Aegina.²

These events took place while the Athenians were engaged in the blockade of Mytilene, and it is possible that the oligarchs of Corcyra ventured to strike so boldly in the belief that no assistance would come to the Corcyraean demos from Athens. In other respects the moment was favourable; the death of Phormio, and the defeat and death of his son Asopius, must have weakened Athenian influence in the west, and their only available force in that quarter was a squadron of twelve ships which lay at Naupactus under the command of Nicostratus.

14. Soon after the despatch of their envoys the oligarchs

¹ Thuc. iii. 70.

² Thuc. iii. 71-72.

were reinforced by a Corinthian trireme with ambassadors from Lacedaemon. They now attacked the people, driving them to seek refuge at night in the acropolis and other high parts of the town. They also held the southern or Hyllaic harbour, while their opponents occupied the market-place and the harbour opposite the continent.

The next day both parties endeavoured to increase their numbers by inviting the slaves in the island to join them. A large number came to the help of the democrats, while the oligarchs were aided by a band of 800 auxiliaries from the mainland, for here, as at Epidamnus, the oligarchs and barbarians acted together. A day was allowed to pass in quietness, but on the next the contest was vigorously renewed, even the women joining in the fray—at least on the popular side—and hurling missiles from the housetops on their enemies. The contest went on till evening, and was turning in favour of the demos, who had the larger numbers and the better position, when the oligarchs, fearing that the people would seize the docks, set fire to a number of houses near the market-place and other large blocks of building. The fire was effectual in checking the advance of their opponents, and both parties remained in their respective positions for the night. The Corinthian trireme, seeing the turn that events had taken, stole away, and the greater part of the auxiliaries returned to the continent.¹

On the next day Nicostratus came up from Naupactus with his ships, and 500 heavy-armed Messenians. He endeavoured to reconcile the hostile factions by proposing that ten of the most guilty oligarchs should be brought to trial, while the rest made a truce and laid aside their enmity, but the ten selected for trial immediately fled, and when Nicostratus was about to quit the island, the popular leaders requested him to leave behind five of his ships for their protection, their place in

Nicostratus
attempts a
reconciliation.

¹ Thuc. iii. 74.

the fleet being taken by five Corcyraean vessels. Nicostratus agreed, and the people began to man the ships with crews selected from the oligarchs. The oligarchs took alarm. Why were they selected to serve under Athenians? Were they not being sent to Athens for punishment? In their terror they took refuge in the temple of the Dioscuri, where they remained in spite of the assurances of Nicostratus. In the eyes of the people, this dread of serving in the Athenian fleet was a proof of treasonable designs. They ^{Distress of} disarmed them by removing ^{the oligarchs.} their weapons from their houses, and would even have killed those whom they met—for in the meanwhile most of the refugees had left their sanctuary—had not Nicostratus interfered. In their distress the unfortunate oligarchs, to the number of 400, took refuge in the temple of Hera; but the people, believing themselves to be insecure so long as their enemies remained in the city, persuaded them to leave the temple, and they were conveyed to the island opposite, to which provisions were regularly sent.¹

15. For three or four days affairs continued in this position, Nicostratus still remaining at Corcyra. A new scene in the drama opened with the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet. After the failure at Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians had determined to increase their navy; and hearing of the troubles in Corcyra, they instructed Alcidas, who was still in command, to sail to the island. Accompanied by Brasidas, who had been chosen as his adviser, he set sail from Cyllene in Elis, with a fleet of fifty-three ships, and anchored for the night at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland. The next morning he sailed upon the city.²

His arrival created the greatest confusion. The popular party were now between two enemies—those in the city and those in the fleet. They hastily manned sixty vessels which lay in the harbour and sent them out in detachments, without waiting till the whole force was ready. Two of the

¹ Thuc. iii. 75.

² Thuc. iii. 76.

Coreyraean ships, on reaching the enemy, at once deserted to them; in others the crews began to fight with each other. A battle followed, which, owing to the skill and coolness of the Athenians, was protracted till sunset, when the Peloponnesians returned to their station at Sybota with thirteen Coreyraean vessels. No attempt was made, either on that or the succeeding day, to capture the town, for in spite of the remonstrances of Brasidas, Alcidas refused to take the opportunity offered by the panic which prevailed. So great was the alarm in the city that the Coreyraeans removed the refugees from the island, and even persuaded some to go on board the thirty triremes, which they were able to man in expectation of a second battle. Alcidas, however, contented himself with ravaging the south of the island for half the day, and when at nightfall signals from Leucas announced the arrival of sixty Athenian ships, he at once sailed homewards, creeping along the shore, and transporting his ships over the low isthmus which united Leucas with the mainland, to escape detection by the Athenians.

The popular party were now absolute masters of the city. The fleet which arrived from Athens, under the command of Eurymedon, joined that of Nicostratus, making a total of seventy-two vessels, besides the thirty Coreyraean ships, which, though partly manned by oligarchs, were commanded by captains of the other party. Thus supported, the Coreyraean demōs went to work with a will. The five hundred Messenians, who had hitherto remained outside the city, were brought within the walls, and all the ships were united in the Hyllaic harbour. The massacre then began. Every oligarch found in the city was at once cut down; and when the Coreyraean ships approached the shore, those refugees who had been placed on board were taken out and slaughtered. Of the suppliants who still remained in the temple of Hera, about fifty were persuaded to come out and stand their trial. These were at once condemned. A much larger number refused to leave the temple, preferring

to be their own executioners; many put an end to their lives in the shrine; others went into the precincts and hanged themselves on the trees, or destroyed themselves in any manner they could. The massacre went on for the seven days during which the Athenian fleet remained at Corcyra. It was ostensibly a political execution, an extermination of the oligarchs, but in reality many other motives were at work; personal enmity, and even the desire to get rid of a creditor, were as active here as in the proscriptions of Rome. Whatever crimes a man committed there was no risk of condemnation, for all were alike implicated in the slaughter. "Every form of death was seen, and everything and more than everything, that commonly happens in revolutions happened then. The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the temples and slain near them; some of them were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and there perished."¹

Even a week of butchery did not suffice for the demos to exterminate their opponents. About 500 of the oligarchs survived the massacre, and passed over—we do not know how—to the mainland, whence they issued forth in plundering raids to the island, raids so successful, that Corcyra was reduced to famine. But in spite of their successes they were unable to bear the separation from their city. They sent envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth asking to be restored, and when this hope failed, they returned to Corcyra in boats, which they burnt, that they might have no resource except in the conquest of the island. They established themselves in a fort on Mount Istone, from which they plundered the country and the city.²

*Escape of the
survivors to
the mainland.*

16. We may anticipate the progress of events and tell out this wretched story to the end. For a year and a half the exiles continued their depredations, but in the spring of 425 the Athenians, when despatching a fleet of forty vessels to

¹ Thuc. iii. 81 (Jowett).

² Thuc. iii. 85.

Sicily under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, gave them orders to call at Corcyra on their way and put an end to the disorder. During the last year the inhabitants of the city had been greatly distressed, and they were now suffering severely from famine, while their enemies were supported by the presence of a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty vessels. On its way, as we shall see, the Athenian fleet occupied Pylus, an event which, though it delayed the Athenians, compelled the Peloponnesians to withdraw their fleet from the island. On their arrival, Eurymedon and Sophocles joined the citizens in an attack upon the fortress of Istone. The attack was successful; the exiles were driven out, and after fleeing for refuge to an elevated part of the mountain, surrendered at discretion to the Athenians. The generals carried their captives to the island of Ptychia, till they could be sent to Athens, guaranteeing their safety on condition that no attempt at escape should be made. But the leaders of the Corcyraean demos, fearing that the Athenians would not put their captives to death, persuaded a few to run the risk, and promised to find a boat for the purpose. The fugitives were of course captured, and the whole number were now given up to the Corcyraeans. For this treachery the Athenian generals themselves were partly to blame; at any rate, they were not unwilling to insist with the utmost precision on the terms of the capitulation, without any regard to the means by which the fugitives had been brought to break them; and as they were themselves engaged to sail to Sicily, they had no wish that captives whom they had taken should be carried to Athens by others, who would reap the honour of their success.¹

The Corcyraeans placed the prisoners in a large chamber, from which, having arranged a number of hoplites in two rows, they led them out, twenty at a time, chained to one another. As they passed along the rows they were beaten and stabbed by the hoplites on

The final
massacre.

¹ Thuc. iv. 46, 47.

either side, each of whom seized the opportunity to avenge himself on an enemy, while others with scourges lashed those who lingered on their way. In this manner about sixty were taken out and destroyed before their fate was discovered. When this was known, those who remained in the chamber called on the Athenians to put them to death with their own hands if they pleased, but they refused to go out or to allow any one to enter. The Coreyraeans made no attempt to force a passage through the doors; they climbed on the roof, and, breaking through it, pelted the prisoners with the tiles, or shot arrows upon them. The wretched men defended themselves for a time, but at length most of them in despair put an end to their lives in any way that they could. The massacre went on through the day and the greater part of the following night, till all were destroyed. The women who had been captured in the fortress were sold as slaves. "This," says Thucydides, "was the end of the great Coreyraean sedition, at any rate for the period of the Peloponnesian war, for, in fact, little or nothing was left of the oligarchical party."¹

17. We now return to the year 427. The Athenians did not forget the threatened attack on the Peiraeus in 429. Soon after the recovery of Lesbos Nicias seized the island of Minoa, lying in front of Megara, which the Megarians had fortified and used as a military station. It was nearer Megara than Budorum or Salamis, and if the Athenians held it they would have complete control of Nisaea. Nicias directed his attack to the side nearest the mainland, and after destroying two towers which commanded the connection with the shore, gained the whole island, in which he built a fort and left a garrison.²

At the close of the summer Athens took a step which was attended with momentous results—a step more opposed than

¹ Thuc. iv. 47, 48. For a criticism on Thucydides' account of the Coreyraean sedition, see Müller-Strübing in *N. Jahrbuch. für Phil.* vol. 133, p. 585 ff.; and for a criticism on this, Holm, *Greek Hist.* ii. p. 392. See also Macan, *Transactions of the Oxford Phil. Soc.* 1886-1887, pp. 30-31.

² Thuc. iii. 51.

any which she had hitherto taken to the policy of Pericles. Envoys arrived from the Chalcidians of Sicily, among whom was Gorgias, the sophist, of Leontini, asking for assistance against Syracuse and the Dorians. Since the final suppression of the rising of the Sicels, Syracuse had greatly extended her power (vol. ii. p. 472). She was now at war with the Leontines, who, finding themselves shut up by land and sea, and relying on the alliance which had been made in 433, came to Athens for assistance. With them were envoys from Rhegium, a city which, like their own, was in alliance with Athens. The envoys were well received. At the beginning of the war the Dorians of Sicily had been ranged among the allies of Sparta, in the confident hope that they would send to the Peloponnese a fleet far more numerous than that of Athens, and though no ships had ever crossed the sea, the alarm had not passed away. There were other reasons also which weighed with the Athenians; in the petition of the Leontines they saw an opportunity of realising the long-cherished hope of extending their dominion

The Athenians
send ships to
Sicily.

over the most prosperous of Greek settlements.

A pretext for war was not far to seek. As Ionians, as allies, they were bound to succour their allies and kinsmen. A small fleet was despatched to Sicily under Laches, who seems, however, to have done nothing till the winter, when an abortive attack was made on the inhabitants of the Liparaean Islands.¹

Meanwhile Athens was once more a city of the dead and dying. The plague, which since the summer of 428 had greatly diminished in severity, though it had never entirely ceased, returned in all its terrors, and continued to rage for a whole year (427-426).

The plague
reappears at
Athens.

In this dreadful scourge no fewer than 4400 of the heavy-armed citizens perished, and 300 of the knights; the mortality among the common people could not even be estimated.²

¹ Thuc. iii. 86, 88.

² Thuc. iii. 87. The plague raged from early summer 430 to early summer 428, and again from winter 427 to winter 426.

CHAPTER VII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF 426 TO THE END OF 425.

I. There was no invasion of Attica by the Lacedaemonians in the spring of 426. The allies had collected at the Isthmus as usual, but their advance was prevented by a series of earthquakes, and they returned home. The season was indeed remarkable for physical disturbances, which could not fail to impress the superstitious minds of the Greeks. The elements seemed to be taking a part in the terrible conflict which was spreading desolation and bloodshed throughout Hellas.

But though the Lacedaemonians allowed the year to pass without an invasion of Attica, they fell upon another project, which promised far greater results, and is a proof that their plans of warfare were being conceived on a larger and more effective scale.

Colonisation of
Heraclea by the
Spartans.

The Trachinians, a Melian tribe, dwelling near the pass of Thermopylae, had suffered greatly at the hands of their neighbours the Oetaeans. Their first intention was to put themselves in the hands of the Athenians, but on second thoughts they sent an envoy to the Lacedaemonians, as the more trustworthy allies (*infra*, p. 199). Their envoy was joined by others from the Dorians, the mountain state which claimed to be the metropolis of Lacedaemon, for they, like Trachis, had been ravaged by the Oetaeans, and were in urgent need of help. The Lacedaemonians resolved to send out a colony, not merely to assist the suppliants, but because a city of their own in that region would be of service in the war. Could a fleet be maintained at Thermopylae, it might cross to Euboea, or control the passage to Thrace. They consulted

the oracle of Delphi, and on receiving a favourable answer sent out colonists from Sparta and the Perioecic cities, inviting any of the Greeks who chose to join, except the Ionians and Achaeans and some other nations. The leaders of the colony were three in number, and all from Lacedaemon: Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. The name Heraclea was given to the new city.

The Athenians were at first greatly alarmed for the safety of Euboea, but their fears proved to be groundless. The Thessalians, who ruled the neighbouring districts, and all whose territory was threatened, were bitterly hostile to the new city, and carried on ceaseless war against it; and when the governors who were sent out from Sparta, by their harsh and tyrannical conduct, frightened away the greater part of the settlers, it was easy for the neighbouring nations to complete their conquest.¹

The foundation of Heraclea was an attempt to carry out the plan of *ἐπιταχισμός*, which the Corinthians mentioned in 432 as one of the means by which Athens might be attacked. To whom the attempt was due we do not know, but in the winter of 427-426 the aged king Archidamus was succeeded by his son Agis, who, as a younger man and more warlike in his views, would be likely to venture on new methods. About this time also Plistoanax was brought back to Sparta after nineteen years of exile. This for a time may have encouraged the Spartans to new plans, though Plistoanax was subsequently desirous of peace.²

2. The Athenians also ventured on new projects. They began the operations of the year by sending out fleets to the Nicias at Melos east and west. Nicias was despatched with a large force to the island of Melos, a colony of the Lacedaemonians, which had hitherto refused to become

¹ Thuc. iii. 92, 23. Strabo, p. 428. Leake, *Northern Greece*, ii. 26 f.

² Thuc. v. 16. Can we accept Aristoph. *Ach.* 652 f., διὰ ταῦθ' ὑμᾶς Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν εἰρήνην προκαλοῦνται καὶ τὴν Αἴγυον ἀπαιτοῦσιν, as evidence that the Spartans were willing to make peace in 426?

a member of the Delian confederacy. The recent events in Lesbos may have warned the Athenians that it was necessary to make their power felt in the Aegean, and above all to deprive the Lacedaemonians of any stations where a Dorian fleet might find shelter. Whatever the cause, they now determined to force the island into the confederacy.¹ The attempt failed, and after devastating the island, Nicias returned to Oropus, on the northern border of Attica. Here the hoplites disembarked under cover of night, and marched along the Asopus to Tanagra. At the same time, on a preconcerted signal, the whole force of Athens advanced over the border to join the invading army. They devastated the country round Tanagra, and defeated the Tanagraeans in battle, after which, without attempting to make use of the victory, they retired, some to the city, and others to the ships. Nicias continued his voyage to eastern Locris, where he ravaged the sea-coast; and then returned home.²

3. The second fleet sailed westwards under the command of Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, of whom we now hear for the first time. Nothing is said of any attempt to land on the Peloponnesus; Demosthenes opened the campaign by destroying the garrison at Ellomenus in Leucadia, and followed up his success by devastating the territory of Leucas. He laid waste the territory on both sides of the isthmus on which the town lay, and reduced the enemy to inaction, but when the Acarnanians in his army urged him to cut the city off with a wall and help them to rid themselves of an old enemy, they found that he had other plans in view.³

Demosthenes
in western
Greece.

The Messenians at Naupactus were on bad terms with their neighbours the Aetolians, and they wished to avail

¹ About this time, or a little earlier, Thera must have been compelled to join the Athenian alliance, and pay a tribute of three talents (*supra*, p. 100).

² Thuc. iii. 91. The attack on Melos was renewed ten years later with terrible success: the battle of Tanagra was an anticipation of the battle of Delium two years later.

³ Thuc. iii. 91, 94.

themselves of the large army collected under the command of Demosthenes, to subdue their opponents. They pointed out that the Aetolians, though numerous and warlike, dwelt in villages distant from each other, and unprotected by walls. Their warriors were only light-armed soldiers, who, if they were attacked before they had time to assemble, could be reduced without difficulty. Of the three tribes which composed the nation, the Apodoti were to be taken first, then the Ophioneis, and after these the Eurytanes, the largest and most barbarous portion of the whole.¹ If these were conquered, the rest could be brought over without difficulty.

Demosthenes was inclined to gratify the Messenians, but his plans went far beyond their proposals. He hoped, by winning over the nations of Aetolia and the neighbouring districts, to march through western Locris, Aetolia.

unassisted by any power from Athens, to Cytinium in Doris, and so make his way round Parnassus into Phocis. The Phocians, though nominally allies of the Spartans, were friendly to the Athenians, and would probably join the Athenian leader, or could be compelled to do so. When in Phocis, Demosthenes would be on the borders of Boeotia, the ultimate object of his expedition.² He led his forces away from Leucas, much against the will of the Acarnanians, to Sollium, a town on the opposite coast, where he laid his new plans before the army. The Acarnanians, finding that Leucas was not to be besieged, at once withdrew, and with them fifteen ships which had come from Coreyra, but with the rest of his army, to which he now added 300 Epibatae (marines) from the Athenian ships, Demosthenes marched against the Aetolians. The western

¹ Thuc. iii. 94. Of the Eurytanes, Thucydides tells us that their dialect was unintelligible, and that they ate their meat uncooked.

² It is interesting to observe that both Demosthenes and Nicias have in view an attack on Boeotia in this year; the one from the south, the other from the north. It is obvious that the plan of 424 was already in the air.

Locrians, unlike their kinsmen on the east, were allies of the Athenians, and being neighbours of the Aetolians, armed like them, and acquainted with their mode of fighting, their co-operation was eagerly sought by the general, who persuaded them to join him at some point in the interior and serve as his guides through the country.

The territory which Demosthenes was about to invade forms roughly the apex of an angle, of which the two sides are the river Hylaethus and the Corinthian gulf. It is a mountainous region, difficult of access. The Apodoti appear to have occupied the left bank of the river and the hills which border it; the Ophioneis lay beyond them on the right bank; the Eurytanes further to the north and north-east.¹ Marching from Oeneon, whither he sailed from Sollium, Demosthenes halted his troops for the night in the temple of Nemean Zeus, a place well known as the scene of the death of the poet Hesiod. In the next three days he captured three Aetolian villages, the last of which was Teichium on the confines of the Ophioneis. He did not intend to push his conquests beyond the Apodoti till he had reduced the whole of their territory. When this was accomplished he would return to Naupactus, and thence begin a new expedition against the Ophioneis. But the Messenians, impatient of the caution of their leader, urged him to press on at once, and unfortunately Demosthenes adopted their advice. Without waiting for the Locrians, of whose light-armed javelin men he was greatly in need, he marched upon Aegitium, a town lying among high hills, about ten miles from the coast. The inhabitants, who had already been joined by the combined forces of the Aetolians, even from the distant tribes bordering on the Meliac gulf, abandoned the town and encamped upon the surrounding heights, from which they threw their missiles at the Athenians, running

Defeat of
Demosthenes at
Aegitium.

¹ See Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, p. 16 ff. The dividing lines of the tribes cannot be drawn very precisely. The Apodoti may have been settled on both banks of the river Hylaethus.

down from the summits in all directions, retiring whenever the Athenians advanced, and attacking when they retired. This desultory mode of battle continued for a long time, greatly to the disadvantage of the Athenians. So long as their archers had a supply of arrows and could use them, they held their ground, the Aetolian light-armed being compelled to retire before the shots of the bowmen; but when the archers lost their commander, and were themselves exhausted by the long conflict, they turned and fled. Ignorant of the locality, for their guide was slain, they found themselves entangled in impassable ravines, in which their light-armed and active enemies caught them at every step. A large number fled into a wood, to which the Aetolians at once set fire; others wandered about till death overtook them, and but a small remnant escaped to Oeneon. Of the three hundred Athenians, one hundred and twenty had been slain, men in the very flower of their youth, whom Thucydides describes as the finest soldiers who fell in the war. When the dead had been recovered from the Aetolians, the ships returned to Naupactus and thence to Athens; Demosthenes, however, fearing to return home after his failure, remained in the neighbourhood of Naupactus.¹

After this success the Aetolians were eager to revenge themselves on Naupactus for the invasion of their country.

Attack on Nau- In the late summer the Lacedaemonians, at
pactus, which
is saved by
Demosthenes. their request, sent a large force over the gulf. When he reached Delphi, the Spartan general, Eurylochus, sent envoys to the Locrians, through whose territory the route to Naupactus lay, to detach them from the Athenians; and the Locrian towns, far from making any resistance, not only gave hostages for a safe conduct, but even joined in the expedition, with one or two exceptions. The army entered the territory of Naupactus, where they were joined by the Aetolians, and laid

¹ Thuc. iii. 95-98. For the locality, see Leake, *Northern Greece*, ii. 612 ff., and especially Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, p. 57 ff., 340 ff.

waste the country as far as the suburbs of the city ; but here their successes came to an end. Demosthenes, when he heard of the intended expedition, knowing the defenceless state of Naupactus, which was both weakly garrisoned and weakly fortified, persuaded the Acarnanians to send 1000 hoplites, with whom he sailed to the city, just in time to save it. Eurylochus felt that it was now impossible to take the place by storm, and withdrew into the neighbouring territory of Calydon and Pleuron. He had already entered into negotiations with the Ambraciots for a combined attack upon Argos Amphilocheium and Acarnania, by which, if successful, the inhabitants of those regions could be brought over to the Lacedaemonian alliance.¹

4. In the autumn the Ambraciots, as they had promised, sent a large force against Argos. Traversing the pass between the mountains and the sea, which commands Invasion of Argos. the northern entrance into the Argive territory, they seized Olpae, a strong fortress on a hill by the sea, about three miles distant from the city. The Argives were aided by the Acarnanians, who, with part of their forces, marched to the city, and with others occupied Crenae (wells), a place in the adjacent plain, to prevent the Peloponnesians under Eurylochus from joining the Ambraciots at Olpae. They also sent a messenger to Demosthenes begging him to take command of their army, and to twenty Athenian vessels which happened at the time to be cruising off the coast of the Peloponnese. The Ambraciots at Olpae, fearing that Eurylochus might be unable to make his way through Acarnania, when they would have to fight without his assistance or return home as best they could, sent to Ambracia and requested the citizens to join them in full force. When he heard that the Ambraciots were at Olpae, Eurylochus set out in haste from Proschium (west of Pleuron), and crossing the Achelous, advanced through Acarnania, where, owing to the absence of the inhabitants

¹ Thuc. iii. 100-102.

at Argos, he met with no resistance. Leaving Stratus on his right, and taking to the range of Mount Thyamus, a wild uncultivated district, he descended into the Argive plain by night, and passed between Argos and Crenae to Olpæ. At daybreak the united forces pitched their camp at a place called the "metropolis," in the immediate neighbourhood.

Not long afterwards the Athenians sailed into the Ambracian gulf, and with them Demosthenes at the head of 200 Messenian heavy-armed and sixty Athenian bowmen.

The battle of Olpæ. The ships lay at anchor off the hill of Olpæ, while the Acarnanians and Amphilocheians, who had already assembled at Argos, prepared for battle. Demosthenes, who was commander-in-chief, at once led out his army to Olpæ, and encamped in a position separated from the enemy by a deep ravine. For five days the two armies remained inactive, but on the sixth they drew out for battle. Finding that the Peloponnesian forces were numerous enough to overlap his own, Demosthenes placed a force of hoplites and light-armed soldiers in a deep lane overgrown with brushwood, in order that they might attack in the rear the extreme wing of the enemy should it attempt to encircle him. The armies then joined battle. The stratagem of Demosthenes was entirely successful. The Peloponnesians had begun to encircle his right, when the Acarnanians appeared from their ambush and drove them back in such haste that they carried with them the greater part of the army. On the other wing the Ambraciots succeeded in defeating their opponents and driving them to the city, but on their return they were attacked by the victorious Acarnanians, and forced to seek refuge in Olpæ, with much difficulty and loss. The Mantineans alone among the invading forces preserved an orderly retreat. On the next day Menedæus, who was now general of the Peloponnesians, as both Eurylochus and Macarius, the second in command, had fallen, proposed a truce to cover the retreat of his soldiers. Demosthenes was unwilling to enter into open negotiations for the retreat of the whole army, and proposed a separate

treaty with the Mantineans and the Peloponnesians, hoping thereby not only to isolate the Ambraciots and their mercenaries, but also to bring the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians into ill repute for their selfish treachery in saving their own lives at the cost of their allies. The terms were no sooner fixed than the Peloponnesians buried their dead and prepared for their own escape. Under pretence of gathering wood and fodder, the Mantineans and others included in the truce began to steal away in small companies, till they were at some distance from Olpae, when they abandoned all disguise and ran off at full speed. The Ambraciots and others who had gone out with them, seeing their movements, quickened their pace in order to overtake them, while the Acarnanians, who thought that all alike were retiring without permission, started in pursuit. When their generals announced that the Peloponnesians were retreating under a truce, there was for a moment an alarm that the whole army had been treacherously allowed to escape, and one of the soldiers in his rage and disappointment threw a javelin at his commanders. Afterwards they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go, but the Ambraciots were cut down on every hand. The survivors escaped into the territory of the Agraeans, whose king, Salynthius, afforded them a friendly shelter.¹

5. Immediately after the battle of Olpae, news had been brought to Demosthenes that the Ambraciots were advancing in full force from the city to join their allies, of whose defeat they knew nothing. He at once sent a portion of his army to occupy the roads and take up a strong position on the

¹ Thuc. iii. 105-111. For the topography, see Leake, *Northern Greece*, iv. p. 242 ff.; Oberhummer, *Akarnanien*, p. 107 f.; Heuzey, *Le Mont Olympe et l'Acarnanie*, p. 293 f. The possible changes of the coast render it difficult to be precise, but on the whole I am inclined to agree with Heuzey about the situation of Olpae, which he places at Hellenokuli, and not as Leake and Oberhummer at Agrilovuni. The ravine which separated the two armies will then be the stream flowing from Lutro to Arapi. The position of Argos and Crenae is certain.

enemy's route, intending to follow with the remainder as soon as possible. On their way into the Argive plain the Ambraciots had to pass through a narrow and difficult defile, which forms the only entrance in this direction, and it was of the utmost importance to Demosthenes that he should secure this pass. His advanced force succeeded during the night in seizing, unknown to the enemy, the larger of two hills, which Thucydides calls Idomene; the smaller had already been occupied by the Ambraciots. After the evening meal, Demosthenes advanced with half his force to the pass, while the other half was sent further to the east, through the Amphilocheian hills. Marching all night, he came upon the Ambraciots at daybreak, while they were yet in their beds and quite ignorant of his approach. Their confusion was the greater because he had purposely placed his Messenians in the van, that the Ambraciots, hearing their Doric dialect, might receive them as friends. The army thus surprised was immediately put to flight with prodigious slaughter; they fled down the hill, but only to find the roads secured,¹ and driven back on every side they wandered in unknown ravines or fell into the ambuscades prepared for them. In despair some rushed to the sea-shore and swam to the Attic ships, thinking, in the extremity of their terror, that if die they must, it was better that they should be slain by the sailors than fall into the hands of the detested and barbarian Amphilocheians. The few survivors found their way back to Ambracia.

Thucydides illustrates the severity of this defeat by the following incident. When the herald came from the Ambraciots at Olpae to ask for the corpses of the slain, knowing nothing of the battle of Idomene, and seeing the arms of the dead, he expressed his astonishment at their number. A bystander, who believed him to be the herald from Idomene, asked how many he thought had fallen. "About two

¹ Were they secured, in part, by the forces sent through the hills?

hundred," was the reply. "Then these are not their arms, for here are those of more than a thousand." The herald answered, "They cannot then be the arms of those who fought with us." "Indeed they are," said the other, "if you were fighting yesterday at Idomene." "Yesterday we fought with no one; it was the day before, in the retreat." The other replied, "All I know is that these are the arms of those with whom we fought yesterday, the men who marched from the city of Ambracia." When the herald heard this, he understood that the army from the city had perished, and overcome by the disaster, he broke into a loud cry and departed as he came, without even asking for the dead. For this, adds the historian, was the greatest calamity that overtook any one city in an equal number of days throughout the whole war, and so great was the number of the slain, compared with the population of the city, that he does not venture to state it. Had the Amphilocheians and the Acarnanians been willing to take the advice of Demosthenes and march upon Ambracia, they would easily have captured the city, but this they refused to do lest they should find the Athenians, if settled there, more troublesome neighbours than their old enemies.¹ Ambracia was subsequently reinforced by a garrison from Corinth.

6. In Sicily (*supra*, p. 187) nothing of importance was achieved beyond the capture of Messene, by which the Athenians became masters of both sides of the strait and planted a firm foot on Sicilian ground. The fleet seems to have been distracted between the claims of Italy and Sicily; too weak to take an independent line, it made desultory attacks as the Rhegians, the Sicilian allies, or the Sicels called for its

Affairs in Sicily;
desultory warfare:
new preparations.

¹ Thuc. iii. 112-113; Oberhummer, *l.c.*, p. 110; Heuzey, *l.c.* 293 ff. He places the greater Idomene at Liapochori, the smaller at Paleokoulia (p. 304), but the locality cannot be determined with precision. It is, however, certain that the smaller Idomene was near the sea, and apparently it was not far from the ἐσβολή or pass leading from Ambracia into the plain of Argos.

assistance. In one of these, Laches captured a fortress on the river Halix, the boundary separating the territory of Locri from that of Rhegium. In another, he made an unsuccessful attempt on Inessa, a Sicel town, but held by the Syracusans. In a third, the Athenians landed in the territory of Himera, while their Sicel allies ravaged the interior border.¹ At the close of the year, when Laches returned to Rhegium, he found himself superseded by Pythodorus. The allies of Athens in Sicily had become weary of the useless war. On land they had lost ground, and though an insignificant fleet was as yet sufficient to keep the Syracusans off the sea, the enemy were preparing a larger force. They called on the Athenians to increase the number of their ships, and the Athenians, "partly because they wished to bring the war in Sicily to an end, and partly to keep their sailors in practice," equipped a fleet of forty vessels. As it was now too late for naval operations, they sent Pythodorus, with a few ships only, intending to despatch a larger number in the following spring. The change brought no better fortune. On his arrival Pythodorus sailed to the Locrian fortress, which Laches had captured, but he was defeated and forced to retire.²

7. Towards the close of the year the Athenians, warned by an oracle, as was said, resolved to purify the sacred island of Delos, and restore the old festival which once made it the centre of the Ionic race (vol. i. 519). A similar purification had been made, more than a century before, by Pisistratus, but to a limited extent, so much only of the island being cleansed as could be seen from the temple. On the present occasion the purification was thorough and complete: all the dead who had been buried in Delos were

¹ Thuc. iii. 90, 99, 103. Perhaps it was at this time that Laches renewed the fatal alliance with Segesta, which is recorded as his work. Thuc. vi. 6. For the previous alliance see vol. ii. 468.

² Thuc. iii. 115; Freeman, *Sicily*, iii. 31 ff. Laches was put on his trial on his return: see Aristoph. *Wasps*, 240, 836 ff.

removed, and for the future neither death nor birth was allowed to take place in the island. The Athenians then restored the Delia as a "five-yearly" festival. Though the old games had fallen into disuse, the islanders had kept up their choral dances, and the Athenians had sent choruses and sacrificed. The gymnastic exercises were now renewed, and horse-races were added—a contest unknown in the old festival. We can hardly doubt that the Athenians, in thus renewing the sanctity and importance of Delos, wished to bind together the Ionic race as closely as possible. The events of the previous year had shown how necessary it was to preserve by every means the allegiance of their allies in the east, and they had recently launched on a new career as the champion of Ionic influence in the west. It was important to show that the championship was something more than imperial domination. The head of Ionic cities must treat the colonies of her race, not merely as allies or subjects, but as fellow-worshippers of the great Ionic deity, and linked together by the enjoyment of a common festival.¹

8. In the following spring (425) the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, but they had barely been in the country a fortnight before they returned home. The invasion had been made so early in the year that they could not support their forces on the harvest, and the weather was unusually severe, but what chiefly hastened their return was the alarming news from Sparta.²

The fleet destined for Sicily set out from Athens about the same time that the Peloponnesians invaded Attica. The generals in command were Eurymedon and Sophocles, but Demosthenes, who had returned home from Acarnania,

¹ Thuc. iii. 104. The celebration of the festival took place in the spring. The final disappearance of the plague in this year may also, as Curtius thinks, have influenced the Athenians in this matter.

² Thuc. iv. 2: τοῦ ἡρὸς πρὶν τὸν σῆτον ἐν τῇ ἀκμῇ εἶναι, *ib.* 6, πρὸ ἐσβαλόντες καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἔτι χλωροῦ ὄντος. They remained in Attica fifteen days; the shortest stay that they ever made.

though no longer a general, was allowed to accompany the expedition and make what use he pleased of the ships on the voyage round the Peloponnese. When they had reached

Pylus seized
and fortified
by the Athenian
fleet.

Laconia, they learnt that a Peloponnesian fleet was already at Corcyra (*supra*, p. 186), and the generals were eager to press forward ; but

Demosthenes wished them to put in at Pylus, a headland on the Messenian coast, about fifty miles distant from Sparta, which, owing to the harbour formed by the island of Sphacteria, was the most favourable station for a fleet in that part of the Peloponnese. The generals were unwilling to delay their voyage, when an opportune storm carried their ships to shore. Demosthenes then urged them to fortify the place, but they refused. Pylus was no better than any other desert headland, and it would be mere waste of the city's resources to occupy it. Finding that he could not prevail with the generals-or with the soldiers, or even the inferior officers, to whom he proposed his plan, Demosthenes had desisted from further efforts, when fortune came to his aid. The bad weather continuing, the soldiers themselves, for want of occupation, began to fortify the rock. Tools they had none ; they picked up loose stones which they fitted together as they could, and mortar, when necessary, was brought by the soldiers on their backs, each man bending forward as low as he dared and locking his hands behind him, to prevent the load from slipping away. The greater part of the place needed no fortification. In six days the Athenians had completed the necessary work, and the fleet could sail away to Corcyra and Sicily, leaving Demosthenes with five ships to protect the new fortress.

9. The Peloponnesian army had no sooner returned from Attica than the Spartans marched upon Pylus. They took

The Spartans
march upon
Pylus: their
fleet recalled
from Corcyra.

with them the nearest of the Perioeci, the only forces available at the moment, for the rest of the Lacedaemonians, having recently returned from the invasion, were unwilling to

move. They also sent round the Peloponnese, bidding the

allies go to Pylus, and the fleet was recalled from Coreyra. On the arrival of their forces the Lacedaemonians at once made preparations for an attack by land and sea; they thought that they would have no difficulty in capturing a fortress built in such haste, and defended by so small a garrison. Thucydides goes on to say that they also resolved, if they failed to take the fort before the arrival of the Athenian ships which Demosthenes had already summoned to his aid, to block the entrances into the harbour, of which the northern one admitted two ships only, the southern not more than eight or nine. It seems certain that Thucydides, in making the statement, has in view the entrances into the bay of Navarino, at either end of Sphacteria, but if so he has been misled as to their breadth.¹ And that the Athenians might not make the island a base of operations, they disembarked a number of hoplites upon it, while others were stationed on the mainland. By these measures they hoped to keep the Athenians off the land altogether, for the coast beyond the immediate limits of the island was quite impracticable. Unfortunately for them, a part only of these preparations was carried into effect. A number of soldiers were taken by lot from all the companies and placed in the island in rotation, those stationed there at the time of the arrival of the Athenian fleet being 420 in number, with their helots, under the command of Epitadas. The obstruction of the entrances to the harbour was for some reason neglected.²

Demosthenes prepared to receive the attack; the triremes which had been left with him he drew up on the shore and surrounded with a palisade; the sailors he armed with

¹ The southern entrance to the bay of Navarino is about 1400 yards wide, the northern about 150 yards wide. But at the end towards the bay this northern entrance is now fordable, there being only two feet of water for some distance (Grundy, *infra*). Throughout his description Thucydides has in view one harbour only—the bay of Navarino. If the Athenians were prevented from entering this, and from landing on the island, their fleet would have no base of operations at all.

² Thuc. iv. 8.

such shields as he could provide. He pressed into his service forty Messenians from two pirate vessels, which happened to be present. The majority of his forces, Demosthenes prepares for defence. armed or not, he ranged on the stronger parts of the fortress toward the mainland, with orders to resist the attack of the enemy, but himself, taking sixty hoplites and a few bowmen, he marched out of the fort to the shore at the point where he thought the enemy would be most likely to land. He then addressed his soldiers, bidding them meet the enemy with a good courage, and above all to make the best use of their position by beating him off before he could land. They were not to be alarmed by the noise or splash of the vessels, but to remember that the Lacedaemonians, so long as they were on the sea, would be at the mercy of any accident, whereas if once they landed the conflict would be equal.

The Lacedaemonians now began the attack, directing their vessels to the point where Demosthenes expected them.

Attack of the Lacedaemonians: energy of Brasidas. Their ships were ~~forty-three~~ in number, but as the space only allowed a few to advance at once, they came on in relays, keeping up a furious attack in the hope of capturing the fortress by assault. Conspicuous among the trierarchs was Brasidas, who, seeing that his fellow-commanders, even when they had the opportunity of landing, hesitated to risk their ships on the rocky shore, bade them not to spare their timbers when the enemy had planted a fortress in their land; they must force their ships ashore, and wreck them if necessary: now was the time for the allies to remember what they owed to the Lacedaemonians, and repay their debt, whatever the cost. Brasidas himself was as good as his word; he forced his pilot to run his ship ashore and prepared to disembark, but before he could land he was struck down. As he fell fainting back into the prow of his vessel his shield fell from his arm, and being carried on shore, was secured by the Athenians, who afterwards used it to adorn their trophy. The rest of the commanders, in spite

of their courage, were unable to land, owing to the firm resistance of the Athenians and the difficulty of the place. Through the whole day the attack was kept up, and for a considerable part of the next, when at length the assailants ceased, and for the first time in Greek history, the Lacedaemonians, the finest soldiers in Greece, saw themselves beaten from their own shores by the Athenians; sailors and soldiers on this occasion seemed to have changed places.¹

10. The Athenian ships now arrived from Zacynthus, fifty in number, but when they saw the mainland occupied by soldiers and the harbour full of ships, they retired for the night to the adjacent island of Prote. On the next day they advanced with the intention of delivering battle in the open sea, if the enemy would meet them; if not, they would force their way into the harbour.² The Peloponnesians remained within the harbour, and manned their ships, but even now they took no measures to block the entrances, and the Athenians, on perceiving this, attacked

¹ Thuc. iv. 12.

² The operations at Pylus have been placed in a new light by the careful survey and paper by Mr. G. B. Grundy, in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1896. He takes the ordinary view that Palaeocastro is Pylus, and Sphagia is Sphacteria. In the account of the island and all that took place on it, Thucydides appears to be accurate (with the exception of the length of the island, which is 4800 yards, not 3000, as he says), but he has a mistaken idea of the harbour and its mouth. There were two harbours; and the harbour into which the Lacedaemonians sailed was not the bay of Navarino, but the lake of Osmyn Aga (cp. Arnold's *Thuc.* vol. ii.); the outlets which the Lacedaemonians intended to block up were the outer and inner mouths of the passage at the southern (Sphacteria) end of Palaeocastro, between which lay the opening into the lake. But, with the appearance of the Athenian fleet, the scene changes to the bay of Navarino, in which the Lacedaemonians were defeated.

Able as Mr. Grundy's paper is, I still doubt whether the lake of Osmyn Aga is to be brought into the account. The Lacedaemonians intended to keep the Athenians in the open sea, and this could only be done by blocking the entrances to the bay of Navarino. For some reason, they neglected to do so; in fact, the Athenians caught them unprepared. We must, I fear, accept the fact that Thucydides was misinformed as to the width of the entrances into the bay.

them at either inlet, with an onset so sudden and severe, that they not only put to flight those ships which met them on the sea, but also seized many before the sailors had time to man them; others they captured without resistance. The Lacedaemonians were in the greatest alarm on seeing that their soldiers on the island were being cut off, and in the hope of saving them, they rushed in their armour into the sea, seizing the ships and dragging them back to shore, out of the clutches of the Athenians. After a long and violent struggle, they succeeded in saving their empty ships, except those which had been captured at the first onset, and both sides retired. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, and collecting the wrecks, began to sail round the island, to prevent the soldiers on it from escaping; the Peloponnesians, who had now assembled in all their contingents, remained inactive on the mainland.¹

They attack
the Lacedae-
monian vessels.

The news of this calamity excited the greatest alarm at Sparta. The situation was felt to be so grave that the ephors at once left for Pylus, in order to decide on the spot what measures should be taken.

Alarm at
Sparta: the
ephors visit
Pylus.

They found on their arrival, that it was impossible to remove the men from the island, and, if hostilities continued, these must either perish by famine, or succumb to an overwhelming attack. No other course was open than to ask for an armistice, during which envoys could be sent to Athens with proposals for peace. To this request the Athenians agreed, but on terms which greatly increased the strength of their own position. They undertook that no Athenian should land on the island, and no attack be made on the Spartan force by land or sea; that a fixed but ample supply of food should be furnished to the imprisoned Spartans and their servants; but, on their part, they demanded not only that the Peloponnesian army should remain inactive, but that

An armistice
agreed upon.

¹ Thuc. iv. 13, 14.

the entire fleet, whether lying at Pylus or elsewhere, should be surrendered, on the understanding that it would be restored uninjured to the Peloponnesians on the return of the envoys from Athens; if these conditions were broken, even in the slightest particular, the armistice was to be at an end, and the Athenians would retain the ships. They also provided a vessel to convey the envoys to Athens. The severity of these terms shows that the Spartans realised to the full the desperate situation of their countrymen, but what they did not realise was the duplicity of the enemy with whom they had to deal. It was not long ere they discovered that, in endeavouring to avert one calamity, they had fallen into another, even more disastrous.

When the envoys arrived at Athens, they were at once brought before the Assembly. They began with an apology

The Spartan envoys at Athens. for their speech: it was not the Spartan habit to speak at length, but it was their habit to use every available means for at-

taining the object which they had in view, and, in the present case, a speech was necessary. Then followed the usual platitudes. The speaker reminded his hearers of the instability of fortune, and warned them against abusing the opportunity which had been thrown in their way. Let them not drive the Spartans to despair by harsh conditions; rather let them win their eternal gratitude by restoring the

They propose a peace. Spartans now shut up in Sphacteria, and accepting the peace which was offered. "No

time," he added, "can be better than the present for reconciliation, for as yet no irreparable injury has been done to add private to public causes of enmity. The die is not yet cast; it is still open to you, Athenians, to win glory and the friendship of Lacedaemon, and to us to come well out of a great disaster. Let us make peace, and put an end to the troubles of the Hellenes. It is you who will gain the credit of the step; for, while no one knows who began the war, you will clearly take the lead in bringing it to an end. We offer you our friendship, to be won by kindness, not by

force ; and if you and we are friends, the rest of Greece will follow in our train."¹

In making this proposal, the Spartans were under the impression that the Athenians would gladly come to terms. Even in the lifetime of Pericles Athenian envoys had visited Sparta with overtures of peace, and it was reasonable to suppose that, after his death, the friends of reconciliation would have gained yet greater authority. In this case, as in many others, the Spartans showed their ignorance of the Athenian character and Athenian politics.

The Athenians were not the men to forget an injury, or to lose an opportunity of avenging it. The Athenians disinclined to peace.

They remembered, even now, the humiliating terms which Sparta had forced upon them twenty years before, and they were well aware that they could command peace whenever they chose, so long as the Spartans in the island were in their power. On the other hand, the revolt of Mytilene had made it clear that Athens must assert her imperial position, if she was to maintain her hold upon her allies, and enjoy their contributions. On this imperial policy, Cleon, the leader of the democracy, had already declared Cleon's extravagant demands. himself, and he now came forward with the demand that, before any proposal for peace could be entertained, the Spartans in the island must surrender their arms, and allow themselves to be brought as prisoners to Athens. If, on their arrival, the Spartans were willing to restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea, which Athens had been compelled to abandon under the terms of the Thirty Years' peace, the Athenians would give up the prisoners and arrange a peace. The Spartans made no public reply to this demand, beyond requesting that a committee might be formed to discuss the question, a step which damaged their cause irreparably, committees being at all times odious to Greek democracies. Cleon was furious, and bade the envoys speak out, if they had anything to

¹ Thuc. iv. 15-20.

say, but the Lacedaemonians seeing that no reasonable terms could be obtained, and wishing to avoid the disgrace of making useless concessions in public, returned to Pylus.¹

On the arrival of the envoys, the armistice came to an end; but when the Spartans demanded their ships, the Athenians refused to restore them, on the ground that an attack had been made on the fortress, contrary to the agreement. The Lacedaemonians protested, but they were helpless; their fleet was gone, and nothing remained but to besiege the Athenians by land. The Athenians, on their part, kept a close watch on the island; during the day, two ships sailed round it in opposite directions; and at night, when the weather permitted, the whole fleet, now increased by the arrival of twenty ships from Athens, was moored off it.²

II. When the truce came to an end, no further supplies of food were sent to the island, and as the Lacedaemonians, having lost their fleet, could render no further assistance to their countrymen, the Athenians expected that the prisoners would be starved out in a few days. In this they were very greatly deceived. Week after week passed away, and no sign of submission was shown. While the armistice lasted, the allowance of food had been so ample that a reserve could be formed, and

The envoys return. The Athenians retain the ships of the Lacedaemonians, who are thus deprived of their entire fleet.

Delay in the operations at Pylus.

¹ Aristoph. *Pax*, 648 f.:

ἐλθοῦσά φησιν αὐτομάτῃ μετὰ τὰν Πύλῳ
σπονδῶν φέρουσα τῇ πόλει κίστην πλέαν
ἀποχειροτονηθῆναι τρίς ἐν τῇ κλησίᾳ.

² Thuc. iv. 21-23. Holm, *Hist. of Greece*, ii. p. 394 E.T., considers that the Athenians were "actually and formally in the right," in refusing to give up the ships. But, if their contention was true, they ought not to have awaited the return of the envoys for the dissolution of the truce; that should have followed at once on the alleged attack of the Lacedaemonians. And Thucydides evidently thought that they were going beyond their rights: οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐγκλήματα ἔχοντες ἐπιδρομὴν τε τῷ τειχίσματι παράσπονδον καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα δοκοῦντα εἶναι οὐκ ἀπέδιδον, ἰσχυρίζομενοι ὅτι δὴ εἰρητο, ἐὰν καὶ ὁτιοῦν παραβαθῇ, λελῦσθαι τὰς σπονδὰς.

afterwards the liberal offers of the Lacedaemonians tempted mariners to set out from every part of the coast, under cover of bad weather, and land on the outward shore of the island. The Helots more especially were ready to encounter any danger in the hope of freedom. Divers were also found who passed from the army on the mainland to the island, drawing leather bottles attached to a string, and filled with poppy-seed, mixed with honey and bruised linseed.

Meanwhile the position of the Athenians was becoming critical. The island must be blockaded, the fortress garrisoned night and day, but there was no secure anchorage for the ships; the forces on land were without sufficient supplies of food and water or a proper camp. If the siege lasted into the winter, neither ships nor army could maintain their position. An attack on the island would seem to have been an obvious expedient, but so great was the terror inspired by the Spartan name, that the attempt was not even proposed. The generals contented themselves with sending messages to Athens, and waiting for further orders.¹

Difficult position of the Athenians.

The disappointment led to a change of feeling, and for the moment Cleon was the best-abused man in the city. It was he who had repulsed the Lacedaemonians, and put an end to the overtures of peace; if the prisoners escaped, as was only too probable, Athens would have thrown away her great opportunity. Cleon, who was still firm against peace, replied to these charges by asserting that the accounts from Pylus were untrue, and proposing that a commission be appointed to visit the place and report precisely on the state of affairs. The commission was at once appointed, Cleon himself with one Theagenes being placed upon it. Upon this he changed his ground, declaring that a commission was a waste of time. If the generals were men, they would sail to Pylus and finish the business out of hand: were he a general he would do so

Attack on Cleon, who retorts on the generals.

¹ Thuc. iv. 26.

without delay. In these hints Cleon was aiming at Nicias, who, though he had taken no part in the action at Pylus, was the most influential of the staff, and supported the Lacedaemonians in their proposals for peace. The scene which follows is probably without a parallel in any civilised political community. Nicias came forward and Cleon and Nicias. offered to forego his command in favour of Cleon; let him be chosen general and try his fortune. Cleon retorted that it was for Nicias, not for him, to lead the army of Athens; but it was now too late, and the audience would not let him withdraw. He made the best of his position, and declared that without taking a single Athenian resident with him, assisted only by the colonists from Lemnos and Imbros who were in Athens, by the targeteers recently arrived from Aenus, and a body of archers, he would bring the Spartans alive to Athens, or slay them on the spot, within twenty days. The Athenians laughed at the extravagant promise, but they readily gave their consent to his appointment as general. If he succeeded, the success would be a public gain; if he failed, the city would be well rid of him.¹

12. When the Assembly had finally confirmed him in his office, Cleon at once sent news of his coming to Demosthenes, whom of all the generals at Pylus he chose as his colleague.² Demosthenes was already preparing to make an attack on Sphacteria, and had collected some additional forces with this object. An accidental fire had burned down the wood

¹ Thuc. iv. 27, 28.

² Thuc. iv. 29. Demosthenes is here spoken of as one of the generals, but when the fleet sailed in the spring, he was merely a private citizen (iv. 2). In the inscription, *C. I. A. i.* 273 (Ol. 88, 4, 425-424), we read among the payments in the "fourth prytany," i.e. about Nov. 425: στρατηγούς περὶ Πελοπόννησον Δημοσθένει Ἀλκισθένους Ἀφιδναίῳ Δ Δ Δ (i.e. thirty talents), where the omission of the words *καὶ συνάρχουσιν* implies that Demosthenes occupied a peculiar position. Are we to suppose that the election of generals took place between the sending of the fleet and the action of Cleon; or was the election of Demosthenes as irregular as that of Cleon himself?

which covered the island, so that the numbers and position of the enemy could now be seen, and his own army was growing impatient of further delay. When Cleon arrived with his contingent from Athens, Cleon arrives at Pylus.

the two generals despatched a herald to the Lacedaemonian army, proposing that the Spartans in the island should lay down their arms and surrender themselves, to be kept under control till terms could be arranged. This offer being refused, the Athenians remained inactive for a day, but when night fell they embarked all their hoplites, and a little before daybreak landed them on both sides of the island, to the number of 800. The Spartans Attack on the island of Sphacteria. were divided into three companies, the largest body being stationed at the centre of the island, near the spring which supplied them with water; a small detachment guarded the northern part—a strong position, precipitous towards the sea, and difficult of approach by land; and about thirty men were encamped near the southern extremity. Upon these thirty the Athenian hoplites fell in the gloom of the morning, and cut them down before they could make any resistance. The embarkation thus secured, the rest of the Athenian forces crossed to the island; every one who could be spared from the defence of the fortress was pressed into the service: archers, peltasts, Messenians, and other troops hurried across; and in the entire fleet only the rowers in the lowest benches, or “*thalamii*,” remained in the ships. These forces Demosthenes distributed into companies of about 200 each, with which he occupied all the elevated parts of the island, in order that, by attacking the enemy from many points at once, he might distract their attention, and prevent a combined resistance. For this purpose his light-armed troops, slingers, archers, and javelin-men, were of the greatest service.¹

When Epitadas, who was with his troops in the centre of the island, found himself attacked, he at once drew out his

¹ Thuc. iv. 29-32.

soldiers for battle, wishing to force an engagement. Opposed to him were the Athenian heavy-armed, on either wing and in his rear hovered the light-armed troops. The conflict in Sphacteria. He soon found that an attack was out of the question; the heavy-armed of the enemy would not meet him, while his own advance was checked by the stones and arrows of the light-armed. These could not be driven away, and though for a time they kept at a safe distance, they gained courage with every new onset. At length they left skirmishing, and gathering in a mass rushed on the Spartans, striking them down with arrows, javelins, stones, and any weapons which came to hand. The Spartans were utterly confounded; such a mode of battle was new to them; the air rang with shouts, the sky was black with dust and ashes, and through the noise and the darkness came the shots of an enemy whom they could neither see nor reach. To remain where they were was impossible; they closed their ranks and fell back on the detachment at the northern end of the island, which they reached with difficulty, hotly pursued by the Athenians. The natural strength of the position was increased by an old wall or fort, which the garrison had repaired as a last refuge. Behind this the fugitives ranged themselves, and being now protected in front and rear, they maintained a more even conflict.¹

In this position the Spartans were able to continue the struggle for the greater part of the day, in spite of the superior numbers of the enemy. The sufferings on both sides were great, owing to the severity of the conflict and the excessive heat. When the end seemed no nearer, the general of the Messenians begged Demosthenes to allow him to conduct a party of archers and light-armed along the rocks to an elevated point in the rear of the Spartans. He succeeded in the attempt, and his appearance on the height was the signal for a renewed attack. The Spartans, who were now exposed

Defeat and
capture of the
Spartans.

¹ Thuc. iv. 33, 34.

to a cross fire, and were by this time enfeebled for want of food and water, were unable to hold out longer, and the Athenians obtained possession of the approaches to the stronghold. A moment more and they would have broken in, but Cleon and Demosthenes, who wished to carry the Spartans alive to Athens, called their forces off, and sent a herald to the fort demanding unconditional surrender. When the Spartans made signs, by dropping their shields and raising their hands, that they were willing to listen to terms, a conference of the generals took place, and Styphon, who was now in command, for Epitadas had fallen, requested permission to consult with the Lacedaemonians on shore. From them, after some delay, he received the final response that "they must decide for themselves, but do nothing dishonourable," a discreditable attempt to throw upon the heroic garrison the responsibility of the decision. Upon this they gave up their weapons and surrendered. For the remainder of the day and the following night the Athenians kept their prisoners in custody; on the next day they were distributed among the trierarchs. The number was 292, of whom 120 were Spartans. The rest of the 420 who had passed to the island had perished. The siege had lasted seventy-two days, and though food had been furnished by the Athenians during twenty days only, the store was not wholly exhausted.¹

13. After this decisive success both Peloponnesians and Athenians left Pylus. Cleon had made good his boast, and returned home within the time that he had stated, bringing his prisoners with him. To the Athenians this was a great surprise; but greater by far was the astonishment caused throughout Greece by the conduct of the prisoners. That a Spartan should lay down his arms, no matter what the odds against him, or the extremity to which he was reduced, was incredible, and some even doubted whether those who surrendered could be men of the same stamp as those who fell. "Were those who fell brave men?" was the taunting question

¹ Thuc. iv. 35-39.

put by an Athenian ally to one of the captives. "The spindle (arrow) would indeed be a weapon of value if it could distinguish brave and coward," was the reply,¹

When the prisoners reached Athens they were at once placed in close confinement. So long as these hostages were

The Athenians
garrison Pylus;
distress of the
Spartans.

in their power, the Athenians could not only insist on favourable terms with Sparta, but could prevent any further invasion of Attica.

They also took measures to secure Pylus, which they garrisoned with a number of Messenians from Naupactus, who spoke the Laconian dialect, and could easily communicate with the neighbouring Helots. The Lacedaemonians felt the danger of their presence severely. The constant dread of a Helot rebellion seemed now to assume definite shape, and though they concealed their anxiety, they sent envoys more than once to Athens with proposals for peace, but owing to the extravagant terms demanded by the Athenians the negotiations fell through.²

"So ended the affair of Pylus." Had the story come down to us on any slighter authority than that of Thucydides, we

Remarks on the
capture of
Pylus.

might question the accuracy of some of the details. The most important success which the

Athenians achieved in the first ten years of the war was not the result of any plan formed by the Athenian generals of the year. At his own request Demosthenes, then a private citizen, is allowed to accompany a fleet sent out to Sicily, and to make what use of it he chooses—for another object! The generals in command oppose his views, and he only attains his end by the opportune accident which compels the ships to put into Pylus under stress of weather. Even then there is no attempt to occupy the place, till the soldiers, weary of inaction, begin, as it were, to play at building a fortification. Again, when the Spartans are cut off in the island, no attack is made upon them till Cleon arrives upon the scene. And Cleon's position is even more anomalous than

¹ Thuc. iv. 40.

² Thuc. iv. 41, *supra*, p. 210, n. 1.

that of Demosthenes. As the leader of the Assembly, he was more than justified in criticising the conduct of the generals, more especially of those who re- ^{Position of} mained at home, while the siege of Pylus ^{Cleon.} lingered on, week after week; but a foolish expression is seized upon, and Cleon, who boasts what *he* would do if in command, is chosen a supernumerary general on the spot, at the instigation of Nicias, amid the roars of a delighted multitude. Finding that he cannot shuffle out of his position—so Thucydides represents the case—he confidently accepts it, and leaves Athens with extravagant promises of success. He is allowed to go, not because his promises are believed, but because the city will be well rid of him, even if the worst happens. It is true that he took no citizens from Athens with him, but were the lives of the “cleruchs” of absolutely no value? And at Pylus there were Athenians whose lives might be sacrificed by Cleon’s folly. The whole scene is more like a passage from a comedy than an incident in Athenian political history.

And what are we to think of Nicias and his party? We naturally ask, why were they so inactive? Intelligence of the situation was constantly brought to them, ^{Conduct of} and they were well aware, as commanders of ^{Nicias.} Athenian fleets, that the blockade of the island could not be strictly kept up in bad weather, or the fortress maintained during the winter. Yet they propose no fresh reinforcements. Did they wish the affair to linger on, in order that the Athenians might accept the terms which the Spartans offered? Or were some personal jealousies at work; some undercurrents of political feeling at which we can only guess? Was Nicias jealous of the success of Demosthenes? Or was he now, as at Syracuse, unable to understand the necessity of rapid movement and hard hitting, the first elements of success in warfare?

Those who claim to be able to read between the lines of their authorities, speak of the affair of Pylus as a scheme arranged between Demosthenes and Cleon. What Demos-

thenes planned as a soldier, Cleon made possible as a statesman. But secrecy was indispensable, or Pylus could never be occupied. Cleon too must gain his position as general by stratagem, and bring the incompetent Nicias to resign his post by pretending to decline his offer.¹ However this may be, and certainly the scene as described by Thucydides cannot have been preconcerted, Demosthenes and Cleon

Energy of
Demosthenes
and Cleon;
gives a new
character to
the war.

are the only Athenians who make a creditable appearance in the matter. Down to this period, the Athenians had frequently sailed round the Peloponnesus, and had landed here and there on the Laconian coast, but no result had

followed. Demosthenes sees where to strike and how, and from this moment the war began to assume a far more serious aspect. The old policy of "parade," so dear to Pericles, is at an end; there is no more playing at soldiers, and what Demosthenes made possible, the energy of Cleon accomplished. What was wanted was vigour, and this he brought to the work; Demosthenes supplied the rest. It suits the comedian² to speak of Cleon as an incompetent swaggerer, who stole the cake which Demosthenes had made, but this is not the view which history takes of the situation. Cleon helped Demosthenes to do what he could not have done without him; he brought him the support of the Athenian people at the moment when he most needed it; he freed him from the paralysing association with Nicias, and infused new life into the conflict. The Athenian generals, trained in the school of Pericles, had, with some exceptions, achieved nothing, because they risked nothing. Cleon did not hesitate, where they held back; and great as was the material result of his victory, the moral result was hardly less important. Had the energy of the great demagogue invigorated the city at the time of the Sicilian expedition, Athens might have come triumphant out of the harbour of

¹ Holm, *Hist. of Greece*, iii. 393 E.T.

² Aristoph. *Knights*, 55.

Syracuse. It is, of course, true that Cleon by his victory made peace impossible; but at the time Athens was right in continuing the war. If the victory at Pylus had been a little more complete; if Brasidas had been slain when he fell fainting into his vessel, or if he had been brought a captive with his shield to Athens, the policy of Cleon and Demosthenes would have been more fully justified in its results. It was the misfortune of Athens that Brasidas survived to attack her in a place as vital as that in which she had attacked Sparta, and with an energy and genius far beyond that of any Athenian.

14. After the success of Cleon it was necessary for Nicias and his colleagues to retrieve their position. It was now too late in the summer for a distant expedition, but a blow might be struck nearer home, in the territory of Corinth or Epidaurus. Embarking a considerable force of Athenians and allies, Nicias succeeded in landing by night on the Corinthian coast near the Solygean Nicias at
Solygea. hill, a position which had been occupied by the Dorians in ancient days, when they wrested Corinth from the Aeolian inhabitants. The Corinthians who had assembled at the Isthmus, having been warned that the Athenians were planning a descent upon their coast, on seeing fire signals marched up to the hill. One of their generals occupied the ridge of Solygea; the other gave battle to the Athenians. After a severe struggle the Corinthians gave way, and retiring to a position on the slope, strong enough to protect them from attack, they refused to renew the engagement. Meanwhile a division of the Corinthians which had been left at Cenchreae, perceiving from the dust that an engagement was going on, joined their ranks, which were further reinforced by a number of citizens from Corinth. The Athenians, who supposed that these new forces were auxiliaries from the neighbouring towns in the Peloponnesus, felt their position to be no longer tenable, and retired hastily with their dead and their spoils to the neighbouring islands. The Corinthians had lost four times as many men as the

Athenians, and, among them, one of their generals, but Solygea was saved, and Nicias had gained nothing by his victory, except the satisfaction of beating Peloponnesian infantry in the open field.

Yet he was not wholly unsuccessful in his efforts to plant a foot on the enemies' territory. Sailing down the coast he seized Methana, a town lying between Epidaurus and Troezen, on the peninsula, which forms such a striking feature in the coast-line of this region. The peninsula he cut off from the mainland by a wall, and leaving a garrison in possession, returned home.¹

In western Greece the Athenians at Naupactus, aided by the Acarnanians, acquired Anactorium, an important colony of the Corinthians and Corcyraeans, which the former had appropriated in 432. The Corinthians were expelled, and their place was taken by settlers selected from all the cities of Acarnania. In the east the Chians, who had recently rebuilt the walls of their city, were compelled to pull them down. The revolt of Lesbos was not forgotten, and any attempt at fortification in the islands or Ionia was regarded as a sign of intended rebellion.²

In the winter season one of the generals engaged in collecting the tribute of the allies, when at Eion on the Strymon, arrested Artaphernes, a Persian on his way from Susa to Sparta. The envoy was conveyed to Athens. In the despatches found upon him, which were written in the cuneiform alphabet, the King complained that he had failed to discover the intentions of the Lacedaemonians, as no two of their numerous envoys said the same thing; and he requested that an embassy should return with his own messenger to explain their wishes clearly. The Athenians seized the opportunity to send ambassadors of their own to the Great King. These accompanied the Persian as far as Ephesus, but on learning that

Arrest of a
Persian
envoy.

¹ Thuc. iv. 42-45.

² Thuc. iv. 49, 51.

Artaxerxes had recently died, they returned home, and the attempt to negotiate with Persia was abandoned.¹

15. In the winter of 426-425, in response to the appeal of their allies, the Athenians had equipped a fleet for service in Sicily, and Pythodorus, one of the three commanders, had been sent forward to announce its coming (*supra*, p. 200). But his colleagues were detained till late in the year at Pylus and Corcyra, and meanwhile the tide had turned against the Athenians. The great success of the previous year had been the capture of Messene, by which, as Rhegium was a friendly city, the Athenians gained the complete control of the straits. In the early spring of 425 this advantage was lost, for at the invitation of a party in Messene, an allied fleet of twenty ships—ten from Syracuse and ten from Locri—seized the town. The Syracusans could not allow a port which commanded the approach to Sicily to remain in Athenian hands, and the Locrians hated Rhegium.²

The war in Sicily.

Messene revolts from Athens; actions in the strait.

After acquiring Messene, the allied fleet, now increased by additional ships to more than thirty, remained on guard in the harbour of the city, and opposite them at Rhegium lay the Athenian fleet of twenty-eight vessels. The Locrians were most eager that operations should be pushed on before the reinforcements from Athens arrived, and from the harbour of Messene; if the Athenian fleet were defeated, they would the more easily subdue the detested Rhegium, and bring the strait completely under their own control. One evening an accident brought on an engagement, and the allies were partly defeated, but others followed in which they held their own, till the Athenians were called away to Camarina, where a plot had been framed for betraying the city to the Syracusans. In their absence the Messenians and the allied fleet attacked the neighbouring city of Naxos—the oldest of all the Greek colonies in Sicily.

Camarina; Naxos.

¹ Thuc. iv. 50.

² Thuc. iv. 1. See vol. ii. 460, 497 f.

Naxos was completely enclosed, and in great danger, when suddenly numerous bands of Sicels began to pour down the hills from the interior upon the Messenians. The Naxians, who took them for Greeks from Leontini and elsewhere, plucked up courage at the sight, and sallying out, defeated the besiegers with great slaughter. A thousand were left dead on the field; a large part of the survivors were slain by the natives, and but a few escaped to Messene. The fleet, now unable to render further service, returned to Messene, and shortly afterwards dispersed.¹

After suppressing the plot at Camarina, the Athenian fleet returned to Rhegium, where a plan was arranged for a combined attempt on Messene, in which the Leontines and other Siciliots were to march upon the city by land, while the Athenians attacked it from the sea. Messene was not recovered, and for the rest of the year the Athenians left the Sicilian Greeks to fight out their quarrels on land by themselves. Even when Eurymedon and Sophocles appeared with their fleet, little or nothing was done. "They joined in the war with their allies"; this, and nothing more, is the information which Thucydides gives us about them.²

16. After the capture of the entire Peloponnesian fleet at Pylus, the subject allies of the Athenians were more than ever at the mercy of the imperial city. The opportunity was not lost. For some time past the treasury had been low, and it had been found necessary to levy a property-tax (*supra*, p. 164). Could not the allies be compelled to supply the deficiency? From the fragments of a long inscription it is clear that in 425 the Athenians made a new assessment of the tribute, and in some cases the amount was more than double of the previous payments. Many cities also were assessed, which previously had escaped payment altogether.³

¹ Thuc. iv. 24, 25.

² Thuc. iv. 25, 48.

³ Cp. *C.I.A.* i. 37, and *infra*, Appendix i.

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF 424 TO THE PEACE OF
NICIAS, 421.

I. With the spring of the following year there came a total change in the usual order of events. The Athenians were now the invaders. Encouraged by their success at Pylus, they began the new year with an attack on Cythera, the island which Demaratus had urged Xerxes to capture, which Chilon had wished sunk in the sea (vol. ii. p. 158). A large force was despatched under the command of Nicias and two others, one part of which assailed and captured Scandeia, a town on the shore, commanding the harbour, while Nicias landed with the remainder on the side of the island looking towards Malea, and marched upon the port or maritime city of Cythera. After a short resistance, the inhabitants fled into the citadel, and surrendered on condition that their lives should be spared, pending final arrangements. Ultimately a few of the citizens who were thought dangerous were deported into the islands of the Athenian empire; the rest remained on their property, paying a tribute or rent of four talents. An Athenian garrison was placed in the island.¹

Cythera now became a base of operations for the Athenian fleet. They ravaged the Laconian coast, and finding that they met with little resistance, they seized the opportunity

¹ Thuc. iv. 53-57. If the text is right, there were two parts of the city Cythera, one on the shore, another further inland, and besides there was a town called Scandeia. But Pausanias distinctly states that Scandeia was the maritime quarter of Cythera (*ἐνὶ πύλῳ*), iii. 23. 1. For the importance of Cythera, see Thuc. iv. 53.

to revenge themselves to the full on an ancient enemy. After their expulsion from their home in 431, the Aeginetans had been allowed to occupy the region of Thyrea, on the shore of the bay of Argos. Thither the Athenians now sailed, after ravaging Epidaurus Limera. The exiles were engaged in building a fort on the shore with the help of a Lacedaemonian garrison, which was stationed in the neighbourhood (*infra*, p. 226); but when the Athenians came in sight they hastily retired to the upper city, distant more than a mile from the sea. The Lacedaemonians, such was their state of demoralisation, refused to enter the gates with them or run the risk of being besieged, and, climbing to the heights above, remained inactive, on the ground that their numbers were insufficient for attack. Meanwhile the Destruction of the Aeginetans. Athenians sacked and burnt the city. All the surviving Aeginetans were carried to Athens, and there put to death by a vote of the Assembly—a sacrifice to the inveterate hatred subsisting between the cities.¹

The destruction of the Aeginetans casts a dark shadow on the reputation of Athens. So great a city, famous alike in legend and history, in art and commerce, deserved a better fate than to fall a victim to the inexorable hatred of a neighbour. Herodotus, whether from his Athenian prejudices, or as a partisan of Samos, is always unfavourable to Aegina, and though he cannot deny the legendary greatness of the city as the home of the Aeacidae, or the bravery of the Aeginetans in the battle of Salamis, he presents them to us as a rebellious, cruel, and treacherous race, whose wealth was obtained by cheating ignorant Helots; whose calamities were due to their own sacrilegious violence.² He dwells on their quarrels with Epidaurus and Athens, and attributes to the Aeginetan Lampon the infamous proposal to mutilate the body of Mardonius. In the poems of Pindar we see Aegina in a

¹ Thuc. iv. 57. Thyrea is said to be ten stadia from the sea, but Leake puts it at three times that distance; *Morea*, ii. 492.

² See Herod. iii. 59; vi. 91; ix. 80.

fairer light. One-fourth of his extant odes were composed in honour of Aeginetans, a proof that the oligarchs of the island, wealthy traders though they were, preserved some of the best traditions of the Dorian race. Pindar also praises the justice and wisdom of the government: "The people are guided by the Dorian rule, not transgressing the right or customs of strangers; as dolphins in the sea do they excel, wise arbiters in the contests of song and of strength." "There Saviour Themis, who sits in judgment by Zeus, the stranger's succour, is honoured more than elsewhere among men. . . . Some ordinance of immortals hath given to this sea-girt land to be to strangers out of every clime a pillar built of God."¹

These noble words are something more than venal praises from a professional eulogist. The greatness of Aegina is attested by imperishable evidence. The barren rock which now supports six thousand inhabitants, was, in antiquity, a great centre of industry and commerce, finding employment for 470,000 slaves.² The Aeginetans gave their name to the oldest and most widely spread of all the Greek systems of weights and coinage; their commerce extended from Egypt to Etruria, and for thirty years before the battle of Salamis, they were "rulers of the seas." In art and architecture they took a leading place: the great temple of Athena—of which the ruined columns may still be seen on the island, though the sculpture of the pediments and friezes are at Munich—was perhaps at the time when it was built the finest in Greece; the plastic work of the Aeginetan school was distinguished for the felicity with which the lightness of bronze was transferred to marble, and forms an important step in the development of Greek art.

Unhappily, owing to her position in the centre of the Saronic gulf, her interests clashed with those of Athens.

¹ Pind. *Frag.* 1; *Ol.* viii. 28 f. (Myers).

² Aristotle, in *Athen.* vi. 272, and Schol. Pind. *Ol.* viii. 30. Beloch would reduce the number to 70,000! *Bevölkerung*, p. 95.

The quarrel between the two cities was ancient and embittered by cruel memories, which swelled in the breast of every Athenian as he looked across to the "eyesore of the Peiræus." The glory of Aegina implied the dishonour of Athens, for to her and not to the Athenians had fallen the prize of valour at Salamis. The opposition of oligarch and democrat, of Dorian and Ionian, made the enmity of the rival cities more intense; but rarely, even in Greece, was a quarrel fought out with such relentless ferocity. Had the enemies of Athens dealt with her as she dealt with Aegina, Athenian history would end with the fifth century.

2. For more than a year the Athenians had carried all before them. They had gained possession of the Spartan Despondency fleet; they had carried Spartans in chains of the Spartans. to Athens. From Cythera they could ravage the coast of Laconia as they pleased, and Pylus was a centre to which any revolted Helot could repair. The Spartans were in the greatest distress. Their star had never sunk so low. Without a ship to call their own they found themselves engaged with a maritime power of unbounded enterprise and animated with the enthusiasm of success. Instead of invading Attica they were at a loss how to protect their own country from invasion. The system in which they trusted had failed, and after the capture of Cythera, "contrary to their tradition," they established a force of cavalry and archers, rapidity of movement being essential against an enemy who could select his own point of attack. They also placed garrisons at various parts of their territory. But these innovations, however useful, did not remove the prevailing despondency; the Spartans were haunted with the sense of impending evil; they shrank from every new undertaking, and allowed their courage to sink with their fortunes.¹ It was not at Sparta only that the success of Athens created alarm. The revolted cities of Chalcidice must expect the vengeance of the Athenians, if Sparta could no

¹ Thuc. iv. 55.

longer hold them in check, and those cities which were secretly in favour of revolt saw their hopes delayed by every new victory. Perdiccas too, though nominally an ally, when he reflected on the past, had little reason to anticipate advantage from the presence of Athenians in Thrace.¹ On these grounds, and also because Perdiccas wished for assistance in reducing the king of the Lyncestians, a common embassy was sent to Sparta with a request for troops, and promises to support them while in service. To the Spartans nothing could be more opportune. By despatching a force to Thrace they would divert the attention of Athens, and also rid themselves of the most dangerous element in the Peloponnesus. For some time past they had been in more than their usual dread of the Helots, and since the loss of Pylus this alarm had amounted to a panic; more especially they feared those who, by service in the field, had become acquainted with the operations of war. They had already diminished their numbers by a deed of iniquity unparalleled in Greek or any other history. They invited every Helot, who claimed to have done good service in the field, to come forward and receive his freedom. Of those who responded, two thousand were selected and allowed to crown themselves with garlands and visit the temples, but in a short time every one of them disappeared, no one knew how. In such a state of public feeling there could be no hesitation about sending Helots into Thrace. Above all, the expedition was warmly supported by Brasidas, whose fame had already reached Chalcidice as the most active and energetic of the Spartans. At his own wish he was placed in command of the troops and allowed to collect such other forces as he could get together by his personal influence. A man of less tact and

Application from Chalcidice; a force of Helots to be sent out under Brasidas.

Spartan measures for repressing the Helots.

¹ In 427, and again in 425, the Athenians had been in negotiation with him about Methone (*C. I. A.* 40). Jowett, *Thuc.* i. lxxxviii.

ability would have accomplished nothing, even if he had succeeded in reaching Chalcidice, but Brasidas, as we shall see, not only struck a blow at Athens from which she never recovered, but acquired for the Lacedaemonians a reputation for liberality and wisdom, which greatly misled the Greeks in their favour.¹

Before he left southern Greece he was able to check the long series of Athenian successes. Since the beginning of the war the unfortunate Megarians had suffered all the evils of foreign invasion and domestic strife. Twice every year the Athenians invaded their territory, destroying the crops so completely that the inhabitants were reduced to famine; and to complete the ruin of the city a body of oligarchical exiles established themselves at Pegae, whence they were able to cut off communications with the Corinthian gulf, and ravage that part of the Megarid, which, as it lay furthest from Athens, might perhaps have escaped the Athenian troops. The distress became intolerable, and the question was raised whether the exiles should not be received into the city.² The leaders of the popular party, finding that they could no longer carry the people with them, made overtures to the Athenian generals, Demosthenes and Hippocrates, for the surrender of the city. The Athenians were at least democrats from whom they had less to fear than from the oligarchs of their own nation. A plan was arranged by which the Athenians should capture the Long Walls, cut off Megara from Nisaea, which was held by a Peloponnesian garrison, and then attempt the city. The conspiracy was so far successful that the

The popular
party at
Megara.

Nisaea is
captured by
the Athenians.

¹ Thuc. iv. 79-81.

² Mr. Forbes suggests that the Megarians were able to hold out under these terrible privations because they were a manufacturing state (cp. *Ach.* 493: ἐνκοφάντει τὰ Μεγαρέων χλανίσκια, *Xen. Memorab.* ii. 7. 6, Μεγαρέων οἱ πλείστοι ἀπὸ ἐξωμυδοποιίας διατρέφονται). They could go on with their weaving when driven into their walls, and sell or exchange their goods in the neighbouring towns of the Peloponnese in the winter.

Athenians captured the Long Walls by a stratagem in the night, and shut up the Peloponnesians in Nisaea. When the day dawned, the conspirators in Megara, who were aware that a large Athenian force had come up from Eleusis during the night, proposed to open the gates and go out to attack the enemy, hoping by this means to gain admittance for the Athenians. But one of their number betrayed the secret, upon which the oligarchs gathered together and refused to meet the enemy or risk the safety of the city. When they saw that the conspiracy had failed, the Athenians advanced upon Nisaea, and began to invest it with a wall. By the evening of the second day the work was almost completed, and the garrison, who were without provisions, in despair of any assistance, surrendered to the Athenians on condition that each man should give up his arms and pay a fixed ransom.¹ The Athenians then established themselves in Nisaea, and threw down part of the Long Walls towards Megara.

The fate of Megara hung in the balance. Would the oligarchical faction save the city for Sparta, or would the democrats bring it over to Athens? The Brasidas in the Megarid. question was decided by the presence of Brasidas, who was now collecting troops for his Thracian expedition at Sicyon and Corinth. On hearing of the capture of the walls, he at once sent to Boeotia for reinforcements, and meanwhile, with a force of more than 3000 men, furnished from the neighbouring towns, advanced to Tripodiscus, in the hope of saving Nisaea. When he found that he was too late, he marched rapidly to Megara with a select body of troops, and begged to be received into the city. There was still a hope, he thought, of recovering Nisaea, and in any case his presence would strengthen the Megarians. But they refused to open their gates; the democrats fearing that by the restoration of the exiles he would bring about their own expulsion; the oligarchs lest the demos in alarm for their

¹ These terms did not, however, extend to the Lacedaemonians in the garrison, who were to be dealt with as the Athenians pleased.

safety should attack them, while the Athenians lay at hand to take advantage of the faction. It was better to wait and let Brasidas and the Athenians fight it out; the issue of the battle might determine the fate of the city, which could safely pronounce for oligarchy if Brasidas were victorious, or for democracy with the Athenians.

Brasidas retired to his camp, where at daybreak he was joined by the Boeotians. The arrival of this force was quite unexpected by the Athenians, whose hoplites were drawn up in Nisaea or on the coast, while their light-armed ranged freely in the plain between Megara and the sea. The Boeotian horse had no difficulty in driving these stragglers down to the coast, but when the Athenian cavalry came out to protect them, an engagement took place which was hotly contested and ended without decisive advantage to either side. Brasidas now ventured to advance nearer the sea and the city, where he awaited the action of the Athenians in a convenient position, from which his movements could be seen by the Megarians. If the enemy were willing to fight, he had no reason to fear the event, for his forces were now superior to theirs; if they thought it prudent to remain in their encampment, he would attain his object at Megara without striking a blow. And in this he was not mistaken. The Athenians went so far as to draw up in order of battle under the Long Walls,¹ but they did not venture into the open field; they had achieved a considerable success in the capture of Nisaea, and it would be foolish to run the risk of an engagement with superior numbers; they would indeed gain Megara if successful, but if defeated the entire loss would fall upon the flower of the Athenian troops. After a time they retired to Nisaea, upon which the oligarchs at Megara received Brasidas into the city to the great dismay of the conspirators.

¹ Of these they had destroyed part (*supra*); the rest were destroyed by the Megarians later in the year; see Thuc. iv. 109.

The allies from Boeotia and Peloponnesus now dispersed and Brasidas returned to Corinth. The Athenians also returned home. The conspirators at Megara retired from the city, but those of the popular party who were not implicated agreed to recall the exiles from Pegae, binding them by solemn pledges to forget the past and promote the good of the city. No sooner were the exiles elected to public office than they seized the opportunity of an inspection of arms to arrest about a hundred of their opponents, whom they put to death after a mock trial; a strict oligarchy was established in the city, and Thucydides observes that it remained in power for a longer time than any other government which owed its origin to a revolution carried out by so small a number of men.¹

3. In the west also the tide turned against the Athenians. Since the winter a new policy had been gaining ground among the Sicilians. The cities resolved to forego their mutual quarrels, and by uniting together to preserve Sicily from foreign intervention. The first to combine were Gela and Camarina, neighbouring towns, which the war had brought into a peculiar relation to each other. Both were Dorian; and Camarina had been recolonised by Geloans, after the destruction of the old city by Syracuse; but the memory of the ancient enmity remained, and though Dorian, Camarina was the ally of Leontini and Athens. In this policy the citizens were by no means united, and as there were some who wished to betray Camarina to Syracuse (*supra*, p. 221), so there were others who wished to be on friendly terms with Gela. Through these negotiations were opened, which ended in an armistice between the cities.

This example was quickly followed. Envoys from all the cities met at Gela and discussed the question of a general reconciliation. There were great difficulties in the way: the cities were sensitive and jealous; each suspected her neighbour

¹ Thuc. iv. 66-74.

of some selfish design; each had her own claims to maintain. The congress was a scene of animated discussion, but of the speeches one only is recorded, which Thucydides selects as being in his judgment most influential in determining the result—the speech of Hermocrates of Syracuse, the great Sicilian patriot, of whom we now hear for the first time.

Hermocrates was a citizen of no mean city. It was not from any fear for Syracuse, or owing to any loss which she had sustained, that he came forward to advocate peace—he spoke in the interests of all Sicily. He had no wish to control the free action of the cities; he was no supporter of peace at any price; but the war, so far as it had gone, had brought no advantage to any one. Let them try peace, therefore, and if that failed, let them go to war again. The danger at the moment was not from within but from without. While they were wearing each other out in factions and conflicts, the Athenians were at hand to take advantage of the result.

“The question which we have met to discuss,” he said, “is not the settlement of our private quarrels but the preservation of Sicily. The Athenians are here with a few ships as yet, and under the pretence of an alliance—but they aim at the conquest of the whole island, and when they have secured a firm footing they will come again with a larger fleet to carry out their design. In all our wars and our appeals to them for help, we are but preparing the way for our own subjugation. Their presence, far more than any arguments of mine, should incline you to reconciliation. In union lies our strength. Let us hear no more of Dorian and Ionian—the Athenians care nothing about either; it is Sicily and her wealth that they desire. Let every man and every city unite against the common foe. It is human nature to take what we can get, and I am far from blaming the Athenians; but it is not less human to resist attack and defend what is our own. Of all ways of getting rid of them this is the speediest. For it is not from Athens, but from those cities

which have invited their assistance, that they carry on war against us. Deprived of these, they will go back whence they came ; and we shall be at peace.

"Let me remind you also that the end of war is uncertain. It is not determined by the justice or injustice of a cause. Fortune is capricious, and fortune is supreme. The best lesson which she teaches is distrust. Let us take this lesson to heart, and in our distrust of the future and alarm at the presence of the Athenians, make up our quarrels, at least till we have got rid of the common enemy. In this way we shall preserve our independence ; we shall go to war how and when we please, and not at the bidding of another.

"I will end as I began. I am not speaking solely in the interest of Syracuse, but in the interests of all. Do not, I entreat you, in your eagerness to damage your opponents, inflict far worse damage on yourselves ; or think that you can govern fortune according to your own moods. Be willing to make mutual concessions ; cast aside all jealousies of tribe or city ; be good neighbours and good Siceliots, resolute in the determination to manage your own affairs, and resist the interference of foreigners whether they come as allies or as mediators."¹

The speech of Hermocrates was decisive. The cities agreed to unite ; and no change was made in their mutual relations, with the exception of Camarina, which agreed to purchase Morgantina from Syracuse for a fixed sum. Those who were allies of the Athenians sent for the officers in command of the fleet and requested them to join in the pacification. They accepted the proposal without any remonstrance, and after a brief interval withdrew their forces from the island.

Thus the Athenians saw themselves shut out from any hope of planting a foot in Sicily, or taking advantage of local quarrels to further their own interests. They were at

¹ Thuc. iv. 58-64. Notice that Hermocrates, in this speech, while appealing to the common feeling of the Greeks in Sicily, and urging them to act as inhabitants of one island home, entirely ignores the natives of the island.

liberty to visit the western waters in a single ship of war—that was allowed by the common custom of Greece—but their presence with any greater number would be the signal for hostilities. So far as we can see, Eurymedon and his fellow-generals were quite unable to make or mar in the pacification; they could neither prevent the meeting of the congress nor influence its decision, nor refuse to accept the result. On their return to Athens they were at once put on their trial. Pythodorus and Sophocles were driven into exile, and we do not hear of them again. Eurymedon was merely fined; he was destined to return and fall in Sicily. From the language of Thucydides we infer that the accusations were frivolous. “In the enthusiasm of their success the Athenians were impatient of every check; they looked on all things as possible, and any armament as sufficient, so extravagant were the hopes aroused in them by their unexpected prosperity.”¹

4. The Lesbians who had escaped from the island in 428-427 had settled on the mainland opposite. With the help of some Peloponnesian mercenaries they captured Rhoeteum, but afterwards they restored the town to the rightful owners—for a large sum of money—and acquired Antandrus, which they intended to make their headquarters. Timber was abundant there, and with the help of a fleet they could harass Lesbos. But two Athenian generals, who were collecting tribute in the neighbourhood, seeing their designs, gathered together a force and recovered the town. They feared that it would become to Lesbos what Anaea was to Samos, a constant source of danger and alarm.²

The successes of Athens had kindled new hopes in the heart of every democrat throughout Greece. Hippocrates and Demosthenes had no sooner returned to Athens from Nisaea than negotiations were opened with them by a number of Boeotians, who desired to see a popular form of government established in their cities. A plot was formed

¹ Thuc. iv. 65.

² Thuc. iv. 52, 75.

by which the conspirators undertook to raise a revolt at different points in Boeotia: at Siphæ, a seaport on the Corinthian gulf in the territory of Thespiæ, and at Chaeronea, a dependency of Orchomenus, in the extreme north, while the Athenians were to seize the temple of Apollo at Delium, near Tanagra, in the south. To prevent the Boeotians from bringing their whole force to bear on any single point, these movements were to take place simultaneously, on a fixed day. If successful, the conspirators would have at least three places of vantage, and by maintaining these and devastating the country, they hoped in time to effect a general revolution. Demosthenes was at once sent to Naupactus to collect an army of Acarnanians and other allies for the attack on Siphæ, while Hippocrates remained in the city, ready to march on Delium at the time appointed. Some Orchomenian exiles had already engaged a body of mercenaries from Peloponnesus, and a number of the neighbouring Phocians were associated in the project.¹

Popular
movement in
Boeotia: plan
for an invasion.

On his arrival at Naupactus Demosthenes found that the Acarnanians had already brought Oeniadae into the Athenian alliance. He immediately began to collect forces for the attack on Siphæ, and while waiting for the time appointed, employed them in subduing the Agræans. But the plan of invasion miscarried. By some mistake Demosthenes sailed for Siphæ before Hippocrates had reached Delium, and the Boeotians, who had been forewarned of the danger, occupied Siphæ and Chaeronea in force. The revolt was suppressed before it had broken out; the conspirators, seeing their mistake, made no sign, and Demosthenes returned to Naupactus.²

Hippocrates was not deterred from executing his part of the plot. Marching to Delium with the entire force of Athens, both light and heavy-armed, including all the available metic and allied troops, he set about fortifying the

¹ Thuc. iv. 76, 77.

² Thuc. iv. 89.

temple. In three days and a half the work was nearly finished, and the army set out on its return. When they had marched about a mile, the hoplites halted, awaiting their general, who had remained at the temple to superintend the completion of the defensive works, but the light-armed went their way homewards. Meanwhile the Boeotians had gathered together from every part of the country, under the command of the Boeotarchs. When they saw that the Athenians were returning home, most of the generals were unwilling to attack them, on the ground that the enemy were no longer in Boeotian territory; they had, in fact, halted on the borders of Oropia; but Pagondas, one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, was eager for battle, and summoning the soldiers in detachments, lest they should all leave their arms at once, urged them to engage, without caring where the battle was fought, whether on Athenian soil or on Boeotian. The Athenian was an invader whom they must repel; and it was folly to talk of boundaries when dealing with a neighbour who sought to advance his frontier to the utmost limit of Boeotia. Let them remember Coronea, and show themselves worthy of that glorious day.¹

The soldiers responded to this appeal, and as it was now late in the day, Pagondas at once led them forward to a position where they were separated from the enemy by a hill. When he had drawn up his forces, he ascended to the summit, ready to sweep down on the foe. He had under his command 7000 heavy-armed, 500 targeteers, and 1000 horse, besides an organised force of 10,000 light-armed. On the right he placed the Thebans and the Boeotians from the neighbouring districts; on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians; in the centre the troops from Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae, and the region round Lake Copais. The cavalry and light-armed troops were placed, as usual, on the wings. The formation of the ranks varied in

¹ Thuc. iv. 90-92.

the different contingents, but the Thebans were drawn up twenty-five deep.

While at Delium Hippocrates had been informed of the approach of the Boeotians. He at once sent orders to the army to form for battle, and soon afterwards joined them in person, leaving three hundred horse at Delium, partly to protect the temple, and also in the hope that they might have an opportunity of attacking the Boeotians during the battle, a danger which the Boeotians provided against by detaching a separate body of troops to meet them. In heavy-armed and cavalry the Athenians were about equal to the Boeotians, but they were almost entirely without light-armed troops. No organised force of the kind existed in the Athenian service, and of the irregular multitude which had followed the expedition from Athens, the greater part were by this time far on their way to the city. The army was drawn up at a uniform depth of eight shields; the cavalry took their place on the wings. Before advancing Hippocrates made a short address to the troops, in which he reminded his soldiers that a victory over the Boeotian cavalry would not only give them possession of Boeotia, but relieve Attica from invasion, for without the protection of this force the Peloponnesians would never venture into their land. "Meet your enemy," he cried, "as those ought to meet him who call Athens their home—as sons of the men whom Myronides led to victory at Oenophyta!"¹

He had only gone over half the line when the Boeotians rushed down the hill with a shout, and the Athenian heavy-armed met them at the double. Those on the extreme right and left of either army could not engage, owing to the watercourses which prevented their advance, but the rest at once joined in close conflict, shield upon shield. On their own right the Athenians were victorious; part of the enemy were put to flight, and the Thespians, who stood their ground,

The battle
of Delium:
defeat of the
Athenians.

¹ Thuc. iv. 93-95.

though attacked on all sides, were at length driven to seek the protection of the centre. So furious was the fighting, so confused the ranks, that some of the Athenians fell by the hands of their own countrymen, who mistook them for the enemy. On the left the extraordinary weight of the Theban column, aided by the ground, was found irresistible; slowly, and step by step, the Athenians were driven back, though as yet the line was unbroken. But now Pagondas, seeing that he had nothing to fear in this part of the battle, secretly detached two companies of horse to assist his broken left, and when they appeared over the ridge, the victorious Athenians, believing themselves attacked by a new army, were panic-stricken and fled; after this the wavering left could no longer keep their ground, and the whole army was put to flight, every man seeking safety where he could find it. The Boeotian cavalry, who were now joined by a troop of Locrians, followed in pursuit, but the approach of night aided the fugitives. Some reached Mount Parnes, on the direct route to Athens, others Oropus and Delium, whence, on the next day, they were conveyed home by sea.¹

The battle of Delium presents many features of interest. It is the first battle in Greek history of which the details are clear enough to enable us to form an idea of the engagement. We know the numbers on both sides, and their disposition; the mode of attack, and the cause of defeat. The absence of light-armed troops was a defect in the Athenian army, which their defeat at Spartolus should have taught them to remedy; which Demosthenes, had he been in command, would probably have remedied. The enormous depth of the Theban line was an anticipation of the tactics which proved successful fifty years later on the field of Leuctra, and on this occasion it seems to have taken the Athenians by surprise, or they were unable to perceive its importance. While the Boeotians

¹ The Boeotians lost about 500 in the battle, the Athenians 1000, including the general Hippocrates, besides light-armed and baggage bearers. See Thuc. iv. 96: cf. *ib.* 101.

have the advantage in the composition of their army, their strategy is also superior to that of the Athenians. Not only do they secure a position, which added immensely to the force of their charge, but when his left is broken Pagondas at once sees that his cavalry can be employed to restore it, though unable to advance on the troops ranged opposite; on the other hand, the Athenian cavalry is useless Decline of the
Athenian army. from first to last, failing even to cover with effect the retreat of the army. If it be said that the Athenians were now departing from the policy of Pericles, and that their defeat is a proof of his wisdom in forbidding them to meet the enemy in the field, the observation is true, but it seems to be not less true that the policy which Pericles pursued in regard to the Athenian army had been fatal to strategic skill.¹

The Athenian garrison was still in possession of the temple at Delium. The Boeotians attempted to dislodge them by refusing to give up the bodies of those who Capture of
Delium. had fallen in the battle, but after some time had been wasted in fruitless negotiations, they resolved to carry the place by assault. They had already been joined by large reinforcements, and the number of the heavy-armed infantry must have amounted to nearly 10,000—an overwhelming force to bring upon a temple surrounded by an earthwork thrown up in three days, and held by a few hundred men. But so helpless was a Greek army before a fortress of any kind, that the besiegers found it necessary to send for slingers and javelin-men from the Melian gulf to clear the walls, and even then the fort was not captured till an ingenious engine had been devised by which they set fire to the woodwork of the palisade and material from the neighbouring vineyard, with which the ramparts had been hastily constructed. The greater part of the garrison escaped to the sea, but about two hundred were captured

¹ Cp. Aristoph. *Frogs*, 1021 ff.:

ΔΙΟ. Θηβαίους γὰρ πεποιήκας
ἀνδρειοτέρους εἰς τὸν πόλεμον . . .
ΑΙ. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν αὐτ' ἐξῆν ἀσκεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐτράπεσθε.

and a few were slain. The Athenians now sent a second herald to recover their dead, who were at once given up to them. They had remained unburied seventeen days.¹

5. The defeat of Delium was a heavy blow to Athens, but a heavier still was now to fall upon her. Brasidas had returned from Megara to his task of collecting forces for the expedition to Chalcidice. In addition to the 700 Helots provided by the Spartan government, he got together by persuasion and promises a force of a thousand heavy-armed, and with these he set out to the north. He had, of course, no difficulty in reaching the Lacedaemonian colony at Heraclea; but to pass through Thessaly was not an easy task, for the Thessalian people were friendly to Athens, and Greek custom did not allow an armed force to cross a neighbour's territory without formal consent. But the governing class in Thessaly was oligarchical, and Brasidas had friends, who, at his request, acted as his guides. With their help and his own tact and energy, he succeeded in making his way to Pharsalus, whence he passed through Perrhaebia to Dium, a city in the territory of Perdiccas.

The Macedonian king lost no time in uniting the Greek force with his own army, for the purpose of attacking Arrhibaeus, the king of the Lyncestians, but when they were on the point of entering Lyncestis, Brasidas expressed a wish for a personal interview with Arrhibaeus, whom he hoped to make an ally of the Peloponnesians. Perdiccas was greatly enraged, and reminded him that he was paid to obey Macedonian orders, not to "act as a peacemaker." Brasidas, nevertheless, opened negotiations with Arrhibaeus, and at his persuasion withdrew his army, upon which Perdiccas, who had hitherto paid half the expenses of the Peloponnesian forces, now refused to pay more than a third. His position was even worse than it had been before the arrival of the Peloponnesians; he had less hope of subduing Arrhibaeus; and the

¹ Thuc. iv. 97-101.

Athenians, suspecting that he had brought Brasidas into Macedonia, declared him an enemy.

Brasidas was now free to pursue his own plans in regard to the Chalcidic cities. On the eastern shore of Chalcidice, where the isthmus connects the promontory of Acte ^{Brasidas at} and Mount Athos with the mainland, a few ^{Acanthus.} miles from the mouth of the canal of Xerxes, lay Acanthus, a colony of Andros, and a subject city of the Athenians. Hither he marched in response to an invitation from the oligarchical party in the town. He found the inhabitants by no means agreed on the question of admitting him with his forces, for here, as almost everywhere, the people were attached to the Athenians. But as it was now the vintage time, and the crop, still ungathered, was at the mercy of the army, they consented to receive him alone, and hear what he had to say. Brasidas, who was "not a bad orator for a Lacedaemonian," made the most of the permission. He declared that he had come to liberate Hellas, and to make good the promises with which Sparta had begun the war. He had come at great risk, and it was a bitter disappointment to find opposition in the first city to which he appealed. What was it that they feared? Was his power inadequate? At Nisaea the Athenians, though superior in numbers, refused to fight with his unassisted forces, and would they be able to send as large an army across the sea to Acanthus?¹ Or was his honesty questionable? He brought the most solemn pledges from the Spartans, that every city which joined them at his invitation should be an independent ally. Or did they suspect that he had come to help one party in the city against the other? Nothing was further from his intention; neither the many nor the few had reason to fear him; he had no thought of substituting a domestic for a foreign tyranny. The Spartans were known to be men

¹ This statement of Brasidas is not true, see Thuc. iv. 108. His army at Nisaea included a large number of Corinthians, who were not with him at Acanthus, and was superior in number to the enemy (iv. 73).

of their word; they would not damage their reputation by actions which would be disgraceful even in an Athenian. But the Acanthians must not suppose that they could remain neutral and continue friends while refusing to admit him into the city. If they would not listen to persuasion, he would try force, for he could not allow them to help the Athenians by their contributions, or to stand in the way of the liberation of Hellas. They had it in their power to save their property, and win a name for their city; but he would maintain his cause against all opposition. Let them choose the better part.¹

The Acanthians were in favour of admitting Brasidas, as might be expected when an army was at the city gates awaiting the signal to devastate the fruit-laden vineyards—and, as they gave their votes secretly, every one could follow his own judgment. Their example was followed by the neighbouring city of Stagirus. It was now October, but Brasidas had no intention of throwing away the advantages which he might gain before the Athenian fleet could arrest his progress. He was already in communication with Argilus, and had hopes of winning no less a prize than Amphipolis itself. The foundation of that city appears to have caused the greatest discontent at Argilus, and, as we find Argilians settled in Amphipolis, it is probable that the territory and population of the new town had been increased at the expense of the older settlement. Whatever the cause, the Argilians and Athenians were on bad terms, and Amphipolis was the bone of contention. The Argilians wished for nothing better than to expel the Athenians, who were but a small minority in the mixed population of the city, and their efforts were aided by a party which had the support of Perdiccas and the Chalcidic cities. Of these discontents Brasidas was fully informed, and he resolved to make use of them. Starting from Arnae, a town a few miles distant from Acanthus, on the evening of a stormy day, he

¹ Thuc. iv. 84-88.

advanced rapidly to Argilus, where his arrival was the signal for revolt, but he would not allow himself to be detained; he rushed on through the storm and darkness, and by early morning reached the bridge which crossed the Strymon, at a little distance from Amphipolis. A small body of soldiers were in charge; these he quickly dispersed, and crossing the river, entered the territory of Amphipolis, which he allowed his army to ravage. The citizens, who woke in the gloom of a wintry morning to find themselves the prey of an unexpected enemy, were filled with alarm; of those who dwelt outside the walls, some fled to the city, others were taken captive. They felt that they were betrayed, but the extent of the conspiracy was unknown, and every man suspected his neighbour. So great was the panic that Brasidas might have secured the city; but he preferred to wait for the action of his confederates, and, when they failed to carry out their part of the plot, he remained in his position.

The Athenians, on hearing of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalcidice, had kept a close watch on the district;¹ and of the two generals who had been appointed to this service, Eucles and Thucydides the historian, the first was now in Amphipolis, the second at Thasos, half a day's voyage distant. In concert with Eucles, the Athenian party kept the gates of the city closed, and sent to Thucydides for help, who immediately set sail with seven vessels, in the hope of saving Amphipolis, or at least occupying Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon. As owning a right over the working of gold-mines in Thrace, he was a man of much influence in the district; and could he reach Amphipolis, he would be able to bring in reinforcements by land and sea. Brasidas no sooner heard of his approach than he issued a proclamation offering the most moderate terms. Any citizen of Amphipolis, even if an Athenian, might either remain in the city undisturbed, or, if he chose, leave it in five days, taking his property with him. The proclamation had the

¹ 1 Thuc. iv. 82.

desired effect; the Amphipolitans were relieved for themselves and their relatives who had fallen into the hands of Brasidas; the Athenians, who were but a small proportion of the inhabitants, were glad to escape from danger.

Capture of Amphipolis. Brasidas took possession of Amphipolis, and on the evening of the same day, Thucydides occupied Eion. With the help of the fugitives from Amphipolis, he put the place into a state of defence, and when Brasidas suddenly attacked it by land and water, his attempt was defeated. The Athenians were still able to watch the lower course of the Strymon with their triremes.¹

6. But Amphipolis had fallen, and with it the bridge over the river had passed out of Athenian control. The prize so long coveted, so hardly won, was lost; and the **Condemnation of Thucydides.** way to their allies was open to the enemy. In their vexation the Athenians turned upon Thucydides, whom they chose to consider responsible for the disaster. He was brought to trial and banished, or perhaps, after his failure, went into voluntary exile. If we may trust his own narrative, he was certainly not remiss in reply to the appeal for help, and but for his rapidity of movement Eion would have been lost no less than Amphipolis. It is not so clear that proper measures had been taken to secure the safety of the Strymon. The importance of the bridge over the river was well known to the Athenians, and above all to Thucydides, as his own words prove to us.² Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that this position was allotted to him among the generals, owing to his intimate acquaintance with the region and his great influence in it. Yet the bridge over the Strymon, though at some distance from Amphipolis, and apparently within easy reach of Argilus, a city long suspected by Athens

Negligence of the Athenians. of disloyalty, is held by a small guard only; at Amphipolis the general is unsupported by any garrison, and is therefore compelled to accept the decision of the people, while Eion is the prize of the

¹ Thuc. iv. 102-107.

² Thuc. iv. 108.

first comer. Even at Thasos no regular force seems to have been maintained, for the ships which Thucydides brought to Eion are said to "have been accidentally at hand." Such negligence was certainly culpable, but we hardly know enough of the facts to decide who was to blame. The Athenians may have sent out the generals with orders to go to Amphipolis and Thasos; they may have supplied them with insufficient forces, trusting to "moral influence," and believing that the period of the year had begun in which active operations were impossible. We are told that when they heard of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalkidice they declared Perdiccas an enemy, and kept a watch on their colonies in that district, but we do not hear of any forces being sent out, and it was not till Amphipolis had fallen that they placed garrisons in the towns. One point is very clear. The Athenians were quite incapable of dealing with so great a soldier, so acute a diplomatist as Brasidas. While they slept, he marched, regardless of the weather and the season. While they collected revenues, he offered emancipation. The power of Sparta, which hitherto had been a mere name to the subjects of Athens in northern Greece, he brought in visible presence to the gates of their cities: the hopes of years were at last realised; the liberator was come. And he came, not in the interests of party, to give oligarch the advantage over democrat, or democrat over oligarch, but offering freedom to all, without respect to their political creed. The Sparta which he represented was not the narrow and selfish community by the Eurotas, but a large and liberal state, which, far from seeking to establish oligarchy in every allied city, was bound, not in honour only, but by solemn oaths, to respect the independence of all who joined her. He encouraged the timid, reassured the suspicious, and convinced the wavering; in his description Sparta was the ideal deliverer of whom the oppressed had dreamed so long, and the impression thus created continued for years to increase the reputation of the city. When persuasion failed, he struck, and struck hard. He saw

that the real weakness of the Athenian empire was its great extent. If an active spirit of revolt were excited through the various districts, even Athenian resources were inadequate to keep her power from crumbling to decay. Athens never recovered from the blow dealt her by Brasidas in Chalcidice, and when the same policy was repeated by Alcibiades in Ionia, the empire was doomed. Fortunately for Athens, the plans of Brasidas received little support from the Spartans, who were quite unable to sympathise with them. The liberation of Greece was in Spartan eyes a small matter compared with the recovery of the prisoners captured at Sphacteria; and, blinded by the miserable jealousy which is so painful a feature in the Greek character, their leading men were more anxious to check the success of their great general than to promote it.

7. After the capture of Amphipolis, Perdicas forgot his resentment and came to support the conqueror in settling the cities. Eager to extend his operations, Brasidas sent to Sparta for reinforcements, and Acquis, etc. began building ships of war on the Strymon. With his allies he marched into Acte, the most eastern of the three promontories of Chalcidice, and brought over the cities there, with one or two exceptions.¹

From Acte he crossed to Torone, which he captured with the aid of a party in the city. Marching through the night as before, he encamped before daylight at a temple less than half a mile from the city—his approach being unperceived by all but those who were in the plot. Of these a few met him at the temple, and by them seven of his light-armed soldiers—for out of twenty selected for the purpose only seven had the courage to go—were introduced into the city and obtained possession of the gates. When the signal was given, Brasidas rushed forward and secured the town without difficulty. Most of the inhabitants were entirely ignorant of the plot by which they

¹ Thuc. iv. 107, 108, 109.

had been betrayed to the enemy. The Athenian garrison, who though apparently charged with the care of the great gates had been asleep in the market-place at the time of the attack, escaped with some slight loss—partly on foot, partly with the assistance of two vessels which lay off the shore—to Lecythus, a fortified promontory separated from Torone by a narrow isthmus, where they were joined by their adherents in the town.

After an interval of two days, during which he had granted a truce to the Athenians for the burial of their dead, Brasidas attacked and carried Lecythus. His success was greatly due to the fall of a tower, which spread consternation among the besieged. Regarding this accident as a proof of divine aid, he piously devoted a sum of thirty minae, which he had promised as a reward to the soldier who should first climb the walls, to the temple of Athena, and consecrated the whole of Lecythus as a precinct to the goddess.

The capture of Torone was the last event of the campaign. For the rest of the winter Brasidas occupied himself with securing his conquests and forming future plans. So far he had been entirely successful, and his last enterprise taught him that he had little to fear from an Athenian garrison. Nothing could be more inefficient than the defence of Torone; the walls are out of repair, and in parts without a guard; a conspiracy is formed in the city, without any suspicion either on the part of the Athenians or their supporters; the garrison are asleep; the gates are insufficiently watched. If this were all the opposition which Athens had to offer, another campaign would decide the fate of the Athenian possessions in Thrace.¹

8. Such was the war in Chalcidice, where, by his energy and enthusiasm, one man was carrying all before him. At home matters wore a very different aspect. Each of the combatants had suffered severely in the last year, and each was apprehensive of new calamities. The fall of Torone roused the Athenians to their danger, and the insufficiency

¹ For Torone, Thuc. iv. 110-116.

of their own measures. If their empire was to be kept together a larger force must be sent out to Chalcidice, and in the meantime Brasidas must be restrained from further aggression. The Lacedaemonians, though regarding the successes of Brasidas as a poor compensation for their losses at home, were aware of the impression which they made at Athens, and sought to take advantage of it. Both parties hoped to gain by a cessation of hostilities, and at the very beginning of the spring of 423 a truce was concluded for a year.

In this instance, as so often, the Spartan policy was short-sighted and selfish to a degree almost incredible. We can understand why the Athenians should desire a truce which would prevent Brasidas from making new conquests, and enable them to send out reinforcements; but why should Sparta consent to it? Why should she wish Brasidas to be stopped in his career, when, as she very well knew, he was inflicting the severest blows upon the enemy? Thucydides explains the situation, but in language so obscure that it is almost unintelligible. The dominant feeling of the Spartans was a wish to recover the prisoners now lying at Athens, and this they might hope to do by offering in exchange their conquests in Thrace, conquests which they could surrender without injury to their allies in Peloponnesus. If, however, the war continued, Brasidas might be defeated, and they would then no longer have these conquests to offer, and if he were victorious, he might indeed restore the balance of the war, but even so they would not have gained their point. Their prisoners would be prisoners still; their recovery would be subject to the chances of war. It was better to sacrifice Chalcidice at once, in spite of all that Brasidas had said about liberation, and make use of his success for the object which they had most at heart.¹

¹ Thuc. iv. 117. The words καὶ ἔμελλον ἐπὶ μείζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι, τοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύειν καὶ κρατῆσειν, are very obscure. See Barton and Chavasse, *ad loc.*

We observe with some surprise that the first two clauses of the truce refer to the temple at Delphi. All Greeks are to be allowed to consult the oracle according to hereditary custom, and steps are to be taken for the detection of those who misappropriate the funds of the temple—provisions which imply that there had been some difficulty in obtaining access to the sacred shrine and some improper use of the sacred treasure.¹ With regard to their conquests each side was to keep what it possessed on the day when the truce was signed. The Lacedaemonians might sail along their own coasts and the coasts of the confederacy in rowing vessels of not more than 500 talents burden, but not in ships of war. A safe-conduct was assured during the truce to envoys from both cities, in the hope that a lasting peace might be arranged; deserters were not to be received; and any disputes which might arise were to be settled by arbitration. The terms having been agreed upon by Sparta and her allies, were carried by envoys, with plenary powers, to Athens for acceptance, and if any change was desired, the Athenians were requested to send plenipotentiaries to Sparta.

On the motion of Laches the Athenians accepted the terms, and on the 14th of Elaphebolion, *i.e.* about the end of March 423, hostilities were suspended.

9. The truce had hardly been signed before new difficulties arose. While Athens and Sparta were negotiating peace, the city of Scione, on the promontory of Pallene, went over to Brasidas. He at once crossed from Torone, and publicly commended the Scionaeans for their courage and good sense. Though almost as defenceless as islanders, owing to the Athenian occupation of

¹ The oracle cannot be said to have been quite impartial in the war. Apollo promised his assistance to the Peloponnesians. He also authorised the foundation of Heraclea. Whether the Peloponnesians carried out their intention of borrowing money from Delphi we do not know; but the funds seem to have been open to them and not to the Athenians.

Potidaea, they had by their own act joined the side of liberty: such bravery was a good omen of their future conduct, and the Lacedaemonians would honour it as it deserved.

The Scionaeans were filled with delight; even those who had opposed the revolt now supported it, and were prepared to go to war with Athens. One spirit animated all. Brasidas received the greatest honours which the city could bestow; as the deliverer of Greece he was crowned with a crown of gold; while the citizens crowded round him with salutations and placed garlands on his head as though he had been a victorious athlete returning from the games. Brasidas left a small garrison in the city and returned to Torone, but soon afterwards he appeared again with a larger force; he was already in negotiation with Mende and Potidaea, and hoped to acquire those cities, with the help of Scione, before the Athenians could arrive.¹

At this moment came the envoys from home announcing the truce. The allies of Lacedaemon in Chalcidice all agreed to the terms, but the Athenian envoy refused to admit the Scionaeans when it was found that they had revolted after the truce had been signed, while Brasidas, though he sent back his army to Torone, would not surrender the town. The Athenians, when they heard the report of the envoy, prepared to sail to Scione, but the Lacedaemonians announced that they should regard the expedition as a breach of the truce, and asked to have the matter settled by arbitration. To this the Athenians would not agree: they were exasperated at the thought that even islanders were revolting in reliance upon the power of Lacedaemon—a power useless at sea—and instantly passed a resolution, on the proposal of Cleon, that Scione should be destroyed and all the inhabitants put to death. In the main question they were right, for the revolt of Scione took place two days after the signing of the truce,

¹ Thuc. iv. 120, 121.

and confining their operations to this one point, they avoided any further hostilities.¹

Meanwhile Mende went over, and Brasidas, though the truce had been proclaimed, did not hesitate to receive the city, excusing his conduct on the ground that the Athenians had themselves violated the ^{Revolt of} ^{Mende.} terms. His action at Scione inspired the Mendaeans with confidence, but the movement was due to a small party who, fearing for their own safety, compelled the populace to go with them. The Athenians were now more enraged than ever, and directed their expedition against Mende as well as Scione.

Brasidas made arrangements for the defence of both, but he was unable to be present in person. At this crisis in the fortunes of two Greek cities, which trusted in him to save them from destruction, he was called away to support Perdiccas in a new invasion of Lyncestis. At the cause of this sudden change in his plans we can only guess; in the previous summer he had offended Perdiccas by coming to terms with Arrhibaeus, and his subsequent career had been one of unbroken success; he was not now seeking admission into the Chalcidic cities; he was the hero, the deliverer, to whom all turned with longing eyes. After the conquest of Amphipolis he was visited by Perdiccas, who may have induced him to reconsider his position towards Arrhibaeus; or he may have been driven by the need of larger forces for protecting his conquests to secure the help of the Macedonian army at any price. He knew that the Athenians would come, and come quickly; that he must meet them unaided by any troops from Lacedaemon; that Perdiccas would not render him assistance till he had helped to carry out the object for which he and his forces had been invited to Macedonia. On some such grounds he may have been brought to join Perdiccas, as he now did, with the

Brasidas joins
Perdiccas in an
invasion of
Lyncestis;
reasons for this.

¹ Thuc. iv. 122. καὶ τὰλλα ἡσυχάζοντες ἐς τοῦτο παρεσκευάζοντο.

bulk of his Peloponnesian forces, and as many Chalcidian troops as could be supplied by Acanthus and other towns. That he did so with a heavy heart and divided purpose is clear from his conduct—and indeed the step was fatal; no fewer than 3000 heavy-armed Hellenic troops and a large force of cavalry were withdrawn from Chalcidice at a time when the presence of the Athenians was daily expected.

10. The combined armies entered the Lyncestian territory and defeated the troops of Arrhibaeus, after which they remained inactive, awaiting the arrival of some Illyrian auxiliaries. When the Illyrians did not appear, Perdiccas wished to push on and destroy the villages round, while Brasidas was anxious to return to Mende, and refused to go further without the Illyrians. The dispute was ended by the news that the Illyrians had thrown Perdiccas over and joined Arrhibaeus. Perdiccas and Brasidas now resolved to retreat. The two armies lay at some distance from each other, and in the night the Macedonians, seized with a sudden panic, rushed homewards, carrying Perdiccas with them before he had time to acquaint Brasidas with his movements. When the morning broke, Brasidas found himself face to face with the Illyrians, and without the support of his allies. Nothing remained but retreat, and was retreat possible? Could his army be kept together in the presence of a multitude of dancing and yelling savages, who threatened an immediate attack. The Greeks rarely marched far beyond their own borders, and expected to find in the enemy armour, tactics, and organisation resembling their own; conflict with savages was new to them. Brasidas saw the danger and met it. He arranged his army in a hollow square, within which he collected the light-armed forces; the most active of the soldiers were placed in readiness for a sally, should the enemy attack; while the general himself, with 300 picked men, took up his position in the rear, to receive

Defeat of the
Lyncestians.

Retreat of
Perdiccas.

Difficult posi-
tion of Brasidas;
his orderly
retreat.

the first onset. He briefly addressed his men. What if they had been abandoned by their allies? It was their duty to conquer by their own valour without the assistance of others. What if they were attacked by greater numbers? They came from cities where the few held the many in subjection. The sight of a barbarian foe was new to them, and what was unknown was feared; but the terror was for the eye only. Barbarians were not trained to fight in ranks; they felt no shame in deserting their post; they were under no controlling authority. "Your safety lies in despising these attempts to frighten you, which are but a proof that the enemy shrinks from a battle. By resisting their onset, and retiring in perfect order, you will soon reach a place of security; and you will find that hordes such as these, if you receive their first attack, are careful for the future to display their valour at a distance. But if you yield to them they will dog your steps, being men of infinite courage where there is nothing to fear."

The orders of Brasidas were obeyed; the barbarians were successfully resisted. After a time they ceased to attack him, and hastened forward, partly to overtake the retreating Macedonians, some of whom they slew, partly to occupy the heights commanding the gorge through which Brasidas must pass on his way to Macedonia. When he was about to enter the defile he perceived their intention, and bade his three hundred run at full speed, without thought of line or order, to the summit of the hill, which he thought that they would occupy, and dislodge the enemy. This was done, and the rest of the army ascended without difficulty, for the barbarians, being greatly discouraged, desisted from further pursuit.

The soldiers of Brasidas were greatly enraged at the conduct of their allies, and on entering Macedonia they revenged themselves by slaughtering the oxen of the waggons, and appropriating the baggage thrown away in the retreat. Perdicas now regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and, forgetting the old hatred

Breach between
Brasidas and
Perdicas.

in the new, forgetting too his own natural interests, he sought an opportunity of joining the Athenians.¹

II. When Brasidas returned to Torone his worst fears were realised. Mende had been captured by the Athenians, and the position of Scione was desperate. On their arrival in Chalcidice, under the command of Nicias and Nicostratus, the Athenian fleet found the Mendaeans and their garrison, a body of 700 Peloponnesian hoplites, encamped under the command of Polydamidas, a Lacedaemonian, on a steep hill outside the town. An attempt was made to dislodge them, but without success; Nicias was driven back wounded, and the whole army narrowly escaped a severe defeat. Next day the Athenians sailed round to the other side of the city, where, without even a brush with the enemy, they took the suburb and ravaged the country round. Nicostratus encamped near the Potidaean gate of the town, where Nicias joined him after completing the devastation of the country as far as the borders of Scione. Within the city all was confusion. Faction had broken out, three hundred Scionaeans, who had come to the help of the city, had gone home, and when Polydamidas began to draw up his soldiers in the marketplace for an attack on the enemy, one of the popular party declared that he had no wish to fight, and would not go out. Polydamidas answered him sharply, and from words proceeded to blows, upon which the populace at once seized their arms and rushed upon the Peloponnesians. They fled in terror at this unexpected attack, and their alarm was increased when they saw the gates opened to receive the Athenians; they believed themselves to be the victims of a preconcerted plot, and sought refuge in the Acropolis, with some loss. Meanwhile the Athenian army poured into the town, pillaging and destroying, and it was only by the personal intervention of the generals that the lives of the inhabitants were spared. The Mendaeans were bidden to return to their old form of constitution, and it was left to them to put on their trial any

¹ Thuc. iv. 124-128.

citizen whom they thought guilty, a concession which could safely be made after the recent outburst of popular fury. The Athenians then cut off the fugitives in the Acropolis by a wall, extending at either end to the sea, and, leaving a detachment to guard it, went on to Scione.¹

Here the same tactics were pursued. To save the city from being surrounded, the inhabitants, with their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, encamped on a hill outside the walls; the Athenians by a vigorous effort of Scione. Blockade dislodged them, and at once set about building a siege-wall. Before the work was finished, the Peloponnesians who had taken refuge in the Acropolis of Mende broke out by the shore, and joined their friends in Scione.²

In the meantime Perdicas came to terms with the Athenian generals, and in order to prove the sincerity of his conversion, which Nicias thought was much in need of proof, he prevailed on his friends in Thessaly to stop the passage of some reinforcements which were marching to the aid of Brasidas.³ Perdicas joins the Athenians; and stops the Lacedaemonian reinforcements. The three commissioners who had been sent to Chalcidice to report on the state of affairs were, however, able to make their way through, and brought with them a number of the younger citizens, whom, contrary to the custom of their state, the Spartans intended to make governors of their cities in Thrace. Of these, Clearidas was established in Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas in Torone.⁴

12. In Greece the truce was strictly maintained, so far as operations between the belligerents were concerned; but for those who had old scores to pay off, the opportunity was too good to be lost. Taking advantage of the heavy losses which

¹ Thuc. iv. 129, 130.

² Thuc. iv. 131.

³ This agreement was confirmed by a formal alliance: cp. *C. I. A.* i. 42; Thuc. v. 6, 83; Forbes, *Thuc.* i. xcv.

⁴ Thuc. iv. 132. On the inscription which, as Boeckh and Hicks suppose, contains the names of Athenians who fell in Chalcidice in 423, see Jowett, *Thuc.* i. xcvi. The blockade of Scione is alluded to in Aristoph. *Wasps*, 209 (Feb. 422): *νῆ Δ' ἡμῶν κρείττον ἢν τηρεῖν Σκιάων ἀντὶ τούτου τοῦ πατρός.*

the Thespians had suffered in the battle of Delium, the Thebans marched to the town and destroyed the walls. They charged the Thespians with "Atticism," an absurd accusation against men who had fought by their side in defence of Boeotia at Delium, and, under the circumstances, as hypocritical as it was absurd. Later in the year the Mantineans and Tegeans renewed their long-standing feud, but, after a hotly contested battle, the victory was undecided; both sides set up trophies, both sent spoils to Delphi, but the Tegeans could claim the slight advantage of encamping on the field of battle.¹

When the winter of 423 was drawing to a close, Brasidas endeavoured to retrieve his fortunes in Chalcidice by an attack on Potidaea. Arriving in the night, he succeeded in planting a ladder against the wall, at the moment when the watchman had passed by; but before he could ascend it, the attack was discovered, and he withdrew his army in haste to Torone.² The year had seen a disastrous change in his position; of the cities which had come over to him in the spring, when his star was in the ascendant, Mende was lost, and Scione was closely besieged. No assistance could be expected from Macedonia, and the way was blocked against reinforcements from home. As yet the Athenians were present with but a small number of ships; in the coming summer he might be called upon to meet their whole force unaided.

13. The truce expired in March, but hostilities were not resumed till the summer, after the Pythian games. During the interval the Athenians, thinking that the purification of Delos was still incomplete, expelled the entire population from the island, on the ground that they were defiled by some ancient stain, and unfit to

¹ Thuc. iv. 133, 134. The battle took place ἐν Λαοδικίῳ τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, "in the valley of the Alpheus, near the spot where Megalopolis was afterwards built" (Arnold).

² Thuc. iv. 135: τοῦ γὰρ κώδωνος παρενεχθέντος οὕτως ἐς το διάκενον, πρὶν ἐπανελθεῖν τὸν παραδιδόντα αὐτὸν, ἢ πρόσθεσις ἐγένετο.

dwelt in the holy land. The exiles found a home at Adramyttium, under the protection of Pharnaces, the Persian satrap ¹ (*infra*, p. 270).

When the Pythian games were over, Cleon persuaded his citizens to send him out with an army to Chalcidice. The success of the previous year had fallen to his opponent Nicias, whose reputation as a general ^{Cleon sails} to Chalcidice. had steadily advanced since the miserable scene of 425. In the interval Cleon had been busy squeezing the allies ² and filling the law-courts, to the great satisfaction of his followers and the increase of his own power. His military ambition had been kindled by his achievement at Pylus, and when in 422 he was once more chosen general he wished for an opportunity of displaying his genius. He flattered himself that he had only to appear in Chalcidice and all that had been lost would be recovered. He set sail with thirty ships, having on board twelve hundred Athenian hoplites and three hundred horsemen, besides a number of allies. At Scione, which was still blockaded, he added to his forces any soldiers who could be spared from the siege. Landing near Torone, and finding that Brasidas had left the city in charge of Pasitelidas with a diminished garrison, he at once despatched ten of his ships into the harbour, and marched his infantry on the town. In order to increase the size of Torone and protect the inhabitants, Brasidas had enclosed and fortified a suburb, which he incorporated with the city by breaking down the old wall. On this new fortification Cleon directed his attack. Pasitelidas was preparing to repel him when the Athenian ships sailed into the harbour. His forces being inadequate to hold both the suburb and the town, he rushed back to the city, leaving the way clear for Cleon. But he was too late. The ships had taken the city before he could reach it, ^{He captures} Torone.

¹ Thuc. v. 1. What led the Athenians to this step we do not know; but it indicates an unusual degree of religious excitement in the city.

² For the *ράξῃς φόρον* of 425 (*C. I. A. i.* 37) and the raising of the tribute, *supra*, p. 222.

and meanwhile the army entered from the suburb. Some of his men were cut down at once, the rest were captured, himself among them. Brasidas, who hastened to the rescue, was within five miles of the city when he heard of its fall.

Cleon had reason to be proud of his success. At his first attempt, without even a serious conflict, he had recovered the headquarters of the enemy, and could send seven hundred prisoners to Athens. He had stolen a march on Brasidas, and proved himself more energetic than the greatest of Spartan generals. It cannot be said on this occasion that he reaped the glory which was another's due; he sailed out, so far as we know, in sole command, taking the whole responsibility upon himself. His success was owing to the rapidity of his movements, his skill in dividing his force, and attacking the town simultaneously at two points. On the other hand, the conduct of Brasidas is inexplicable. What induced him to leave Torone with an insufficient garrison at the moment when a large Athenian force was expected? Was he misled by false intelligence, or was he still collecting reinforcements at the time when Cleon arrived? Whatever the cause, the result was disastrous, and the Spartan power in which he had persuaded the Chalcidic cities to put their trust was shown to be unequal to the task which it had undertaken.

14. From Torone Cleon sailed to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon. The recovery of Amphipolis was the chief object of his expedition, but, before entering on so difficult a task, he wished to collect reinforcements from Macedonia and Thrace. While waiting for their arrival, he attacked and took the neighbouring town of Galepsus.

Brasidas was informed of his movements, and at once marched up from Argilus to Cerdylum, a hill on the right bank of the Strymon, commanding a view of Amphipolis and the country round. From this point he could keep a watch on Cleon, should he attempt the town without waiting for his reinforcements.

He divided his army into two portions, one of which he kept near him on the hill; the other was placed in Amphipolis, under the command of Clearidas.¹

Cleon was unable to carry out his plans. His soldiers grew weary of inaction; their spirits drooped; they murmured loudly against the strategy which kept them idle in the sight of their enemy; and contrasted in no flattering terms the conduct and abilities of their own general with those of Brasidas. It was with the utmost unwillingness that they had taken service under such a leader.² Cleon gave way to the discontent so far as to advance upon Amphipolis, not with the intention of risking a battle, but merely to reconnoitre. He posted his army on the hill above the city, which commanded a view of the lake on the Strymon, and the country towards Thrace, as well as the interior of Amphipolis. He did not anticipate an engagement, and felt confident that he could without difficulty retire to Eion whenever he pleased.

Cleon advances on Amphipolis.

The opportunity which Brasidas desired had come; Cleon, unsupported by his Thracian and Macedonian auxiliaries, was within striking distance. As soon as he saw the Athenians on the opposite hill, he hastened from Cerdylum, and entering Amphipolis, joined his forces to those of Clearidas.

Brasidas prepares to attack the Athenians.

He did not venture to offer battle in the open, for though his army was about as numerous as that of the enemy, it was far inferior in quality. He selected 150 of his best hoplites with whom to make a sudden attack on the Athenian centre, while the rest were stationed under the command of Clearidas at the Thracian gate of the city, with orders to rush out and

¹ Thuc. v. 6.

² Thucydides says that their reluctance was more than justified, and such was the feeling of the knights or cavalry who served under Cleon; cp. Aristoph. *Clouds*, 572 f.; but so far as Cleon's conduct went, they had no reason to be dissatisfied. When rapidity was required, he moved rapidly, and it was in the confidence arising from success that his soldiers became so impatient. Cleon knew when to wait, and they did not.

support him. In a short address to the soldiers he explained his plans: they were not to be dismayed by the disparity of numbers; the enemy would be taken unawares and thrown into disorder by his attack, and the reinforcement under Clearidas would come upon them as a new army and fill them with alarm.

The advance of Brasidas into the town was observed by the Athenians, and Cleon was informed that the enemy's forces were collected near the gate, under which the feet of men and horses could be seen. He went himself to look, and finding that an attack was intended, he gave orders to his army to retire by the left wing, which, as he lay along the ridge facing the town, was the part of his army nearest Eion. He hoped to get away before the enemy sallied out, and when the troops seemed to delay, he ordered his right to wheel round and march forward to the coast, thus presenting the unshielded side of his soldiers to Amphipolis. Brasidas detected the mistake. He rushed out of the city with his followers at the first gate in the Long Wall, and hastening up the steepest part of the hill, fell upon the Athenian centre as it was preparing to retire to Eion. The Athenians were terrified at the

Battle of
Amphipolis:
Death of Cleon
and Brasidas.

sudden attack, and thrown into disorder. Clearidas then sallied out and attacked the right wing; upon which the army was panic-stricken and fell to pieces. The left, which was completely severed from the rest, hastened to Eion, the right retired up the hill. At this moment both the commanders fell: Brasidas, while advancing to attack the Athenian right, was wounded and carried off the field; Cleon was overtaken in his flight by a Myrcinian targeteer and cut down on the spot. On the top of the hill the Athenian right continued for some time to repulse the attacks of Clearidas, but at length, hemmed in by cavalry and targeteers, with whom they could not come to close quarters, they were put to flight. The whole army was now routed, and the survivors fled as they could to Eion, whence they sailed back to Athens.

About six hundred Athenians were slain, of their enemies seven only, but of these seven one was Brasidas.

He lived long enough to be assured of his victory. He was buried with public honours in the city, followed to his grave by all the army. And as his devotion Honours paid to Brasidas. in saving the city seemed more than human, the grateful citizens made his tomb a shrine, and sacrificed to him with yearly games and offerings as a Hero. Regarding him as their deliverer, they also made him the Founder of Amphipolis, transferring to him the honours hitherto assigned to Hagnon, whose shrine they destroyed, as well as any other building which commemorated their connection with Athens. They were an Athenian colony no longer.¹

15. By saving Amphipolis, Brasidas rendered a great service to Sparta, who had now an important post to offer in return for the captives at Athens. And we Brasidas. cannot praise too highly the skill and devotion by which the city was saved. The attack on the Athenian line was admirably planned and executed. Every detail of the action was carefully arranged: every arrangement efficiently carried out. Brasidas anticipated every movement of Cleon, and fell upon him at the very moment when resistance was almost impossible. His own onset at the head of 150 men upon the centre of the Athenian army—a force of picked men—over most unfavourable ground, was a feat without parallel in the war, and impossible for any general but Brasidas, who alone possessed the genius to plan such a charge, and the power to inspire his men and keep them together. Confidence in their leader's judgment, devotion to his person, and admiration of his courage, these were the feelings which animated every soldier in his army, and by these the audacious enterprise, which in other hands might have proved a disastrous failure, if it could have been executed

¹ Thuc. v. 6-12. For the topography of Amphipolis, see Leake, *Northern Greece*, iii. 190 f.; Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, iv. 546. Diodorus, xii. 14, gives a different account of the battle; Cleon falls fighting bravely in the ranks.

at all, proved a brilliant victory. When we turn from this rapid, definite, and energetic movement, this devoted confidence and admiration, to consider the action of the

Conduct of Athenians, the contrast is great indeed. Cleon
Cleon at is compelled by the clamours of his army to
Amphipolis. march upon Amphipolis without waiting for

his reinforcements; the leader allows his wishes to be forced by his soldiers, and the soldiers claim to direct their general. Such insubordination is fatal to the discipline which alone makes an army efficient, and such weakness marks a general as unfit for his post. Yet we must in this point make large allowance for Cleon. He appears to have had some difficulty in persuading the Athenians to send an expedition against Amphipolis at all; they did not see the imperative necessity of recovering the town by arms, when they still had the Spartan prisoners in their hands, and they were disinclined to renew the war after the year of truce. Thus the expedition was unpopular from the first, and only sent out under

His command the pressure of Cleon's personal influence. It
unpopular. became more unpopular still when it was known

that Cleon was to have the command. The soldiers, who were knights and hoplites of the best class, took service with the greatest unwillingness: they had, or professed to have, no confidence in their leader. With such relations existing between general and soldiers, there was little hope of successful action, but the conduct of Cleon on reaching Amphipolis goes far to cancel any excuse which we can make for his

He is entirely march thither. He at once fell into the trap
outwitted by which Brasidas had prepared for him; and
Brasidas. when he saw the gates closed, and no evidence

of an intended sally, he assumed that the enemy was overawed at his mere approach. In his extravagant self-confidence he thought that he could come and go as he pleased, and allowed his soldiers to wander from their ranks. "Had he brought up his siege-engines," he said, "he could have assaulted the city at once." When he became aware of his danger, he at once lost all courage, threw his army into confusion by

giving orders for retreat, and fled for his life. The Athenians, abandoned and demoralised, were cut down almost without resistance, till six hundred of the best soldiers in the city were left upon the field, at a loss to the enemy of seven men only.

16. The battle of Amphipolis was the last event of the Archidamian war,¹ for in Greece neither side had moved since the expiration of the truce. The scene in Chalcidice was indeed little more than a personal duel, in which both principals were but moderately supported by the government at home. Influence now passed Desire for peace; into the hands of those who heartily desired Nicias and peace—Nicias at Athens and Plistoanax at Plistoanax. Sparta. The fall of Cleon after a career of such unexpected prosperity must have made a deep impression on the sensitive and even superstitious mind of Nicias. He was afraid that a similar reverse might overtake himself. He desired to preserve the good fortune which had attended him hitherto; "he would have liked to rest from toil and to give the people rest; and he hoped to leave behind him to other ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city."² Plistoanax had other reasons, and they were even more personal. Banished from Sparta after the events of 446-445, in which he was suspected of receiving bribes to induce him to quit Attica, he had retired to Mount Lycaeus, where he dwelt in a house, half of which lay within the sacred precinct of Zeus—so great was his fear of the Lacedaemonians. He remained in exile nineteen years, when, owing to the repeated commands of the Oracle of Delphi, he was brought back and restored to the throne with all the ceremonies customary at a coronation. Nevertheless he was suspected of influencing the Delphic priestess in some dishonest manner, and the calamities which the Spartans suffered after 426 were by some attributed to his return. For this reason he was anxious to put an end

¹ The name given to the war from 431 to 421.

² Thuc. v. 16.

to the war, and preclude any further chance of disaster from this source; above all by recovering the Spartan captives from Athens to rescue the city from her helpless position. Nor were the cities less inclined to peace than their leaders. Since their success at Pylus, the Athenians had suffered severely at Delium and Amphipolis, and they now perceived that war was not the one-sided game which in the flush of their success they had imagined it to be; the Lacedaemonians, so far from reducing the Athenians by a few invasions of Attica, found themselves at the end of a ten years' struggle with their own territory ravaged from Pylus and Cythera, and a number of their best citizens in chains at Athens. The Helots were constantly deserting, and the ever-present fear of a revolt was more keenly felt than ever.

Another reason of great weight with them was the approaching close of the Thirty Years' Peace which had been concluded between Argos and Sparta in 451.

If Argos were free from her obligations, she might join Athens, or she might form a second centre in Peloponnese, to which any dissatisfied city could repair. She was demanding the restoration of Cynuria as a condition of renewing the peace, and if pressed by the war to secure her help Sparta would be compelled to give way.

On these grounds negotiations for peace were opened in the winter of 422-421, and towards the spring the Spartans, in order to force the hand of the Athenians, announced to their allies that they would be required to assist in invading Attica and building a fort to command the country. The announcement had the desired effect; and after a good deal of negotiation and many journeys to and fro, a peace was finally arranged. The Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies to a conference at Sparta, and in spite of the opposition of the Boeotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleans, the majority accepted the terms.

17. These were as follows: Both parties were to give up

what they had acquired by force of arms. The Athenians were to restore Pylus, Cythera, Methana, Pteleum, and Atalanta; the Lacedaemonians Amphipolis and Panactum (a fortress on the frontier of Attica which had been betrayed to the Boeotians just after the renewal of the war). The Boeotians refused to surrender Plataea, on the ground that it had been won not by force but by agreement, and Athens replied by retaining Nisaea for the same reasons. With regard to the Chalcidic cities, Scione, Torone, and Sermyle were left, without any conditions, to the mercy of the Athenians. Others were to be independent on condition that they paid the tribute as assessed by Aristides; they were to be allies of neither party unless they joined the Athenians of their own free will—these were Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. If the inhabitants were dissatisfied, they were free to change their abode and take their property with them. All prisoners on either side were to be restored.

Free access to the "common temples" was guaranteed to all Hellenes. The temple at Delphi was declared independent, and the Delphians were to be an independent state, enjoying their own revenues, laws, and customs.

Neither party was to take up arms to the injury of the other in any way or manner; and controversies were to be decided by arbitration.

The peace was to continue for fifty years.¹

In these terms the Spartans paid but little attention to the interests of their allies. No mention is made of Potidaea, the relief of which was one of the chief causes of the war. The Megarian decree was so far from being rescinded, that the port of the city was now given up to Athens; the desolation of Aegina and the slaughter of the inhabitants were condoned; and from her action in Chalcidice it was plain that Sparta was wholly careless what befel the towns if she could save her own citizens:—the tribute was guaranteed to

¹ Thuc. v. 18.

Athens from cities from which she had not now the power to collect it without an armed force. There was no doubt a party at Athens which had looked for more than this. Those who had hoped, with Cleon, to break up the Peloponnesian confederacy, and recover the full extent of empire which Athens had possessed in 447 or gain more, were bitterly disappointed. In the Peloponnesus Sparta had lost nothing; she was still the head of the confederacy, if the confederacy would follow her. The treasury of Athens had been emptied; the utmost pressure had been put upon the allies to provide money and men, yet both by sea and land Athens had since 424 failed to achieve any success. Even those who acquiesced in the plan of "wearing Sparta out" must have felt that the war had been useless. And the peace was useless too. All the causes which led to hostilities in 431 were still at work: was it likely that an agreement for fifty years, which settled nothing, would prevent them from taking effect?

CHAPTER IX.

FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE TO THE INVASION OF SICILY, 421-415.

I. The peace had barely been concluded before it became clear what peace meant. The question who should begin the work of restitution was decided by lot, and the lot fell on Sparta. She found herself unable to carry out her undertaking. All the prisoners in her hands were at once set at liberty; but when Clearidas, who commanded in Thrace after the death of Brasidas, received orders to give up Amphipolis, he declared himself unable to do so against the wishes of the Chalcidians, and he was eventually recalled home with all the Peloponnesian forces under his command;¹ Athens continued to be deprived of her most coveted possession. She retaliated by refusing to give up Pylus and Cythera, or the prisoners taken at Sphacteria; and thus the Spartans also failed to secure the objects for which they had sacrificed all their gains in the war. Still greater were the difficulties which arose out of the attitude of the allies. The Corinthians, exasperated at the neglect of their claims, refused to accept the peace; and the Boeotians contented themselves with securing their own interests by a truce with Athens terminable at ten days' notice.²

Sparta was in difficulties. In spite of her recent successes her reputation in the Peloponnese had fallen so low, that the Argives ventured to reject the terms which she had offered for a renewal of the truce. On the other hand, there

¹ Thuc. v. 21.

² Thuc. v. 32.

was nothing under the terms of the existing peace to prevent the members of the confederacy from joining Athens if they chose to do so. To obviate these dangers, Sparta proposed to enter into a separate alliance with Athens ; and after some negotiations the offer was accepted. The alliance was primarily defensive : each city was to assist the other in case of invasion, and Athens was to help Lacedaemon against any revolt of the Helots. But the invader, in each case, was regarded as an enemy of both cities, to be punished by them conjointly, and neither city was to cease from war before the other.¹ Immediately after the conclusion of the alliance, the Athenians restored the captives taken at Sphacteria, but as Sparta was unable to give back Amphipolis, they refused to withdraw their troops from Pylus or Cythera. By this alliance the Spartans were greatly the gainers. They could count on the help of Athens in case of an invasion by Argos ; Pylus could not be used as a centre from which to spread revolt among the Helots ; and above all, they had attained the object which they had most at heart—the recovery of their countrymen.

2. The Argives were confirmed in their contempt of their ancient enemy. For ten-years past the Grecian cities had been oppressed by military service and contributions ; they had seen their cities pillaged, their fields wasted, their commerce destroyed, while Argos had enjoyed the blessings of peace and prosperity. The city has indeed no history during the thirty years since she concluded peace with Sparta, but Thucydides significantly remarks that she had made “a harvest of both sides” ; she had also become a centre of democracy in the Peloponnese ; and so far as we can form an opinion, she had been improving her army by the creation of what may be called a “standing force” of a thousand picked soldiers, supported and trained at the expense of the city, a body with which no doubt she intended to meet the trained soldiers of Sparta. Once more

¹ Thuc. v. 22-24, and the note in Poppe-Stahl on 22. 2.

she might hope to resume the position which her rival could no longer retain, and become, as in heroic days, the leader of Greece. The allies of Sparta were more exasperated than ever by the alliance between Sparta and Athens, and persisted in their refusal to accept the terms of the peace. As at the beginning of the war, the Corinthians ^{Corinthians} were the most energetic in expressing their ^{at Argos.}

displeasure. On leaving the conference at Sparta, after the conclusion of the peace and alliance, their envoys turned aside to Argos, and urged the authorities there not to lose the opportunity which now offered of drawing over the confederacy, and protecting the Peloponnese from the Spartans and Athenians, who were conspiring against the liberties of Greece. If it were known that Argos would receive any city into a defensive alliance, many would flock to her, through hatred of the Lacedaemonians. To prevent any public repulse, they advised that negotiations should be carried on by a select body of men, and not through the general Assembly. The Argives took the matter up, and appointed twelve men with whom the cities could treat. Only in the case of Athens or Sparta wishing to join were the proposals to be laid before the people.¹

3. The Mantineans were the first to join. For some time past they had acted in a manner of which they could hardly expect that Sparta would approve. During the ^{The Argive} truce of 423 they had been at war with Tegea, ^{confederacy.} and though they failed in this direction, they had succeeded in reducing a considerable part of Arcadia. These conquests they knew that the Lacedaemonians, now that their hands were free from the war, would not allow them to retain. Moreover they were a democracy like Argos, and had always been in sympathy with that city.² Their defection was the signal for a general agitation among the cities of the confederacy, which the Lacedaemonians vainly endeavoured

¹ Thuc. v. 27, 28. See Aristoph. *Pax*, 468, 9, the Argives *κατεγέλων τῶν παλαιπωρουμένων καὶ τὰν διχόθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἀλφίτα*.

² Thuc. iv. 134, and v. 28, 29, 33, 81.

to check by sending envoys to Corinth to remonstrate. The Corinthians, who had summoned the recalcitrant cities, replied in their presence that they were justified in breaking away from the confederacy. Of the real but private grounds of offence—that neither Sollium nor Anactorium had been restored to them—they said nothing, but pretended that they were bound by their oaths to their allies in Thrace, for in the ordinances of the confederacy such separate oaths were allowed to be a valid reason for refusing to accept the decision of the majority. The Eleans Mantinea and Elis. were the next to conclude an alliance with Argos. They also had their quarrel with Sparta, who had decided against them in a contention with Lepreum, and restored this city to its former independence (*infra*, 275). They were followed by the Corinthians, who, however, would only consent to a defensive alliance, and the Chalcidians. The Megarians and Boeotians agreed to stand aloof. They were well aware that the Lacedaemonian constitution was more congenial to their own oligarchical form of government than the Argive democracy.¹

While these negotiations were taking place in the Peloponnesus, Athens was asserting her imperial power. The blockade of Scione was brought to an end, and the unfortunate city treated with the utmost severity. All the grown up men were put to the sword, and the women and children sold into slavery. The Athenians also brought back the Delians from Adramyttium to Delos, “moved partly by the defeats which they had sustained, partly by an oracle of the Delphic God.”²

When the Argives and Corinthians appeared at Tegea with proposals that the city should join them, they met Tegea and Boeotia. with a repulse. In Boeotia they fared little better. The Boeotians still hesitated about joining the Argives. They had concluded a truce, terminable at ten days’ notice, with Athens soon after the peace

¹ Thuc. v. 29-34.

² Thuc. v. 32.

was settled, and the Corinthians were anxious that they also should be on a similar footing. They persuaded the Boeotians to go with them to Athens and support their request, but the Athenians merely answered that if the Corinthians were allies of Sparta they were included in the terms of the general truce.¹

4. Meanwhile Sparta endeavoured to recover her position. King Plistoanax marched with the whole force of the city into Arcadia, rescued the Parrhasians from their subjection to the Mantineans, and destroyed a Sparta. fort which had been built by the Mantineans in the Parrhasian town of Cypsela, to command the Sciritis. The Helots who had served with Brasidas, on their return to Laconia, had received their freedom and permission to dwell where they pleased, but now they were settled with the Neodamodes² at Lepreum to defend it against Elis. The prisoners from Sphacteria, who hitherto had enjoyed the privileges of citizens, and in some cases had been elected to public office, were disfranchised: they could neither hold office, nor buy nor sell—a severe sentence considering that the government had thrown upon them the responsibility of their surrender (*supra*, p. 215), but one which after a time was cancelled. Negotiations went on with Athens about the terms of the peace which were still unfulfilled, and though no result was attained, the Athenians agreed to withdraw the Messenians and Helots from Pylus,³ and settled them in Cephallenia.

Such a state of affairs satisfied no one. When the ephors of the year came into office at Sparta in the autumn of 421, a new line of policy was taken up. After an abortive discussion at Sparta, in which the Athenians, Boeotians, Corin-

¹ Thuc. v. 32.

² The Neodamodes were emancipated Helots (Thuc. vii. 58), but there was some difference between them and the soldiers of Brasidas which we cannot explain.

³ Thuc. v. 34, 35. The reasons of the Spartans for the disfranchisement are noticeable: *δείσαντες μή τι διὰ τὴν ξυμφορὰν νομίσαντες ἐλασσωθήσεσθαι καὶ ὄντες ἐπίτιμοι νεωτερίσωσιν.*

thians, and other allies took part, the ephors urged the Corinthians and Boeotians to unite as closely as possible. The Boeotians should then ally themselves with Argos, and bring both Argives and Boeotians into alliance with Sparta! The Boeotians would thus escape the Athenian alliance, and even the Spartans, if they could gain Argos, were ready to throw Athens over. The envoys who carried these proposals to Thebes and Corinth were overtaken on leaving Sparta by two Argives of great authority who pressed their alliance very strongly on the Boeotians. All promised well, but when laid before the Boeotian councils by the Boeotarchs, the proposals were rejected. The Boeotians were afraid to conclude an alliance with Corinth—a city which had revolted from her allegiance to Sparta—and the Boeotarchs had unwisely concealed the fact that they were acting with the authority of Sparta. The plan fell to the ground¹ so far as it concerned Argos and Corinth. With the Boeotians, in spite of their treaty with Athens, the Spartans concluded an alliance; only thus could they recover Panactum, which they wished to exchange for Pylus. But no sooner was the alliance concluded than Panactum was levelled to the ground, and the plans of the Spartans were foiled.²

5. When it became known that Sparta had concluded an alliance with Boeotia, there was the greatest excitement at Argos and Athens. The Argives, who supposed that the alliance had been made with the cognisance of Athens, were afraid that so far from leading the Peloponnesus, they would be left in isolation, while Sparta would be joined by Athens and Boeotia in addition to her loyal allies within the Isthmus.

Argos and Sparta. They immediately sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations (420). The old dispute about Cynuria could not be set aside, but they were willing to leave the decision to any city or individual who might be agreed upon, and when the Spartans would not allow a

¹ Thuc. v. 37, 38.

² Thuc. v. 39.

word of this to be mentioned in the terms, they made a second proposal, declaring themselves ready to enter into an alliance for fifty years, on condition that either side might challenge the other, if not suffering from plague or engaged in war, to settle the possession of the land by combat. To this the Spartans assented—though it was in their opinion a foolish proposal, and the envoys were bidden to acquaint their state with the conditions of alliance; if they were accepted, they were to return again at the Hyacinthia and take the oaths.¹

The Spartan envoys, on their return from Boeotia, had gone to Athens to deliver the prisoners that they had received from the Boeotians. They also endeavoured to explain away the Boeotian alliance, and asked for the surrender of Pylus in return for Panactum. The Athenians were in no mood for explanations; they considered that the Spartans had transgressed the treaty, both in regard to Panactum and the Boeotian alliance, and the envoys were sent home with a rough answer.

Sparta and
Athens:
Alcibiades.

At this time the foremost man in the war-party was Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, who was just beginning public life, and burning with ambition to win for himself a place among the great names of Athenian history. He may have thought, as Thucydides says, that the alliance with Argos was really for the interest of Athens; he was certainly piqued that he had been passed over in the negotiations for the peace with Sparta, in spite of the hereditary "Spartan friendship" in his family, which his grandfather had disowned, and which he was anxious to renew. Taking advantage of the ill-feeling which had arisen, he bade the Argives send envoys to Athens together with Mantinea and Elis: now was the time to propose an alliance, and he would help them to the utmost. Upon this the Argives threw over their envoys at Sparta, and repaired to Athens, carrying their new allies of Mantinea and Elis with them.²

¹ Thuc. v. 40, 41.

² Thuc. v. 42-44.

6. The Lacedaemonians were alarmed. They at once sent envoys to Athens, among them Endius, of whom we shall hear again, giving them full powers to settle all the points in dispute. Alcibiades was in a difficult position; if the Lacedaemonians carried the Assembly with them, the Argive offer would be rejected, and his credit for political influence would be at an end. Falsehood and deception were resources which he employed without hesitation. He persuaded the envoys to deny before the people that they had come with full powers, promising in return that he would induce the Athenians to restore Pylus and settle all the points in dispute. No sooner had the envoys announced in the Assembly that they had not come as plenipotentiaries, thus denying what they had affirmed in the Council, than Alcibiades fiercely attacked them for their dishonesty; and so exasperated were the people, that they would have concluded an alliance with Argos on the spot had not an earthquake brought the meeting to a close. On the next day Nicias was able to prevent an open breach with Sparta. Envoys were despatched demanding the restoration of Panactum—as a fortress not as a ruin—and of Amphipolis; the Boeotian alliance must also be renounced, or the Athenians would join the Argives. Of the envoys Nicias himself was one, but the utmost that he could obtain was a renewal of the oaths between the cities. On their return an alliance was at once concluded between Athens on the one hand, and Argos, Mantinea, and Elis on the other, for mutual protection against invasion. A force of Athenian knights was sent to Argos to be in readiness if required.¹

¹ Thuc. v. 45-47. See also the fragment of the stone copied in Hicks, *Hist. Inscr.* No. 52, and the remarks in Jowett's *Essay on Inscriptions*, p. lxxxix-xci. The principal terms were as follows:—(1) The Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies are not to attack the Athenians, or the allies "over whom they rule"; and conversely the Athenians are not to attack the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans and their allies; (2) If the Athenian territory is invaded, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans are to send such help as the Athenians may demand, to the utmost of their power, and if the enemy has devas-

In this treaty the Corinthians refused to join, though they were still willing to abide by the terms of the defensive alliance into which they had originally entered with Argos. They were now more inclined to think kindly of their old friends the Lacedaemonians. Later in the year, after the Olympic festival, the question was once more discussed, but without result. "Much was said and nothing was done, till an earthquake put an end to the meeting and the envoys dispersed."¹

7. In the course of this summer two incidents occurred which indicated the declining influence of Sparta. Her citizens were excluded from the Olympic festival, on the ground that she had refused to pay a fine which the Eleans had imposed on her for violating the Olympic truce, and her colony of Heraclea, after suffering a defeat at the hands of the neighbouring tribes, was seized by the Boeotians, "lest the Athenians should take it while the Lacedaemonians were involved in troubles in the Peloponnesus."

From what we read in Thucydides, it is difficult to say whether the Eleans were right in their contention that the Lacedaemonians had violated the truce; or whether they used the charge as a pretext for demanding the restoration of Lepreum.² They asserted that the Lacedaemonians had sent a force into Lepreum when the truce had already been proclaimed, but as the truce was proclaimed at Elis first, and

The Lacedaemonians excluded from the Olympic festival.

tated the territory and gone away, that city is to be the enemy of the Argives and their allies; they are to do it what injury they can; and no single city is to come to terms without the consent of all. And conversely: (3) Without the consent of all, no single city is to allow an armed force to pass through its territory.

¹ Thuc. v. 48, 50.

² The Lepreans, being at war with certain Arcadian tribes, called in the Eleans to assist them on condition of receiving half their territory. When the war had been brought to a successful end, the Eleans allowed the Lepreans to cultivate the land on payment of a rent of a talent a year to Olympian Zeus. Until the Peloponnesian war this rent was paid, but then the Lepreans took advantage of the war to discontinue it. When the Eleans tried to compel them to pay, they appealed to the Lacedaemonians, who undertook to arbitrate.

afterwards in the cities at a distance, the Lacedaemonians could reply that it had not been proclaimed to them when the force was despatched. The Eleans, while refusing to accept this view, were willing, if the Lacedaemonians would restore Lepreum, to remit part of the fine and pay the rest themselves, an offer which seems to reveal their real motives. But when the Lacedaemonians refused to accept this offer, and refused even to take an oath that they would subsequently pay the fine, the sentence of exclusion was passed on them. During the festival there was great alarm lest they should take up arms to enforce their rights, and troops were in readiness to resist them. The excitement became intense when Lichas, the Lacedaemonian, was beaten by the officers in full view of the gathering. His pair of horses had been entered in the name of the Boeotian community, and when they were declared the winners, he came forward and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus claiming the honour for himself. But there was no further disturbance. The Lacedaemonians were content to offer sacrifice at home.¹

8. In the next spring (419), Alcibiades was chosen to be one of the generals at Athens. He was no sooner in office than he entered on a vigorous policy. Crossing into Achaea. Peloponnesus with a small force of Athenians, and being there joined by the Argives and other allies, he marched through the whole breadth of the country, and formed alliances wherever he went. He persuaded the inhabitants of Patrae to extend the walls of their city to the sea, and was about to build a fortress at Rhium, but his efforts were

"The Eleans suspected that they would not have fair play at their hands; they therefore disregarded the arbitration and ravaged the Leproan territory. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians went on with the case and decided that the Eleans were in the wrong, and that Lepreum was an independent state. As their award was rejected by the Eleans, they sent a garrison of hoplites to Lepreum."—Thuc. v. 31. The incident is characteristic, (1) of the feeling of the Peloponnesians towards Sparta; (2) of Spartan policy in establishing independent states; (3) of the difficulty of maintaining peace in the confederacy.

¹ Thuc. v. 48-51.

checked by the Corinthians and Sicyonians, who saw that the fortress would be to their injury.¹

A quarrel now broke out between Argos and Epidaurus. As keeper of the temple of Apollo Pythaeus, Argos still claimed the right to demand certain offerings from the neighbouring cities, and Epidaurus had failed to comply.² This was a sufficient pretext for war. Epidaurus lay between Argos and the Isthmus, and for the Argives in their present relations with Corinth the acquisition of her territory was most desirable; the route to Aegina and Athens would also be rendered much shorter. The Argives at once prepared to invade Epidauria, and take the victims for themselves. About the same time the Lacedaemonians marched out with their whole force to Leuctra on their own borders under the command of Agis, but for what object no one knew, "not even the towns which furnished the troops." The sacrifices offered before crossing the border proving unfavourable, the army was disbanded; and orders were sent to the allies to assemble when the month of Carneus—a sacred season for all Dorians—was over. The Argives took advantage of the delay. Entering Epidauria on the 27th of the month preceding Carneus, and keeping this day during the whole of the invasion, they devastated the country, while the Epidaurians in vain appealed to their allies for help. Some excused themselves owing to the sacred season, others, though they advanced to the frontier, would not cross it.³ Meanwhile, at the instance of Athens, the allies were assembled at Mantinea to discuss the question of peace. The Corinthian envoy at once called attention to the

¹ Thuc. v. 52.

² See vol. i. p. 226 and note.

³ The words in Thucydides v. 54, *ἀγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον*, can only be translated as in the text; and the confusion of Greek calendars, which constantly required intercalary days or months, might easily render such a fraud possible. All the days during which the Argives were in Epidauria were considered as coming before the close of the 27th of Hecatombæus, the month preceding Carneus, in which the festival was held. See Xen. *Hell.* iv. 7. 2 for this trick.

hostilities between Argos and Epidaurus, and urged that these must be brought to an end before the question of peace could be discussed. The Argives were withdrawn from Epidauria, but in vain. No conclusion was reached at the conference. The Argives then returned to their work, aided by 1000 Athenians with Alcibiades in command, and they did not retire till they had devastated a third of the country. The Lacedaemonians, who again marched as far as Caryae, were again prevented by ill omens from crossing the border, and went home.¹ Later in the year they sent a force by sea to Epidaurus, upon which the Argives at once complained at Athens. By the treaty, each ally had undertaken to prevent any armed force from passing through their territory; the sea was the territory of the Athenians, and they had allowed the Lacedaemonians to pass through it,—an unfriendly act which the Argives would only condone if the Athenians would take back the Helots to Pylus. This was done by the influence of Alcibiades, and a note was made on the pillar on which the treaty was recorded, that the Lacedaemonians had not observed the terms of it. The rest of the year passed with nothing more important than slight skirmishes between Argos and Epidaurus.²

9. The reputation of the Lacedaemonians was now at so low an ebb that if the state was not to lose her position altogether, vigorous steps must at once be taken to retrieve it. In the summer of 418 Agis marched upon Argos with the whole force of the city, including the Helots. He was joined by the Tegeatae and the other allies in Arcadia, but the rest of the allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians (5000 hoplites with as many light-

¹ Thuc. v. 54, 55. Cp. Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 507 ff., esp. 512-515 :

εἴτ' ἀλγοῦσαι τάνδοθεν ὑμᾶς ἐπανηρόμεθ' ἂν γελάσασαι,
τί βεβούλευται περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν ἐν τῇ στήλῃ παραγράψαι
ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τήμερον ὑμῶν ; τί δέ σοι ταῦτ' ; ἧ δ' ὅς ἂν ἀνήρ,
οὐ σιγήσει ; καὶ γὰρ ὀσίγων.

A passage which shows with what interest these negotiations and changes were watched in Athenian homes.

² Thuc. v. 56.

armed, 500 cavalry and an equal number of "runners"¹ collected at Phlius. Before the forces could combine, the Argives met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium, supported by the Mantineans and 3000 Eleans. They were eager to attack, but in the night Agis broke up his camp and joined the allies at Phlius. The Argives followed, and took up a position on the road from Nemea to Argos, expecting by this means to prevent Agis from reaching the city. Agis outmanœuvred them by dividing his forces. With his Arcadian and Epidaurian allies, he descended by a difficult path into the plain; the Corinthians and Phliasians entered it at another point by an equally difficult route; the Boeotians, who were well supplied with cavalry, the Megarians, and Sicyonians descended by the Nemean road, on which the Argives lay. On hearing that Agis was in the plain, laying waste their territory, the Argives returned from their position near Nemea, and after a slight brush with the Corinthians and Phliasians, drew up for battle. They were surrounded on all sides. Agis cut them off from the city; the Corinthians and their allies held the higher ground to the west; and on the Nemean road lay the Boeotians. Their Athenian allies had not yet come up, and they were without cavalry. When the armies were on the point of engaging, two Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, came to terms with Agis, undertaking that Argos should satisfy any complaints which the Lacedaemonians had to bring against her, and enter into a lasting peace. Agis, after conferring with one of the Lacedaemonian magistrates who were in the camp, agreed to a truce for four months, to allow time for the Argives to fulfil their promises. In these transactions neither party was supported by public authority; four persons only—two on each side—acting entirely upon their own responsibility,

Agis comes to terms with Argos.

¹ Thuc. v. 57. For the ἀμῖπτοι who are mentioned in this passage only in Thucydides, see Arnold's note, *ad. loc.* Xenophon mentions them among the Boeotian forces at Mantinea (362).

decided the issue of the campaign. When drawing off his forces, Agis did not even inform his allies what had taken place, but such was the discipline of the Peloponnesian army that, though indignant at his action, they obeyed his commands. Never before had so fine an army been collected; all the allies were present except the Mantineans and Eleans, who were fighting for Argos, and the soldiers were picked men. "In numbers and quality they were a match for the force opposed to them and for another as large," and they had caught the Argives in a trap. More undaunted still were the Argives, who had not at all realised how perilous was their position. They blamed their generals for allowing the Lacedaemonians to escape them. It was their custom to decide any disputes which arose in a campaign at the Charadrus, a ravine outside the city walls, and when the army reached this place on the march home, the soldiers began to stone Thrasyllus. He saved his life by fleeing to an altar for protection, but his property was confiscated.¹

10. After the truce had been concluded, the Athenian contingent arrived at Argos, 1000 foot and 300 horse, under Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives were for sending them back, as the war was at an end, but the Eleans and Mantineans compelled them to listen to Alcibiades, who, though not one of the generals for the year, was present as an envoy. He urged that the truce which had been concluded in the absence of some of the allies had no validity. They must disregard it, and make the best of the present opportunity. Alcibiades prevailed. The allies at once marched upon Orchomenus in Arcadia, where, after some delay, they were joined by the Argives, in open violation of their engagement with Sparta. Orchomenus, unable to resist the united forces, agreed to join them. These were now uncertain what step to take: the Eleans called on them to march upon Lepreum; the Mantineans proposed an attack upon Tegea; and when

¹ Thuc. v. 57-60.

the proposal of the Mantineans was preferred, the Eleans withdrew their forces, thus depriving the army which they had insisted on calling into the field of the support of three thousand men.¹

The conduct of Agis had been severely condemned at Lacedaemon, and when it was known that Argos had promptly broken the truce, and that Orchomenus had surrendered, it was proposed to punish him, contrary to all tradition, by razing his house to the ground and imposing a heavy fine. Agis prevailed on the authorities to remit these severe penalties, but the Lacedaemonians passed a new law, by which the king was forbidden to lead out an army from the city without the leave of ten commissioners, who were chosen to be his advisers. They were now informed by their friends in Tegea that the city was all but lost; nothing could save it but immediate help. They were roused to action as they had never been roused before: without a moment's delay they marched with their Helots to Orestheum, and called on their Arcadian allies to follow them to Tegea. The allies in Corinth and Boeotia were summoned, and the war-cry was sent even to Phocis and Locris; but it was difficult for the contingents to assemble at such short notice, and unless united they could not make their way through territory which was occupied by the enemy. With the Arcadians to support them, the Lacedaemonians, who had put five-sixths of their force in the field, took up a position near the temple of Heracles, in the territory of the Mantineans. The allies then ranged themselves in a strong position over against them. The light-armed were already throwing their stones and javelins, when one of the elders called to Agis that he was curing one mistake by committing another, for the enemy were in too strong a position to be attacked with success. Upon this Agis withdrew his troops to a position on the low watershed between Tegea and Mantinea,

The Lacedaemonians again take the field.

¹ Thuc. v. 61, 62.

and directed the water, which, as it did much damage, was a constant source of contention between the two cities, upon the fields of the Mantineans. By this means he succeeded in drawing the allies into the plain. The generals were unwilling to leave their strong position, but the soldiers, who were already dissatisfied with the campaign in Argolis, declared that they were again betrayed. The enemy was escaping once more, without attack or pursuit. They descended into the plain; and the Lacedaemonians, on returning to their old camp by the Heracleum, suddenly found themselves face to face with an army drawn up for battle. It was a moment in which Spartan discipline was invaluable; never before had they been so taken by surprise. Under the commands of Agis, passed down through a succession of officers to the smallest divisions of the army, the troops fell into order. On the left were the Sciritae, next to whom were the Helots who had served under Brasidas, and the Neodamodes; beside these were ranged the Lacedaemonians in their companies; then came the Arcadian allies, and on the right the Tegeatae and a few Lacedaemonians: the cavalry were placed on both wings. The right wing of the allies was held by the Mantineans, in whose territory the engagement took place; next to them were the allies from Arcadia; beside these were the "Thousand" of the Argives, a select body of troops trained at the public expense; then the rest of the Argives, who were arranged in five battalions, and their allies the Cleonaeans and Orneatae. On the left were the Athenians, flanked by their cavalry.¹

II. Before joining battle, the commanders spoke a few words of encouragement to their soldiers. The Mantineans

¹ In numbers the Lacedaemonians appeared to have the advantage; but beyond a computation which gives 3584 as the number of the Lacedaemonians, Thucydides will not venture on any precise statement. It is worth attention that Thucydides describes the Cleonaeans and Orneatae as allies of the Argives: this would lead us to suppose that they stood in the same relation to Argos as, e.g., the Tegeatae to Sparta. The words *μείζον ἐφάνη* of the Lacedaemonian army may imply that he was present at the battle.—Thuc. v. 67-68.

were reminded that if defeated they would again be slaves of the Lacedaemonians, but if victorious they could maintain the dominant position which they had recently gained in Arcadia; the Argives that they had at last an opportunity of revenging themselves on their ancient enemies, and recovering their supremacy in the

The battle of Mantinea.

Peloponnese. The Athenians were told that a defeat of the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese would be a blow to their supremacy from which they would not recover; they would never again interfere with the expansion of Athenian power or invade Attica. "But the Lacedaemonians, both in their war-songs and in the words which a man spoke to his comrade, did but remind one another of what their brave spirits knew already. For they had learned that true safety was to be found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when they were going into action."¹

When the signal was given for battle, the Argives and their allies rushed eagerly forward, while the Lacedaemonians advanced slowly to the music of flute-players, who were placed in their ranks, not from motives of religion, as Thucydides remarks, but that by their music the steps of the soldiers might be steadied, and their time preserved unbroken.

The weak point in a Greek army was the right or unshielded flank, and for this reason every army tended, even unconsciously, to overlap the opposing line by moving to the right, each soldier seeking to cover his spear arm by the shield of his comrade. Owing to this movement, the two armies, even before joining battle, began to overlap each other on the right—the Lacedaemonians passing beyond the Athenians, and the Mantineans beyond the Sciritae. Agis had sufficient forces at command to extend his line beyond both wings of the enemy without unduly diminishing its depth; and seeing the danger to which the Sciritae and Brasideans were exposed, he gave instructions for them to move to the left and cover the Mantineans, and at

¹ Thuc. v. 69, Jowett.

the same time ordered two of the Lacedaemonian polemarchs to march their divisions from the right into the vacant space which the movement of the Sciritae necessarily caused in the centre of his line. The polemarchs refused to obey orders: the Sciritae were unable to close up, and the Lacedaemonian army was broken into two divisions. To any other forces such a failure in tactics would have been ruinous, but the Spartans were either too stupid to understand the full extent of their danger, or too courageous to be discouraged by it. Their left wing was defeated and driven back to the waggons by the Mantineans and the select Argives, who outflanked them on the one hand, and on the other dashed through the broken line upon the unshielded arm of their opponents; but in the centre, where Agis was posted with the three hundred Spartan "knights," the allies fled at the first approach of the enemy without striking a blow.

The allied line was now in a worse plight than that of the Peloponnesians. The right had rushed forward in pursuit of the enemy; the centre, including some of the Athenians, was driven back by the Spartan charge. Only the Athenians on the extreme left remained in their position. They were in great danger of being surrounded on one side and defeated on the other, but they were saved from destruction partly by the excellent service of their own cavalry, and partly by a change in the plans of Agis, who ordered the whole army to go to the support of his defeated left. The Athenians and Argives of the centre seized the opportunity to leave the field, and this was the end of the conflict. For when the Mantineans and select Argives saw the rest of their army defeated, and the whole Spartan force advancing on themselves, they abandoned any further pursuit of the Sciritae, and fled. Of the allies, about eleven hundred fell, including both the Athenian generals; and of the Lacedaemonians about three hundred. The loss of the allies on their side was inconsiderable.¹

¹ Thuc. v. 70-74.

Thucydides describes the battle of Mantinea as "by far the greatest of Hellenic battles which had taken place for a long time, and fought by the most famous cities." It is also so described that we can form a clear conception of it. We can follow the progress of the conflict step by step. One point only is not easily explained—the insubordination of the Spartan polemarchs. No doubt the movement which Agis ordered was one involving difficulty and danger; but danger and difficulty are not reasons for disobeying orders in the battlefield; and such a movement, difficult as it was, could not have been beyond the capacity of the Spartan army—the most perfect instrument of war in the Grecian world. The polemarchs were afterwards sent into exile "for their cowardice," a light punishment for their offence. They had imperilled the safety of the Spartan army on a day when Sparta's power and position were at stake.

After the battle, the Spartans collected the arms of the enemies slain, and erected a trophy; the dead they gave back, according to custom, and, retiring to Tegea with their own dead, buried them there. They then dismissed their allies, and returned to Sparta to celebrate the Carneia. The second king, Plistoanax, who had marched out just before the battle with reinforcements, had reached Tegea, but returned on hearing of the victory. The contingents from the more distant allies were countermanded.¹

12. The battle of Mantinea placed Sparta in a higher position than she had occupied since the outbreak of war in 431. The reputation of her army, which had suffered from the disaster at Pylus, was fully restored; her soldiers "were thought to have been hardly used by fortune, but in character to be the same as ever."² Her policy was now clear, and she began to carry it out in an effective manner. When the festival of the Carneia was over, an army was led out to Tegea, and with these warlike movements to support them, proposals of peace were sent to Argos. In that city there

¹ Thuc. v. 73-75.

² Thuc. v. 75, Jowett.

had always been a party which sympathised with Sparta, and were willing to overlook the jealousies and enmities of the past, if they might have her assistance in establishing their own power on the ruins of the democracy.

**Alliance
between Sparta
and Argos.**

The proxenus of the Argives at Sparta, Lichas by name, appeared at Argos offering war or peace, as they were pleased to accept it. It happened that Alcibiades was in the city at the time, supporting the democratic interest, but, in spite of his influence, after a heated discussion, the Spartan party carried the day; terms were agreed upon between Argos and Sparta. The army then retired from Tegea, and not long afterwards Argos, renouncing her alliance with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, entered into an alliance with Sparta.¹

The alliance between Argos and the discontented members of the Peloponnesian League is now finally at an end, and the Peloponnesus is again united round Sparta, with Argos as her ally. The alliance between Sparta and Athens is still in force; but Athens and Argos are allies no more.² In the strength of this new combination, the two cities displayed an energy hitherto unknown in the Peloponnesus.

¹ By the terms of the first treaty, the Argives were to evacuate Epidauria and destroy their fortifications. And if the Athenians refused to do the same, they were to be regarded as enemies. No pretext was to be left for their interference in the affairs of the Peloponnese. The cities in the Peloponnesus, both small and great, were to be independent; a provision which put an end to any ambitious schemes of dominion cherished by the Mantineans. One clause seems directly aimed at the Athenians: "If any one from without Peloponnesus comes against Peloponnesus with evil intent, the Peloponnesians shall take counsel together, and shall repel the enemy." The terms of the treaty might be shown by either party to their allies, who, however, were allowed to accept or refuse them as they pleased.

In the second treaty, the alliance between Argos and Sparta is extended to the rest of the Peloponnesus, and even to the allies outside the Peloponnesus. All were to be independent, and in undisturbed possession of their own territory; all were to submit to arbitration on fair terms; and if a quarrel broke out between any two of them, it was to be settled by some impartial state.

² Thuc. v. 77, 79.

Envoys were sent to Perdiccas, whom they persuaded to join them, when it suited his convenience to do so, and to the Chalcidian cities, with which "they renewed their former oaths and swore new ones." No communications were to be entered into with Athens unless she withdrew entirely from the Peloponnesus, and no alliance was to be made, no war declared, by the cities, except in concert.¹

The action of Argos made it impossible for the Mantineans to hold out. The claim to supremacy over neighbouring cities of Arcadia, which they had endeavoured to set up in the general confusion of the war,² was abandoned, and they came to terms with

Action of
Sparta towards
her allies.

Lacedaemon, concluding a peace for thirty years.³ At Sicyon, also, where the government was unsatisfactory, the Lacedaemonians appeared in force, and established a more oligarchical constitution. Similar changes were soon afterwards carried out through the whole of Achaëa, in which hitherto Pellene alone had been an active ally of Sparta. In their own city, the oligarchs of Argos put down the democracy, with the help of the Lacedaemonians, and Argos was now entirely governed in the interests of Lacedaemon; even Elis, finding she had as little to hope from the Athenians as from the Lacedaemonians, in a short time ceased to take any part on either side.⁴

13. The hopes of Alcibiades appeared to be ruined. After the battle—too late to be of any service at the critical moment—reinforcements had arrived at Mantinea from Athens and Elis; and while the Lacedaemonians were occupied with the Carneia, these allied forces marched upon Epidaurus to punish an invasion which the Epidaurians had made into the Argive territory. They began to surround the city with a wall, and when the Athenians had completed their portion, a garrison was left in it composed of contingents from the various cities, and the allies returned home. Little was gained by their labour; by

Siege of
Epidaurus.

¹ Thuc. v. 79, 80.

³ Thuc. v. 81; Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 2.

² Thuc. v. 29.

⁴ Thuc. v. 82.

the terms agreed upon, since the commencement of the work, between Argos and Lacedaemon, Argos was compelled to evacuate Epidauria and call on Athens to do the same.¹ Not long afterwards, the Athenians sent Demosthenes to bring their troops away: he succeeded in getting the fortifications into his own hands, but it was impossible to remain; the Athenians renewed their treaty with Epidaurus, and gave up the position.²

For these disasters Alcibiades and Nicias were chiefly to blame. The restless spirit of Alcibiades had involved Athens in the complications which had turned out so ill; Nicias had been dilatory in sending out the necessary forces. The popular leaders at Athens believed that their opportunity had come. What the failure of Nicias at Pylus had been to Cleon, the failure of Alcibiades at Mantinea might be to Hyperbolus. Ostracism was demanded in the hope of getting rid of Nicias or Alcibiades, one the opponent, the other the rival, of the lamp-seller. It was thought that the supporters of Nicias would vote against Alcibiades, and the supporters of Alcibiades against Nicias. Alcibiades saw the danger, and met it by joining Nicias. Contrary to all expectation, the sentence fell on Hyperbolus, who left Athens, never to return. So absurd did the result appear, that ostracism was henceforth discontinued. It was not to protect Athens against such men as Hyperbolus that the institution had been invented; for him to aspire to the position of a tyrant was ridiculous.³

14. In the following summer (417) the Spartans discovered how slight was the hold which they had on Argos. The alliance, which was to last for fifty years, did not last twelve months. The popular party took advantage of the Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon to attack the

¹ Thuc. v. 75.

² Thuc. v. 80; *O. I. A.* i. 180; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, p. 69.

³ Thuc. viii. 73; Plut. *Alc.* 13; *Arist.* 7. The year of the ostracism is, however, uncertain: 417 is the most probable on general grounds; see Beloch, *Attisch. Pol.* p. 339 f., *Griech. Gesch.* i. 567.

oligarchs, of whom they slew some and expelled the rest. The Spartans, who were informed, unwillingly put off the festival and advanced to Tegea; but it was too late; they could only return home and resume the celebration of the festival. Even when both the Argive parties appeared before a congress of the allies at Sparta, the Lacedaemonians contented themselves with denunciations of the democrats, and idle promises of help to their opponents. Meanwhile the democratic party at Argos drew nearer to Athens. In order to secure their communications with the sea, should the Spartans invade Argolis, they began to build Long Walls from Argos to the coast. All the citizens, with their wives and slaves, were engaged in the work, assisted by masons and carpenters from Athens. Sparta was now thoroughly roused, and before the walls could be finished, Agis appeared with an army and destroyed them. Yet the constitution of the city was unchanged; the oligarchical faction was too feeble to help the Lacedaemonians or to be helped by them.¹

In these movements at Argos we may trace the hand of Alcibiades. Meanwhile Nicias was engaged in the northern Aegean, where he blockaded the ports of Perdiccas, whom the Athenians now regarded as an enemy.² In the summer (416), Alcibiades sailed to Argos, and, seizing three hundred of the citizens who were suspected of favouring the Lacedaemonians, he placed them in the adjacent islands. In spite of this severe purging, the democrats were still suspicious; and when the Lacedaemonians threatened an invasion towards the end of the year, they apprehended more of the citizens. The Spartans, however, finding the omens against them, returned home without entering the Argive territory.³

Athens and Sparta were still at peace; and the situation remained the same even when the Athenians at Pylus plundered the Lacedaemonians, and the Corinthians, on private

¹ Thuc. v. 82, 83.

² Thuc. v. 83; see Dittenb. *Syll.* p. 70.

³ Thuc. v. 115, 116.

grounds, went to war with the Athenians. The Spartans contented themselves with proclaiming that any one who chose to make reprisals by plundering the Athenians was at liberty to do so.¹

²⁴ In the Archidamian war it was the Corinthians who took the lead in forcing the Lacedaemonians to take up arms; and in their forecasts they pointed out more clearly than others what was needed in order to ensure success. When peace was concluded they found that their exertions had been in vain; so far from gaining anything by ten years of war, their towns of Sollium and Anactorium had been lost to them, and Potidaea was now an Athenian colony. The same was the case with the Megarians, who saw their port in Athenian hands. The Boeotians had indeed gained something by the destruction of Plataea and Panactum, and their victory at Delium had given them a high position in Greece, yet they also must have felt that a peace which formally left Athens where she was at the beginning of the war was not the object for which they had taken up arms. In the negotiations which follow the peace of Nicias, the Corinthians again take the lead, but while refusing to accept the terms, they are conscious that they cannot themselves form a centre to which the discontented members of the confederacy will flock. Neither in legend nor in history was the city so famous that she could lead the Peloponnesus; she had never held the "Hegemonia" by acquisition or inheritance. Hence she betook herself to Argos, the city of Agamemnon, and for a time there was a probability that a second Peloponnesian confederacy would be formed with Argos at the head, while Sparta sought to protect herself by separate alliances with Athens and Boeotia, thus revealing the weakness of her position, and the selfishness of her aims. The project is wrecked on political difficulties. Argos was a democracy—which, though a recommendation in the eyes of Mantineans and Eleans, could not fail to excite jealousy in the minds of

¹ Thuc. v. 115.

Corinthians and Boeotians. For if democracy formed the basis of union, Athens must come in. Alcibiades seizes a favourable moment, and endeavours to unite the democratic cities of Peloponnese with Athens. Hence the alliance of Argos, Elis, Mantinea, and Athens. Democracy is now ranged against oligarchy. This gives Sparta, to whom, as an oligarchy, her old allies return, the opportunity which she wishes for. The two opposing forces meet at Mantinea, and Sparta is victorious. The superiority of her army is re-established. Once more she becomes the leading state of the Peloponnesus and the acknowledged head of the confederacy. She avails herself of her position to establish oligarchy on a firmer basis where necessary, as at Sicyon and in Achaea. Argos is isolated and compelled to make terms—for a time; Mantinea comes in; Elis stands sullenly aloof, and we hear but little more of her in the Peloponnesian war.

It must however be borne in mind that the Peloponnesians were still without a fleet. On the water Athens was supreme, and she could retaliate on the spread of Laconian oligarchy on land by the extension of Athenian imperialism at sea. Her second expulsion from any share in the affairs of the Peloponnese made her more determined to be absolute in her own dominions. Hence the attack on Melos, and the savage temper in which hostilities were carried on; hence, perhaps, among other motives, a desire to revenge on the Dorians in Sicily her failure against the Dorians at home.

15. For us who read our Greek history in Thucydides, all other events of the year 416 are overshadowed by the expedition which the Athenians now sent against Melos. In the year 426 Nicias had made an attack on the island, and though the attempt was unsuccessful, we find the Melians assessed at 15 talents in the tribute list of 425. Steps were taken to enforce this payment, or, at any rate, to coerce the Melians into becoming subject allies of the Athenians, and at length they were driven into open hostilities. The Athenians resolved to make an example of them, and teach the Greeks that if Sparta had won her cause in the

Peloponnese, she was powerless to help her allies in the islands. Athens was mistress of the sea, and if islands such as Melos and Thera were allowed to be independent, or to range themselves on the side of Sparta, they held their position on sufferance. Athens had long held her hand, but now she allowed it to fall with fearful severity.¹

A large force was despatched against the island, but before taking further steps, envoys were sent to treat with the Melians. These were not brought before the people, as was common in democratic states, but were requested to explain their views to the magistrates and chief men of the city.² The Athenians agreed to this with some reluctance—they would gladly have displayed their eloquence—and suggested that the conference should take the form of a dialogue, in which each side should state their opinions. This dialogue is reproduced in the history of Thucydides. What opportunity he had of making himself acquainted with the actual substance of the discussion we do not know; he is not likely to have been at Melos at the time; and it was impossible to get information from the Melians who took part in it—for they were put to death. His information can only have come from the Athenian side,³ and if the dialogue has any claim to authenticity, if it is not merely a record of the arguments which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Athenians and Melians, as suitable to the situation of each, we must suppose that there were Athenians who thought that the arguments used by the envoys could be repeated without discredit to the Athenian people. Or shall we

¹ Thuc. v. 84. Thuc. says: "The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part; but when the Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into open hostilities." The generals in command were Cleomedes and Tisias. Thuc. *l.c.*; cp. Dittenberger, *Syll.* p. 70.

² Thuc. v. 85; cf. iv. 22 and v. 27.

³ Unless the partisans of the Athenians in the city were spared in the general massacre.

suppose that the historian, before narrating a deed which left even in antiquity an indelible stain on the name of Athens, endeavours to explain—not to palliate—their action by showing that such deeds were the natural result of the ideas which, under the tuition of Cleon and Hyperbolus, and perhaps of Alcibiades, had now begun to take possession of the Athenian mind?

We have not come here, the Athenians say, with any pretence of justice, which is a question to be discussed between equals. We fall back on an older principle—that those who have the power will take what they can, and the weaker must submit. It is to our interest that you should be our subjects, for every independent island is at once a danger to our empire and evidence of its weakness; if you will submit without resistance no harm will befall you, but if from any foolish love of freedom or loyalty to Lacedaemon you resist an overwhelming power, you will be the authors of your own destruction. If you trust to the chances of war, in which the result is sometimes contrary to all expectation, we remind you of the delusive nature of hope—a spendthrift who ruins every one who stakes his all at her bidding. If again you believe that the justice of your cause will win you the favour of heaven, we reply that we are no less confident. In acting as we act, we are but doing as men have always done, and as we believe that the gods also do: we rule where we have the power. This always has been and always will be the guiding principle of action. And if you trust in the honour of the Lacedaemonians, we reply that their virtue begins at home and ends at home. In their dealings with foreign nations they are well known to regard what is pleasant as honourable, and what is convenient as just.

It was in vain that the Melians pleaded the claims which bound them to their kinsmen at Lacedaemon. The point at issue was not honour but existence. Honour is a foolish word which has brought many men to ruin, and to shame too, because their disasters were the result of their own

folly. "Remember this," the Athenians said in conclusion, "and be on your guard against a seductive name. The safety of your city rests on your decision!"¹

In spite of this plain speaking, the Melians resolved to hold out. They would not surrender without a struggle the freedom which they had enjoyed for 700 years; and they still hoped that assistance would come from Lacedaemon. They were willing to remain neutral, but to this proposal the Athenians would not listen. The envoys returned to the army, and the city was at once surrounded by a wall; a garrison was left, and the troops dispersed. The siege lasted through the summer; twice did the Melians break through the wall and bring in supplies, but as the winter approached a larger force was sent out. Within the walls there was treachery, and at length no other course was left but to surrender at discretion. The men of military age were massacred, the women and children sold into slavery.

¹ Thuc. v. 112. It is probable, though not certain, that in the years 424-415 was written the singular treatise on the *Athenian Republic*, which is commonly included among the works of Xenophon. It is the work of some Athenian oligarch, who, though quite out of sympathy with the Athenian constitution, criticises it as an instrument adapted for a certain object. The expansion of the democracy, and the maintenance of Athens at the expense of the allies, are the main thesis of the book, ideas which were naturally popular at a time when Athens was absolute mistress of the sea, and which resulted in the Sicilian expedition. See Forbes, *Thuc.* i. lix. f.; and Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, i. 538 f.

CHAPTER X.

AFFAIRS IN SICILY, 422-413.

I. So far as ridding Sicily of the Athenians went, the pacification of Gela was a masterstroke. From the departure of Eurymedon and his colleagues in 424 down to the great expedition nine years later, no Athenian ships of war visited the island. Less was achieved in putting an end to domestic strife; in this respect Hermocrates had hardly hoped for success; he was aware that factions would break out in the cities, and if they confined their quarrels within the limits of Sicily, he was willing to let things take their course. It was at Leontini that disturbances arose, and Syracuse herself, the city of Hermocrates, had a share in them.

After the withdrawal of the Athenians, the Leontinians had enrolled a number of additional citizens, and in order to find land for them, it was proposed to redivide the territory of the state. This popular measure Faction at
Leontini. alarmed the notables, who at once sought the aid of Syracuse, and drove the demos out of the town to seek refuge where they could, after which they abandoned their old home and went to live at Syracuse as citizens of that city. Not long afterwards a number of them, discontented with their new position, returned, and established themselves partly at a fortress in the Leontine territory, partly in Leontini itself, from which, supported by the majority of the exiled demos, they carried on war with Syracuse. Their efforts availed little; the Leontine territory still remained a part of Syracuse; Leontini ceased to exist as a community, and all that now remained of the once flourishing city state was a band of exiles encamped in two fortresses; democrats who had

been driven from Leontini, and oligarchs who had exiled themselves from Syracuse.¹

At Messene also domestic faction broke out soon after the congress; the aid of the Locrians was invited by one of the parties, and so numerous were the settlers who took up their abode there, that for a time Messene became "a possession of the Locrians." But the absence of so large a body weakened Locri, and when a revolt broke out among some of the Locrian colonies, she could no longer maintain her position at Messene.²

2. On hearing of these domestic quarrels, the Athenians resolved to renew communication with their friends in Sicily. In the summer of 422 a commission was sent out, consisting of Phaeax and two others, in the hope of forming a combination against Syracuse. Such a combination was necessary if Leontini was to be restored, and Phaeax could now answer Hermocrates by pointing out that the enemy whom all had to fear was not the foreigner against whom he had warned them, but the city which he represented. In choosing Phaeax as an envoy, the Athenians appear to have carefully selected a man who was known as a diplomatist rather than a general. He was smooth of tongue and conciliatory in manner, a man of persuasive conversation rather than an orator, yet subtle in argument and forcible in expression—a favourite among the fledgling disputants of Athens.³

On his way Phaeax was able to make terms with the Locrians, who alone of the allies had refused to make peace with the Athenians at the time of the pacification of Gela. From Locri he went on to Camarina, the city which had most to fear from Syracuse, as her immediate neighbour. Here, and at the more powerful city of Agrigentum, he was successful, but at Gela he failed; the city adhered to her policy, choosing Syracuse before Athens. Phaeax was disheartened; and, thinking it useless to visit the rest of the

¹ Thuc. v. 4.

² Thuc. v. 5.

³ Eupolis, *Frag.* 95 K. Aristoph. *Knights*, 1374 f.

cities, he returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana, where his ships met him. On the way he visited Bricinniae, one of the fortresses in which the Leontines were encamped, and gave them what encouragement he could.¹

In his voyage home he endeavoured to establish amicable relations with those maritime cities of Sicily and Italy at which he touched, but his embassy had little or no result. The time had not yet come when Athens could interfere with effect in the affairs of Sicily, and indeed it never came. And at this moment the spirit of enterprise at Athens was crushed. The tide of success had turned in favour of Sparta: the defeat of Delium and the loss of Amphipolis, with other successes of Brasidas in Chalcidice, weighed heavily against the gains at Pylus and Cythera. Danger threatened the city in a very vital part of her empire; and till the career of Brasidas could be checked, a distant expedition to the west was out of the question.

3. In the years which followed the peace of Nicias, Athens rapidly recovered from the disasters of the Archidamian war. Her revenues were unimpaired, and we are informed that seven thousand talents of surplus were deposited in the Acropolis in the time of Nicias.² The population increased till the ravages of the plague were forgotten. There were many who longed for the stirring times of war, and with the genuine spirit of Athenians thought the years wasted which passed in inaction. They longed for novelty; they dreamed of empire; and why not, when the men and money were at hand? Others turned their thoughts to the revenues which

Athens during
the peace of
Nicias.

¹ Thuc. v. 5.

² Andocides, *De Pace*, § 8; Aeschines, *Fals. Leg.* p. 337. But I agree with Grote, v. 144, note 3, that we cannot place confidence in either of these authorities. For the inscription to which Grote refers as proving that 3000 t. had been stored in the Acropolis during the peace of Nicias (*C. I. A.* i. 32; Hicks, *Hist. Inscript.* 37) see Jowett's *Essay on Inscriptions*, Thuc. i. lxii. ff. Though written down after 420, it is supposed by some authorities to refer to a period before the war. Money was accumulated, Thuc. vi. 26.

were lying useless in the treasury of Athena. The soldier's calling was rapidly becoming a profession, by which he expected to live, and for him war was a time of plenty. There could be no better use of the public funds than the acquisition of new territory, from which new revenues would flow to the city, and new pay to the citizens.

In the autumn of 416 a quarrel broke out between two neighbouring cities in the west of Sicily—Segesta and Selinus.

Segesta and Selinus. Segesta was a town of the Elymi, with which, as we have seen, the Athenians had entered

into alliance about the middle of the century—an alliance apparently renewed by Laches.¹ Selinus was a colony of the Sicilian Megara, a Dorian city which could rely on Dorian Syracuse. The quarrel related to those trivial matters which were always disturbing the peace of neighbouring towns: rights of intermarriage, and the use or limits of neutral ground. Selinus sought the aid of Syracuse, and thus succeeded in reducing her enemy to great straits by sea and land. In her distress, Segesta called to mind her ancient ally, the city beyond the sea, whose eyes had long been fixed with an eager gaze on Sicily. Her envoys appeared at Athens, reminding the Athenians of the old connection, and begging for assistance.² They had many complaints to make, but throughout they dwelt chiefly on the aggression of Syracuse. Was the desolation of Leontini to go unpunished? Was Syracuse to destroy the allies who still remained to Athens in Sicily? In that case Dorian would join Dorian, and colonist would join mother-city and the west would come with an overwhelming host to overthrow the empire of Athens. It was prudent for the Athenians to meet the danger before it was too late by sending help to their oppressed allies; ample means would be supplied for the support of any assistance which might come.³

¹ *Supra*, p. 188. In Thuc. vi. 6 Classen omits *Λεοντίων*.

² Diodorus, xii. 82, asserts that Segesta applied in vain to Agragae and Syracuse,—and to Carthage. The first statement is so improbable that we cannot ascribe any weight to the second.

³ Thuc. vi. 6.

The appeal of the Segestaeans led to much discussion. Some supported it; others pointed out that Segesta was a distant barbarian city of which little was known. After many meetings, it was resolved to send envoys to Segesta to report on the resources of the city; and the state of the war with Selinus. Here for the moment the matter rested, but the thoughts of the Athenians were once more turned to Sicily. We may imagine how the subject grew in the minds of men during the winter months (416-415) before the return of the envoys. The distance of the island, the extent and resources of it, the number and size of the cities, their population, their sympathies and antipathies, their past history—all these were subjects of discussion in the colonnades and shops of Athens. Any one who had more information than the rest became the hero of the hour; men gathered round him and hung on his lips, forming in their minds bright pictures of the gain and glory that was coming. Foremost in the movement was Alcibiades, whose restless spirit, foiled at Mantinea, was eager to seek distinction in some new field of action. Athens at peace and limited by treaties, Athens unable to put forth her strength, was no city for him. He saw himself sailing to Sicily at the head of a larger force than any which had ever visited the waters of the west, winning the cities by force or persuasion, and so passing onwards, "roaming with a hungry heart," till he reached Carthage, the metropolis of the west. The greatest of Phœnician cities would fall before his attack; her fleets would be added to his own, and he would then turn upon his course, and bring an irresistible armament against the Peloponnesus.

Meanwhile the envoys arrived at Segesta. They were more than satisfied by what they saw of the wealth of the town; they were entertained most hospitably, and at every house they saw an abundance of gold and silver plate; they also heard of large reserves in the treasuries and temples; and what they heard they believed, without further examination. On their return they were accompanied by Segestæan

Envoys sent
from Athens
to Segesta.

envoys, who brought with them sixty talents, a month's pay for the sixty ships which they asked the Athenians to supply.

The Athenians hesitated no longer. On hearing the report of the envoys, they decreed to send sixty ships to Segesta, under the command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. The immediate object of the expedition was to aid Segesta against Selinus, but if time and means permitted, the generals, who were granted full powers, were to promote the restoration of Leontini, and advance in any way that they could the interests of Athens in Sicily (415).

4. Four days after this decree was passed, the Assembly was again summoned to discuss the details of the expedition. Nicias seized the opportunity to give expression to his views. In his opinion the decree was a mistake; and it was against his wish that he had been chosen one of the generals to conduct the expedition. "We are met to discuss the details of our force," he said; "but in my judgment it would be better to discuss the original question." It was useless to advise Athenians to be content with what they had, or to warn them against risking present advantage in the hope of future gain. But was it wise to seek new enemies in Sicily, when they were leaving so many enemies behind them in Greece? They must not rely on the peace; those who maintained it had many complaints to make, and others did not maintain it at all. The Chalcidic cities were still in revolt; the Corinthians had never accepted the terms of agreement; the Boeotians were only held in check by a truce terminable at ten days' notice. Was this a time to divide the Athenian power and send the greater half across the sea?

"If we are successful," he continued, "we cannot maintain our conquests; and what can be more foolish than to enter into a war in which we gain nothing if we succeed, and lose much if we fail? We are warned that if we do not interfere, all Sicily will fall into the hands of Syracuse—but what have

we to fear? The Syracusans will not risk their empire by joining the Lacedaemonians against us—that would prepare the way for their own destruction. Leave Sicily to the Siceliots, and be on your guard against the old enemy, who is plotting to overthrow your democracy first, and then your empire.¹

“The best way of terrifying the Siceliots is to keep at a distance from them, or, if we visit the island at all, to display our power and return at once. Men are always afraid of what is strange and distant. And we must not despise the Lacedaemonians because we have defeated them. They are still planning to retrieve the past. We ourselves have only recently recovered from great disasters; we cannot afford to waste our resources on those who will make no adequate return if successful, and if they fail will involve us in their own destruction. He who urges you to undertake this war is a young man without experience, pleased with the novelty of office, and eager to gratify his own ambition, or find means to support his extravagance. He has gathered his friends round him, but you must not be afraid of them; remember the risk, and do not be shamed into voting against your convictions. Leave the Siceliots to manage their own affairs, and tell the Segestaeans that as they began the quarrel without consulting you, they must bring it to an end without your help.” Nicias then turned to the presiding officer, and begged him not to shrink from putting to the vote a question which had been decided already. Such an act might be informal, but no formalities should be allowed to stand in the way of the safety of the state.²

¹ Thuc. vi. 11: ὅπως πόλιν δι' ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ὀξέως φυλαξόμεθα, a passage which shows that Nicias at any rate was fully alive to the action of Sparta after Mantinea.

² Thuc. vi. 14: καὶ σὺ δὲ πρῶταν ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαι τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφισε καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὐθις Ἀθηναίοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὀρρωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ' ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σchein, κ.τ.λ. In what did the illegality consist? In the case of the Mytilenaeen decree, iii. 36, a subject already decided was

5. Though Nicias had not mentioned Alcibiades by name, the audience were well aware who the young man was whom he accused of urging Athens to her destruction. The answer of Alcibiades. All eyes were turned upon him, and he was not slow to respond. The public policy at once became a personal question, as was invariably the case with Alcibiades. His own wishes, his own interests, his own influence and position were of paramount importance to him. In genius, both political and military, he was far the first man of his day, and he did not underrate his abilities. Nor did the Athenians underrate them, but they looked with suspicion on one whose personal extravagance and contempt of all social custom marked him out as a man who had objects in view which he could never satisfy as a citizen among citizens. The ever-present dread of "a tyranny" gave a legitimate sanction to the envy with which many Athenians regarded every eminent citizen.

"Nicias has attacked me," Alcibiades said, "for my wish to take command in this expedition. My answer is that I have as good a right to command as any other man, or better; and I am equal to the post. The extravagance which he charges against me has been of the greatest service to the city. At a time when our resources were thought to be exhausted, I made a display at Olympia which was the astonishment of all Greece, entering seven chariots for the race, and obtaining the first, second, and fourth places.¹ Such success is rewarded with public distinctions, and it is also evidence of power. That I should be envied is natural; but those who are disliked in their lifetime often become, in a later age, the pride of their cities. At any rate, I had influence enough to combine the Peloponnesus against Sparta. I

proposed for reconsideration, and not a word is said about any illegality. In this case, it may be urged, the reconsideration of the decree was not the object for which the meeting had been summoned; it was brought up in the course of the debate; and to this extent the Mytilenæan decree is not strictly parallel.

¹ Probably in Ol. 90 (B.C. 420).

appeal to you, then, to make use of my impetuosity while it lasts ; combine my rashness and the good fortune of Nicias to secure success in this great expedition. Do not change your minds under the impression that Sicily is a great power : the Sicilian cities are not like ours ; they are inhabited by a mixed population, without common sympathies, or fixed sentiments. No one thinks of his city as his home, nor is he prepared to fight for it—to him it is a place to make a fortune in, which he may carry elsewhere when he pleases. Among such cities there can be no consistent policy : they will not follow one leader, nor are their armies so large as we think ; and indeed throughout Hellas, the fighting force has been found far less than the estimate.

“But Nicias says : ‘Remember what an enemy you are leaving behind you.’ This consideration will weigh with us but little, if we look at the matter fairly. When our fathers acquired this empire, they were at war with the Peloponnesians and the Persians too, but, owing to the superiority of their fleet, they overcame both. And we also shall leave behind a fleet more than sufficient to keep the Peloponnesians in check. On these grounds, then, we have no reason to hesitate, nor have we any excuse for throwing over our allies. We must keep our engagements with them, regardless of loss and gain. We did not attach them to us with the intention that they should come to our assistance, but in the hope that they would prevent our enemies from crossing the sea. It was by helping others—Greeks or barbarians—when they called upon us, that we acquired our empire, and if we abandon this policy to stay at home and make nice distinctions in sending assistance, we may lose what we have got. We cannot fix a limit to our empire, and say that we will go thus far and no farther : we must rule or be ruled ; and before we can change our politics, we must change our nature. If we sail to Sicily, we shall humble the pride of the Peloponnesians ; we shall add Western Hellas to our empire, or at least injure the power of Syracuse to our own advantage.

"Do not follow Nicias in his want of energy and mistrust of youth. Youth and age must go together; each supplying the defects of the other, as they have done in the past. The state, if at rest, like everything else will wear herself out by internal friction. Every pursuit which requires skill will bear the impress of decay, whereas by conflict fresh experience is always being gained, and the city learns to defend herself, not in theory, but in practice. My opinion in short is, that a state used to activity will quickly be ruined by a change to inaction; and that they of all men enjoy the greatest security who are truest to themselves and their institutions even when they are not the best."¹

6. Such a speech could not fail to be convincing, for it appealed to the strongest impulses of the Athenians; and when the envoys from Segesta and Leontini came forward, reminding them of the pledges which they had given, they were more eager than ever for the expedition. Nicias saw that it was useless to press his arguments further; the stream was too strong for any direct opposition; he hoped that a change might come when the Athenians realised the vast preparations which would be required. It was not now a question of thirty or forty ships. To meet the forces of Sicily with any hope of success, a large army must be sent out, including slingers and bowmen who would act against the Sicilian cavalry; the fleet must be on a great scale to ensure a constant supply of food, besides that which would have to be conveyed from Attica. An ample supply of money would also be necessary, for the promises of the Segestaeans might be found delusive.

The words of Nicias, so far from diverting the Athenians from their purpose, merely confirmed them in it. They thought that with a general so cautious, and an equipment so complete, they could not fail. The Sicilian fever ran higher than ever. All alike were seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder among them convinced that they

¹ Thuc. vi. 16-18. See Jowett's translation.

would achieve the conquest of the island, the younger longing to see with their own eyes the marvels of a distant country, while the main body of the troops expected to receive present pay and to conquer territory which would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future.¹ At last one of the audience, weary of the objections and delays of Nicias, came forward and asked him to state plainly what forces he considered necessary.² Nicias replied that so far as he could form an opinion, without further consideration, a fleet of not less than 100 triremes, and a force of 5000 heavy-armed, with a proportionate number of light-armed, would be required. On this the Assembly at once decreed that the generals should receive full powers to decide about the number of the fleet, and arrange for the despatch of the expedition.

The day on which this decree was passed was a day of evil omen at Athens. It was the sacred day of Adonis, and if Aristophanes may be believed, the cries of the women who came out upon the roofs of the houses to lament Adonis were heard even in the Assembly.³ Other tokens of impending evil were not wanting, and even Socrates is said to have been warned by his familiar sign against the expedition.

7. At this moment, when every one was more than usually disposed to pay attention to signs and omens, an outrage was committed at Athens which spread a panic through the city.

¹ Thuc. vi. 24.

² Thuc. vi. 25. Thucydides does not give the name, but there is little doubt that the man was Demostratus. See Plut. *Nic.* 12: ἀναστὰς γὰρ δὲ μάλιστα τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον παροξύνων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους Δημόστρατος ἔφη τὸν Νικίαν προφάσεις λέγοντα παύσειν καὶ ψήφισμα γράψας ὅπως αὐτοκράτορες ᾖσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ κἀνταῦθα κἀκεῖ βουλευόμενοι καὶ πράττοντες, ἔπεισε τὸν δῆμον ψηφίσασθαι. This account agrees with Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 391 ff.

³ Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 389 f. :

ὁ τ' Ἀδωνιασμός οὗτος οὐπὶ τῶν τεγῶν,
οὐ γὰρ ποτ' ὦν ἤκουον ἐν τῇ κκλησίᾳ.
ἔλεγεν δ' ὁ μὴ ὥρασι μὲν Δημόστρατος
πλεῖν εἰς Σικελίαν· ἢ γυνὴ δ' ὀρχουμένη
"αἶ, αἶ, Ἀδωνί," φησιν, κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Plut. *Alc.* 18; *Nic.* 13.

It was the custom of the Athenians to set up in the porticoes of their houses and temples square pedestals of stone, carved into a rude resemblance of the human head and trunk. These statues were known as *Hermæ*; they were relics of some primeval cult, associated with good luck and productive power. In a single night, about six weeks after the vote had been given for the expedition, every statue in the city but one was found mutilated to a greater or less degree.

Who committed the outrage, and what was their object in committing it, was never known. It may have been an attempt to put a stop to the expedition to Sicily by adding one more to the unfavourable omens which attended it; and it was even asserted to be the work, directly or indirectly, of the Corinthians, who thus sought to save Syracuse from attack. If this was really the case, the attempt entirely failed; amid all the excitement which the outrage created, no one, not even those most opposed to the expedition, took advantage of it to persuade the people to change their plans. It is also possible that the outrage was merely the frolic of a wine-party, but this explanation, though afterwards given, did not satisfy public opinion in the present state of excitement. The crime was commonly regarded as the act of conspirators, who aimed at nothing less than the overthrow of the constitution, a view which we should be better able to explain if we were more thoroughly acquainted with the state of feeling at Athens at this time. It is also possible to take another view. The party spirit aroused by the ostracism of Hyperbolus was still bitter; there may have been a feeling that the people had been deprived of the leader whom they trusted, and deceived into accepting Alcibiades. Every one felt that a man was growing into power whose habits and aims were inconsistent with the safety of the existing constitution. It was largely due to him that the Sicilian expedition was sent out; he was one of the generals; if he returned victorious, his power would be unbounded; he might aim at the consummation which every eminent Greek

was supposed to desire, and make himself tyrant. But if the mutilation of the Hermae was in any way connected with an attempt to destroy Alcibiades, we must regard it as a preliminary step, intended to excite public fanaticism, and fill the mind of the people with alarm for the safety of the city, for no evidence was ever produced which implicated Alcibiades in this crime.

Large rewards were at once offered for the discovery of the perpetrators ; and every one who knew of any sacrilegious act committed against the gods was requested to come forward and give information. To carry out the investigation more successfully, the Council received full powers, and a Commission was appointed, of which Pisander, Charicles, and Diogenetus were members.¹ Information was given by a number of metics and slaves, who, though they could tell nothing about the Hermae, spoke of other mutilations committed by young men in their intoxication. It was also stated that the mysteries were profaned by being celebrated in private houses ; and in connection with this the name of Alcibiades was mentioned. Thereupon his enemies, especially Androcles, the leading democrat of the day, at once attacked him, declaring that he was really to blame for all the acts of impiety which had been committed. His life and conduct showed that he was no friend to democracy, and these outrages were steps towards its overthrow.²

Profanation of
the mysteries :
attack on
Alcibiades.

¹ Thuc. vi. 27 ; Andoc. *De Myst.* 14, 36.

² Thuc. vi. 28, ἄλλων ἀγαλμάτων περικοπαὶ τινες ὑπὸ νεωτέρων μετὰ παιδιᾶς καὶ οἶνον γεγενημέναι ; viii. 65. The details are by no means clear. In Andoc. *De Myst.* 11 ff., we are told that in the Assembly which was held just before the departure of the expedition, Pythoniscus came forward with a declaration that Alcibiades was in the habit of celebrating the mysteries in a private house, and offered to prove the charge on the evidence of a slave, by name Andromachus. The slave, when produced, asserted that Alcibiades, Niciades, and Meletus celebrated the mysteries in the house of Pulytion. But in Plut. *Alcib.* 19, Androcles is mentioned as bringing forward slaves and metics with information of the same kind ; and apparently before

Alcibiades demanded to be put on his trial at once. It was unjust, he said, that he should be exposed in his absence to the attacks of his enemies. This was exactly what his enemies did not wish. If the case were brought up for settlement before the expedition sailed, Alcibiades would have the support of all those who were serving in the army; if he were detained in Athens, it was doubtful whether the Argives and Mantineans who had joined at his solicitation would not return home. And his own personal influence would go far towards securing his acquittal. Availing themselves of the help of other speakers in the Assembly who were not known as opponents of Alcibiades, they carried through a proposal that he should sail at once, and be recalled to stand his trial within a fixed time.¹

8. The time was now come for the departure of the expedition. Most of the allies, the merchantmen, and the lesser craft had been ordered to sail to Corcyra, and there await the arrival of the Athenians. On the day fixed, the soldiers and sailors went down to the Peiræus at daybreak, accompanied by almost the whole population of the city, whether native or foreign. It was an impressive scene. At this final moment of their departure, the dangers of the enterprise seemed more real; there were many misgivings and fears for the future, and the partings were not without tears. But the preparations were on so great a scale, the equipments so complete, that failure seemed impossible, and as the day wore on, confidence was restored. No armament so magnificent had ever left the harbour of Athens. Empty ships had been provided at the public expense, and pay for the sailors at the rate of a drachma a day; the trierarchs had not only selected the best crews, paying additional wages to the superior sailors and the officers, but, in a spirit of honourable rivalry, had spent large sums on the adornment of their vessels. The same

the Council. There were also other informers; and the reward was claimed by all. Andoc. l. c. § 27.

¹ Thuc. vi. 29; Plut. *Alcib.* 19.

spirit prevailed in the infantry. For, though the Athenian soldier had what might be called a "regulation" shield and spear, the body-armour was determined in some degree by the means or caprice of each citizen, who could vary his panoply as he pleased. A Greek campaign was never without its commercial accompaniments; besides the soldiers and sailors, merchants joined the expedition with a view to trade; and even among the soldiers themselves, many took with them goods for traffic as well as maintenance. When all were on board, silence was proclaimed by sound of trumpet; the customary prayers were offered, not singly from each ship, but in unison from all, in which the thousands gathered on the shore took part. Libations were then poured from vessels of gold and silver; the paean rose, and when these rites were ended, the ships sailed out of the harbour in single line. They raced as far as Aegina, after which they passed quickly on to Corcyra.¹

Here the generals arranged the vast host, making three divisions, which were assigned by lot, one to each general.² They also sent on three ships to make inquiries what cities in Italy or Sicily would receive them. On reaching Italy they first touched at Tarentum, where, as was natural from a Dorian city, they met with a very cold reception. They were not allowed to cast anchor or obtain a supply of water. The same was the case at Locri; the rest of the cities were content with closing their gates and markets against them. Even at Rhegium, which, as a Chalcidian city, was expected

The fleet at
Corcyra—

at Rhegium.

¹ Thuc. vi. 30-32.

² The numbers which crossed to Sicily at this time were as follows:—Heavy-armed Athenians, 1500 + 700 armed Thetes = 2200; allies, 2900; total 5100. Bowmen, 480, slingers, 700; light-armed Megarians, 120; horsemen, 30; making a total of 6430 in all. Of ships there were sixty triremes and forty transports from Athens; thirty-four Chian ships and two Rhodian penteconters. The crews of the last cannot be accurately calculated, but altogether the sailors amounted to more than twenty thousand men. There were also thirty merchantmen, with corn, bakers, etc.; a hundred boats, besides boats of merchantmen which followed to trade. Thuc. vi. 43.

to be friendly, they were not received within the walls, though allowed to encamp outside and obtain provisions. The Rhegians would only act in concert with the other Italiots. Here for a time the fleet remained, awaiting the return of the ships which had been sent on to Segesta to inquire what money might be expected from that city.

9. Meanwhile intelligence of the expedition was conveyed to Syracuse. At first it was received with disbelief.

Discussion at Syracuse. Athenagoras, who was at the time leader of the popular party, declared that the Athenians would never be guilty of such folly as to attack Sicily in the present state of affairs in Greece. Men who were so familiar with military preparations as the Athenians, knew too well what was necessary for such a great and distant enterprise, to enter upon it; and the reports which were current had been set about with a purpose. In war the city must be led by a few men, and this was what the oligarchical party most desired.

Athenagoras spoke in answer to Hermocrates, who had received accurate information, and knowing that the Athenians would certainly come, and were or soon would be at Corcyra, had suggested that the Syracusans with all the Siceliots who would join should sail to Tarentum to meet them on their arrival off the coast of Italy. Such a bold stroke would give them pause, and perhaps prevent them from crossing the Ionian Sea. This daring suggestion received no support. Finally, a general who was present reminded his countrymen that this was not the time for political strife; and, availing himself of the powers which his position conferred upon him, he dismissed the Assembly with an assurance that the proper precautions would be taken for the public safety.¹

¹ Thuc. vi. 32-41. The proposal of Hermocrates was perhaps intended to unite Sicily and Italy in resistance to the invader. His plan would not have turned the Athenians from their purpose. All would have been risked on a single battle, and the probability is that the Athenians would have won.

All doubt was soon removed. Word came from Rhegium that the enemy were encamped there. Upon this the Syracusans reviewed the available military force of the city, and despatched garrisons to various border fortresses in the interior, for it was of the first importance that the Sicels should be prevented from joining the Athenians.

10. The ships which had been sent forward to Segesta returned to the Athenians with the intelligence that their envoys had been grossly deceived. There were The fraud of the Segestaeans. only thirty talents in the Segestaeon treasury. The profusion of gold and silver plate, which had been regarded as evidence of wealth, was a mere sham; the same cups and vessels had been used over and over again at the various entertainments to which the Athenians had been invited during their stay in the city, and a portion of these had been borrowed; the vessels in the temple of Eryx were of silver only. By Nicias the news was not unexpected, but the spirits of the other generals sank at the disappointment of their hopes. Not a man from Rhegium; not a talent from Segesta!¹

Before advancing further, the generals discussed the plan of campaign. The opinions given were characteristic of their authors. Nicias wished to make as great a Plans of the generals. show and do as little as possible. He proposed that they should sail at once against Selinus, and if the Segestaeans would find pay for the whole army, they would act accordingly; if not, they must demand pay for the sixty ships which had been asked for, and the fleet should remain and bring the quarrel to an end by force or persuasion. They would then sail along the coast of Sicily, displaying to the cities the power of Athens, and her loyalty to her allies—and so return home without wasting the resources of the city, unless some favourable opportunity occurred of rendering aid to Leontini. The most splendid armament which had ever left Athens was to aim at nothing more than composing a petty squabble between two cities of the second rank, and

¹ Thuc. vi. 46.

this on condition of receiving an adequate contribution to the expense!

Alcibiades was all for diplomacy. He had not forgotten his successes in the Peloponnese; how he had combined the cities against Sparta, and forced her to stake her position on the issue of a single battle. He wished to send envoys to all the Grecian cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, beginning with Messene, which, being placed on the strait, was a most excellent base of operations. The Sicels, also, must be visited; those who were subject to Syracuse must be persuaded to revolt; those who were independent must be brought into alliance. When allies had been secured, they could attack Selinus and Syracuse, if these cities refused to accede to their requests. Alcibiades was unwilling that so great a force should return home without any adequate achievement, but he failed to see how greatly the Athenians would suffer in prestige, if, tacitly confessing that their force was insufficient, they delayed action till they had secured allies in Sicily.

To Lamachus neither of these plans commended itself; he was a soldier, and nothing but a soldier—a plain man without the support of birth or wealth. He had a soldier's instinct for striking while the iron is hot. He proposed to attack Syracuse at once, using the deserted port of Megara as a base of operations. If Syracuse was gained, Sicily was gained, and it would be far easier to gain Syracuse if they attacked at once, while their power was most impressive, and the fear of them at its height. They would win far more allies by immediate action than by delay; and their armament would never be so efficient as at the moment of its arrival in Sicily.¹

That this advice was far the best from a military point of view there can be no doubt. It was, however, open to one

¹ Thuc. vi. 47-49. For Lamachus see Plut. *Nic.* 15; and the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes, where he is mockingly called ἥρως (549, etc.); *Pax*, 465. In the *Frogs*, after his death, the title is given him in earnest (1307).

serious diplomatic objection : it tore away the flimsy disguises by which the Athenians had endeavoured to conceal their plans, and made it perfectly clear that the conquest of Sicily was the object of the expedition. Besides, such hard hitting was not likely to find favour with Nicias, and it also destroyed the play of diplomacy in which Alcibiades hoped to shine. Lamachus received no support, and gave his vote in favour of the plan of Alcibiades, which would at least prevent the expedition from returning to Athens without achieving any result whatever.¹ Alcibiades at once visited Messene, but he failed to obtain any active support from the city ; if the fleet came they would grant supplies and no more. Two of the generals then sailed with sixty ships to Naxos, where they were well received, and Catana, which hesitated. From Catana they sailed on to the Terias, and the next day to Syracuse, sending ten triremes into the Great Harbour to see what ships were there, and also to announce to the city that they had come to restore the Leontines. On their return to Catana, some Athenian soldiers entered the city through a neglected postern gate, and appeared in the market-place at a time when the citizens were gathered in assembly to hear an address from Alcibiades—for, though the army was excluded, the generals were allowed to enter the city and say their say. Upon this the Syracusan party became alarmed and left the city ; the rest decided to receive the Athenians, who now sailed thither with their whole fleet from Rhegium. At Catana intelligence was brought from Camarina which induced them to hope that the city might be won if they appeared there. They sailed at once, but nothing came of the visit. The Camarinaeans declared

The Athenians
move from
Rhegium to
Catana.

¹ It is strange that Alcibiades should not have seen how excellent the advice of Lamachus was. A decisive victory on the first arrival of the fleet at Sicily would have placed him beyond the reach of his enemies. He may have feared failure, but more probably he was blinded by his passion for diplomacy. Nor would such an aristocrat willingly listen to the suggestion of the plebeian Lamachus.

that they were under an oath to receive a single vessel and no more.¹ The Athenians returned to Catana.

II. Meanwhile the opponents of Alcibiades were pursuing their course at Athens. In the eagerness to obtain information about the Hermae, any evidence was accepted, no matter from what source it came.² Numbers of citizens were thrown into prison by the Council. Among the informers Teucer and Dioclide were the most prominent. Dioclide declared that he had seen the mutilators at their work by the light of the full moon, but on investigation it turned out that the outrage took place on the night of the new moon!³ With hardly less shamelessness he asserted that he gave information because the guilty persons would not pay him to withhold it. Yet he was regarded as a patriot, and, adorned with a crown, he was conducted in a mule car to dine in the Prytaneum.⁴

What followed is told differently by Thucydides and Andocides, the orator, who was implicated in the affair. From Thucydides, who mentions no names, we learn that one of those who had been arrested and imprisoned "was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a confession—whether true or false I cannot say; opinions are divided, and no one knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the offenders were. His companion argued that even if he were not guilty he ought to confess and claim a pardon; he would thus save his own life, and at the same time deliver Athens from the prevailing state of suspicion. His chance of escaping would be better if he confessed his guilt in the hope of a pardon, than if he denied and stood his trial. So he gave evidence both against himself and others in the matter of the Hermae.⁵ The Athenians were delighted to think that they had at last

¹ Thuc. vi. 50-52.

² Thuc. vi. 53.

³ Plut. *Alcib.* 20; Diod. xiii. 2. Grote disbelieved this. (Vol. v. p. 174, n.)

⁴ Andoc. *De Myst.* §§ 41, 45. In examining the persons thus ruthlessly attacked, the Council went so far as to suspend the decree of Scamandrius, which forbade the putting of any Athenian to torture, but the men escaped. Andoc. *l.c.* § 43. ⁵ Thuc. vi. 60, Jowett.

discovered the authors of the conspiracy. The informer was liberated, and all against whom he brought no charges : the accused, as many of them as could be found, were executed."

In his *Oration on the Mysteries*, delivered in 399, Andocides, who is, no doubt, the prisoner to whom Thucydides refers, endeavours to clear his character. He could point to the fact that the Hermes before his own house was the only one uninjured in the city, as evidence that he had nothing to do with the outrage. That he had informed against his fellow-prisoners he could not deny, but he could explain the motives which led him to do so. It was not from any desire to save himself that he repeated what he had heard from those who were implicated in the outrage ; he wished to save his friends and relations, and put an end to the painful state of suspicion in which the city was plunged. He also maintains, in direct contradiction to the statement of Thucydides, that no one was put to death in consequence of his information. Among those mentioned in his list some had already been condemned on the evidence of Teucer ; others had escaped sentence by going into exile ; and the remaining four, whom he was the first to mention, men previously suspected and certainly guilty, had saved their lives by flight.¹

True or false, the information given by Andocides cleared the air. The Athenians were delivered from their fear of revolution. But the enemies of Alcibiades had Renewed attack on Alcibiades. all the wider scope for their schemes ; they could now fix the attention of the people on the danger to be apprehended from his ambition. About this time the Spartans happened to send a small body of troops to the Isthmus in connection with the Boeotians, and this was represented as a movement against Athens, prompted by Alcibiades and supported by a party of conspirators in the

¹ Andoc. *De Myst.* §§ 49, 52 f. See also *De Reditu*, § 7, and Mr. Marchant's Appendix, "On the connection of Andocides with the mutilation of the Hermae," p. 178 of his edition, Rivingtons, 1889 ; Plutarch, *Alcib.* 21.

city. The greatest excitement prevailed, and for one night the people lay in arms in the temple of Theseus. At Argos also there was some disturbance, and his friends there were suspected of a leaning towards tyranny. This was enough to revive the impression made by the violation of the mysteries, and it was resolved to bring him to trial without further delay.¹ An impeachment for impiety was brought forward by Thessalus, the son of Cimon, and the Salaminian galley was despatched to Catana to bring him home to trial.²

On their return to Catana, the Athenians found the *Salaminia* waiting for Alcibiades. Orders had been given to those on board not to arrest him, a step which might have alienated the Argives and Mantineans in the army; he was merely requested to go back to Athens and defend himself. He made no resistance, and, together with others who were accused, at once accompanied the state galley on the homeward voyage. By the time that they reached Thurii he seems to have ascertained more clearly the state of feeling at Athens; to return was to fall a victim to the prejudice which his enemies had created against him. He disappeared from his ship with his companions, and after searching for him in vain, the *Salaminia* returned alone to Athens.³

12. After the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus divided their forces into two portions, for which they cast lots, as before. Whether they formally revised their plans is not stated; in the operations which immediately follow, we seem to have a combination of the three schemes. The whole fleet sailed from Catana to Segesta to ascertain what money would be

Alcibiades recalled from Sicily: his escape.

Movements of the Athenians in Sicily.

¹ Thuc. vi. 61.

² According to Plutarch, *Alcib.* 22, Alcibiades was charged with celebrating the mysteries in his own house, where he took the part of hierophant himself, Pulytion that of torchbearer, and Theodorus that of herald, etc. This is a different version from that given in Andocides, *l.c.* § 12, where it is stated that the celebration took place in the house of Pulytion.

³ Thuc. vi. 61.

supplied, and also to investigate the nature of the dispute with Selinus. On the way they touched at Himera, where they were not received, and succeeded in capturing and enslaving Hyccara, a town of the Sicanians. From Hyccara the army returned by land to Catana, through the territory of the Sicels. Nicias, with the fleet, went on to Segesta, where he received the 30 talents still remaining in the treasury. A far larger sum was received from the slaves taken at Hyccara, who were sold at Catana for 120 talents. The summer was now almost over; what remained was spent in a fruitless attempt on Hybla Geleatis.¹

So far the campaign had been conducted on the programme of Nicias and Alcibiades. The result cannot be called successful. Besides Naxos, no Greek city had joined the Athenians but Catana, and Catana had been gained by an accident; no town had been captured but the barbarian Hyccara. The delay had produced the natural result at Syracuse. The alarm created by the arrival of the Athenians had worn off: the Syracusans, so far from dreading attack, clamoured to be led out to Catana; their horse rode up to the Athenian lines, asking whether they had come to restore the Leontines, or themselves to settle in Syracusan territory. Such insolence could not be permitted. The generals at once resolved to remove from Catana to Syracuse, but the change was not easily accomplished. If they went openly by sea, there would be difficulties about disembarkation; if by land, they would be harassed by the Syracusan horse. It was necessary to resort to stratagem, in which Nicias was helped by citizens of Syracuse, acting in concert with their party at Catana. The Syracusans were led to believe that the Athenian camp might be surprised at night and their fleet burnt. A day was fixed upon; the Syracusans marched out and encamped for the night on the Symaethus, from which, next day, they pressed on to Catana, to find the Athenians

They advance
from Catana
to Syracuse.

¹ Thuc. vi. 62.

gone, they, meanwhile, learning that the Syracusans had left the city, embarked with all haste, entered the Great Harbour, and encamped on a convenient site which had been pointed out to them near the Olympieum. Lying between trees and houses on the one hand, and the cliffs of the shore on the other, they were well protected from the Syracusan cavalry, which could not take them on either flank. They strengthened their position still further by repairing a fortress on the promontory of Dascon and breaking down the bridge over the Anapus; their ships they protected by a stockade. No attempt was made from the city to disturb them till the Syracusans, on their return from Catana, rode up to the lines and offered battle, an offer which Nicias did not then accept.¹

The next day a sharp engagement took place. The Athenian army was divided into two sections; one half was in advance, drawn up in line, eight shields deep; the other remained near the encampment, arranged in a square with the baggage in the centre. These also were eight shields deep, and were under orders to support any part of the line which might be in difficulties. The Syracusans were drawn up sixteen shields deep, and on the right were posted their cavalry, 1200 in number, with the javelin men. After a short speech, Nicias led his men forward, too rapidly for the enemy, who never supposed that the Athenians, after their refusal of the previous day, would begin the attack. The engagement opened with skirmishes of the light-armed—the “stone-throwers,” bowmen, and slingers on either side, each in turn defeating the other, but without any decisive result. Sacrifices were then offered; the trumpets sounded; the heavy-armed met. For a long time the Syracusans held their ground, though somewhat dismayed by a violent thunderstorm which broke upon the battle—for though not deficient in courage, they were without experience of war. At length the Argives defeated the Syracusan left, and the Athenians those on the right:

¹ Thuc. vi. 63-66. For the places mentioned see the plan, p. 327.

the whole line then broke up and turned to flight. The victorious army had to remain content with the possession of the field, for pursuit was rendered impossible by the Syracusan horse, *which by repeated charges compelled the Athenians to keep together. Without even seizing the Olympieum, where the Syracusans had placed a large amount of treasure,¹ they returned to their position and set up the usual trophy of victory. They then gathered up the corpses of their slain, and burnt them on a funeral pyre. On the next day, after giving back to the Syracusans their dead, they collected the spoils on the battlefield and at once sailed back to Catana, carrying with them the bones of their dead. They thought, or Nicias thought, that in spite of their victory they could not maintain their position without a force of cavalry; and they were in need of supplies. They resolved to defer further operations till the spring. Meanwhile they would send to Athens for money and horsemen; and gain what support they could from the cities of Sicily.²

The Athenians
return to
Catana.

We cannot of course tell to what extent the Athenians suffered from the Syracusan horse, but as their loss in the battle did not amount to one-fifth of the enemy's, the damage cannot have been great. Yet Nicias at once condemns his equipment as insufficient, abandons all thought of further hostilities, and resolves to spend the whole of the coming winter in renewed preparations. He was known as one of the safest of Athenian generals—a commander under whom any one might serve with the least possible risk,—but his caution was now become timidity. A resolute attack on Syracuse at this time, such as Lamachus doubtless advised, would probably have carried the city; but such an attack would have cost lives; and Nicias knew the temper of the Athenians towards those who led their fellow-citizens—their

¹ This omission Plutarch ascribes to the piety of Nicias; *Nic.* 16.

² *Thuc.* vi. 67-71. The historian seems to dwell with peculiar interest on this first conflict, describing in considerable detail what was after all an unimportant matter.

sons or brothers—to destruction. He fell back on the plan of Alcibiades, when Alcibiades was no longer present to carry it out.

13. The Syracusans made the best of the respite. On the advice of Hermocrates, who encouraged his countrymen by pointing out that their defeat was due to want of skill rather than want of courage—they had been like apprentices in war matched with skilled craftsmen—they reformed their military system, training their army, and reducing the number of generals from fifteen to three, of whom Hermocrates was himself to be one. To these they gave full powers, binding themselves by an oath to obey the orders given. They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon. They wished if possible to get help from these cities, or at least to induce the Lacedaemonians, by making open and vigorous war on Athens, to prevent the sending of additional forces to Sicily.¹

When they arrived at Corinth, the envoys, who had endeavoured on their way to rouse the Greek cities in Italy to a sense of the impending danger, were received with great enthusiasm; a vote was at once passed for sending aid to Syracuse, and Corinthian envoys were chosen to accompany them to Sparta and support their petition.

To Sparta they went, and there found Alcibiades and his companions, who, on their non-appearance at Athens, had been condemned to death. They had crossed from Thurii to Cyllene in Elis, whence Alcibiades had been brought to Sparta under a safe-conduct. He now appeared in the Assembly, and every eye was turned upon him when he came forward to support the Syracusans. For the Spartan authorities were already intending to send envoys to prevent the Syracusans from coming to terms with the Athenians, but they declined to take any more active steps in their behalf. They were in fact considering the

¹ Thuc. vi. 72, 73.

renewal of the war at home, and wished to concentrate their forces on that.¹

After a few opening words, in which he convinced his audience that he was a traitor to Athens, and not to them, Alcibiades pointed out the importance of sending assistance to Syracuse. He declared that the object of the expedition was not the conquest of Sicily only, but of Italy, and even Carthage. Mistress of these regions, and using their resources to increase her fleets and her armies, Athens would then bring an irresistible force against the Peloponnesus, and reduce her to the condition of a subject. This, which was a dream of his own and other excited minds at Athens, he declared to be a settled plan, which the generals in Sicily would endeavour to carry out. Hence it was of vital importance to Sparta to save Syracuse. He urged them to send ships so manned that the rowers could at once serve as heavy-armed, and above all to send a Spartan to take the chief command in the city. At the same time they must not neglect the war in Greece. They must occupy Decelea, which commanded the frontier towards Boeotia and Euboea; by this means they would not only damage the Athenian territory, but cut off the revenues derived from the silver-mines at Laurium and other sources. When the allies saw the Lacedaemonians in earnest, they would no longer stand in awe of Athens, and would refuse to pay their tribute. With this the Athenian empire would come to an end, and Sparta would become the acknowledged leader of a willing Hellas.² The Spartans were persuaded; they believed, and were right in believing, that Alcibiades spoke in their interests, and that he knew the points at which Athens could be attacked with the greatest success. Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, who was well known in the west (*supra*, p. 21), was appointed to take the command in Sicily, and ordered to arrange at once with the Corinthians and Syracusans as to the best and speediest means of sending help.

¹ Thuc. vi. 88, 93.

VOL. III.

² Thuc. vi. 89-92.

14. The Syracusans were not less active than the Spartans. During the winter they enlarged the fortifications of the city, Preparation of inclosing the district known as the Temenites, the Syracusans. and extending the new wall along the whole front towards Epipolæ.¹ They also planted a garrison at Megara, and at the Olympieum, and protected with stockades any point in the shore which offered opportunities for landing. The Athenians, after leaving the Great Harbour, had sailed to Messene, in the hope that the city would be betrayed to them, but failing in this, owing to the treachery of Alcibiades, they returned to Naxos for the winter, abandoning their camp at Catana. This the Syracusans now destroyed; and hearing that the Athenians were in hopes of persuading Camarina to disregard the convention of Gela and go back to the alliance which had been made in the time of Laches, they sent Hermocrates and other envoys to counteract them. The situation was discussed in a public assembly of the Camarinaeans, and Thucydides has availed himself of the opportunity to bring before us the opposite views of the patriotic defenders of the island, and of the invaders. Hermocrates spoke first. He endeavoured to throw discredit on the Athenian professions by pointing to their past conduct, which showed what they really had in view when proposing an alliance. They had gathered allies round them under pretence of liberating them from the yoke of Persia, but the liberation had been no more than a change of slavery; and their object now, in their pretended support of Leontini, was the enslavement of Sicily. Besides Camarina was a Dorian city, and between Dorians and Ionians there could be no lasting friendship. Sicily must combine to repel the invader; by offering a united front they might hope for success, but if there was a division among them, the Athenians would carry the day.

Camarina,
Hermocrates,
and the
Athenians.

¹ See Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, vol. iii. Appendix xii. The details cannot be fixed with any degree of certainty.

Syracuse would do her part; if Camarina did not choose to join her—and in the recent battle her assistance had been of the most half-hearted kind—she would be treated as a traitor, should the Syracusan cause gain the day.

The Athenian envoy, Euphemus, took up the assertion that the Ionians and Dorians were always at enmity. It was for that reason that Athens had established her independence in Hellas after the Persian war—for why should she follow the lead of Sparta?—and that independence she would maintain. On her empire depended her safety. It was the same fear of falling into the power of Dorian Peloponnesus that had brought them into Sicily, but they came as allies and not to establish an empire. This might appear to be an inconsistent policy, but it was not so; the Athenians were guided by the same motives in each case. It was to their advantage to have subject allies in Greece, and independent allies in Sicily; and therefore the Camarinaeans need not be afraid of them. But of Syracuse they had every reason to be afraid; she was an aggressive city, which sought by subjugating Sicily to become a great power, and for that reason Athens was attacking her. It was through fear of Syracuse that Camarina had already entered into alliance with Athens; let her follow the same policy with greater vigour now, when it was in her power to render efficient help.

The hearts of the Camarinaeans were with the Athenians—though they were not without some suspicions of their designs on Sicily; with Syracuse, as a neighbouring city, they were always at variance. At the same time they were afraid of the Syracusans, who, if victorious, would certainly punish their defection. They answered the envoys that as both cities were allies, they could join neither; but they nevertheless sent some slight assistance to the Syracusans, as they had already done in the battle by the Great Harbour.¹

The Athenians spent the rest of the winter in negotia-

¹ Thuc. vi. 75-88.

with the Sicels. Those who had maintained their independence—inhabitants of the midland regions of the island—The Athenians and the Sicels.—were mostly on the Athenian side, and furnished supplies. Others, who dwelt in the plain and were subject to the Syracusans, stood aloof for a time, but were compelled to come over, except those who were rescued by timely aid from Syracuse. The Athenian camp was also removed from Naxos to the old position at Catana. At the beginning of the winter a trireme had been sent to Athens for cavalry and supplies; another was despatched to Carthage to open friendly negotiations and obtain help if possible, and yet another to Etruria, where some of the cities promised help, which subsequently came. Horses were demanded from the Sicels and Segestaeans, and siege-materials were prepared.¹

15. As soon as the weather permitted (414), the Athenians opened the campaign by devastating parts of the Syracusan territory which lay between the city and Catana, and acquired a Sicel town named Centoripa. On their return to Catana they found that 250 horsemen had arrived from Athens with their harness, but no horses, and large supplies of money.

Nicias now resolved to begin the siege of Syracuse. In order to cut off the city on the landward side, it was necessary for the Athenians to occupy Epipolae—a long triangle of table-land, with sides more or less precipitous, which slopes gently from an elevated point on the west to the city wall—as a base; if this occupation could be prevented, a siege was impossible. On hearing that the Athenians had received reinforcements, the Syracusan generals held a review in the low land by the Anapus, and chose a select band of six hundred heavy-armed to act as a garrison on Epipolae, which seems to have been hitherto left unprotected. But it was too late. While they were thus engaged, the Athenians advanced from Catana to a

¹ Thuc. vi. 74, 88.

point on the shore near Leon, less than a mile from Epipolæ. Here they landed their infantry, while the fleet returned to Thapsus. The infantry at once rushed to Epipolæ, which they ascended, unperceived, by a narrow path near the Euryelus, at the western end of the slope. When the Syracusans caught sight of them from their position near the Anapus, they hastened to the defence; the six hundred and other troops came up at full speed, but as they had to traverse about three miles before they reached the enemy, their attack was ineffectual and irregular. About half of the select troops were slain, including the commander, and the rest retreated into the city. The Athenians then built a fort at Labdalum, on the edge of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara, as a storehouse for their supplies. They were now joined by a body of horsemen from Segesta, and having also obtained horses for the cavalry who had come from Athens, they could put in the field a troop of six hundred and fifty mounted soldiers. From Labdalum they advanced to Syke, in the direction of Syracuse, and began to build a circle or central fortress, from which to carry on the wall of circumvallation.¹

16. The Athenians were now firmly established on Epipolæ; for the Syracusans did not venture on a general battle, and even their dreaded cavalry were defeated in a slight


¹ Thuc. vi. 97: ἵνα περ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους. There is much doubt about the meaning of τὸν κύκλον. Is it (1) the wall by which they intended to surround Syracuse, or (2) a circular fort at Syke? That there was such a fort is certain, cp. c. 102; yet in vii. 2 τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον seems to mean the part of the besiegers' wall towards Trogilus. For though in vi. 98 we can join πρὸς Βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου, we cannot join πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον τοῦ κύκλου. In some other points also the language of Thucydides is obscure. Why does he use the extraordinary expression at the beginning of c. 97: ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς τῇ ἐπιγιγνομένη ἡμέρᾳ? There is nothing to which ταύτης τῆς ν. can conveniently refer. What we expect to be told is that the Athenians came to Leon during the night, and on the next day ascended Epipolæ. But he also speaks of a review—ἐξητάζοντο, c. 97; and where does this come in? It is difficult to suppose that it was held at Leon, for time was everything in seizing Epipolæ. See Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, iii. 211, Appendix xiii.

engagement. They at once began to build a wall which should extend from the edge of the Great Harbour to the open sea towards Trogilius, using the "circle" as a base of operations. They first took in hand the section towards the north of the circle; and the Syracusans, seeing them engaged in that direction, resolved, on the advice of Hermocrates, to run a counter-wall, protected by a stockade, south of the circle from the city wall, so as to cross the line on which the Athenian wall would be built. Even if they did not succeed in carrying their counter-wall past the Athenian line, they would at least divide them, and prevent them from carrying on their work with their whole force. And as the Athenian ships had not yet sailed into the Great Harbour, the Syracusans could still make free use of the shores of it. Without any opposition from the Athenians, who refused to be drawn from their building on the north, they completed the wall, and placed a garrison on it. The Athenians replied by severing the conduits which conveyed water into the city, and afterwards, taking advantage of the carelessness of the garrison at noonday, they drove the Syracusans from the counter-wall and destroyed it.¹

On the next day the Athenians began to carry their wall southwards from the circle, to secure the cliffs which overhung the marshy ground between Epipolae and the Great Harbour; and the Syracusans, on seeing this, resolved at any rate to prevent them from advancing from the cliffs to the shore of the harbour. Abandoning the higher ground, and even the lower level on the southern slope of Epipolae, they now cut a trench "through the middle of the marsh," and planted a stockade alongside. The Athenians in reply ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, and when they had brought their

¹ Thuc. vi. 99, 100. The nature of the counter-wall is clear from o. 100: *ὅσα τε ἐσταυρώθη καὶ ἀκοδομήθη τοῦ ὑποτεινίσματος*. It was also furnished with wooden towers. There is no doubt that it ran south of the circle, though in Poppe-Stahl—on vi. 99—it is put north.

wall to the edge of the cliffs, they at once attacked and destroyed the newly erected stockade. In the battle which followed they defeated the Syracusans, but the victory was dearly purchased by the death of Lamachus. Lamachus, who, while reinforcing the Athenian right, was



This plan has been copied, with the permission of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press, from that in Professor Freeman's *History of Sicily*, vol. iii. p. 167. The fortifications of Tycha and Temenites are quite uncertain; perhaps the dotted line 1 should be extended south-east to the point where the dotted line 7 leaves the wall of Achradina, and the solid lines enclosing Temenites (on all sides but the east) removed. This is the view taken in the map given in Lupus, *Syrakus*.

cut off from the main body, and slain, with five or six others. Nicias had taken no part in the attack. He had

remained behind in the "circle" on Epipolæ owing to illness. He too found himself in danger of being cut off, for while the engagement in the marsh was still going on, a party of Syracusans, who had fled into the city, formed again, attacked the circle, and even carried an outwork connected with it. Nicias, who was almost alone, could only save himself by setting on fire the engines and timber which lay scattered round. By this means he not only kept off the enemy, but gave a signal to the Athenians on the lower ground, who at once sent assistance. At the same time the sight of the Athenian ships sailing into the Great Harbour recalled the Syracusans to the defence of the city. From all quarters they retired within the walls, and abandoned the attempt to prevent the Athenians from completing their siege wall.¹

17. The death of Lamachus was a severe blow to the Athenians—the more severe because the sole command of the fleet and army was now in the hands of Nicias, who, owing to illness, was more than ever unequal to his position. Fortunately, no further action was required for a time. The Athenians went on with their work, unmolested by the Syracusans, carrying a double wall from the cliffs of Epipolæ to the edge of the harbour.² The tide of feeling now changed in their favour; supplies were brought in from all parts of Sicily; from Etruria came three ships of fifty oars; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto wavered, sent contingents. The Syracusans, on the other hand, Despondency of the Syracusans. began to despair; no help came to them from the Peloponnesus, and the complete blockade of the city seemed inevitable. In their vexation they deposed the generals, including Hermocrates, whom they blamed for their misfortunes, and chose three others in their place.

¹ Thuc. vi. 101, 102; Freeman, *l.c.* p. 669. The words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον τὸν κρημνὸν are explained by ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρὸς τὸν κρημνὸν ἐξείργαστο just below.

² Thuc. vi. 103: ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν καὶ τοῦ κρημνώδους . . . μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης.

The surrender of the city was publicly discussed, and negotiations were opened with Nicias.

Unknown to them the Deliverer was on his way. On receiving his instructions (*supra*, p. 321), Gylippus had arranged with the Corinthians to despatch two ships without delay to Asine in Messenia, and Approach of Gylippus.

prepare for starting, when the season arrived, as many more as they meant to send.¹ With these ships he had reached Leucas on his way to the west, when he was informed that Syracuse was completely invested by the Athenians and beyond relief. Gylippus at once showed of what metal he was made. If Sicily were lost, he might still save Italy, and he determined to press on. Accompanied by Pythen, the Corinthian commander, he sailed with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships to Tarentum, leaving the rest to follow. From Tarentum, after an unsuccessful effort to win over Thurii, of which city his father had once been a citizen, he passed along the coast, intending to visit the adjacent cities, but he was caught in a violent storm, and only with difficulty made his way back to Tarentum.² Nicias was informed of his arrival, but treated it as a matter of no importance. What harm could a privateering expedition, with four ships, inflict on the Athenian army? And this had been the opinion at Thurii. But Gylippus thought differently. After refitting his ships at Tarentum, he advanced to Locri. Here he received more precise information about the situation of affairs at Syracuse, He lands at Himera. and formed his plans accordingly. He determined to sail to Himera, and after collecting what forces he could, to come back to Syracuse by land. He succeeded

¹ Thuc. vi. 93.

² Thuc. vi. 104. ἀρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τερινᾶιον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνέει ταύτῃ μέγας κατὰ βορέαν ἐστηκώς, ἀποφέρεται εἰς τὸ πέλαγος. The Terinaean gulf is on the other side of the "foot" of Italy, and Gylippus could not have reached it without passing through the straits of Messina. Why Thucydides chooses so distant a point in determining the position of Gylippus it is difficult to say. Was he misled by imperfect information?

in passing the straits unseen by the ships which Nicias, on hearing of his advance to Locri, had sent to intercept him, and reached Himera. The Sicels of the district were favourable, and as their king, Archonides, who was a friend of the Athenians, had recently died, they could render efficient assistance; Himera, Selinus, and Gela also furnished contingents. Gylippus quickly found himself at the head of a force of about three thousand men, including the rowers on his own vessels, whom he armed. With these he at once marched on Syracuse.

18. The great news had already reached the city. After the departure of Gylippus, the Corinthian ships had crossed with all speed from Leucas, and Gongylus, one of the commanders, though latest in starting, was the first to arrive at Syracuse, which he seems to have had no difficulty in entering. He found the citizens on the point of meeting in the Assembly to discuss the terms of peace with the Athenians. Hopeless of success, they wished to bring the war to an end. This mood was quickly changed when they heard from Gongylus that his was the first of a number of ships, and that a Lacedæmonian, Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was on his way to Syracuse. They at once abandoned all thought of peace, and resolved to march out with their whole force to meet Gylippus.

Of the double wall which they were building from the southern edge of Epipolæ to the harbour, the Athenians had now completed about a mile; only a small portion at the harbour's edge remained to be finished. From the cliff to the "circle," the wall, a single one, was finished; from the "circle" to Trogilus on the north, part of the wall was finished, part was being built, and for the remainder the stones were placed in readiness. It was still possible to enter Syracuse at this point.¹ Gylippus seems to have been

¹ We do not know what interval of time separated the seizure of Epipolæ by the Athenians from the coming of Gylippus, but a more active general than Nicias could now be would certainly have

accurately informed of the state of affairs. Seeing that the Athenians were engaged upon their wall on the edge of the harbour, he rushed on Epipolæ, ascending Gylippus on by the Euryelus, as the Athenians had done Epipolæ. before him, and united with the Syracusans, who had come out from the city to meet him. With their support he advanced on the Athenian fortification.¹ The Athenians were taken at a disadvantage, and thrown into some confusion, but they drew out for battle. Their astonishment was great when Gylippus, before giving the order for attack, sent a herald to say that he was willing to grant an armistice for five days, if in that interval the Athenians would leave Sicily. To this proposal no reply was made; and, when we remember that the Athenian force was many times as great as that commanded by Gylippus, and that they held, or ought to have held, complete control of the sea, we cannot wonder that they treated the offer with contempt. The engagement which followed was not fought out; Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans had a difficulty in forming, withdrew to a more open position, and He enters
Syracuse. when Nicias declined to follow, led his army within the walls to encamp in the Temenites. The next day, to divert the attention of the Athenians, he drew out the greater part of his army in front of the Athenian lines; while, with a smaller force, he captured Labdalum, which was out of sight of the Athenian lines. The Syracusans also obtained their first success at sea by seizing an Athenian

completed his wall of circumvallation without delay. A single wall, cutting off the city from sea to sea, might have been built in the time required to build a double one for a much smaller distance, but such a wall did not satisfy Nicias, who never recognised that rapidity is one of the first conditions of success in war. He had of course failed in his duty in taking insufficient measures for intercepting Gylippus and the Corinthians, and in allowing Gongylus to enter Syracuse.

¹ Thuc. vii. 2: ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Poppe-Stahl regards this τεῖχος as the double wall of the Athenians on the level ground near the harbour. The omission to secure Euryelus was another gross blunder on the part of the Athenians.

trireme, which was keeping watch near the mouth of the harbour.¹ Encouraged by their success, the Syracusans now reverted to their old plans. Once more they began to build a wall which should cut the Athenian line, and render it impossible for them to complete their work. This new wall was, of course, built on Epipolæ to the north of the circle, where the Athenian line was still incomplete.

19. Finding that all was going against him on land, Nicias began to pay more attention to the sea than he had done hitherto. When they finally entered the Great Harbour, the Athenian ships appear to have been stationed in the north-west corner, not far from the point where the Athenian wall subsequently abutted on the harbour's edge. It was important that they should be near the army, but in other respects the position was unsatisfactory. It was at a distance from the smaller harbour of the Syracusans, which it was the duty of the Athenians to blockade, and from the mouth of the Great Harbour, through which their supplies were now chiefly brought. To obviate these evils, Nicias seized Plemmyrium, the promontory on the southern side of the entrance to the harbour, and built on it three forts, one large and two smaller, to serve as storehouses. The ships of war and larger boats were now brought up and moored off Plemmyrium. Yet even this new position, though excellent so far as the control of the harbour was concerned, was not without its disadvantages. Water and wood could only be obtained at a distance, and the sailors who went in search of them were often cut off by the Syracusan horse, of which a third part was told off for this service. Nicias also sent out twenty ships to intercept the Corinthian contingent, which was now expected from Leucas.²

In building their wall, the Syracusans actually availed themselves of the stones which the Athenians had placed

¹ Thuc. vii. 3.

² Thuc. vii. 4.

for use in their own fortification. To protect the work, Gylippus constantly led out his forces in front of it; and the Athenians faced him with theirs. In the first engagement which took place between them, they fought in the narrow space between the Athenian wall and the Syracusan counter-wall, where the Syracusan horse could not operate. The Syracusans were defeated and driven back, but Gylippus, with a frankness remarkable in a Spartan general addressing strangers under his command, took the blame upon himself, and encouraged his men to try their fortune again, under more favourable conditions. Peloponnesians and Dorians were not to be defeated by Ionians and islanders, a motley horde gathered from the ends of the earth. Nicias, on the other hand, was anxious to fight under any circumstances, for the counter-wall was now brought up within a short distance of the Athenian wall, and, unless the Syracusans could be checked, there was an end to all hope of cutting off the city. In the second engagement, Gylippus, taught by his previous experience, drew out his men further away from the walls, and placed the cavalry on his right wing, which we may suppose lay towards Epipolae and the open ground. His dispositions were successful. The Athenians were defeated and beaten into their own lines, and in the following night the Syracusans carried their wall past the Athenian line. The game was won.¹

The third Syracusan wall is carried past the Athenian wall.

On sea also the Athenians were unfortunate. The squadron sent out to intercept the Corinthian ships failed to catch them. They entered the harbour unobserved, and their crews at once joined the Syracusans in completing their work on the fortifications.²

¹ Thuc. vii. 6, 7.

² Thuc. vii. 7: *ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἑγκαρσίου τείχους*. The meaning of these last words is very doubtful. Grote, whom Freeman and others follow, supposed that Thucydides is referring to a wall along Epipolae, which was carried down from Euryelus to meet (μέχρι) the counter-wall of the Syracusans. But why with a fort at Euryelus, another at Labdalum, and three *πορείσματα*

20. Gylippus had obtained the first and greatest object of his coming; he had delivered Syracuse from any immediate danger. He was on the full tide of success, and Gylippus collects felt that he was able to leave the city for a reinforcements. time, to collect new reinforcements in Sicily. He was now able to persuade those who had hitherto been waverers to join him. Preparations were also made for attacking the Athenians on sea, and more envoys were sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth, asking for further help to meet the reinforcements which would certainly come from Athens in the spring.

Nicias had already sent numerous messengers home to report the change in his prospects, and now feeling that his position was critical, he resolved to write a letter to the Athenians, in order that they might know from himself the difficulties in which he was placed. Sad was the story which he had to tell, and envoys might be unable or unwilling to repeat the whole truth. In this he acted like the honest and courageous man that he was; he also acted wisely, for it was now necessary that the truth should be known. He had to confess that since the coming of Gylippus he had been entirely outgeneralled on land. Unless the Syracusan counter-wall was captured, and this could not be done without a large force, Syracuse could no longer be besieged. Encouraged by their success on land, the enemy were contemplating an attack on the Athenian fleet. They who but a little while ago were hardly known to possess a navy, were about to assail the greatest sea-power in the world! During their stay in Sicily, the Athenian ships had greatly deteriorated in condition; the demands on the service had been so incessant, that there was no opportunity of properly drying the vessels. To obtain supplies it was necessary to be constantly on the watch; and, as the Syra-

on Epipolae, should this long wall be necessary? Yet no other solution has been found which suits the description in vii. 43 so well. See Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, vol. iii. Appendix xv.

cusan ships were more numerous than their own, there was always a danger of attack. Their crews were also destroyed and demoralised; many had been slain by the Syracusan horse, many more deserted, and their places had to be filled by slaves. These evils Nicias was unable to remedy. He had now no resources left but such as he had brought with him; the cities in Sicily, Naxos and Catana, were unable to help, and if the Italian cities from which he purchased supplies went over to the enemy, the war would be brought to a close by the starvation of his army. He concluded with declaring that the force at his disposal was no longer equal to the task before it. They had to face a united Sicily, which would soon receive help from Peloponnesus. Another armament, not less than the first, and amply provided with money, must be sent out, or the forces must at once be recalled from Sicily. And what was done must be done quickly. For himself, he begged to be relieved from his command, to which in his present state of health he was quite unequal.¹

21. Thucydides ascribes the failure of the Sicilian expedition to a want of support from home; the Athenians were absorbed in intrigues and factions, and paid too little attention to affairs in Sicily.² In this he may be referring to the recall of Alcibiades, which was a grave error—though its consequences could hardly be foreseen at the time—or to other party feuds, unknown to us, which prevented the Athenians from listening to the messages of Nicias. For otherwise it is difficult to understand the statement. When by the letter of Nicias the true condition of affairs in Sicily became known, there was no

Reinforce-
ments decreed
to Sicily.

¹ Thuc. vii. 7-15.

² Thuc. ii. 65. After the death of Pericles, the leaders of the people *ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι*. ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὥς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνῶμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὐδ' ἐπῆσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγινώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προορασίας, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν.

hesitation about sending out reinforcements on the most liberal scale. And though the Athenians refused to relieve Nicias from his command, they chose two officers from the troops in Sicily—Menander and Euthydemus by name—to support him till new generals should arrive from home.¹ Preparations were made for a second expedition, of which Demosthenes, now the best officer in Athens, and Eurymedon, who was already known in Sicily, were placed in command. Eurymedon was despatched at once (midwinter 414) with ten ships and 120 talents. He did not, however, remain at Syracuse, but sailed back to return with Demosthenes in the following year. At the same time twenty ships were sent to cruise round the Peloponnesus, and keep watch at Naupactus, to prevent any reinforcements reaching Syracuse.²

This momentous resolution was taken at a time when the situation of affairs at home was becoming more serious from day to day. To the end of the summer of 414 the peace between Athens and Sparta had been maintained, at least to the extent that neither state had invaded the territory of the other. Such restraint satisfied the letter of the treaty, and that was enough. But in the autumn of 414, when an Athenian fleet had gone to the help of Argos in resisting an invasion from Lacedaemon, the generals in command—

The Athenians
violate the
truce in the
Peloponnesus.

Pythodorus and others—were persuaded to make a descent on Laconian territory at Epidaurus Limera and Prasiae.³ This was the opportunity for which the Lacedaemonians had long been waiting; the marauding excursions from Pylus, and damage done to other parts of the Peloponnesus beyond the limits of Laconia, did not amount to actual violation of the terms of peace, and if they had acted upon them, they would again have been haunted by the feeling that they were the aggressors in the quarrel, as they had been during the

¹ Cp. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, iv. 196.

² Thuc. vii. 17 : πέμπονσι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς, κ.τ.λ. These must be the same as ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ εἴκοσιν Ἀττικαῖς, c. 19.

³ Thuc. vi. 105; cp. c. 95.

Archidamian war. But now the violation of the truce was undeniable; and they entered on the war with a clear conscience and a hearty good will.¹

22. At the beginning of spring (413), "earlier than ever before," the Lacedaemonians and their allies once more invaded Attica. King Agis was in command. After ravaging the plain of the Cephissus, they set about fortifying Decelea, as Alcibiades had urged them to do. At the same time large reinforcements, amounting to 1600 heavy-armed, were sent out to Sicily from Lacedaemon, Boeotia, Corinth, and Sicyon, and twenty-five Corinthian ships which had been prepared earlier in the year were despatched to hold in check the Athenian squadron at Naupactus, while the merchantmen, with the troops on board, should pass on to Sicily.² Nor were the Athenians less active, though their plans were marred by a want of decision. Charicles was sent out early in the spring to coast round Peloponnesus as a kind of counterstroke to the occupation of Decelea, but he was also ordered to put in at Argos to take on board a force of heavy-armed. Demosthenes, who was in command of the fleet destined for Sicily—sixty Athenian ships and five Chian, 1200 heavy-armed "from the roll," and as many others as could be got from the islanders—was ordered to act with Charicles, but wasted time at Aegina waiting for his forces to assemble. When the armament was at last complete, he joined Charicles off Laconia. Together they ravaged Epidaurus Limera, and landing on the coast opposite Cythera, they erected a fortress to form a second Pylus, a Decelea in Laconia, a base from which excursions could be made, and a point to which Helots might flock.³ Demosthenes then sailed to Coreyra on his way to Sicily; Charicles returned home with the Argives.

The effects of the occupation of Decelea by the Peloponnesians were quickly felt at Athens. Deprived of the use of

¹ Thuc. vii. 18.

² These merchantmen were driven far out of their course, *infra*, 348.

³ Thuc. vii. 26.

their fields, the citizens were now entirely dependent on imported supplies—chiefly from Euboea. These could no longer be carried over land past Oropus; and the conveyance by sea round Sunium was longer and more costly. The sources of public and private income, so far as Attica was concerned, were dried up, so that many families who had hitherto lived in comfort were now penniless. Those who possessed shops and manufactories were hardly better off, for the slaves, especially those employed in any kind of handicraft, deserted by hundreds. The efforts necessary to send out the second expedition to Sicily seem to have exhausted the treasury; and in the hope of improving the finances, the Athenians changed the tribute hitherto paid by the subject cities for a tax of five per cent. on their maritime trade. The demands of military service were severe; the cavalry were constantly in requisition to keep the raids of the enemy in check, and the horses, as their hoofs were not protected by iron, were soon lamed by their incessant work on rocky ground. The city walls needed a guard day and night, and owing to the absence of so many men in Sicily, this duty fell the heavier on those who were left. Yet in spite of these difficulties, the Athenians maintained their spirit, and once more astonished the Grecian world by their courage and tenacity. They did not suffer themselves to be diverted from the war in Sicily by the renewal of the conflict at home; regardless of the presence of the enemy in their land, which they sacrificed now as readily as they had done in the Persian war, they still indulged their dream of conquest in the west.

23. But the strain was great, and the Athenians felt it. What could be done towards cutting down expenses, they did. A force of Thracians, 1300 in number, had been hired at a drachma a day to take part in the expedition to Sicily, but before they arrived Demosthenes had set sail. To keep them idle at Athens was a greater expense than the treasury could bear. They were sent back under the command of Diitrephes, who received orders to do the enemy any injury that he could on the way. When passing through the

Euripus, Diitrephes landed his men, and led them against Mycalessus, a Boeotian town at some distance from the sea. The town was easily surprised, for no attack was apprehended, and no guard had been set. The Thracians burst through the gates and crumbling walls, plundering the houses and temples, and slaying every living thing that came in their way—man, woman, child, or beast. To crown their murderous work, they fell upon a school in which the boys had recently assembled, and slaughtered every one of them.¹ Happily vengeance was not long in coming. Before they could regain the shore, the Thracians were overtaken by the Thebans, and two hundred and fifty of the number were cut down.

24. Meanwhile affairs were going from bad to worse in Sicily. With the spring (413) Gylippus had returned to Syracuse bringing large reinforcements. He was no sooner in the city than he urged the Syracusans to attack the Athenians by sea as well as land. His appeal was supported by the eloquence of Hermocrates, who pointed out that the skill of the Athenians at sea, which caused so much alarm, was after all acquired rather than innate and inherited. They had become mariners under the stress of a great war, and why should not the Syracusans do the same? The Syracusans were persuaded. A combined assault on Plemmyrium was arranged. Under cover of night Gylippus led out the whole of his forces to be in readiness for an attack on land. The next morning, at a concerted signal, forty-five ships advanced from the arsenal in the Lesser Harbour to the mouth of the Greater, in order to join other thirty-five which put out from the Great Harbour in delivering an attack by sea. The Athenians answered the challenge by sending twenty-five vessels to engage the Syracusans in the Great Harbour and thirty-five to keep the entrance. For

¹ Thuc. vii. 29 f. For Diitrephes, cf. Aristoph. *Birds*, 798 ff. It was doubtful whether he was a citizen: τὸν μαυρόμενον, τὸν Κρήτα, τὸν μόγυς Ἀρρικόν, Plato, the comedian, calls him, *Eoprai*, frag. 31.

a time the Syracusans were victorious; those in the harbour defeated the Athenians, those outside succeeded in forcing their way in. But the advantage was not maintained. As the ships streamed through the entrance they were carried upon those in the harbour, and both were thrown into confusion. The Athenians seized the opportunity, and defeated the combined fleet, sinking eleven of their enemy's ships with a loss of three of their own.

What was gained on sea was more than lost on land. In the early morning, when the fleets were engaged, Gylippus fell upon the forts on Plemmyrium. They had not been left without defence, but the garrisons were quite inadequate, and the movements of Gylippus were as rapid as they were unexpected. He captured the largest of the three forts without any difficulty, and the garrisons of the other two did not even wait to be attacked. The loss to the Athenians in captives and stores was great, for Plemmyrium was regarded as a safe repository in which trierarchs could place their tackle and merchants their goods. It was also the granary of the army. Gylippus knew how to make use of his conquest. Of the two smaller forts one was destroyed, the other, and the larger fort, were strongly garrisoned. It was now difficult for the Athenians to bring supplies into the harbour or control the entrance to it, yet on this depended the very existence of the army. Dismay and despondency fell upon them.¹ The army was confined to the camp between the siege-walls, where these came down to the water's edge and the Anapus;² they had no hope of effective operations on land, and were entirely dependent on their ships for supplies. Meanwhile each side endeavoured to damage the other as opportunity offered.

The Syracusans, to protect their docks, had driven piles off the shore, some of which were not even visible above the water. These the Athenians now endeavoured to destroy

¹ Thuc. vii. 22-25.

² See Freeman, *Hist. Sic.* iii. 285.

in any way that they could, for the two fleets were in close proximity, and in part they succeeded—but for a time only, for the Syracusans replaced them as soon as possible.

Not content with merely defensive measures, the Syracusans, hearing that supplies were at hand for the Athenians off the coast of Italy, sent out twelve ships which destroyed most of them. Envoys were also despatched to Old Greece, and to the Greek cities in Sicily, to announce the capture of Plemmyrium and ask for fresh aid.

In an attempt to intercept the twelve Syracusan ships on their return home, Nicias was unsuccessful; in the engagement which took place off Megara one ship only was taken—ten others escaped safe into the harbour of Syracuse, and the twelfth had sailed with the envoys to Greece. With them came one of the merchant-ships from Peloponnesus, having on board a number of Thespians, who were destined to take a memorable part in the defence of Syracuse. In another quarter Nicias was more fortunate. He persuaded the Sicels, who were still his friends, to lie in wait for the reinforcements which the envoys sent to the Greek cities in the west of Sicily were bringing through the interior of the island to Syracuse, and they did so with such success that about a third of the force was destroyed.¹ Still the Corinthian, who alone of the envoys escaped, brought in about 1500 men; and in addition large reinforcements came from Camarina and Gela. Agrigentum, alone of the Dorian cities of Sicily, still refused to range herself on the side of Syracuse.

25. The news of this disaster so far damped the spirits of the Syracusans that they desisted from the immediate attack on the Athenians by land and sea which they had planned. But when they heard of the approach of Demosthenes and his fleet they delayed no longer; their reinforcements, in spite of the loss, were considerable, and they had prepared their ships in a

The Syracusans
prepare for a
second battle.

¹ Thuc. vii. 25, 32.

way which they hoped would enable them to overcome the skill of the Athenians. From their experience of the last engagement, they perceived that the battle would be fought out prow to prow: the Athenians would have no room within the limits of the harbour for their ordinary manœuvres, and as the shore was now in Syracusan hands, except the small part occupied by the Athenian camp, they would not be able to retire to the land to recover impetus for a fresh charge. Nor could they sail out into the open sea, for on either side in their docks and at Plemmyrium, close to the mouth of the harbour, the Syracusans lay in wait for them. To meet the new conditions of warfare, the Corinthians suggested alterations in the form of the prows of the vessels, which were made shorter and stronger, and strengthened in a manner which the Corinthians had already adopted in a conflict off Erineum.¹

When all was ready, a combined attack was made on sea and land. Nicias was taken off his guard; he had expected an attack on land only, misled perhaps by his wish that no attack by sea should take place till the arrival of Demosthenes. Amid some confusion troops were despatched to meet the Syracusan army, and seventy-five ships were launched against the Syracusan eighty. Of the fortunes of the army, Thucydides says but little; his interests are mainly occupied with the great struggle at sea. No decisive advantage was gained on the first day; the fleets advanced and retreated without coming to an engagement. The next day was spent by Nicias in preparing for the attack which he saw would be renewed; any ship which had been damaged was repaired, and a secure retreat provided for those which might be hard pressed. On the third day the Syracusans again advanced to the attack, and it seemed as if the fleets would spend their time in ineffectual skirmishes as they had done before, when Ariston, a Corinthian, "who was the

¹ *Infra*, p. 344. The changes necessary for meeting the Athenians in the Corinthian gulf had no doubt been discussed at Corinth for some time past.

ablest pilot in the Syracusan fleet," persuaded the admirals to give orders for supplies to be brought down to the water's edge, in order that the sailors might take their meal and rejoin their ships with the least possible delay. This was done, and the Syracusans at once retired to the shore. The Athenians, mistaking their action for a sign of defeat, under the impression that the contest was at an end for the day, disembarked at their leisure and set about preparing their meal. Suddenly they saw the Syracusan fleet bearing down upon them. In great confusion, and many of them still fasting, they rushed on board, and after some delay, feeling that their only hope was in immediate action, they charged the enemy face to face. Their light prows were shattered by the heavy ships of the Syracusans, and their crews wounded by the ceaseless stream of darts Victory of the Syracusans. which were poured upon them, partly from the Syracusan decks, and partly from small boats which crept up under the blades of the oars. Outmanœuvred in every way, they at length desisted from the conflict, and retired behind the merchantmen which Nicias had moored in front of his stockade for their defence.¹ Beyond these the enemy did not venture to pursue them, owing to the leaden dolphins which had been suspended aloft in the merchantmen. Two Syracusan ships, which advanced too near, were disabled, and one of them captured with the crew.

A victory had been won—a clear, undoubted victory. "The Syracusans were now quite confident that they were not only equal but far superior to the Athenians at sea, and they hoped to gain the victory on land as well. So they prepared to renew the attack on both elements."

26. In the midst of these preparations the Athenian reinforcements arrived. While engaged in collecting forces in the neighbourhood of Coreyra, Demosthenes had been joined by Eurymedon, who brought from Syracuse the news that Plemmyrium had been taken by Gylippus. At the same

¹ Thuc. vii. 36-41.

time Conon appeared from Naupactus asking for help against the Corinthian ships, who were threatening to engage him.

Engagement off Erineum. Ten of the best ships in the fleet were handed over to him, and soon after an engagement took place off Erineum in Achaea, in which the Corinthians, who had specially prepared their ships for charging the enemy prow to prow, inflicted some damage on the Athenians, and the two fleets parted without any decisive result. The Corinthians were triumphant. For them it was victory not to be defeated. The Athenians were proportionately downcast. In this, the first engagement fought at sea between Peloponnesians and Athenians since 425, they had failed to win, and such failure was in their eyes a defeat.¹

From Corcyra the Athenian fleet, increased by fifteen ships from Corcyra, sailed to Iapygia, where they renewed an old friendship with Artas, a Messapian chief, who **The fleet of Demosthenes.** furnished javelin-men. They passed on to Metapontum, from which they received reinforcements, and thence to Thurii. On finding that the party opposed to Athens had just been expelled from the city, they remained there for some days, and succeeded not only in obtaining reinforcements from the Thurians, but in persuading them to become allies of the Athenians. The ships then sailed towards Crotona; the men were reviewed and led to the river Hylias, which divided the Thurian and Crotoniate territory. They were forbidden to pass through the latter, and descending to the mouth of the river, were again taken on board the fleet, which coasted along till it reached Petra in the territory of Rhegium. From Petra it crossed over to Sicily, and entered the Great Harbour of Syracuse. The force consisted of seventy-three ships, five thousand heavy-armed, and large numbers of javelin-men, slingers, and archers.²

¹ Thuc. vii. 34. No Athenian ship was sunk, but seven of them were rendered useless, by this novel mode of attack.

² Thuc. vii. 35, 42. Demosthenes arrived at Syracuse about the middle of August; yet the fleet left Athens early in the spring.

27. At the sight of this great armament, the Syracusans were filled with dismay. The resources of Athens seemed to be inexhaustible. Their labour had been in vain; their successes unavailing. The Athenians were encouraged in proportion to their previous despondency, but unhappily for them, Demosthenes had not come with plenary powers; he, the most enterprising and energetic of Athenian officers, was in joint command with Nicias and others, who could outvote him on any proposal. When Demosthenes saw in what a position the Athenians were, he was eager to strike at once. He believed it to be impossible to remain where they were without decisive action, and he had no intention of bringing upon himself the contempt of the Syracusans as Nicias had done by wasting a winter at Catana. The counter-wall of the Syracusans, which prevented the Athenians from carrying their wall of investment to the northern edge of Epipolae, was but a single wall, and might be captured. If he succeeded in the attempt he would be able to complete the Athenian wall; if he failed, he would carry the army back to Athens, abandoning all further operations in Sicily. He had left Athens after the renewal of the war, and knew that she was in need of money and men at home. The mode in which his attack was carried out is obscure. We first hear of an assault by engines,—apparently on the south side of the Syracusan wall, from the “circle” which was still in the hands of the Athenians. When this failed, it was decided, on the urgent advice of Demosthenes, to attempt to regain possession of the northern and western part of Epipolae, from which the Athenians had been dislodged by Gylippus. To do this in the daytime was impossible; but in the night a surprise might be successful. Leaving the camp early in the night, Demosthenes, Eurymedon, and Menander led the whole army round the western end of Epipolae to the path by which

Arrival of
Demosthenes
at Syracuse.

Night attack
on Epipolae.

This long delay is very remarkable, especially when we read in c. 26 :
ὅπως ἐκείθεν (from Corcyra) τὸν πλοῦν ὡς τάχιστα ποιήται.

the Athenians had first climbed the heights. Unnoticed by the Syracusan guards, they attacked and took the fort of the Syracusans which commanded the ascent. Fugitives carried the news to the three camps which had been established on Epipolae, and the troop of six hundred, which were stationed as a guard at this point. These rushed forward to the defence, but part of the Athenian force beat them back, while others swept on to the Syracusan counter-wall, of which they captured a part and began to destroy it.¹ Gylippus at the head of his forces sallied out from the fortified camps to render aid, but, startled at the sudden attack, he too was at first beaten off. In the elation of victory, the Athenians pressed on too rapidly; they were thrown into disorder, and when they came into collision with the Boeotians (the Thespians who had joined the Syracusans at Locri, *supra*, p. 341) they were repulsed and put to flight. The details of the engagement Thucydides was unable to discover. Many things contributed to increase the confusion. It was night, and though the moon shone brightly, it was impossible

¹ Thucydides does not make it clear how far the Syracusan cross-wall passed beyond the Athenian siege-wall to the west. Grote and Freeman thought that there was a wall running along the whole of the northern part of Epipolae, from Euryelus to the city, *supra*, p. 333; Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, Appendix xv. Thucydides mentions (1) a *τείχισμα* at the ascent of Euryelus; this the Athenians captured; (2) τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία—to which the fugitives fled; (3) τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων—which the Athenians captured and began to strip of its battlements. The expression ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης is very obscure—it seems to mean the nearest part of the παρατείχισμα, but this would be more correctly expressed by τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης τοῦ παρατείχισματος: (4) τὰ προτειχίσματα, from which Gylippus brought his forces to the assistance of the Syracusans. These are the same as the στρατόπεδα (hence the reading ἐν προτειχίσμασιν, vii. 43). The position of the camps is not given with accuracy. The impression left by Thucydides is that τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης παρατείχισμα reached a point not very far from Euryelus—that the camps lay between this point and the city. And as the Athenians were apparently on the northern side of the wall, the camps of the Syracusans, etc., were on this side also.

to distinguish accurately who was a friend and who was an enemy. The Athenian front was driven back, but others were still climbing up Epipolae, and pressing forward, ignorant of what had occurred. No one knew whither to turn first, or whom to attack, and owing to the constant use of it in their uncertainty, the Athenian watchword became known to the enemy. Still more misleading was the Dorian war-cry, which, being used on both sides, made their Dorian allies as terrible to the Athenians as the enemy. At length the Syracusans succeeded in driving the Athenians to the edge of the cliff. Some found their way to the level ground down the narrow path; others threw themselves from the cliffs and perished. Of the survivors those who were acquainted with the locality returned to the camp, but many lost themselves and were cut off when day appeared by the Syracusan horse.¹

28. After this disaster, Demosthenes wished at once to return to Athens. The soldiers were encamped in a marshy and unwholesome region; and their spirit was broken by constant defeat. The sea was still open, and there was work for them nearer home than at Syracuse. But Nicias feared the shame of an open confession of defeat, and bad as his own position was, he was led to suppose from the information supplied by his friends that affairs in Syracuse were still worse. In spite of the successes of Gylippus—who after his victory went for a second time into the interior to collect troops—there was an Athenian party at Syracuse who wished Nicias to remain, and misled him into the belief that the resources of Syracuse were all but exhausted. Of this, or of his own doubts and fears, he said nothing, but strongly urged that if they returned to Athens without a vote of the Athenian people, they would be brought to trial before juries who knew nothing of the situation, and the very soldiers who now clamoured to be led home would be

Demosthenes
wishes to
return. Nicias
decides to
remain.

¹ Thuc. vii. 42-45.

the first to come forward against them. It was better, if die they must, to fall in the field of battle, than to be condemned on a false charge in a court of law. Demosthenes then insisted that if they remained they should at least move their quarters to Thapsus and Catana, where they would be able to support the army by raiding the interior, and at the same time have free use of the open sea. In this he was supported by Eurymedon; but Nicias opposed the change, and nothing was done.

Gylippus now returned with large reinforcements. Agrigentum, it is true, was still unfriendly, and as the anti-Syracusan party had just succeeded in expelling their opponents, the hope of bringing that city over fell to the ground. But the rest of Sicily was on the side of Syracuse. With these reinforcements also came the hoplites who had been despatched from Peloponnesus in the spring. They had been carried away to Libya, whence they had coasted, in triremes furnished by Cyrene, to Neapolis, a Carthaginian factory. From this point—the nearest to Sicily—they crossed to Selinus, where Gylippus found them.¹

On the arrival of Gylippus, the Syracusans resolved to make another attack by land and sea. And Nicias, seeing the great increase in the forces of the enemy and the daily deterioration of his own, came over to the view of Demosthenes, and gave orders for all to be ready to break up camp, and sail out of the harbour at a given signal. The necessary preparations were made, and they were on the point of sailing, when the moon was eclipsed. Such a phenomenon was still regarded by the Greeks as a direct manifestation of the divine will.² The soldiers, who had been

Gylippus collects reinforcements.
Nicias, now willing to depart, is deterred by an eclipse.
Aug. 27, 413.

¹ Thuc. vii. 50; *supra*, p. 337.

² See the remarkable passage in Plut. *Nic.* 23: τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἡλίου τὴν περὶ τὰς τριακάδας ἐπισκότησιν ἀμῶς γέ πως ἤδη συνεφρόνουν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ γενομένην ὑπὸ τῆς σελήνης· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν σελήνην, ὅτινι συγτυχάνουσα καὶ πῶς αἰφνίδιον ἐκ πανσελήνου τὸ φῶς ἀπόλλυσι καὶ χροᾶς

eager to go, were now as eager to remain, and Nicias, the most superstitious of men, declared that he would not even allow the question to be raised, till thrice nine days had elapsed, that being the period within which the soothsayers forbade any movement.¹ By this infatuated folly the doom of the Athenians was sealed. General and army must share the blame, for in this matter Nicias and his men were in accord. The contempt for Anaxagoras and his teaching at Athens was bearing bitter fruit.

29. After some days' practice with their ships, the Syracusans advanced once more upon the Athenian fleet. The Athenians had still the advantage of numbers on their side, but they were fighting under conditions which made numbers and skill of little avail. Their centre was the first to give way; after which Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing, and was endeavouring to sail round the enemy, was driven to shore, in the "recess of the harbour." His ships were destroyed and himself slain. The defeat of the rest of the fleet was an easy task. Gylippus, when he saw that the Athenians were being driven to shore beyond the protection of their own camp and stockade, sent down a portion of the infantry who had been led against the Athenian wall, to destroy the sailors as they came to land; but first the Tyrrhenians (*supra*, p. 328), who were on guard at this part of the shore, and then the whole body of Athenian hoplites came up, and the Syracusans were defeated with some loss. An attempt which the Syracusans made to set the remainder of the ships on fire was also unsuccessful.²

Third naval
engagement:
defeat of the
Athenians.

The help sent to the Athenians had been sent in vain. Contrary to their experience and expectation, they had

ἔσι παντοδαπὰς, οὐ ῥάδιον ἦν καταλαβεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀλλόκοτον ἡγούντο καὶ πρὸ συμφορῶν τινῶν μεγάλων ἐκ θεοῦ γινόμενον σημεῖον.

¹ Thuc. vii. 50; cp. Plut. *Nic.* 23, who tells us that Nicias had no skilled seer at hand at the time: ὁ γὰρ συνήθης αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στιλβίδης ἐτεθνήκει μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν. Stilbides would have told him that the omen was favourable.

² Thuc. vii. 51-54. See Diodorus, xiii. 13; Freeman, *l.c.* pp. 693 ff.

suffered a serious defeat at sea, and their despondency was great. They had no hope of gaining any advantage by diplomacy, for Syracuse was a democracy like Athens, and a change of constitution could not be held out as an inducement to the Syracusan people to join them. On land and sea they were outmatched. This was the first time that they had been engaged with a power resembling their own in energy and resources, and to this, more than any other cause, their failure was due.¹

30. The Syracusans now sailed about the harbour as they pleased. They were no longer anxious about the safety of their city; they thought no more of their own deliverance, but were eager to destroy the Athenian fleet and army, and win for themselves imperishable renown. With this object they resolved to close the mouth of the harbour, thus preventing any escape by sea. The spirit of the Athenians was so greatly broken that they made no effort to keep the harbour open, but when the work was done the effect of it was more clearly realised. Food was already scarce; the supplies from Catana had been stopped when it was resolved to transfer the camp thither, and unless the bar at the harbour mouth were broken, nothing could be brought in by sea. The generals determined to concentrate what remained of the forces for a final effort. The walls on Epipolæ were entirely abandoned, and the army brought within the smallest possible space. Every ship that was in any degree seaworthy was to be launched; and every available man was to go on board. If they succeeded in breaking their way out, they could establish themselves at Catana; if they failed, they would burn their ships and march by land to some friendly city. A hundred and ten ships were put upon the water; on the decks were archers and javelin-men—for the contest was not to be one of skill, but of sheer force—a

The Syracusans
close the mouth
of the harbour:
the Athenians
prepare for a
final struggle.

¹ Thuc. vii. 55; cp. viii. 96. Aristotle, *Politics*, v. 4-9=1304 a 27, observes: καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν.

"land-fight on sea." In order to counteract the effect of the heavy prows of the enemy's ships, the Athenian vessels were furnished with "iron hands," or grapnels, which would hold the attacking ship at close quarters, and prevent it from retiring to make a second charge. When all the preparations were complete, Nicias endeavoured to rouse the soldiers from their despondency. They were veterans in warfare, he said, who knew the changes and chances of battle. They might still hope for victory, for every precaution had been taken, and with their infantry they still had the superiority. He called on the sailors who were not Athenians, to save the empire, in whose advantages they shared, reminding them that by identifying themselves with Athens, speaking the Athenian dialect, and imitating Athenian manners, they had been admired throughout Greece as citizens of the great city.¹ Let them show that, in spite of disease and calamity, they were still the first sailors in the world. To the Athenians in the army he pointed out how great was the issue at stake. The fleet and the army could not be replaced. If they failed in the impending contest, they would fall into the hands of the Syracusans, "and you know," Nicias said significantly, "with what intentions you attacked them," while the Athenians at home would be unable to save themselves from subjection to the Lacedaemonians. "Stand firm, therefore, now if ever, and remember, one and all of you who are embarking, that you are both the fleet and army of your country, and that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens: for her sake, if any man exceed another in skill or courage, let him display them now; he will never have a better opportunity of doing good to himself and saving his country."²

Gylippus also addressed his soldiers. He reminded them that the Athenians had come to Sicily with the intention of

¹ Thuc. vii. 62: οἱ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὑμῶν τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει ἐθανμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

² Thuc. vii. 64, Jowett.

enslaving the island, and using it as an instrument for enslaving Hellas. These hopes had been dashed to the ground.

Address of Gylippus. The irresistible navy had been defeated, and it would soon be defeated again. The preparations of the enemy, the crowding of their decks with heavy-armed and javelin-men, and the great number of ships, would be a hindrance rather than a help. The attack which they were about to deliver was the last effort of despair, for it was impossible for them to remain where they were. Their good fortune had left them and deserted to the Syracusans. "I need not tell you that they are our enemies, and our worst enemies. They came against our land that they might enslave us, and if they had succeeded, they would have inflicted the greatest sufferings on our men, and the worst indignities upon our wives and children, and would have stamped a name of dishonour on our whole city. Wherefore, let no one's heart be softened to them. Seldom are men exposed to hazards in which they lose little if they fail, and win all if they succeed."¹

31. What followed can only be told in the words of Thucydides.

"While Nicias, overwhelmed by the situation, and seeing how great and how near the peril was (for the ships were on the very point of rowing out), feeling too, as men do on the eve of a great struggle, that all which he had done was nothing, and that he had not said half enough, again addressed the trierarchs, and calling each of them by his father's name, and his own name, and the name of his tribe, he entreated those who had made any reputation for themselves not to be false to it, and those whose ancestors were eminent not to tarnish their hereditary fame. He reminded them that they were the inhabitants of the freest country in the world, and how in Athens there was no interference with the daily life of any man. He spoke to them of their wives and children and their fathers' gods, as men will at such a time; for then they do not care whether their common-place phrases seem to be out of date or not, but loudly reiterate the old appeals,

¹ Thuc. vii. 68, Jowett.

believing that they may be of some service at the awful moment. When he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as the scanty time allowed, he retired, and led the land-forces to the shore, extending the line as far as he could, so that they might be of the greatest use in encouraging the combatants on board ship. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who had gone on board the Athenian fleet to take the command, now quitted their own station, and proceeded straight to the closed mouth of the harbour, intending to force their way to the open sea where a passage was still left.

"The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with nearly the same number of ships as before. A detachment of them guarded the entrance of the harbour; the remainder were disposed all round it in such a manner that they might fall on the Athenians from every side at once, and that their land-forces might at the same time be able to co-operate wherever the ships retreated to the shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded the Syracusan fleet, each of them a wing; Pythen and the Corinthians occupied the centre. When the Athenians approached the closed mouth of the harbour, the violence of their onset overpowered the ships which were stationed there; they then attempted to loosen the fastenings. Whereupon from all sides the Syracusans and their allies came bearing down upon them, and the conflict was no longer confined to the entrance, but extended throughout the harbour. No previous engagement had been so fierce and obstinate. Great was the eagerness with which the rowers on both sides rushed upon their enemies whenever the word of command was given; and keen was the contest between the pilots as they manœuvred one against another. The marines too were full of anxiety that, when ship struck ship, the service on deck should not fall short of the rest; every one in the place assigned to him was eager to be foremost among his fellows. Many vessels meeting—and never did so many fight in so small a space, for the two fleets together amounted to nearly two hundred—they were seldom able to strike in the regular manner, because they had no opportunity of first retiring or breaking the line; they generally fouled one another as ship dashed against ship in the hurry of flight or pursuit. All the time that another vessel was bearing down, the men on deck poured showers of javelins and arrows and stones upon the enemy; and when the two closed, the marines fought hand to hand, and endeavoured to board. In many places, owing to the want of room, they who had struck another found that they were struck themselves;

often two or even more vessels were unavoidably entangled about one, and the pilots had to make plans of attack and defence, not against one adversary only, but against several coming from different sides. The crash of so many ships dashing against one another took away the wits of the sailors, and made it impossible to hear the boat-swains, whose voices in both fleets rose high, as they gave directions to the rowers, or cheered them on in the excitement of the struggle. On the Athenian side they were shouting to their men that they must force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never of returning in safety to their native land. To the Syracusans and their allies was represented the glory of preventing the escape of their enemies, and of a victory by which every man would exalt the honour of his own city. The commanders, too, when they saw any ship backing without necessity, would call the captain by his name, and ask, of the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they expected to be more at home upon the land of their bitterest foes than upon that sea which had been their own so long; on the Syracusan side, whether, when they knew perfectly well that the Athenians were only eager to find some means of flight, they would themselves fly from the fugitives.

“While the naval engagement hung in the balance, the two armies on shore had great trial and conflict of soul. The Sicilian soldier was animated by the hope of increasing the glory which he had already won, while the invader was tormented by the fear that his fortunes might sink lower still. The last chance of the Athenians lay in their ships, and their anxiety was dreadful. The fortune of the battle varied; and it was not possible that the spectators on the shore should all receive the same impression of it. Being quite close, and having different points of view, they would some of them see their own ships victorious; their courage would then revive, and they would earnestly call upon the gods not to take from them their hope of deliverance. But others, who saw their ships worsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves. Others again, who had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which was undecided, were in a state of excitement still more terrible; they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and fear as the stubborn conflict went on and on; for at every instant they were all but saved or all but lost. And while the strife hung in the balance, you might hear in the Athenian army at once lamentation, shouting, cries of victory or defeat, and all the various sounds which are wrung from a great host in extremity of danger. Not less agonising were the

feelings of those on board. At length the Syracusans and their allies, after a protracted struggle, put the Athenians to flight, and triumphantly bearing down upon them, and encouraging one another with loud cries and exhortations, drove them to land. Then that part of the navy which had not been taken in the deep water fell back in confusion to the shore, and the crews rushed out of the ships into the camp. And the land-forces, no longer now divided in feeling, but uttering one universal groan of intolerable anguish, ran, some of them to save the ships, others to defend what remained of the wall; but the greater number began to look to themselves and to their own safety."¹

32. Even in this dreadful hour there was one soldier in the Athenian army whose spirit was not broken, whose genius at once divined the best plan of saving the wreck of the army. The Athenians had still more ships available for service than the enemy; let them go on board again and endeavour to force their way out at daybreak: such was the advice of Demosthenes. Nicias agreed, but when the order was given to the sailors, they refused to obey it. They would not again face the enemy on sea; and nothing remained for the generals but to arrange for retreat by land. Hermocrates suspected their intention, and resolved to prevent it by securing the roads and passes. Ruined though it was, the Athenian army was still numerous, and, if settled in Sicily, might become a source of danger. The Syracusan authorities agreed with Hermocrates; but would their soldiers be willing to carry out the plan? They had just won a great victory, and were also celebrating a festival—to be called out for service at such a time would be too great a hardship. If Hermocrates could not rouse the Syracusan soldier to a sense of his duty, he could at least count on the folly of the Athenian commander. When night came on he sent out friends of his own to play the part of envoys from the

Demosthenes wishes to renew the conflict.

Action of Hermocrates,

¹ Thuc. vii. 69-71, Jowett. For the account of Diodorus, see Freeman, *l.c.* p. 348 ff.

Athenian party in Syracuse, and warn Nicias that the passes were guarded. Let him wait for daylight before moving his army. The Athenian generals swallowed the bait, countermanded the orders given, and even delayed till the following day, that the soldiers might set out as well equipped as the circumstances permitted. In this interval the Syracusans had ample time to secure the fords and passes into the interior, and to dispose their forces in the best positions for attack. They also towed the Athenian ships from the shore of the harbour to the city, except a few which the Athenians had burnt.¹

33. At last the retreat began.

“The Athenians were in a dreadful condition ; not only was there the great fact that they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their expected triumph had brought the utmost peril upon Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights which presented themselves as they quitted the camp were painful to every eye and mind. The dead were unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend lying on the ground he was smitten with sorrow and dread, while the sick or wounded who still survived but had to be left were even a greater trial to the living, and more to be pitied than those who were gone. Their prayers and lamentations drove their companions to distraction ; they would beg that they might be taken with them, and call by name any friend or relation whom they saw passing ; they would hang upon their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, and when their limbs and strength failed them and they dropped behind many were the imprecations and cries which they uttered. So that the whole army was in tears, and such was their despair that they could hardly make up their minds to stir, although they were leaving an enemy’s country, having suffered calamities too great for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater in the unknown future. There was also a general feeling of shame and self-reproach,—indeed they seemed, not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city captured after a siege ; and of a great city too. For the whole multitude who were marching together numbered not less than forty thousand. Each of them took with him anything he could carry which was likely to be of use.

¹ Thuc. vii. 74.

Even the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to their practice when under arms, conveyed about their persons their own food, some because they had no attendants, others because they could not trust them ; for they had long been deserting, and most of them had gone off all at once. Nor was the food which they carried sufficient ; for the supplies of the camp had failed. Their disgrace and the universality of the misery, although there might be some consolation in the very community of suffering, was nevertheless at that moment hard to bear, especially when they remembered from what pride and splendour they had fallen into their present low estate. Never had an Hellenic army experienced such a reverse. They had come intending to enslave others, and they were going away in fear that they would be themselves enslaved. Instead of the prayers and hymns with which they had put to sea, they were now departing amid appeals to heaven of another sort. They were no longer sailors but landmen, depending, not upon their fleet, but upon their infantry. Yet in face of the great danger which still threatened them all these things appeared endurable."¹

Nicias was not wanting at this crisis. Though suffering so severely from a painful disease that his condition was apparent to every one, he endeavoured to Heroism of Nicias. inspire his soldiers with such hope as their circumstances admitted. He entreated them not to be cast down by their misfortunes. He himself, though his life had been passed in the performance of every duty, was now deserted by the good fortune which had hitherto attended him, and involved in the common calamity. Yet looking on the past he still cherished hope for the future. If they had been under the displeasure of any god when they set forth to attack Syracuse, their sufferings were an ample expiation ; they were now an object of divine compassion rather than divine envy. They were still a great army, such as no Sicilian city could easily resist ; and wherever they encamped they would at once form a city. The march must be made in good order, and in haste, for supplies were short ; but as soon as they reached the territory of the Sicels they would be safe. They had no place of retreat near, to which a

¹ Thuc. vii. 75, Jowett.

coward could fly, and on their success it depended whether the power of Athens, overthrown for the time, should be restored. "It is men, not walls or ships, which make a city."

The heavy-armed were arranged in two hollow squares, within which were placed the baggage and the light-armed, and two divisions were made of the army: the first marching under the command of Nicias, the second under Demosthenes.

At the ford of the Anapus they found a body of Syracusans waiting for them; these they defeated, and passed onwards, for about five miles, harassed all the way by the Syracusan horse and javelin men. The next day, after marching about two miles and a half, they encamped in a plain to obtain food and water; meanwhile the Syracusans built a wall across a steep hill path, between two ravines, up which their route lay. When the Athenians resumed their march on the third day they were again attacked by the horse, as before, and after a fruitless resistance returned to their camp. The next day (the 4th) they marched up to the hill, but only to find the pass held by the Syracusan army in great force. Their efforts to break through were in vain, and to add to their discouragement a storm of thunder and lightning burst over the army. The very elements seemed to be fighting against them. They succeeded, nevertheless, in preventing an attempt which Gylippus made to cut them off in the rear by a wall across the ravine through which they had passed. They then retired towards the level ground and encamped for the night. With the next day (the 5th) they again advanced, but the Syracusans set upon them from every side, retiring when the Athenians advanced, and attacking when they retired. After a long struggle the Athenians once more encamped in the plain about three quarters of a mile in advance of their former position.¹

¹ Thuc. vii. 77-79. Thucydides gives the name *Ἀκραῖον λέρας* to the hill between two ravines where the Athenians were checked: it is the modern Monasterello, and the pass leading to it is the Cava Spampinato. See Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, iii. p. 375; p. 701 ff.; *infra*, p. 364.

The Athenian generals now changed their plans. They abandoned the attempt to penetrate into the interior, and resolved to retire to the coast under cover of night. In this way they hoped to shake off ^{Change of route.} the Syracusans, by whom such a change of route would be quite unexpected. They got away unobserved, but their ill luck still pursued them; a panic fell on the army; the division of Demosthenes was thrown into disorder, and greatly delayed on its march. At daybreak (6th day) Nicias reached the sea, and struck into the Helorine road, intending, when they arrived at the Cacyparis, to march up the river into the interior, where the Sicels, to whom they had sent envoys, would receive them. When he reached the river, he found the Syracusans engaged in cutting off their progress through the ford by walls and palisades. He succeeded in driving them off, but on the advice of his guides he abandoned the plan of marching up the Cacyparis, and went on to the Erineus, where, as he hoped, he would be less hindered by the Syracusans.¹

34. The Syracusans, when they found the Athenians gone from their encampment, were for a moment dismayed and indignant. They even suspected Gylippus of ^{Surrender of} allowing them to escape. But though the ^{Demosthenes.} fugitives had changed their route, it was easy to trace them, and in a short time the Syracusans came up with the division of Demosthenes (6th day), which had not yet

In their attempt to win this pass, the Athenians were, in Professor Freeman's opinion, endeavouring to make their way to Catana—and this is the view of Diodorus, xiii. 18, *προήσαν ἐνὶ Κάρανης*—which, however, must be a mistake. In c. 80. 1, Thucydides says *ἦν ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνὶ Κάρανης τῷ στρατεύματι*, and if *ἡ ξύμ. ὁδός* means "the whole retreat" this is decisive. The only change in their plans was that whereas they originally intended to march inland at once, now they marched by the shore till they could find a favourable opportunity of striking into the country. Cp. 80. 2.

¹ For the topography, see Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, iii. 706. The Cacyparis is apparently the Cassibile; about the Erineus there is more doubt: it may be the Cavallata, a small stream to the south of Avola.

recovered from the panic of the night, and was about six miles in the rear of Nicias. When they attacked him he abandoned all thought of retreat, and prepared to resist, but the enemy would not give him the opportunity of a battle. He was driven into an olive-garden, an enclosure surrounded by a wall, with roads running on each side of it. Here, the whole day through, his soldiers were exposed to the missiles of the enemy from every side, until at length Gylippus, seeing their distress, proclaimed that any islanders in the army, who came over to him, would retain their freedom. A few cities, and only a few, availed themselves of the permission; the majority, whether from distrust of the Syracusans or from loyalty to Athens, preferred the nobler part of sharing to the end in the disasters of the day. After some further delay the whole force, amounting to 6000 men, agreed to give up their arms on condition that their lives should be spared, a stipulation in which Demosthenes himself refused to be included. What money they had was collected—and enough was found to fill four shields—and the men were immediately led away to the city.¹

Nicias meanwhile had crossed the Erineus and encamped his division on rising ground. The next day, the seventh of
 Nicias at the the retreat, when the Syracusans came up, they
 Assinarus. announced the surrender of Demosthenes, and
 called on Nicias to do the same. On finding that the state-

¹ Thuc. vii, 81, 82. The narrative of Thucydides is not clear; he speaks as if both divisions entered the Helorine road and advanced to the Cacyparis. But this is not probable, for by the middle of the day Nicias is fifty stadia ahead of Demosthenes, though at some distance from the Erineus, yet the whole distance between the Cacyparis and Erineus is not more than forty stadia. Plutarch identifies the olive-garden as that of Polyzelus (the brother of Hiero), *Nic.* c. 27; and informs us that Demosthenes attempted to kill himself, but was prevented by his captors. Pausanias also mentions the attempt, on the authority of Philistus, the Sicilian historian (see below, p. 364, n.), i. 29. 12: γράφω δὲ οὐδὲν διάφορα ἢ Φίλιστος, ὃς ἔφη Δημοσθένην μὲν σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὡς ἡλίσκετο, αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτεῖναι. The circumstances of the retreat make it probable that Demosthenes was overtaken before he reached the coast.

ment was true, Nicias offered, on the part of the Athenians, to pay a full indemnity for the cost of the war, if his army were allowed to go free, and to give sureties—one citizen for each talent—till the money was paid. The offer was not accepted; and the Syracusans at once began to attack the division in the same manner as they had done that of Demosthenes. Though greatly distressed for want of food, the soldiers held out for the whole of the day, and when night came they endeavoured to steal away unobserved. In this they were detected, though three hundred broke through the ring of the Syracusan guards, only to be captured later on. The rest remained where they were. Next day (the 8th) Nicias led them forward, amid the attacks of the Syracusans, to the Assinarus. Here they hoped to find some relief, and they would at least be able to quench their intolerable thirst.

“No sooner did they reach the water than they lost all order and rushed in; every man was trying to cross first, and the enemy pressing upon them at the same time, the passage of the river became hopeless. Being compelled to keep close together, they fell one upon another, and trampled each other underfoot; some at once perished, pierced by their own spears; others got entangled in the baggage, and were carried down the stream. The Syracusans stood upon the further bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles from above on the Athenians, who were huddled together in the deep bed of the stream, and for the most part were drinking greedily. The Peloponnesians came down the bank and slaughtered them, falling chiefly upon those who were in the river. Whereupon the water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it.

“At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps upon one another in the water and the army was utterly undone, some perishing in the river, and any who escaped being cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, in whom he had more confidence than the Syracusans. He entreated him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they pleased with himself, but not to go on killing the men. So Gylippus gave the word to make prisoners.”¹

¹ Thuc. vii. 85, Jowett. The Assinarus is identified with the Falconara.

Demosthenes had surrendered on terms, and his soldiers became prisoners of the Syracusan state. It was otherwise with the division of Nicias; there was no formal agreement in this case; the slaughter was brought to an end at the request of Nicias, and the men passed into the hands of those who took them. Of the whole division only a thousand came into the possession of the Syracusan state. The slaughter had been great—both at the Assinarus and on the march thither—and many escaped, but the remarkable difference in the number of the captives in the two divisions is to be explained by the appropriation of the prisoners by their captors.¹

In Pausanias we read a story which casts a ray of light on the horrors of the final scene. He tells us that Callistratus, one of the Athenian hipparchs, cut his way through the enemy at the Assinarus, and led his troop in safety to Catana. Then he returned to Syracuse, and finding the enemy still engaged in plundering the Athenian camp, he rode in upon them, and slew five of the number. Then he fell, and his horse also, beneath their spears.²

The return of the victorious Syracusans is described by Plutarch. The captives, so many of them, that is, as were state prisoners, were collected into a body to be taken to the city. On the tallest and most beautiful of the trees which grew by the Assinarus were suspended the panoplies of the prisoners to serve as a trophy; the Syracusans adorned themselves with crowns, and their horses with splendid trappings, while they clipped the manes of any of the enemy's horses which fell into their hands. Thus they rode back to the city. The day was celebrated by a festival called the Assinaria. No contest so great had ever been

¹ Thuc. l.c.: τὸ δὲ διακλαπὲν πολὺ. See Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, iii. 399.

² Paus. vii. 16. 5. He may have got the story from Philistus. Cp. Lysias, 20, 26, ἐπειδὴ δὲ διεφθάρη [τὸ στρατόπεδον] καὶ ἀνεσώθην εἰς Κατάνην, ἐληΐζομην ὁρμώμενος ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους κακῶς ἐποίουν.

fought between Greeks ; no conqueror had ever won a victory so complete.¹

35. An assembly was now held of the Syracusans and their allies to decide on the fate of the prisoners. The two generals—Nicias and Demosthenes—were at Fate of the once condemned to death, in spite of the prisoners. opposition of Gylippus. Demosthenes, perhaps, could hardly have expected any other doom. From the Lacedaemonians he had nothing to hope ; the seizure of Pylus was not to be forgotten ; nor were the Corinthians likely to spare the man who had dealt so severe a blow at their colony of Ambracia.² Nicias was sacrificed, partly to the Athenian party in Syracuse, who were afraid of inconvenient disclosures, and partly to the Corinthians, who, knowing his wealth, thought that he might purchase his escape to Greece.³ "For these reasons or the like he was put to death," a man who, in the opinion of Thucydides, was less deserving than any of the Hellenes of his time of such a miserable end.

The rest of the prisoners were placed in the stone-quarries on the southern slope of Achradina. A scanty measure of food and water, barely enough to sustain life, was allowed them day by day. There they remained, suffering the extremes of temperature—glowing heat in the day, and piercing chill at night—in the midst of intolerable smells, and "every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place." At the end of ten weeks the Syracusans took out all except the Athenians and their allies from Sicily or Italy, and sold them for slaves. The rest remained for nearly six months longer, when the survivors were removed to the public prison of Syracuse.⁴ Sicily "was now full of slaves"—not uncivilised slaves purchased from barbarous regions,

¹ Plut. *Nic.* 27, 28. He fixes the day on the 27th Metageitnion (Sep. 21?).

² *Supra*, p. 199.

³ Thuc. vii. 86. According to Diodorus, xiii. 19, it was at first proposed by Diocles to put them to death with torture. He gives the discussion at great length.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 87 ; Diod. xiii. 33.

but cultivated Athenians, superior in every way to many of their captors. It is to the honour of the Sicilians that their merits were recognised by their masters. Plutarch informs us that those who could repeat passages from Euripides were allowed their freedom; and even the wretched straggler who could sing a song out of the famous tragedies was supplied with food and water.¹

Such was the end of the Sicilian expedition. "Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed of any Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest, the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished, for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the earth—nothing was saved; and of the many who went forth, few returned home."²

¹ Plut. *Nic.* 29. Later writers, as usual, supplement or correct the narrative of Thucydides. Justin (iv. 5) says that Demosthenes put an end to himself (thus improving on Philistus, *supra*), Plutarch, that he and Nicias were not put to death by the order of the Syracusans, but died by their own hands, Hermocrates giving them the opportunity of doing this while the Assembly was still in session. Diodorus tells us that they were put to death at the instigation of Gylippus, whose speech he gives (*inter alia*)—a correction, of Thucydides due perhaps to some Sicilian historian who wished to remove the stigma from his nation. What value is to be attributed to the picturesque details given in the text from Plutarch it is impossible to say; had we the history of Philistus before us we should be able to explain much. He was an eye-witness of the siege (Plut. *Nic.* 19), and wrote a history of Syracuse down to the capture of Agrigentum in 406.

² Thuc. vii. 87.

APPROACH TO 'Ακραῖον λέπας.

A very narrow defile with steep sides at least one and a half mile long: then a very small space of open country. I climbed the hill to the left. The 'Ακραῖον λέπας in front, rising gently at first, more steeply afterwards; a little road running up it: a comparatively open valley, with perhaps a ravine at the bottom, on the right (of the λέπας, from the spectator's point of view): a very deep ravine running far up into the hills on the right, and forking after about a quarter of a mile.

W. H. FORBES,

Note of a Visit to Syracuse, 1881.

CHAPTER XI.

FROM THE END OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO THE FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED (413-411).

I. No formal report was sent to Athens of the destruction of her forces in Sicily, and the unauthorised rumours which reached the city were at first received with incredulity, for the Athenians could not believe that so great a calamity had overtaken so splendid an army and so safe a general; and even when they heard the story from the lips of the survivors, soldiers of known reputation who had escaped from the general destruction, it was long before they could bring themselves to accept the whole truth.¹

Feeling at
Athens on the
news of the
Sicilian
disaster.

When doubt was no longer possible, their minds were filled with rage, grief, and alarm. They turned fiercely upon the "orators" who had persuaded them into the expedition, forgetting that those who had opposed their wishes had been cried down as rogues and traitors. Not less bitter was their resentment against the prophets who had spoken smooth things, and the diviners who had foretold from the omens the conquest of Sicily. Their hearts were saddened, not merely by the failure of their hopes, but by the loss of friends and relatives. "The citizens mourned, and the city mourned." And when they thought of the war in

¹ Thuc. viii. 1. Plutarch, *Nicias* 30, tells us that the news was first brought to Athens by a stranger, who on landing in the Peiraens entered a barber's shop and spoke of the disaster as commonly known. The barber at once informed the magistrate, who summoned him before the Assembly, and called on him for his authority; but as he could give no account of the stranger, he was put on the rack and tortured until his story was confirmed.

which they were again involved, what a prospect was before them! The flower of the infantry and cavalry lay in the quarries of Syracuse, and their places could only be filled, if at all, by the old, or the young, or the incompetent. Crews could not be collected for the ships, and if they could, there was no money to pay them; the number of triremes in the docks was quite inadequate to the demands of the crisis. They foresaw that in this hour of her weakness not only would the old enemies of Athens redouble their efforts for her destruction; not only would the allies hasten to throw off the yoke under which they had groaned so long, but the forces of the West were now free to take part in the conflict. Since the capture of the Peloponnesian fleet in the harbour of Pylus in 425, Athens had had nothing to fear at sea, but the days of security were ended. The ships of Sicily, which even in 431 were expected to form the bulk of the Peloponnesian fleet, would now appear off the Peiræus to complete the ruin of the tyrant of the seas.

Yet even in this crisis of their fortunes, the Athenians did not lose heart, but with the marvellous buoyancy which they always displayed in misfortune, they made preparations to meet the gathering storm. It was fortunate for them that the winter season was at hand, during which the Syracusan ships would not venture across the water; and that Brasidas, whose restless energy regarded all seasons of the year as equally fit for martial operations, was no longer alive to lead or inspire the Peloponnesians. In six months of comparative inaction on the part of the enemy much might be done; ships could be built; money saved or collected; and above all a strict watch set over the subject and allied cities.

More especially the Athenians directed their attention to Euboea, which, since Agis had occupied Decelea, was doubly necessary to them as a source of supplies; and in order to secure the safety of their merchantmen—as it was now impossible to import corn overland—they fortified the headland of

Courage of the
Athenians:
they prepare
for war.

Fortification of
Sunium: estab-
lishment of
Probuli.

Sunium. The strictest attention was given to economy, expenses were retrenched where possible; even the fortress in Laconia, which had been built by the fleet on the voyage to Sicily, was now abandoned. These measures were carried out under the superintendence of a board of ten Probuli or Commissioners of Public Safety, "who were chosen to advise together and lay before the people such measures as might be required from time to time."¹

The establishment of such a board was felt to be a step towards oligarchy. Democracy was in fact on its trial, and many were ready to take advantage of the shock which it had received by the failure of the great popular enterprise, though, as yet, no one knew how deep was the distrust of existing institutions.²

2. By the enemies of Athens the news of the great disaster was received with a thrill of delight. At last the tyrant city was down; and but a few months would pass before her destruction was complete. Feeling of the
enemies of
Athens. Every one hastened to be in at the death.

Those who had hitherto stood apart from the war were eager to join in it. They wished to share in the glory of the final victory which could not be long delayed; they longed to repay the evils which they had suffered in anticipation, knowing that if Athens had been successful in Sicily they would have been added to the list of her victims. The

¹ Of the duties of these officers we can only form a vague opinion on evidence which is not very trustworthy. In the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes, which was brought out in 411, a Probulus is introduced, and the duties assigned to him are partly financial and partly political. With his colleagues he seems to have had control over the public funds, and to have received deputations from foreign states, duties which usually devolved on the Prytanen. But they did not take the place of the Council, which still retained its administrative power and brought proposals before the Assembly. See *Lysist.* II. 421 f., 433 ff., 980 ff.; Gilbert, *Beiträge*, p. 289. The number of the Probuli is fixed by *Ath. Pol.* c. 29. Two only are known to us by name: Hagnon and Sophocles. The first is the adoptive father of Theramenes; the second may be the poet.

² Thuc. viii. 1, 4.

subjects of Athens, allowing their temper to get the better of their judgment, were convinced that the tyrant city could not hold out for a year. The Lacedaemonians and their allies expected a large force from Sicily in the spring, with whose help they would bring the war to a close, and free themselves for ever from the apprehensions which had for two generations agitated the Grecian world. The Athenian empire and Athenian dreams of conquest would be things of the past. Greece would fall back into the old grooves, and Sparta would be once more acknowledged as the leading state.¹

But low as she was brought, Athens was still "mistress of the sea," and without ships Sparta could accomplish nothing.²

Preparations for a Peloponnesian fleet. In the winter of 413 Agis marched from Decelea upon the Oetaeans and neighbouring tribes, and in spite of the protests of the Thesalians, whose subjects they were, insisted that they should not only join the alliance, but contribute money and give pledges of fidelity. On their part, the Lacedaemonians called upon the cities of the alliance to build a fleet of one hundred vessels (of which fifty were to be provided by themselves and the Boeotians in equal proportions); these were to be ready by the following spring.

And now the evil which Athens had most to fear began to show itself. From all sides envoys from her allies flocked to the Lacedaemonians, requesting their help in throwing off the yoke. First in the field were the Euboeans, who visited Agis at Decelea. Agis eagerly listened to their proposals, and at once sent home for additional troops and officers, of whom one was Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas (*supra*, p. 89), but when he was about to transport them across the Euripus, a deputation from Lesbos arrived proposing to bring *their*

¹ Thuc. viii. 2.

² The Athenians had command of the sea during the winter of 413; for the Spartans were without ships, and were as always slow to take advantage of the situation.

island over. As the Lesbians had the powerful support of the Boeotians, their ancient kinsmen, Agis abandoned Euboea and promised to send a small fleet to act with the Lesbians, under the command of Alcamenes, who was to be "harmost" of Lesbos, a title now mentioned for the first time. In making these arrangements he acted without reference to the home authorities.¹ His position at Deceslea allowed him to take up an independent line, and by his zeal and policy he had won the confidence of the allies. Like Brasidas, but in a less degree, he exhibited Spartan energy and ability without the severe formalism of the Spartan officer, and for this reason the cities applied to him for help more readily than to the impracticable government on the Eurotas. To Sparta, meanwhile, came the Chians and Erythraeans accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, the King's general on the Asiatic coast and satrap of Sardis. Tissaphernes had lately succeeded Pissuthnes, with orders to crush the revolt which that satrap had excited. By purchasing Lycon, a Greek soldier in command of the revolted troops, he had forced Pissuthnes to capitulate; but the rebels still held their ground in Caria, under Amorges, the son of Pissuthnes; and the King now commanded Tissaphernes, not only to produce Amorges alive or dead, but to collect the arrears of tribute from the Greek cities of the coast, which though unpaid since 479 were duly entered as a debt against the satrap (cp. vol. ii. 73, 286). For these reasons Tissaphernes readily undertook to support any force which the Lacedaemonians would send into Ionia. Finally, two exiled Greeks, Calligitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus, came from Pharnabazus, the satrap of Phrygia, who, being also pressed for arrears of tribute, was eager to bring over the Athenian allies in the Hellespont to Persia and negotiate an alliance between Lacedaemon and the Great King. But though the envoys of Pharnabazus

The Chians
apply to Sparta:
Tissaphernes
supports them.

Envoys from
Pharnabazus
at Sparta.

¹ This is the more remarkable after the events of 418 and the arrangements mentioned *supra*, p. 281.

had brought twenty-five talents with them, a tempting bait to Spartan cupidity, Tissaphernes and the Chians found a powerful advocate in Alcibiades, who was the hereditary and personal friend of Endius, one of the ephors of the year. Before a final decision was pronounced, the Spartans sent an envoy to Chios to ascertain whether the island was able to make good her promises. On receiving a favourable

report, they at once admitted the Chians and Erythraeans into alliance, and passed a vote to send forty ships to their help (the Chians had sixty), of which Lacedaemon herself undertook to furnish ten. Melancredas, the admiral, was placed in command, but an earthquake occurring before the ships put to sea, Chalcideus was elected in the room of Melancredas, and the number of the ships was reduced to five.¹

3. Meanwhile the allied vessels and those which Agis had collected to sail to Lesbos, thirty-nine in all, were assembled in the Corinthian gulf. A meeting of the allies was held at Corinth, and it was agreed that the fleet should sail first to Chios, then to Lesbos, and finally to the Hellespont. To each district a separate commander was assigned: Chalcideus to Chios, Alcamenes to Lesbos, and Clearchus to the Hellespont. In order to distract the attention of the Athenians, the ships were to sail in two detachments, and with this precaution it was thought safe, in the present state of the Athenian navy, to sail through the open sea without any attempt at concealment.

When the season was sufficiently advanced for operations, the Chian envoys were most urgent that the Peloponnesian ships should sail at once, before their designs became known to the Athenians (412). Three Spartans were despatched to Corinth with orders to carry the ships over the Isthmus and set out for

The Lacedaemonian fleet to sail to Chios, Lesbos, and the Hellespont.

The fleet delayed by the Isthmia.

¹ Thuc. viii. 5: ὑπὸ βασιλείῳ γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσειν ἐπωφείλησε: *ibid.* c. 6. Ctes. Pers. 52.

Chios. But an unexpected difficulty arose. The Corinthians would not sail till they had celebrated the Isthmia, nor even agree to the suggestion of Agis that he should send forward his detachment while they remained behind. Meanwhile the Athenians, who had received information of what was going on, sent to Chios to complain, and the Chians, though denying the accusation, complied with the Athenian demand for a contingent of seven ships. The time had not yet come for open rebellion; the oligarchs, who alone were in the plot, were not in a position to brave the enmity of the people, who had no wish to break with Athens.¹

At the Isthmian games, which they visited under the protection of the sacred truce, the Athenians discovered the truth about Chios, and, on returning home,

they took measures to prevent the Lacedæmonian ships from leaving Cenchreae, the Corinthian port on the Saronic gulf. When the Spartan Alcamenes set sail after the festival

The Lacedæmonian fleet driven by the Athenians to Peiraeum in Corinthia.

with twenty-one ships, he found his movements watched by an equal number of Athenian vessels, by which he was at length driven on shore at Peiraeum, a desolate harbour on the extreme edge of the Corinthian territory towards Epidauria. Leaving a sufficient number of ships to blockade the defeated foe, the Athenians retired to a small island close at hand, where they encamped and sent to Athens for reinforcements. In the engagement the greater part of the Peloponnesian ships had been disabled and Alcamenes slain.

News of the disaster was at once conveyed to the Corinthians, who came to the rescue on the next day, and were quickly followed by the rest of the inhabitants of the district. At first they despaired of protecting the ships in a situation so desolate, but finally they drew them ashore, and left a force of infantry in charge, till some opportunity of escape should arise.

It had been arranged between Alcamenes and the ephors

¹ Thuc. viii. 7-9. For the date of the Isthmia see Goodhart's note on c. 9; he puts them in May, in this year.

that a horseman should be despatched to Sparta when his ships left the Isthmus. On receiving this information, they prepared to send off their own five vessels, under Chalcideus and Alcibiades, but when they heard of the defeat at Peiræum, they changed their plans, and resolved not only to send no ships of their own to Asia, but to recall those which had already put to sea. If Alcibiades had not been at Sparta, no further steps would have been taken; the "Ionic war" would have been abandoned before it had well begun; the Chians would have been left to their fate, and the offer of Persian aid neglected. He pointed out to the ephors that if Chalcideus set sail at once, he would reach Chios before the news of the disaster of Peiræum; and for himself he had only to land in Ionia, and so persuasive would be his proofs of the inability of Athens either to protect or to punish her subjects, that the cities would at once come over. In private he appealed to the ambition of his friend Endius, urging him not to allow the honour of exciting rebellion in Ionia, and winning for Sparta the alliance of the Great King, to pass into the hands of Agis. The ephors withdrew their opposition, and allowed Chalcideus to set sail.¹ About the same time, the prospects of the confederacy were a little brightened by the return of the ships which had sailed to Sicily with Gylippus. These, sixteen in number, had been roughly handled off Leucadia by the Athenian squadron which lay in wait for them, but had escaped with the loss of one trireme, and now sailed into the harbour of Lechæum.²

4. As they crossed the Aegean, Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized every ship which came in their way, to prevent news of their approach reaching Chios. They did not make directly for the island, but put in at Corycus on the mainland opposite, where they were met by some of their Chian confederates. It was arranged that the Chians should return home and summon a

Chalcideus and
Alcibiades sail
to Ionia.

¹ Thuc. viii. 11, 12.

² Thuc. viii. 13.

meeting of the Council, without announcing publicly the arrival of the Peloponnesians, who suddenly appeared in the harbour, to the astonishment of the populace. Alcibiades and Chalcideus were admitted to the Council; and, on hearing that a fleet was coming to their assistance, the Chians revolted from Athens. Their example was followed by the Erythraeans on the opposite coast, and afterwards by Clazomenae. And, as Clazomenae lay on a small island, and was therefore quite at the mercy of any hostile fleet, the citizens fortified Polichna on the mainland as a place of retreat in danger. The revolted cities at once began to rebuild the walls which the Athenians had compelled them, in old days, to pull down, and prepared for war.¹

The news was quickly carried to Athens, where it created the greatest excitement. Chios was the only "independent" ally remaining, except Methymna. Since the formation of the Delian League, she had continued a faithful friend, rendering assistance when required, and in return retaining unimpaired her old institutions, though, like the rest, she had been compelled to destroy her walls.² She was the largest and perhaps the wealthiest of all the allied cities, and, amid the various storms of warfare, she had enjoyed profound peace. No island was so well and thoroughly cultivated: in none was there such an abundance of slaves. In their extremity, the Athenians considered that the time had come for rescinding the decree by which a thousand talents had been set apart at the beginning of the Archidamian war; and the money was partly spent in manning ships to sail to Chios. Eight were at once despatched under the command of Strombichides, and twelve more were to follow under Thrasyclus. Both these squadrons were withdrawn from the blockading force at Peiraeum, their place being taken, at least in part, by fresh ships. Other thirty vessels

Revolt of Chios.
Erythrae,
Clazomenae.

Alarm at
Athens: the
reserve funds
used.

Ships sent
to Asia.

¹ Thuc. viii. 14.

² Thuc. iv. 51.

were also to be manned, for, in the excitement of the moment, no sacrifice was thought too great. Strombichides sailed to Samos, and thence to Teos, in the hope of preventing a revolt there, but Chalcideus also sailed to the town with twenty-three ships, supported by the land forces of Erythrae

and Clazomenae, and the Athenians were compelled to return to Samos. Teos went over to the Peloponnesians, and the wall which the Athenians had built to protect it towards the interior was pulled down.

Having thus secured the most important of the Ionian islands for Sparta, Alcibiades resolved to bring over the most important of the cities on the mainland. He was on friendly terms with the leading citizens of Miletus, and flattered himself with the figure which he would make with the Chians and with Endius, if he could win the capital of Ionia before the arrival of any reinforcements from Peloponnesus. He persuaded Chalcideus, on his return from Teos, to leave behind the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels to form a force of heavy-armed infantry in Chios, and fill their places in the ships with Chians. With the five vessels thus manned, and other twenty obtained from Chios, he sailed in all secrecy to Miletus. The ships had barely reached the harbour before Strombichides and Thrasycles appeared with the united Athenian fleet. But it was too late. Miletus had already revolted, and the Athenians could do no more than lie at anchor off the island of Lade and watch the progress of events.¹

5. Alcibiades had made good his promise with regard to the revolt of Ionia, but he had still to arrange an alliance between Lacedaemon and the Great King. This was a matter of little difficulty, after the successes which had been gained, and on the revolt of Miletus Tissaphernes and Chalcideus agreed upon the following terms: that all the territory and all the cities which were now in the King's possession, or had

¹ Thuc. viii. 17.

ever been in the possession of his forefathers, should be his ; that the Lacedaemonians and their allies should help the King to prevent the Athenians from collecting tribute, or deriving any other advantage from these cities ; that both parties should carry on war against the Athenians in common, and bring it to an end by common consent only ; that cities which rebelled from the King should be treated as rebels from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and *vice versa*.¹

The words of this shameful bargain can hardly have been sufficiently weighed by Chalcideus, or he would have shrunk, as Lichas afterwards shrunk, from surrendering to the King all the territory which his forefathers had ever possessed. In the days of Xerxes, before 480, the Persian dominions not only included all the Greek cities in Asia, all the islands off the coast, and the Cyclades, but extended into Europe as far as Mount Olympus. Even Thessaly and Boeotia might be considered as part of the kingdom of Xerxes, for they had been occupied by his troops with the consent of the inhabitants. And these concessions were more than a mere renunciation of claims ; for the Spartans were bound to assist the King in reducing to submission any of the new subjects who might rebel. On the other hand, the King was pledged to nothing. No stipulations were made for the payment of the fleet, the bait by which Tissaphernes had gained the assistance of Sparta. The truth was that Chalcideus was merely a tool in the hands of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. In order to gain his immediate purpose, Alcibiades was willing to accept any conditions, regardless of the fate of his countrymen and the liberty of Greece, and it was a matter of no moment to him that the Spartans, who claimed to liberate Hellas, were pledging half of it into slavery. Tissaphernes gained all and more than all that he expected. The cities, which he could not reduce, were placed in his hands without the loss of a ship or a man ; the tribute for which he was pressed would flow into his

Remarks on
the treaty.

¹ Thuc. viii. 18.

coffers, and the satrap of Sardis would once more occupy the position which he had lost at Mycale.

The Chians were not content with sending out ships under a Spartan officer; they wished to play their own part in the great work of liberation. After the departure of Chalceus, they despatched ten ships which landed at Anaea,¹ opposite Samos, wishing to gather news of the attempt on Miletus. But Chalceus sent messengers to warn them away, asserting that Amorges was in the neighbourhood with his army; and at the same time, an Athenian squadron of sixteen triremes was sighted, which had been sent under the command of Diomedon, to join the other two generals. The Chians immediately fled, losing four ships to the Athenians, who went on to Samos. From Teos, where they had taken refuge, the Chians brought over Lebedos and Erae, after which their forces, both naval and military, returned home. Not long afterwards Tissaphernes appeared at Teos, and completed the destruction of the wall, but he, in his turn, had no sooner gone than Diomedon arrived and persuaded the Teians to receive the Athenians as well as their opponents. Erae, however, which he also attempted, held out against him.

While these events were taking place in Ionia, the Spartans were encouraged by success at home. The twenty ships which had been blockaded since the Isthmia at Peiraeum, succeeded in breaking out. They returned to Cenchreae, where they were joined by Astyochus, who had been appointed high admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, and prepared to sail to Chios.²

6. So far the balance was against the Athenians. There was hardly a place on the mainland of Ionia which they

¹ See Thuc. iv. 75; *supra*, pp. 33, 164.

² Thuc. viii. 19, 20. The appointment of Astyochus would lead us to suppose that the annual change of magistrates had taken place at Sparta; if so, new ephors were now in office, and Alcibiades lost the support of Endius, which would give Agis the opportunity he sought.

could call their own; Chios was in active hostility; the Great King was in alliance with the enemy. All their hopes centred in Samos; if this island remained loyal, they had still a strong base of operations; if it joined in the revolt, Ionia was gone. It was a subject city, without walls, crushed for a long time by a heavy indemnity,¹ and subsequently called upon to pay tribute and furnish soldiers. The nature of the government after 440 is uncertain, but as the oligarchs took the lead in the rebellion, and Pericles, on his first voyage, established a democracy, we should naturally suppose that a democracy was left in power when the city was finally reduced. However this may be, the oligarchs certainly gained in influence, and if the government was not entirely in their hands, they were now a strong party in the island. Whether they entered into negotiations with the Chians is unknown, but it is probable enough that the success of the Chian oligarchs and the revolt of Miletus aroused in the minds of the Samian oligarchs the hope of recovering their power. They were, in any case, suspected, and the suspicion gave rise to an outbreak of popular fury. With the help of three Athenian ships which were at hand, the demos attacked the notables, slew two hundred of them, banished four hundred more, and divided among themselves their houses and lands as spoils of victory. The Athenians, partly to reward such ardour in a good cause, and partly because they were now sure of their fidelity, allowed the democrats the privileges of independence. Henceforth they governed the city for themselves, excluding the old landowners or Geomori from every privilege, refusing even to marry or give in marriage among them.²

Samos all
important
to Athens:
state of the
island.

Popular
revolution
at Samos.

7. On their return from Teos, the Chians did not relax their energies. They despatched thirteen ships to Lesbos—the second point in the Lacedaemonian programme. On

¹ Thuc. vii. 57; i. 117.

² Thuc. viii. 21; *C. I. A.* i. 56.

arriving at the island, the ships put in at Methymna, which immediately revolted; and leaving four vessels to protect the city, they passed on to Mytilene, which also joined them. Meanwhile Astyochus had arrived at Chios from Cenchreae, and after a stay of two days followed to Lesbos; but before he could reach the island, the Athenian fleet, twenty-five vessels strong, under the command of Diomedon and Leon (who had come from Athens with ten additional ships) had appeared at Mytilene and recovered the city. When Astyochus heard of this disaster on his arrival at Eresus (in the south of the island) he abandoned Mytilene, and contented himself with bringing over Eresus. Arming the citizens, while he sent the hoplites of his own ships, under the command of Eteonicus, to Antissa and Methymna, he himself sailed thither to support them. Soon afterwards he returned to Chios, taking his soldiers with him. The attempt on Lesbos proved a failure at every point; the island fell back into the hands of the Athenians, who settled affairs to their liking, and afterwards crossed over to the mainland, where they destroyed the fort which the Clazomenians were building at Polichna. The authors of the revolt fled to Daphnus, a neighbouring town; the rest of the inhabitants returned to their island, and Clazomenae also was once more Athenian.¹

Encouraged by these successes, Diomedon and Leon carried the war into Chios. Using Lesbos, the Oenussae, and some forts in the territory of Erythrae as a basis, they landed at various points in the island. Their ships had been manned by hoplites "from the roll," who had been compelled to serve as marines, and with these excellent troops they defeated the Chians with great slaughter, and laid waste their country. Such a disaster had not been known at Chios since the days of the Persian war, and it was the more deeply felt owing to the high cultivation of the

¹ Thuc. viii. 22, 23 § 4; *supra*, p. 373; see Jowett's *Thuc. i., Essay on Inscriptions*, xciii.

island. Hardly any other people in Greece had enjoyed so long a respite from the miseries of war, and in the judgment of Thucydides none had made a better use of their prosperity. Their present sufferings were indeed of their own making, but their opinion of the desperate state of Athens was one shared by almost all the Greeks, and therefore a pardonable mistake. What they had not accurately estimated was the indolence, timidity, and incapacity of the Spartan rulers, and the almost superhuman energy which Athens displayed in the hour of need. When they found themselves driven off the sea and their country ravaged, a reaction set in, and overtures were made with a view to putting the city into the hands of the Athenians. But the plot was checked by the appearance of Astyochus, who was brought over from Erythrae for the purpose.¹

8. Meanwhile the Athenian squadron of twenty ships still lay at Lade watching Miletus. A descent was made on the Milesian territory, and in the conflict which followed, Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian commander, was slain; but this success led to no change in the situation, and it was not till the close of the summer that affairs took a decisive turn. By this time Athens had once more gathered her strength; a fleet of forty-eight ships sailed to Samos, having on board 1000 Athenian hoplites, 1500 Argives—500 of whom were armed by the Athenians—and 1000 of the allied forces, under the command of Phrynichus and two others. From Samos they moved to Miletus, where they were met by 800 Milesians, the Peloponnesian forces of Chalcideus, and the auxiliaries of Tissaphernes, who also furnished a force of cavalry. In the battle which followed, the Argives, despising their enemies as Ionians, and meeting them in disorder, were defeated by the Milesians with heavy loss; but the Athenians, after repulsing the Peloponnesians and their auxiliaries, marched

¹ Thuc. viii. 24. The historian is very anxious that we should estimate at its proper value the *σωφροσύνη* of a city which was not spoiled by prosperity.

up to the gates of Miletus, and there piled arms, for the Milesians, on seeing the defeat of their friends, offered no further resistance. After the battle, which was remarkable for the victory of Ionians on both sides, the Athenians proceeded to cut off Miletus by building a wall across the isthmus, which connected the city with the mainland.¹ But ere the day closed, the news came that the combined fleet of the Peloponnesians and Sicilians was at hand, fifty-five triremes strong, under the command of Theramenes. What the Athenians dreaded had come to pass; their Syracusan enemy, Hermocrates, anxious to complete the ruin which he had so well begun, persuaded his city to send him over with twenty ships, to which Selinus, grateful for her deliverance, had added two; and, uniting with these, the Peloponnesian squadron, which was at last ready, had sailed over to join Astyochus. The appearance of the great Syracusan gives interest and elevation to the war. He was capable and honest, and sincerely in earnest in liberating Greece. His ability raised him above his Spartan colleagues; his honesty above Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. He takes no decisive part in the contest, but from time to time he will reappear, leaving always the impression of a noble and patriotic soldier. The fleet sailed to Leros,² but on learning that the Athenians were at Miletus, they passed on to Teichiussa, in the Iasian gulf, to await further information. Here they were visited by Alcibiades, who not only acquainted them with the defeat of the Milesians, with whom he had fought, but urged them, as they wished to save Ionia, to lose no time in relieving Miletus.

Upon this the Peloponnesians made preparations for sail-

¹ Thuc. viii. 25. The Peloponnesians here mentioned are thought to be the *ἐπιβαραί* who served on board the ships of Chalcideus. Chalcideus had left his crews behind in Chios (cp. c. 17, 32).

² Thuc. viii. 26. Leros is an island about forty miles from Miletus, but a convenient position from which to watch the city. See Herod. v. 125.

ing on the next morning to Miletus. But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, who had heard of their approach, had no intention of risking an engagement, and though his colleagues were at first indignant that an Athenian fleet should retire before the enemy, he convinced them of the wisdom of a cautious policy. The fleet broke up from Miletus and returned to Samos, whence the Argives, annoyed at their defeat and at the turn which events had taken, returned home. Next morning the Peloponnesians sailed out from Teichiussa, leaving their heavy tackle behind them, in expectation of an engagement, but after waiting a day, they returned, and on the instigation of Tissaphernes went on to Iasus, where Amorges still held out. The Iasians, who never expected to see any but Athenian ships in their bay, were taken unawares, and the town captured. Amorges was given up to Tissaphernes; his mercenaries, who were chiefly Peloponnesians, were pressed into the victorious ranks; while Tissaphernes was allowed to have the town, and all the captives, slave or free, on a payment of a daric (16s.) for each. The spoil, which was very great, the accumulation of many years of prosperity, was divided among the soldiers. The fleet then returned to Miletus.¹

The Athenians
retire from
Miletus to
Samos.

The Pelopon-
nesians at
Iasus.

After the services rendered to him at Iasus, Tissaphernes could no longer refuse to make good the promise of support by which he had drawn the Spartans to Ionia. He now appeared at Miletus with a month's pay for the whole of the fleet, at the rate of an Attic drachma (8d.) a man; but with ill-timed parsimony he declared that he could not for the future provide more than half a drachma without special permission from the King. This proposal provoked a strong remonstrance from Hermocrates, which was so far effectual that Tissaphernes slightly increased the amount.² The total

¹ Thuc. viii. 28.

² Thuc. viii. 29. He appears to have counted 55 ships as 60. See Goodhart's note.

number of ships in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus now amounted to eighty, of which twenty were Chian. About the same time the Athenians received a reinforcement of thirty-five ships from Athens, and as their numbers now amounted to a hundred and four triremes, they resolved to divide the force and send thirty under the command of Strombichides to Chios, while Phrynichus, Charminus, and others with the remainder kept watch over Miletus.¹

9. Astyochus, the admiral of Sparta, was still engaged at Chios in suppressing the plot (p. 379), but when he heard of the arrival of Theramenes he took courage, and sailed out to make attacks on the mainland at Pteleum and Clazomenae. At neither place did he meet with success; and when leaving Clazomenae he was caught in a great storm and carried to Cyme, while the rest of the ships sought refuge in the adjacent islands. There they lay for eight days, consuming the property which the Clazomenians had conveyed to the islands for safety, after which, the storm abating, they also went on to Cyme. Astyochus was now solicited to take part in another attempt to bring over Lesbos, but as the allies refused to join, he returned to Chios; and about the same time Pedaritus arrived from Lacedaemon as governor of the island. He brought with him the auxiliaries which had been obtained at Iasus, and found in Chios the crews of the ships which Chalcideus had left behind, 500 strong. Nevertheless he turned a deaf ear to the suggestions of Astyochus, and would neither sail to Lesbos nor allow the Chians to do so. Upon this Astyochus went away in a rage to Miletus, taking with him the few ships which he had in his own command, and declaring that a day would come when the Chians would need his help and fail to obtain it. On his voyage he narrowly escaped being caught by the Athenian squadron which was sailing to Chios. The fleets anchored on opposite sides of Coryceus,

¹ Thuc. viii. 30. Strombichides is mentioned as one of the generals who brought up these reinforcements. Had he gone back to Athens?

hidden from each other by a spur of the mountain; and it was merely because Astyochus was called out of his course to investigate a supposed plot at Erythrae that he did not fall into the Athenians' hands.¹ From Erythrae He returns to Miletus. he made his way to Miletus. On their part the Athenian ships were caught in a storm when leaving Corycus, by which three of their number were carried to the city of Chios, the crews being slain or captured as they were driven ashore. The rest sought shelter under the lee of Mimas, and sailed thence to Lesbos.

So far Iasus had been the furthest point to the south touched by the Peloponnesians, and this town had been attacked to please Tissaphernes. But the Peloponnesians now bethought themselves of their own kinsmen in Asia. A fleet under the command of Hippocrates, a Spartan, but chiefly composed of Thurian vessels, led by Dorieus of Rhodes, put in at Cnidus, a Dorian colony, which had been already won over by Tissaphernes.² They were quickly followed by the Athenians from Samos, who captured six of the vessels, and were within an ace of recovering Cnidus.

When Astyochus arrived at Miletus he found the Peloponnesian fleet in a high state of efficiency; pay being regular and good, and the spoil of Iasus yet unexhausted, while the Milesians were most eager in the cause. The spirits of the Peloponnesians rose with their prosperity, and the former treaty with Tissaphernes, which had been drawn up in the timidity of their first arrival, was no longer satisfactory. A second was arranged between Theramenes—who had not yet given up his command—and the satrap, in which Second treaty with the Persians. the King was pledged to maintain any army which he should invite to his aid, while it was in his country. In other respects also some modifications were introduced; the war was to be carried on in common as before, and neither party was to come to terms without the

¹ Thuc. viii. 30-33.

² Thuc. viii. 35, reading *ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνης*. See Goodhart.

consent of the other, but if one party required the aid of the other he was to be satisfied with the assistance which he could persuade him to give: the King undertook not to attack the Lacedaemonians or their allies, and the Lacedaemonians on their part recognised the King's claim to all the country and cities which had belonged to him or his father, or his forefathers, and undertook not to exact tribute from these.¹

After concluding this treaty, which was perhaps intended for the home authorities, Theramenes set out for Sparta in a boat, but on the voyage he was lost at sea.

Affairs at Chios were going from bad to worse. The Athenians crossed over from Lesbos (p. 378), and after defeating the Chians in numerous engagements, established themselves at Delphinium, a strong fortress convenient for the sea, and close to the town of Chios. Factions also broke out among the citizens. The revolt had been brought about by the oligarchs, without the knowledge of the people, and even among the oligarchs there had been a reaction, owing to the ill success of the rising. Some citizens had been put to death by Pedaritus, the new governor, on a charge of Atticism, and a spirit of suspicion was abroad, which required most careful watching. Messengers were sent to Astyochus, begging him to send assistance, but in vain, and at length Pedaritus despatched an envoy to Sparta to make complaint of the conduct of the admiral.²

10. The Peloponnesians now carried out the last part of the programme which they had sketched in the autumn of the preceding year. The envoys of Pharnabazus had remained at Lacedaemon, in the hope of inducing the authorities to send out a fleet to the Hellespont. At length—it was now December—they were successful, and twenty-seven ships were despatched under the command of Antisthenes. On

Desperate
condition of
Chios.

A Pelopon-
nesian fleet is
despatched to
the Hellespont.

¹ Thuc. viii. 37.

² Thuc. viii. 38.

its way the fleet was ordered to carry eleven commissioners, of whom Lichas was one, to Miletus, where they were to investigate the charges against Astyochus, and supersede him if necessary. The ships were then to sail to the Hellespont under the command of Clearchus. When crossing the Aegean, the fleet put in at Melos, where they came upon ten Athenian vessels; three of these were destroyed, but the rest escaped, and fearing that they would convey intelligence to Samos, the Lacedaemonians shaped their course to Crete, and so to Caunus, whence they sent to Miletus, begging for aid in conveying the ships past Samos. For since their return from Iasus, some three months previously, the Peloponnesians had remained at Miletus, and over against them, on the island of Samos, were the Athenians, ever ready to make a descent when opportunity offered.¹

Pedareitus still urged Astyochus to come to Chios, which was reduced to the greatest distress. The sea was closed to the Chians, their land laid waste, and since the occupation of Delphinium by the Athenians, the slaves had deserted in large numbers, putting their knowledge of the country at the service of the enemy. If help were sent at once, it would be possible to prevent the Athenians from completing Delphinium and the still larger fortifications which they were planning for their army and fleet. Astyochus was preparing to despatch some ships, notwithstanding his threat (p. 382), when the news came of the arrival of the Peloponnesian ships at Caunus. Upon this he abandoned Chios, and sailed to join the new comers. It was of the first importance to bring the commissioners safe to Miletus, and by uniting the fleets, he might gain command of the sea. On his way he attacked and overran Cos, which had been recently desolated by a terrible earthquake, but on reaching Cnidus, he was compelled to sail, without disembarking his men, against an Athenian squadron,

Disastrous
state of affairs
at Chios.

Movements of
Astyochus:
engagement
with the
Athenians.

¹ Thuc. viii. 39.

which had been sent from Samos under Charminus to keep watch over the Peloponnesian ships. Charminus was reported to be off Syme, and thither Astyochus followed him. A storm of rain, followed by a thick fog, scattered his ships, and when morning broke, his left wing came in sight of the Athenians, the rest being hidden by the island. Charminus at once attacked with a few vessels, and defeated his opponents, but when the rest of the fleet came up he found himself outnumbered, and took to flight. The contingents of the Peloponnesians then united and returned to Cnidus, whither they were soon followed by the entire Athenian fleet, but neither side would risk an engagement,¹ and the Athenians returned to Samos.

The whole Peloponnesian fleet was now collected at Cnidus, and the eleven commissioners reviewed the situation.

The Peloponnesian fleet at Cnidus. Tissaphernes also was present. Some criticisms were made on his past conduct, and arrangements for the future discussed. Lichas was

Quarrel of Lichas and Tissaphernes. bold enough to express his dissatisfaction at both the treaties which had been concluded, pointing out that if the King was to be master of the territory which had been governed by his forefathers, his country would extend to Boeotia, and so far from liberating Hellas, the Lacedaemonians would be agents in establishing a Median empire. He must have better terms than these, which indeed he refused to observe, nor would he accept Persian support on such conditions. On this Tissaphernes went away in a rage, and for the time Persia and Sparta were estranged.²

The alliance now received an important acquisition. As they lay at Cnidus, the most influential inhabitants of Rhodes joins the alliance. Rhodes made overtures to them, inviting them to visit the island. Rhodes was a powerful state, with a large force of infantry and numerous soldiers,

¹ Thuc. viii. 41. For Charminus at Syme see also Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 801 ff.

² Thuc. viii. 43; cf. 52.

wealthy enough to supply the funds so necessary at the present moment, when the allies were looking for supplies to take the place of the pay of Tissaphernes. The invitation was eagerly accepted, and the fleet, ninety-four vessels strong, put in at Camirus. The populace, as usual, had not been informed of the plans of the oligarchs, and as the place was unfortified, they fled in terror. The Lacedaemonians reassured them, and a congress was held of the three cities of the island, Camirus, Ialysus, and Lindus, after which Rhodes formally seceded to the Peloponnesians. On hearing of the revolt, the Athenians sailed to the island in the hope of saving it, but in vain; all that they could do was to make attacks on Rhodes from neighbouring stations at Cos and Chalce. The Rhodians contributed to the allies no less than thirty-two talents, and Astyochus, finding himself in comfortable quarters, drew his vessels on shore and remained inactive for nearly three months (January to March 411), equally regardless of the danger in Chios, and of the important events which, as he knew, were taking place in Samos.

The Peloponnesian fleet remains at Rhodes.

II. After the death of Chalcideus and the accession to office of new ephors, the feeling at Lacedaemon had turned against Alcibiades. Agis was his personal enemy, and others were doubtless jealous of his success, while Endius was no longer in office to protect him. Before leaving Miletus, Astyochus had received instructions to put him to death, but Alcibiades, who had his suspicions, escaped by withdrawing to Tissaphernes. He was naturally indignant at the conduct of the Spartans; and perhaps he reflected that it was by his own act that the Greeks of Asia were passing into the empire of the Persians, from which they had been so long and so successfully preserved. His thoughts once more returned to Athens, and with his usual energy he exerted himself to the utmost to damage the Peloponnesian cause. Knowing that Tissaphernes

The Spartans turn against Alcibiades.

He escapes to Tissaphernes, and advises him to reduce the pay of the Peloponnesians.

could not or would not furnish supplies, he supported him in reducing the pay from a drachma to three obols—and even this was not supplied regularly—urging that the Athenians paid no more, not so much from economy as because they found that sailors if overpaid became dissolute and incapable. Arrears of pay were also an inducement to sailors to remain on their ships. The objections of the trierarchs and generals could be silenced by timely presents of money, and, in fact, Hermocrates alone refused the bait. When the cities applied for funds, Alcibiades had answers ready, telling the Chians with his own lips that the richest of the Greeks ought to be ashamed of asking for funds; would they not even pay the auxiliaries who had come to their assistance? Did they expect to be rescued without cost of money or life? The subject cities which had paid tribute to Athens were reminded that they were only spending on themselves what they had formerly spent on the Athenians. And to one and all he pointed out that Tissaphernes must needs be careful while he was spending his own resources, but if the King should send supplies, the pay of the sailors would be increased, and the wants of the cities considered. In private he advised Tissaphernes not to be in any haste to finish the war, either by bringing up the Phoenician fleet—a plan which he had in view—or by increasing the forces of the Peloponnesians. It was not to his advantage that the same state should be supreme by land and sea; a divided control was better, for in this case the King could use one power against the other. It was much safer, and much cheaper, too, to allow the Greeks to wear out their power on each other, than to raise the Spartans into a position from which they could not be dislodged without great expense and danger. And after all the Athenians would prove the more serviceable allies of the two; they had no desire to make conquests on land; they wished to enslave the seas, and could assist the King in enslaving the Greeks in his territory; whereas the Lacedaemonians posed as the

The true policy of Persia is to let the combatants wear each other out.

liberators of Greece, and were not likely to free the cities from the Athenians in order to make them the slaves of the King. Let it be his object to reduce both, getting as much as he could from the Athenians, and then driving the Peloponnesians out of the country. This advice agreed with the wishes as well as the interests of Tissaphernes. He took Alcibiades into his confidence, and at once began to reduce his payments to the fleet. At the same time he refused to allow them to engage with the enemy till joined by the Phœnician fleet, which would give them an irresistible superiority. By this means he destroyed the efficiency of the fleet, and Astyochus, the admiral, being already in Persian pay, though he sought to conceal his own treachery by faint remonstrances, could offer no real opposition.¹

In giving this advice to Tissaphernes, sound though it was, Alcibiades had other aims in view than the interests of the Persians. He must be a power somewhere, and a power in Greece; and he had no sooner ceased to be influential at Sparta than he wished to be again influential at Athens. Yet how could he hope to be restored to the city which he had so deeply injured? or what influence could he gain so long as the people were governed by the leaders who had expelled him? The position might well seem desperate, but he knew the divided state of feeling at Athens, and how to turn it to his own advantage. Since the Sicilian disaster democracy had lost in credit, and many citizens were inclined—even with the most patriotic views—to doubt whether a change might not be introduced with advantage. As the old sources of supply fell off, and the burden pressed more and more heavily upon them, the richer citizens sought to be rid of the war and the government which persisted in it at their expense. The old opposition between oligarchy and democracy which had divided Cimon and Pericles took a sharper edge; and if many wished to reform the democracy, there were others, and those perhaps

¹ Thuc. viii. 45, 46.

the ablest men in the city, who wished to get rid of it altogether. If Alcibiades could hold out a hope of new supplies, he would certainly attract those who were being ruined by the war; and if this help were conditional on the overthrow of democracy, he would get rid of the popular leaders who stood in the way of his return. What his own position under an oligarchy would be he does not seem to have considered, but if he were the instrument in establishing such a government, he could hardly fail to profit by it.

12. Such were his hopes, and he no sooner found himself in favour with Tissaphernes than he began to feel his way in the fleet at Samos, intimating that if an oligarchy took the place of the "villainous democracy" which had banished him, he would be willing to return, and secure for Athens the support of Tissaphernes. These overtures were met more than half way by the trierarchs and others at Samos, who were dissatisfied with the existing form of government. Of these a few visited Alcibiades, who explained his views clearly, promising to bring over Tissaphernes and the King if the democracy were abolished in which the King could place no confidence. They returned filled with hopes that they would get the government into their own hands, and bring the war to an end, and with this object in view, a plot for a revolution was formed. The proposals of Alcibiades were announced openly, and the people, though at first alarmed, were soon quieted by the prospect of receiving pay from the treasures of the Great King; but when the conspirators began to discuss matters more carefully among themselves, they found a formidable opponent among their own numbers.

Of all the generals in the camp at Samos the ablest was Phrynichus, the son of Stratonides. We have already seen that he prevented the Athenians from rashly encountering the enemy at a time when defeat would have been fatal; and Thucydides, when recording his conduct, remarks that on this as on every other occasion "then

Alcibiades
proposes an
oligarchical
revolution.

Opposition of
Phrynichus.

and afterwards" he showed himself a man of most capable judgment. He appears to have been of humble origin; he began life as a shepherd in the country, an occupation which he afterwards changed for the more promising but less honest career of a "sycophant" in the city.¹ What his political convictions were it is difficult to say; for on the one hand he saw very clearly the advantage which Athens derived from her democratical constitution, and on the other he became one of the chief agents in overthrowing it. Whether democrat or oligarch, he was probably guided by personal motives only, and above all by a hatred and distrust of Alcibiades, whose return to Athens he wished to prevent by every means. This hatred now brought him into opposition to the proposed revolution, and his keen insight at once detected the difficulties which attended it. The King was not likely to throw over the Lacedaemonians when their fleet had become powerful, and join the Athenians in destroying what he had helped to create; they had done him no harm, while the Athenians were justly the objects of his suspicion. The change from democracy to oligarchy would gain Athens no advantage in the subject cities; on the contrary, her empire mainly rested on the support of the demos, and those who had gone over to the Lacedaemonians had not revolted to establish an oligarchy, but to obtain independence. The desire of freedom would not be satisfied by a change of constitution, and the oligarchs, "the gentlemanly party," would cause the Athenians quite as much trouble in the allied cities as the democrats; they were selfish and unscrupulous, and would not shrink from bloodshed without form of trial, while the people were the refuge of the oppressed.² On general grounds, there-

¹ Lysias 20, §§ 11, 12.

² Thuc. viii. 48: τοὺς τε καλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις εἶναι καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαίτερον ἀποθνήσκων τὸν δὲ δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστὴν.

fore, there was no reason why Athens should exchange democracy for oligarchy; and with regard to Alcibiades, Phrynichus was aware that he cared neither for the one nor for the other form of government. His only object was to return to his "clique" at Athens, by whose help he would be able to carry out his designs, whatever they might be. Above all, Phrynichus entreated his colleagues not to create divisions among the people at a moment when it was most important that all should act in harmony.

13. These were wise counsels, but they were not followed. The conspirators resolved to go on with their work, and despatched Pisander, with some others, to Athens, to prepare the way for the changes which were to win Persian help for the city—the return of Alcibiades, and the removal

Phrynichus
attempts to
destroy
Alcibiades,

of the democracy.¹ Phrynichus now found himself in a dangerous position, for if the proposal to recall Alcibiades were carried at Athens, as he foresaw that it would be, his

action in opposing it would probably cost him his life. He resolved, if possible, to get rid of Alcibiades; and with this object secretly informed Astyochus, who had not yet left Miletus for Rhodes, that Alcibiades was ruining the Lacedaemonian interests with Tissaphernes, and bringing him over to the Athenians. His own treachery he excused by the plea that a man might be pardoned for damaging his enemy even at the expense of his state—such was the morality which faction and misapplied acuteness had taught the Greeks. But Astyochus

but falls into
great danger,
from which
he extricates
himself with
much diffi-
culty.

had no mind to punish Alcibiades, who was indeed out of his power. He saw that he was in favour with Tissaphernes, and that his own interests lay, not in punishing, but in serving him. He immediately went to Magnesia, where Alcibiades and Tissaphernes were, and

laid before him the communications of Phrynichus. His services did not go unrewarded, and from this time he was

¹ Thuc. viii. 49, 50.

in the pay of Persia, an accomplice in the designs of Tissaphernes, to whose injurious treatment of the Peloponnesian fleet he could only oppose a faint remonstrance (p. 389). Alcibiades at once sent a letter to the authorities at Samos, attacking Phrynichus, and demanding his execution as a traitor. Phrynichus was in greater danger than before, but he extricated himself with admirable skill. He addressed another communication to Astyochus, complaining of his conduct in revealing the former message, but nevertheless offering him an opportunity of destroying the entire Athenian fleet at Samos, and giving minute details for the execution of the plan; and as before, he excused his conduct on the ground that he must either destroy his enemies or perish miserably at their hands. He then announced to the army that the enemy intended to take advantage of the unprotected state of Samos to make an attack on the fleet, and being himself general, he pushed on the fortification of the city and kept the strictest watch at every point. Meanwhile Astyochus had communicated the intelligence to Alcibiades, as before; and Alcibiades, in his turn, sent a second letter to his friends in Samos exposing the treachery of Phrynichus. But the letter failed to have any effect, for, owing to the conduct of Phrynichus, Alcibiades was not believed, and his communication was thought to be merely a malicious attempt to destroy his enemy.

Alcibiades now addressed himself with yet greater zeal to the task of winning over Tissaphernes to the Athenian cause. The satrap was not unwilling to be persuaded, for the conduct of Lichas at Cnidus had convinced him of the truth of Alcibiades' warning, and he now regarded the Lacedaemonians as bent on the liberation of Greece—a policy not at all in his interests. But the numbers of the Peloponnesian fleet were so great that he did not venture openly to break with Sparta.¹

*Tissaphernes
not unwilling
to abandon
the Spartans.*

Meanwhile the envoys from Samos, with Pisander at their

¹ Thuc. viii. 52.

head, arrived at Athens. An assembly was held, in which they stated the chief points in the new policy, insisting that

Pisander
arrives at
Athens.

if Alcibiades were recalled and the constitution changed, they would have the assistance of the King in overcoming the Peloponnesians.

The proposal met with much opposition. The people could not bear the thought of exchanging democracy for oligarchy, while the enemies of Alcibiades protested against the return of an outlaw, and the protest was supported in the strongest

Excitement
at Athens.

language by the Eumolpidae and Kerykes, the guardians of the sacred rites which he had outraged.

Pisander was not to be turned from his purpose: regardless of the abuse poured upon him, he called up each of his opponents, and asked him the simple question, whether he had any hope of the city. The Peloponnesians had more ships at sea, more allied cities to support them; the resources of the King and of Tissaphernes were open to them, while Athens was without funds, and without prospect of funds, unless the King supplied them. To this question there could be but one answer. Pisander then plainly told the excited multitude that they would never succeed in gaining the King, unless the constitution were "sobered" and office confined to fewer hands. If this were done, the King would have confidence in them, and why should they discuss the constitution when their existence was at stake? At a future time they could restore what they had removed. Alcibiades also must be recalled, for he, and no one else, could carry the negotiations through. Upon

The Athenians
agree to the
change of
constitution.

this the people gave way, though unwillingly; the change seemed absolutely necessary at the moment, and they hoped that it would be for a time only, as Pisander suggested. A decree

was passed empowering Pisander to return to Samos with ten envoys, and make the best arrangements that he could for securing Alcibiades and Tissaphernes.¹

¹ Thuc. viii. 53, 54.

At the same time Phrynichus was removed from his command—at the suggestion of Pisander, who knowing that he was opposed to the return of Alcibiades, charged him with treacherously betraying Ionia to Amorges—and with him his colleague, Scironides. Their places were filled by Leon and Diomedon,¹ who were at once despatched to Samos.

14. In his public advocacy of the revolution, Pisander acted a part as legitimate as it ~~was~~ courageous; but before leaving Athens he took other steps to secure his ends, Pisander and the clubs. which have left a dark stain upon the movement. Among the characteristic features of Athenian life were the small associations, which tended to flourish and abound in a society where family influence was imperfectly felt, and where the church was not yet distinguished from the state. They were formed for all kinds of purposes—religious, social, and political—and known by very different names. The members were united by the closest obligations, which, being honourable rather than legal, they could not break without incurring the deepest infamy. So far as they were religious and social, these combinations were tolerated though not supported by the state; no one was thought a worse citizen because he sought enjoyment or protection by joining an *ἐπαινος*, whose members were pledged to some common entertainment, or to save any one of their body who fell into the hands of pirates. With political associations the case was different: these might be open or they might be secret, in support of the constitution, or against it. It had long been the custom of the leading politicians to gather round them a knot of friends on whom they could rely in carrying their measures. More especially was this the case with the oligarchical party, who, being fewer in number, naturally sought the strength of union. In the stormy times which followed the expulsion of the tyrants, Isagoras had been supported by an association of this kind in his

Political
associations
at Athens.

¹ Leon and Diomedon must therefore have returned to Athens from Chios, where we last heard of them, but Thucydides has not recorded this.

attempt to establish an oligarchical government, and in the last struggle against Pericles, Thucydides had carefully organised and drilled his party. In these instances there had been no attempt at concealment, and though the result was a sharper opposition of parties, the practice was no more to be condemned than are the means by which we carry on our party government. It was otherwise in the Peloponnesian war, when personal aims took the place of public. The associations became more secret, their aims less legitimate. Thucydides speaks of conspiracies which had for their object suits at law and public offices, that is, secret societies formed with the purpose of securing for their members success in trials and elections. Such objects were not necessarily criminal; the richer men at Athens had reason enough to protect themselves from the attacks of sycophants, and found it difficult to maintain their position in the government of the city, but the societies might easily become criminal, and being secret they were suspected. Even if they were no more than clubs formed for common amusement, the prevailing distrust and discontent ascribed to them a more sinister motive, especially after the affair of the Hermae in 415.

To these "conspiracies" Pisander now addressed himself, bidding them unite and form some common plan for the overthrow of the constitution. They must set to work at once and prepare the ground against his return from Samos.¹

But the game was far from being won, as Pisander quickly discovered on reaching the court of Tissaphernes. In so far as he advised him to allow the combatants to wear out their strength on each other, Alcibiades had a real influence with the satrap, but beyond this point he could not carry him. Tissaphernes

Pisander at
the court of
Tissaphernes.

¹ Thuc. viii. 54: *ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔσαι, ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*, iii. 82. See Thirlwall, *Hist. Greece*, vol. iv. (8vo), Appendix i. Cp. Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 577:

καὶ τοὺς γε συνισταμένους τούτους, καὶ τοὺς πιλοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖσι διαξῆναι, καὶ τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀποτίλαι.

had no wish to be at war with the Peloponnesians, whom he feared; or to assist the Athenians, whom he distrusted. Alcibiades found himself in the awkward position of a man who has promised more than he can perform. If the Athenians granted all that Persia asked without obtaining Persian aid in return, his failure would be apparent. He must therefore insist on terms which were impossible. When Pisander appeared, he took the business of negotiation upon himself. He demanded that Ionia and all the adjacent islands should be ceded to the King, and this demand, involving the sacrifice of Athenian honour and reputation, was granted. Alcibiades then went farther and insisted that the King should be allowed to build what ships he pleased, and cruise with them along the shores of Asia. Even Athenian oligarchs could not agree to terms, which not only annihilated the Athenian empire, but transferred the control of the eastern Aegean to Persia.¹ Pisander broke off the negotiation in anger, and returned to Samos. The hopes on which the conspirators had chiefly relied in carrying out their scheme were dashed to the ground. Nothing remained of their programme but simple revolution, without any of the advantages which revolution was supposed to bring with it.

Action of Alcibiades.

Pisander breaks with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.

At this time the Athenian fleet was divided into three portions — stationed respectively at Samos, their headquarters, Chalce, and Cos, from all which they watched the Peloponnesians at Rhodes. When Leon and Diomedon arrived, apparently at Chalce, they made an attack on Rhodes, with some success, and finding Chalce the most convenient point of observation, concentrated the fleet at that station, with a view of preventing any movement on the part of the Peloponnesians.

Position of the Athenian fleet.

Meanwhile news was brought from Chios to Rhodes that

¹ Thuc. viii. 56: *ναὺς ἡξίου ἐὰν βασιλεία ποιείσθαι καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν, ὅπη ἂν καὶ ὅσαις ἂν βούληται.*

the fortress of the Athenians at Delphinium was all but completed, and unless help were sent, the island was lost (p. 385).

Affairs at Chios. The facts were even worse than the messenger knew, for after his departure, Pedaritus, the Spartan commander, fell in an attack on the Athenian fortifications, with considerable loss of men and arms. Chios was now completely invested, and the famine became severe.¹

15. For the moment Tissaphernes had broken with both parties; yet he did not intend to withdraw entirely from the war. He feared that the Peloponnesians, if deprived of his support too long, might risk an engagement with inadequate forces, or their navy might melt away, and the Athenians would then gain what they wanted without Persian help. Or they might support themselves by ravaging the King's territory. Soon after the conference with Pisander, he repaired to Caunus, and sending for the commanders of the Peloponnesian fleet from Rhodes, furnished them with supplies, and concluded a third treaty. In this it was agreed that the King's country, so far as it was in Asia, should belong to the King, and that he should deal with it as he pleased. Each party undertook not to damage the possessions of the other, or to allow their allies or subjects to damage it. In regard to supplies, Tissaphernes was to support the Peloponnesian ships at the same rate as before till the arrival of the King's fleet, after which they were to furnish supplies for themselves, or if Tissaphernes furnished them, they must repay the cost at the end of the war. The two fleets were to act together under the joint control of Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians; and, as before, the war was only to be ended by common consent.²

¹ Thuc. viii. 55, 56.

² Thuc. viii. 58. The heading of the treaty is as follows: *ξυνθήκαι ἐγένοντο ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρὸς Τισσαφέρνην καὶ Ἱεραμένην καὶ τοὺς Φαρνάκου παῖδας περὶ τῶν βασιλείως πραγμάτων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων.* The sons of Pharnaces are Pharnabazus and his brother. Hieramenes is a doubtful

In this treaty we see that the remonstrances of Lichas had not been without effect; some limits are assigned to the "country of the King" which the Greeks were not to molest. On the other hand, the question of the European possessions of the Persians is left open; and much more definite conditions are laid down about supplies. We observe also that the King now speaks of his own navy, implying that the Peloponnesian fleet is rather a useful ally than a vital force in the conduct of the war. By promising to bring up this navy—which never appeared—Tissaphernes had prevented the Lacedaemonians from engaging with the Athenians; and he now formally uses the same promise to put a limit to the supplies which they were to receive.

On the conclusion of the treaty, Tissaphernes pretended to make arrangements for the arrival of the Phoenician fleet, while the Peloponnesians at last broke up from their long inaction at Rhodes and returned to Miletus. In this they were not only consulting the wishes of Tissaphernes; they were putting themselves in a better position for the relief of Chios. Envoys had also arrived from Eretria, asking assistance in bringing over Euboea, a step which was again in serious contemplation, and the more so because a combined party of Boeotians and Eretrians had been successful in persuading the garrison of Oropus, on the borders of Attica and Boeotia, opposite Eretria, to surrender the place. The request was refused, or perhaps referred to the authorities at home, who soon after took the matter up. On the way to Miletus, the fleet came in sight of the Athenian squadron, which, under the command of Leon and Diomedon, had been watching them from Chalce, but neither side would engage.¹ The Athenians now returned to Samos to keep watch over their enemy at Miletus.

The relief which the Chians expected from the Pelopon-

person. In Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 9, a Hieramenes is mentioned, who married a sister of Darius.

¹ Thuc. viii. 59, 60, 55.

Nature of the treaty.

The Peloponnesians leave Rhodes for Miletus.

nesians never came, for Astyochus was unable to pass the Athenians without an engagement, which he was probably forbidden to risk till the arrival of the Phoenician fleet. Their position was almost desperate, when they succeeded in bringing up from Miletus a Spartan named Leon, to take the place of Pedaritus, and a small squadron of twelve vessels. Upon this the Chian fleet attacked the Athenians, and though the engagement was not decided, they certainly were not defeated. A few days afterwards the Athenian commander Strombichides found it necessary to leave Chios for the Hellespont, where Abydus and Lampsacus had been induced to revolt by Deréyllidas, the Spartan, of whom we now hear for the first time. Strombichides succeeded in recovering Lampsacus, from which he carried off the slaves and materials of war, but Abydus could neither be persuaded nor forced to return to alliance. Strombichides had to content himself with establishing a garrison at Sestos, to keep watch over the Hellespont.¹ The news of these successes so encouraged Astyochus that he at length ventured to sail with two ships to Chios, and finding that the island was no longer in any danger, he brought back all the Chian ships to join his own fleet at Miletus. With these reinforcements he sailed out to attack the Athenians, but in vain; they refused to leave the harbour.

They were indeed in a miserable plight. On their return from Tissaphernes, Pisander and the envoys, far from abandoning their plans, pursued them with still greater eagerness, and even persuaded some of the leading Samians to join them in establishing an oligarchy, though these had recently helped to destroy the Samian oligarchs. They resolved to go on with the war, and contribute the necessary funds from their own resources; the burden would not press so heavily if borne in their own interests. And with regard to Alcibiades,

The Pelopon-
nesians in
Chios.

Attempted
revolution
at Samos.
Plans of the
oligarchs.

¹ Thuc. viii. 62.

they now discovered that he was not a man suited to an oligarchy, and left him to go his own way. Being firm for revolution at all costs, they sent Pisander and half the envoys back to Athens to complete the revolution there, bidding them establish oligarchies in every city at which they touched on the way; the other half they sent to various subject towns. Diotrephes, who had been chosen to command in the Thracian district, was despatched to his province, where he had no sooner arrived than he put down the democracy at Thasos; but the result was by no means answerable to the expectations of the oligarchs. Two months after his departure, the Thasians began to build walls, and in conjunction with some exiles who had taken refuge with the Peloponnesians, they summoned ships to their aid and went over to Lacedaemon, thus reforming the state and getting rid of the demos without any risk to themselves. And the same thing, Thucydides says, happened in many other cities. When the power of the demos had been checked and the oligarchs could act in safety, they threw aside the sham independence proffered by their fellow-oligarchs at Athens and secured complete freedom.¹

Pisander sent to Athens to complete the revolution there.

Diotrephes at Thasos.

On their way to Athens, Pisander and his colleagues not only put down democracies in any city at which they touched, but collected forces to aid them in their undertaking. When they reached the city, they found that their partisans in the various clubs had been most active in preparing the ground. The first three or four months of the year 411 had been little better than a reign of terror in the city. Androcles, a leading democrat, who had taken the foremost part in expelling Alcibiades, was secretly assassinated by some of the younger oligarchs, and the same fate overtook others who stood in the way of the conspirators. A programme of the

Pisander at Athens.

Reign of terror at Athens.

¹ Thuc. viii. 64. For Diotrephes we ought perhaps to read Diitrephes (*supra*, p. 338). See Goodhart's note.

Reformed Constitution had also been issued, in which it was declared that henceforth no one should receive money for service to the state other than military: that the franchise should be confined to those men who were most able to assist the city in purse and person, and that their numbers should not exceed five thousand. This was meant for the public, for of course the conspirators intended to keep the power in their own hands. The Assembly and the Council still continued to meet as before; but at their meetings such subjects only were discussed as pleased the conspirators; no one spoke who was not of their party, or said anything which they had not previously considered. Opposition was indeed out of the question, for if any one was rash enough to support the democracy, he at once disappeared, and no attempt was made to discover his murderers, or to punish them if they fell under suspicion. The people were terror-struck and dumb; every one thought himself fortunate if silence secured immunity. The extent of the conspiracy was unknown, and therefore exaggerated; to claim sympathy was dangerous, to repel attack impossible: many were found among the conspirators, whose lives and opinions seemed to make such a position impossible, and the popular party, terrified by these instances of treachery, lost all confidence in themselves.¹

16. Pisānder and his colleagues now appeared at Athens, and lost no time in carrying out the remaining part of their

The Revolution: programme. The Athenians were summoned to an Assembly, at which ten² commissioners with full powers were chosen to frame a constitution, and they were to report by a given day to the people. When the day came, the Assembly was again summoned, not in the Pnyx, nor in Athens at all, but in the precinct of Poseidon at Colonus, rather more than a mile

meeting at
Colonus.

¹ Thuc. viii. 66.

² In *Ath. Pol.* c. 29 we have thirty, including the ten Probuli; see Sandys' note.

distant from the city.¹ The Commissioners then brought forward their report, if report it can be called, for they had made no attempt to frame a constitution; and contented themselves with recommending the suspension of the law against illegal proposals, by which, more directly than by any other provision, the stability of the constitution was in ordinary times maintained. Every citizen was now at liberty to make what proposals he pleased, however unconstitutional they might be, and any one who attacked him on the score of illegality was threatened with severe penalties. In other words, the Athenian constitution was now thrown into the melting-pot, and those whose business it was to provide a new model left matters to take their own course, which was exactly what the conspirators wished. Pisander at once came forward with a scheme for a new form of government. He proposed to sweep away all the existing arrangements for public offices; and for the future to abolish the payment of officers; to restrict the franchise, as before, to five thousand citizens; and to place the management of the state in the hands of a new Council of four hundred members, who were to be irresponsible, and empowered to summon the five thousand at their pleasure, and at their pleasure only. The election of the four hundred was arranged as follows: five *proedri* were chosen by the Assembly; of these five, each selected nineteen others; and each of the hundred thus chosen selected three.²

The New
Government
of the Four
Hundred.

Not a word was said against these proposals. So well had

¹ Thuc. viii. 67: *ξυνέκλησαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς τὸν Κολωνόν* (ἵστί δὲ ἱερὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως, ἀπέχον σταδίου μάλιστα δέκα). Thucydides gives us no explanation of the curious word *ξυνέκλησαν*, and no reason for the choice of Colonus. The oligarchs no doubt took steps to hinder the free action of the people by limiting the number present; see Goodhart's note.

² Thuc. viii. 67. For the contradiction between Thucydides and Aristotle, see Appendix ii. I follow Thucydides throughout: (1) as a contemporary, his authority stands first; (2) so vivid and impressive a narrative as his deserves more credit than the confused account of Aristotle.

the ground been prepared, so widespread was the conspiracy, so great the ability of the leading conspirators, that the Athenian people were brought to surrender without a struggle the freedom which they had enjoyed for a hundred years. But the Council of Five Hundred yet remained, and, if resolute, might prove a serious obstacle to the revolution. It was the Council which, in the days of Isagoras, had frustrated the attempt to govern Athens by an oligarchy. The conspirators thought it necessary to proceed with the greatest caution. At this time, owing to the presence of their enemies at Decelea, the Athenians, contrary to their usual custom, were constantly under arms. On the day fixed for the enterprise, the Four Hundred allowed those who were not in the plot to leave their posts for rest or food, but ordered those in their confidence to remain within reach of their arms. They were also supported by a number of foreign troops, Tenians, Andrians, Carystians, and by colonists of Aegina; above all by a band of a hundred young men, whom they could trust to carry out their instructions. Thus prepared against any resistance from the people, they proceeded to the Council-Chamber, each carrying a concealed dagger. Their precautions were needless: the Council of Five Hundred showed not the slightest sign of resistance, and were quite willing not only to leave the House, but to take the pay due for the remainder of their year of office, which was offered to them at the door as they passed out. Their expulsion took place about a month before the close of the Attic year in July.¹

The Four Hundred were now absolute masters of the city. The people had been partly cheated, partly frightened into accepting the revolution, and even those who were under arms for the defence of the city looked on with indifference. All the functions of government, deliberative and executive, were in the hands of the new

Expulsion of
the Council of
Five Hundred,
June 411.

Proceedings of
the New Council.

¹ Thuc. viii. 69. *Ath. Pol.* 32. Cp. Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 808, 809: ἀλλ' Εὐβούλης τῶν πέρυσιν τις βουλευτὴς ἔστω ἀμείνων, παραδοὺς ἑτέρῳ τὴν βουλείαν; οὐδ' αὐτὸς τοῦτο γε φήσεις.

Council, who, after offering the prayers and sacrifices customary upon entering on office, chose by lot¹ some of their number to act as a standing committee, and set about changing the details of the constitution. There was now no general Assembly, and the choice of officers, civil and military, lay entirely with the Council: any one not of their party was no doubt removed from his post to make way for an oligarch, but we cannot follow their action into particulars. All we know is that they ruled the city by force; some citizens whom it was thought convenient to get rid of were put to death, others were imprisoned, others were sent out of the country.²

At one point they stopped short—they did not propose to recall the exiles. On his previous visit to Athens, Pisander had used the name of Alcibiades and his influence with the Persian satrap to win the consent of the Athenian people to a change of the constitution, but after the interview with Tissaphernes these hopes came to an end. Phrynichus, who, since his recall to Athens, had worked heartily in the oligarchical cause, was well aware that the return of his enemy would involve his own destruction. Even in regard to the war, the policy of the oligarchs was no longer in harmony with that of Alcibiades. He was the declared enemy of Sparta, and offered the help of Persia in continuing the war; they had no wish to continue the war, and had therefore no need of Persian help. Their objects were personal: they wished to secure their position and to free the city from the rule of the multitude at any cost; in the pursuit of these aims Alcibiades would have been in their way, and they could not recall the exiles without recalling him.³

¹ Thuc. viii. 70: ἀπεκλήρωσαν.

² Thuc. l.c.: κατὰ κράτος ἐνεμον τὴν πόλιν. For the election of generals, see *Pol. Ath.* c. 31, where a distinction is drawn between the election of the generals before and after the establishment of the Council. For the remainder of the Attic year, generals were to be chosen from the five thousand (by whom?); afterwards the Council was to elect them.

³ Thuc. viii. 91. *Infra*, p. 412. See, however, *Ath. Pol.* 32 end,

They were no sooner in power than they sent envoys to Agis at Decelea, thinking that he would listen to overtures, which came, not from a "faithless multitude," but from oligarchs who sympathised with Lacedaemon. Agis, however, was by no means convinced that the people would acquiesce in the new government; if all were quiet for the moment, new factions would certainly arise, should a large army appear before the gates of the city. So far from entering into negotiations, he at once summoned forces from the Peloponnese, and with these and his own garrison he marched upon Athens, expecting by his approach to throw the citizens into such confusion that they would accept what terms he pleased, or at least to find the Long Walls deserted in the general tumult, and an easy prey to his attack. These plans were foiled by the excellent discipline of the Athenians. Within the city the strictest order was kept, and not a man was moved from his post; when the Peloponnesians came up to the walls, troops were sent out against them with such effect that Agis suffered some loss. Upon this he retired to Decelea, and sent the reinforcements home. He was now more inclined to listen to the overtures which still came to him from the Four Hundred, and they, in their turn, were encouraged to send an embassy to Lacedaemon.¹

17. The success of the conspiracy had been due in a great measure to the absence of large numbers of the citizens. Had the "seafaring rabble" who manned the fleet at Samos been present at the Assembly at Colonus, democracy would not have died so easily at Athens. And, in truth, it was not dead. The fleet now constituted the real power of the city. If the sailors refused to obey orders from home, any treaties which the oligarchs might make

where it is stated that the Athenians abandoned negotiations with Lacedaemon because the Lacedaemonians insisted on the surrender of the empire.

¹ Thuc. viii. 81; see also c. 86, 90; Antiphon and Pisander were the chief movers. The envoys were Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. They never reached Lacedaemon. *Infra*, p. 412.

with Sparta were idle forms. So long as the action of the fleet was undecided, Agis was not likely to retire from Decelea. It was, therefore, essential to the success of the oligarchical movement that it should be supported in the fleet. The situation was the more difficult as the sailors were strongly democratical; and the Samians had recently The revolution risen against their oligarchical government, at Samos.

Yet, before leaving for Athens, Pisander and the Athenians of his party had persuaded a number of the Samians to abandon their new principles, and a body of three hundred had been formed with a view to carrying out a counter-revolution. The conspirators began their work

in the usual manner, with assassination; they June 411.

struck down Hyperbolus, the Athenian demagogue, who, after his ostracism (*supra*, p. 288), had lived at Samos—an act in which they were abetted by Charminus, one of the Athenian generals, and they were about to make an attack on the popular party, when they met with opposition where they perhaps least expected it. The generals Leon and Diomedon, who had been sent out by the oligarchs at Athens to take the place of Phrynichus and Scironides (*supra*, p. 395), were by no means satisfied with the turn Action of Leon and Diomedon; the revolution crushed. which affairs were taking; their sympathies were with the people, in whose confidence and

esteem their influence lay. Thrasybulus also, one of the trierarchs, and Thrasyllus, one of the heavy-armed rank and file, with some others, were known to be warm friends of democracy. When the conspiracy was discovered, the Athenians at once went among the soldiers and sailors, beseeching each one separately to oppose it: more especially they sought out the crew of the *Paralus*, the state ship, who were all Athenian citizens, and ready to attack oligarchy, real or imaginary. The generals were also careful to leave behind a number of ships when they were called away from Samos, and when at last the three hundred made their attack, it was successfully resisted, and democracy was maintained. About thirty of the conspirators were slain;

three who were most deeply implicated were sent into exile: the remainder were allowed to live in peace under the democracy.¹

18. The *Paralus* was at once despatched with the news to Athens. By this time the Four Hundred were in power, and when the crew, who were ignorant of the course of events, landed at Peiraeus, two or three were immediately thrown into prison, while the rest were transferred to a transport vessel and sent to keep watch off Euboea.

But Chaereas, a staunch democrat, who had come out in the ship from Samos, found means to escape and return to the island, where he set about most exaggerated reports of the conduct of the oligarchs. He declared that no one was allowed to say a word against the usurpers; that freeborn Athenians were punished with the lash; that women and children were outraged; and that the oligarchs intended to seize the relations of all the soldiers in Samos who were not of their party with the intention of putting them to death if resistance were made. By these reports

the Athenians in the fleet were roused to such fury that they were on the point of attacking the oligarchs, when the moderates prevented an outbreak by pointing out the danger of a quarrel while the enemy lay at hand to take advantage of it. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, who were now the acknowledged leaders of the democratic party, seized the spirit of the hour to come forward publicly and pledge the soldiers, especially those of the oligarchic faction, by the strongest oaths, not only to forget their differences and maintain the democracy, but to carry on the war with Sparta to the last; and above all, to be uncompromising enemies of the Four Hundred. The same pledges were taken by all the Samians of military age. From this time forward Athenians and Samians made common cause, participating equally in

¹ Thuc. viii. 73.

dangers and successes, and regarding their interests as inseparable. They had no hope but in themselves and in each other; Samian and Athenian would alike perish if the enemy at Miletus or the oligarchs at Athens gained the day.¹ In this common danger the past was forgotten. Thirty years before, Samos had nearly destroyed the Athenian power in the Aegean, but now she was the sole means of preserving it. For if the Samians had joined the oligarchs at this moment, or had merely taken up an independent position, the war would have speedily been brought to an end in the interest of the oligarchs, and democracy would have ceased to be a power in Eastern Greece.

Secure of the support of the Samians, the Athenians took steps to strengthen their position. New generals, among whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, were chosen in the room of the old; and any trier-
New generals
chosen at
Samos.
 archs who were suspected of oligarchical sympathies were replaced by men of sounder principles. They called on each other not to lose heart; Athens was indeed lost to them, but in numbers and resources they had the advantage. They had a base of operations at Samos, a great and famous city, from which they could send out to collect supplies from the allies. It was owing to the fleet that Athens had enjoyed security; they were the protecting force which kept off the Persians and supplied the city. They had it in their power to reduce Athens if the oligarchs refused to restore the ancient constitution, but Athens could neither help nor injure them. She could not send them money, for she had none; nor direct their movements, for they could not trust the destroyer of their liberties. There was also a hope that Alcibiades would yet join them, and bring the King to their side: he and they were both enemies of the Peloponnesians. And at the worst, with such a fleet at command, they could win for themselves a new city and a new country on some distant shore.²

¹ Thuc. viii. 75.

² Thuc. viii. 76.

19. The next step was to approach Alcibiades, without whose assistance there was no hope of obtaining help from Tissaphernes. Hitherto he had declared himself an enemy to democracy, and it was therefore uncertain what attitude he would take up towards the Athenians at Samos, or whether they would receive him. The second difficulty was removed by the persuasive arguments of Thrasybulus and his friends, who at length obtained a formal safe-conduct for the exile. A general assembly of the soldiers was then summoned, at which Alcibiades came forward. For the first time since the Sicilian expedition had left Athens, he stood face to face with an audience of his countrymen. It was soon clear that he had not lost the old power of fascination. After lamenting his exile, not without reproach of those who had been the cause of it, he entered on the political situation. He exaggerated his influence with Tissaphernes, with a view of securing his own position at Samos and shaking that of the oligarchs at Athens, whom he knew to be opposed to his return; and he raised the hopes of his hearers to the highest pitch by declaring that Tissaphernes had pledged himself to keep the Athenians supplied—if only he could put confidence in them—so long as he had any resources left, even if he had to coin the silver fittings of his litter; and that the Phoenician fleet, which was lying at Aspendus, would be brought up to their assistance, and not to the assistance of the Peloponnesians. But on one condition only would his confidence be given to the Athenians—Alcibiades must be received back and placed in a responsible position.¹

On hearing these promises, the Athenians were greatly elated. So far from feeling any anxiety about their own future, they looked forward with confidence to the day when they would bring the Four Hundred to account. Alcibiades was at once elected one of the staff of generals, and entrusted with the control of

Alcibiades
elected general
at Samos.

¹ Thuc. viii. 81: εἰ σὼς αὐτὸς κατελθὼν αὐτῷ ἀναδέξαιτο.

affairs. So great was their enthusiasm that many were eager to sail at once to the Peiraeus, regardless of the enemy who lay at Miletus watching their movements, but this Alcibiades would not permit. The help of Tissaphernes must be first secured, and with this object he departed, immediately the Assembly was over, to the satrap's court.¹ It was now as necessary for him to exaggerate his success with the Athenians to Tissaphernes as it had previously been to overstate his influence with the satrap at Samos.

20. The commissioners of the Four Hundred had reached Delos when they became aware of the state of affairs in Samos. As it was useless to go back, and perhaps worse than useless to go forward, they stayed in the island awaiting the course of events. When they heard that Alcibiades had been received, they ventured to continue their

journey, and on their arrival at Samos they were brought before a meeting at which he was present. The excitement was intense;

The commissioners from Athens arrive at Samos.

for a time the soldiers demanded their instant execution as the destroyers of the democracy, but when at length they obtained a hearing, they entered on an apology for the Four Hundred, contradicting the reports of Chaereas about the treatment of the citizens, and maintaining that the change in the constitution had been made honestly in the interests of the city. Little attention was paid to their words, and the angry temper of the Assembly was shown in a number of conflicting proposals, of which the most popular was a renewal of the resolution to sail at once to the Peiraeus. Alcibiades, who had by this time returned to Samos, again interposed his veto, and repressing the excitement against the ambassadors, he sent them away with the reply that he was willing to accept the Five Thousand as the governing body at Athens, but the Four Hundred must be removed, and the old council of Five Hundred restored. He also expressed his warm approval of

Counsels of Alcibiades.

¹ Thuc. viii. 82.

any measures which had been taken with a view to economy, and bade the Athenians continue the war to the uttermost, for so long as the two parties remained, there was a hope of reconciliation: but a mistake on either side would lead to the ruin of both.¹ In the same Assembly the Athenians were cheered by the presence of some envoys from Argos, who had come over with the crew of the *Paralus* to offer their sympathy and assistance to "the Athenian people at Samos." The Paralians had been recalled from their cruise off Euboea to convey the envoys of the Four Hundred to Lacedaemon, but when sailing off Argos they arrested the ambassadors and deposited them with the Argives, whose envoys they now brought to Samos.²

21. The commissioners at once returned to Athens, and reported the message of Alcibiades. The result was a division

Return of the
commissioners
to Athens.

in the oligarchical party. Pisander and Phrynichus, who had broken with Alcibiades, and

were opposed to his return, resolved to follow the path upon which they had entered: the advice of Alcibiades could have no weight with them while his position at Samos menaced their position at Athens. They were more eager than ever to make terms with Lacedaemon; and for this object were willing to sacrifice not only the Athenian empire, but even the independence of the city, if required. It was better, they thought, to save themselves by admitting the Lacedaemonians into the city than to perish at the hands of the hated democrats, as they certainly would perish, if the constitution were restored. The moderates, on the other

Divisions
among the
Four Hundred.

hand, among whom were Theramenes, the son of Hagnon, and Aristocrates, two of the generals of the Four Hundred, were alarmed at the

turn which events had taken. They recognised the power of Alcibiades and the armament at Samos, and without openly opposing the oligarchs, they urged the policy of making the Five Thousand a real and not a merely nominal part of the

¹ Thuc. viii. 86.

² Thuc. viii. 86. See above, p. 406.

constitution. If the government were kept in too few hands, they would be without the strength necessary for carrying out their measures. These were their public sentiments: in their hearts they were animated partly by personal jealousy—for many of them had been left behind in the race for power by their more able but less scrupulous partisans—partly by real alarm and the desire to save themselves in the coming restoration by posing as democratic leaders.

The extremists saw that their position was threatened. Another embassy was sent to Sparta—Antiphon and Phrynichus being among the envoys—with instructions to conclude peace on any tolerable terms. And meanwhile a fortress which was in course of erection on Eetionea, a projecting spur of land commanding the entrance to the Peiræus, was rapidly pushed on to completion.¹ Within the fortification was included a large portico or store-house, and orders were issued that all the corn in the city should be conveyed into it, and all that was imported should be deposited there—and from thence retailed to the city—orders which made the holders of the fort absolute masters of the supplies of Athens. The building of this fortress had been regarded with suspicion from the first by the more moderate members of the oligarchy, and Theramenes had repeatedly expressed his opinion that it was not so much intended to keep out the Athenian ships from Samos as to admit those of the Peloponnesians.²

Proposals for peace to Sparta; fortification of Eetionea.

When the envoys returned from Sparta without obtaining any terms of peace, and at the same time the news was brought that the Peloponnesian fleet, raised by contingents from Italy and Sicily to forty-two vessels, lay off Las in Laconia in preparation for a descent on Euboea, the worst suspicions were confirmed. Theramenes asserted that the fortress would prove the ruin of the city:

Excitement at Athens.

¹ Thuc. viii. 90. The details are somewhat obscure, but see Goodhart's plan.

² Thuc. viii. 89, 90, 91.

the fleet was intended not for Euboea but for Athens, and unless immediate steps were taken all would be lost. These suspicions were at first whispered about in small knots of the citizens, but the excitement increased every hour. At length Phrynichus, who had recently returned from Sparta, and was perhaps regarded with suspicion more than any other of the extremists, owing to his previous Assassination of Phrynichus. conduct at Samos, was struck down by an assassin in the crowded market-place, near the Council-Chamber. The assassin, who was one of the frontier guard, escaped, and his accomplice, an Argive, who was caught and put to the torture, refused to give the name of any person who had incited him to the act: all that he would confess was that many conspirators were in the habit of meeting at the house of the captain of the Peripoli and elsewhere. The matter was allowed to pass without any further investigation, or at any rate without any severe measures being taken to crush the conspiracy.¹

¹ Thuc. viii. 92 says that the assassin (who escaped) was one of the Peripoli, and that his accomplice (who was captured) was an Argive. Plutarch (*Alc.* 25), who can always be precise where older authorities are vague, gives the name of the Peripolus: Hermon (whom Thuc. mentions, c. 92, as captain of the Peripoli, at Munychia), and adds, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δίκης γενομένης τοῦ μὲν Φρυνίχου προδοσίαν κατεψηφίσαντο τεθνηκότος, τὸν δ' Ἑρμῶνα καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ συστάνας ἐστεφάνωσαν. On the other hand, Lysias asserts (13, § 71) that Thrasybulus the Calydonian and Apollodorus of Megara were the assassins, the actual blow being struck by Thrasybulus—and that both of them escaped. For this service they were subsequently made Athenian citizens by public decree. (The object of Lysias is to prove that Agoratus had nothing to do with the death of Phrynichus.) Lysurgus, while retaining the names Thrasybulus and Apollodorus, gives a different account of the circumstances of the murder: Φρυνίχου γὰρ ἀποσφαγέντος νύκτωρ παρὰ τὴν κρήνην τὴν ἐν τοῖς οἰσίοις ὑπὸ Ἀπολλοδώρου καὶ Θρασυβούλου καὶ τούτων ληφθέντων καὶ ἐς τὸ δεσμοτήριον ἀποτεθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ Φρυνίχου φίλων, κ.τ.λ. And in an inscription belonging to the spring of 409, Thrasybulus and Apollodorus receive rewards from the Athenian people by public decree: *C.I.A.* i. 59; Dittenb. 43; Hicks, 56. See Arnold's note on Thuc. *l.c.*, which, however, was written before the discovery of the inscription. Bergk was the first to connect the inscription with the murder of Phrynichus. Whether he was right

22. The death of Phrynichus was the signal for more energetic action on the part of the moderates. The prevailing suspicion was increased by the movements of the Peloponnesian fleet, which first advanced to Aegina and then returned to Epidaurus. Theramenes insisted that there was no longer any room for doubt or delay, the army must act or they would be lost. Thus encouraged, the hoplites engaged on the works at Eetionea, among whom was Aristocrates, in command of his tribe, and Hermon, the captain of the Peripoli, seized one of the oligarchical generals, named Alexicles, "a man of influence among the clubs," and detained him amid the cheers of the rank and file. The Four Hundred were assembled in the Council-Chamber, Theramenes being with them, when they received intelligence of the outbreak. They wished to suppress it at once by force, but Theramenes checked them, and offered to go and release Alexicles. He took with him one of the generals whom he knew to be of his own party, and went to the Peiraeus, which was now a scene of the wildest excitement. For Aristarchus, a general of the oligarchical party, had come up with a number of the younger knights, and while some thought that Alexicles had been killed, others

Destruction of
the fort at
Eetionea.

in so doing may be doubted. For (1) there is not a word about the assassination in the inscription, nor is Apollodorus mentioned as the accomplice of Thrasybulus; (2) Lysias says that it is clear from the inscription that Agoratus had nothing to do with the matter, but his name is mentioned in this inscription; (3) Thucydides gives no names, but "one of the Peripoli" would naturally be an Athenian citizen, and his accomplice was an Argive. That Thrasybulus and Apollodorus were rewarded for some act which benefited the Athenian people is clear, and in the time of Lysias they were thought to be the murderers of Phrynichus, but his account of the facts is inaccurate. The older contemporary author states that the accomplice was put to the torture: Lysias says that both assassins escaped: in the next generation both were captured! Such is our evidence for an act committed in open day (according to our best authority) in the market-place of Athens. See Gilbert, *Beiträge*, 320 ff., on the whole story; he attempts to explain how Thucydides made his mistakes! But surely Thucydides could have learned the facts from the inscription.

feared an attack on the Peiræus from the city. The older men endeavoured to calm the citizens, and Thucydides, a Thessalian of Pharsalus, the proxenus of the Athenians in that city, was especially active in pointing out the danger of domestic strife when the enemy was at hand to take advantage of the confusion. Theramenes then came forward, and in a loud and angry voice upbraided the soldiers for their action. This was known to be a feint, and produced no effect. The soldiers asked him, in reply, what he thought about the fort: "Should it be destroyed or not?"—and as he now saw which way the feeling ran, he replied: "Yes, if they thought so."¹ The work of destruction was at once begun, but Theramenes, though he had broken with the Four Hundred, was not prepared for the restoration of democracy. He proclaimed the Five Thousand, and called on every one who wished them to govern to help in destroying the fort.

The fort was destroyed; Alexicles was released. On the next day the Four Hundred met in the Council-Chamber; the army in the Peiræus assembled in the theatre of Dionysus near Munychia, and resolved without delay to march to the city, where they piled arms in the temple of the Dioscuri. Deputies came to them from the Four Hundred, who now offered to publish the names of the Five Thousand, and to choose the Four Hundred from them in any way which the Assembly might approve. After long discussions, the soldiers became calmer, and a day was fixed for an Assembly to be held in the theatre of Dionysus, at which the constitution should be settled.

The day came, and at the very moment when the people were gathering in the theatre, the Peloponnesian fleet was seen sailing from Megara along the coast of
 Fear of attack from Sparta. Salamis. The excitement was intense; the warning of Theramenes was remembered; every one thought

¹ Thuc. viii. 92. The historian puts the conduct of Theramenes in a very suspicious light.

that Athens was betrayed. The whole city rushed down to the harbour and prepared to defend it.¹ The squadron passed round Sunium to Oropus on its way to Euboea, but though their worst fears were over, the Athenians found themselves compelled in their distracted state to despatch a fleet for the protection of that island. A battle was fought off Eretria under very disadvantageous conditions and with an inadequate force. For a time the Athenians resisted, but in vain. They were overpowered and driven to the shore. Some escaped to Chalcis, and to a fortress near Eretria, but those who sought refuge in the city were cut down; twenty-two ships and their crews fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians. The whole of Euboea, except Oreus (Hestiaea), now revolted—a very severe blow to Athens, which since the occupation of Decelea had largely depended on the island for supplies.²

23. Athens was well-nigh lost. Ships there were none, nor sailors; the main source of supplies was cut off; the fleet at Samos was alienated; the city was torn with sedition. The enemy were at hand with a victorious fleet: they had but to lie off the Peiraeus, and sedition would develop into civil war; or to blockade the city, and so compel the fleet to abandon Ionia. Either of these plans they could easily have carried out, but as Thucydides remarks, "on this as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved themselves to be the most convenient enemies whom the Athenians could possibly have had."³ The danger passed away, but the panic completed the ruin of the Four Hundred.

An Assembly was held in the Pnyx, the "first of many," at which the Four Hundred were formally deposed, and the government placed in the hands of the Five Thousand, in which number were to be included all the citizens who could provide themselves with body-armour. No one

Deposition
of the Four
Hundred:
excellence of
the constitu-
tion which
followed.

¹ Thuc. viii. 94.

² Thuc. viii. 95, who gives more details of the battle.

³ Thuc. viii. 96.

was to be paid for the discharge of official duties. The details of the constitution were fixed in a series of meetings, and Nomothetae were appointed to revise the laws (see *infra*, p. 420). The government thus appointed was the best which ever existed at Athens in the memory of Thucydides—at least in its early days—a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, under which the city was again able to raise her head. The Athenians at Samos and those at Athens now felt themselves in accord, and though some years still elapsed before they became one city, there was no longer any fear of a serious collision.¹

Of the leaders of the Four Hundred, Pisander, Alexicles, and others retired to Decelea; Aristarchus, who was one of the generals, collected a few archers, “of the most barbarous sort,” and led them to Oenoe, the Athenian fortress on the borders of Boeotia (*supra*, p. 117), which was now being besieged by the Corinthians. Availing himself of his position, he treacherously induced the garrison to capitulate, and Oenoe fell into the hands of the Boeotians. Antiphon and Archeptolemus were arrested and put to death, and their property was confiscated. The same sentence was recorded against the leaders who escaped.² Of the speech made by Antiphon in his defence, Thucydides observes that it was undoubtedly the best ever made by any man tried on a capital charge down to his day. He goes on to describe Antiphon as inferior in *ἀρετή* to none of his contemporaries—a judgment which has been a stone of stumbling.

¹ Thuc. viii. 97; *Ath. Pol.* 33; Beloch, *Griech. Geschich.* ii. 71, speaks of this as the constitution of Theramenes, and undoubtedly Theramenes and Aristocrates were the leaders of the moderate party. When Beloch goes further and asserts that the constitutions described in *Ath. Pol.* 30, 31 refer to the constitution of Theramenes, and not to the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, it is difficult to follow him. There was doubtless great confusion between the two constitutions, and between the proposals of the Four Hundred which were and those which were not carried out. See Thuc. viii. 96, and *infra*, Appendix ii.

² Thuc. viii. 68; Lysias, 7, § 4. The accuser of Antiphon was Andron, himself one of the Four Hundred. Harpocration, *sub voc.* Ἀνδρων.

But ἀπερὴ does not always mean moral virtue. The historian would not for a moment have compared Antiphon and Nicias. Antiphon was as able and effective a man as lived in Athens in his day, and succeeded where success seemed almost impossible. That his aims were treacherous, and that the means he employed to compass them were such as are in use among traitors and conspirators, Thucydides has made perfectly clear. By a judgment somewhat similar Theramenes is said by the historian to be a "good speaker and a sagacious man." This he undoubtedly was, as we shall see, but whether he was honest in his sagacity is one of the puzzles of Greek history.¹

¹ Thuc. viii. 68; Beloch, *l.c.* ii. 72, takes a favourable view, after *Ath. Pol.* c. 28. For Antiphon, see also Plutarch, *Vitae Dec. Orat.*

CHAPTER XII.

FROM THE FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED TO THE FALL OF THE THIRTY.

I. The constitutional history of Athens, from the fall of the Four Hundred to the end of the war, is very obscure.

The Nomo- Who were the Nomothetae mentioned by
thetae. Thucydides, (*supra*, p. 418) and what were
the changes to which he alludes, when he observes that the
government established on the deposition of the Four
Hundred was "in its early days" the best that he had
known? How long did these early days last? When and
how was the democracy restored? To these questions, which
it is easy to ask, no clear answer can be given.

In the Athenian constitution, the decrees of the Assembly were, strictly speaking, administrative acts only, not laws, and how laws were passed in the fifth century at Athens is unknown. It is usually assumed that the process of legislation which existed in the fourth century, and is described by Demosthenes, was in use in the preceding century. Under this arrangement the Nomothetae were little more than a special jury, selected from the ordinary Heliaea, before whom laws were put on their trial—the new against the old, where two came into conflict, or the new on its own merits. It is not likely that such Nomothetae are meant in the present case. More probably a commission is meant, who were to examine the statutes of Athens, and endeavour to bring them into better order. We find traces of such a commission in the appointment of Nicomachus to issue a corrected code of the laws of Solon,¹ and the publication of

¹ Lysias, *Orat.* 30, with Frohberger's Introduction. The task was

the Draconian laws in 409. But the work was not carried out with any completeness—an indication that the government of the Five Thousand did not long continue in power.¹

2. Immediately after assuming office, the new government passed a decree for the recall of Alcibiades and other exiles; and sent envoys to Samos to explain the position of affairs,² and urge the army to vigorous action. Alcibiades did not return: Athens and Samos remained for the present divided; the government at Samos was not the government at Athens, and the generals of the fleet were not the generals in command in the city. This division could not fail to be a source of weakness to the government. The demos quickly recovered its position and took the power from them.³ The real demos was not at Athens, but at Samos, where about eighteen thousand men were now serving in the fleet. Even if half of these were aliens, the remaining nine thousand were a larger portion of the city than the Five Thousand, and after their victory at Cyzicus (*infra*, p. 427), the Athenian sailors would not be in a mood to allow themselves to be excluded from the franchise.⁴ In a very few months, Theramenes and his friends found themselves compelled to relax something from the severe standard of their earliest regulations. In an inscription of 410,⁵ payments are made for the "diobelia" out of the state funds. Whatever the "diobelia" may have been,

Athens divided:
the city and
Samos.

to be finished in four months, but Nicomachus remained in office six years, furnishing laws on demand to those who paid for them—so at least his enemies said—or cancelling those in existence.

¹ For this view of the Nomothetae, see Frohberger, *l.c.*, Gilbert, *Beiträge*, p. 326 ff., who draws a parallel between this legislation and the decree of Tisamenus in 403.

² In Plut. *Alcib.* 32, Critias proposes this decree; in Diodorus, xiii. 38, Theramenes.

³ *Ath. Pol.* c. 34. If the decree of Demophantus (Andoc. *De Myst.* § 96) really belongs to Hecatombaeon 410, there is no doubt that the democracy was restored by that time.

⁴ For the absence of men from Athens in 411, cp. Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 524. Those who were in the city were constantly in armour, cp. *ibid.* 555 ff., and Thuc. viii. 69.

⁵ Dittenberger, *Syll.* 44; *C. I. A.* i. 188.

whether payment to the poorer people to enjoy the festivals, or payment to the jurors, such payment was not contemplated in the first ardour of financial reform. And in the *Constitution of Athens* we are told that this payment was proposed by Cleophon, who was the leader of the extreme democratic party. Cleophon may have been a member of the Five Thousand, but he is not likely to have occupied a leading position among them unless the temper of the Athenians had undergone a considerable change. But the brilliant success of Cyzicus, and the financial relief which followed it, may have made it impossible to repress an outburst of democratic fervour, or to adhere to the strict rule of expenditure laid down in 411.¹

3. While Athens had been well-nigh reduced to despair by the revolt of Euboea, the war in the East had taken a more favourable turn. For some time the Peloponnesian sailors had been much dissatisfied with the conduct of their admiral Astyochus, and Tissaphernes. No advantage had been taken of the anarchy prevailing among the Athenians, though Astyochus had a far superior fleet. Tissaphernes neither brought up the promised Phoenician ships, nor provided regular pay. Astyochus attempted to satisfy his men by offering battle; but the Athenians refused. They had summoned Strombichides from the Hellespont, whither he had been sent with twenty-four ships, and till he arrived they felt their numbers to be insufficient. The Peloponnesians, on the next day, were about to attack Samos, but,

¹ *Ath. Pol.* c. 28. That the sum of two obols constituted some well-known payment at Athens at the time when the *Frogs* was acted (405) is clear from l. 141 of that play: ὡς μέγα δύνασθον πανταχοῦ τὸ δὴ' ὀβολῷ. The scholiast, *ad loc.*, explains it by the juror's fee, and it is possible that the juror's fee, which was abolished under the Four Hundred, was reintroduced at a lower rate—two obols instead of three. But Aeschines, *Fals. Leg.* § 76, asserts that Cleophon corrupted the Athenians by the distribution of money, which is the view taken in the *Ath. Pol.* of the "diobelia."

on learning that Strombichides had returned, they retired to Miletus, and when the Athenians offered battle, they too refused in turn.

The large fleet (a hundred and twelve ships) could not be maintained without Persian help, and, as Tissaphernes was remiss in payment, Astyochus accepted the offer of Pharnabazus, and despatched forty ships to the Hellespont. A storm drove them back, and ten only reached the strait. These brought over Byzantium, where Clearchus, their commander, joined them.¹

The ill-feeling against Astyochus and Tissaphernes continued to increase, and when it was known that Alcibiades had returned to Samos, the sailors were more exasperated than ever. More especially the Syracusan and Thurian sailors, who were free men, were outspoken in their demands for pay, and when Astyochus answered them roughly and even threatened Dorieus of Thurii with his staff, they broke into open violence. Astyochus only saved his life by taking refuge at an altar. The Milesians, not less indignant, drove out the garrison from a fort which Tissaphernes had built in their city, in spite of the remonstrances of Lichas, the Spartan general, who counselled submission.²

About midsummer, Astyochus was succeeded in his office by Mindarus. He returned to Sparta, and with him an envoy from Tissaphernes, to complain of the conduct of the Milesians, and defend himself against attacks. The Milesians also sent envoys, together with Hermocrates the Syracusan, who had been especially vehement in condemning the inactivity and treachery of the Spartan management of the fleet. Meanwhile Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, under pretence of bringing up the Phoenician fleet, which was there, in number 147 ships, and appointed Tamos his agent in his absence. At Aspendus he was joined by Alcibiades.³

¹ Thuc. viii. 78-80.

² Thuc. viii. 87, 88.

³ Thuc. viii. 83, 84.

Upon this Mindarus delayed no longer. Convinced of the dishonesty of Tissaphernes, he left Miletus for the Hellespont, but a storm compelled him to take refuge at Icarus, whence he sailed to Chios. Thrasyllus started in pursuit with the Athenian fleet, and observing that the enemy was at Chios, he made Lesbos his headquarters, intending to attack him there. He also wished to recover Eresus, which had revolted. Thrasybulus had already reached the place, having sailed direct from Samos. While they were thus engaged, Mindarus was able to slip away from Chios to Rhoeteum in safety. The small Athenian squadron, which had previously been sent into the straits to watch Clearchus (*supra*, p. 423), escaped with some loss to Lesbos, and joined the fleet, which they found quietly besieging Eresus, never supposing that the Peloponnesians would escape them. The Athenians at once followed the enemy to the Hellespont, and prepared for action.¹

4. The battle took place off Cynossema, a promontory in the Chersonese, near Madytus. The Athenian ships, seventy-six in number, lay along the Chersonese, from Idacus to Arrhiani. The Peloponnesian, which numbered eighty-eight, extended from Abydus to Dardanus on the opposite shore. Mindarus, on the left wing, was opposed to Thrasybulus; the Syracusans, on the right, to Thrasyllus. As the Peloponnesian left extended beyond the Athenian, Mindarus wished to shut them into the strait, and, at the same time, to force their centre back upon the land. Thrasybulus was, however, able to over-lap Mindarus, and secure the passage into the open; but, at the same time, the Athenian left passed beyond Cynossema, and the centre being thus weakened by the extension of the wings, the Peloponnesians were able to drive it on shore. Neither right nor left wing could render assistance, and, indeed, the projecting promontory prevented Thrasyllus from seeing what was taking place. But the Peloponnesians, in their eager pursuit of the defeated enemy,

¹ Thuc. viii. 99-101.

allowed their line to fall into disorder. Thrasybulus at once left off extending his wing, turned upon the ships opposed to him, and put them to flight. He then attacked the victorious centre, which, owing to the confusion, fell into a panic, and hardly offered any resistance. Thrasyllus meanwhile had defeated the Syracusans; the Athenians were victorious along the whole line.¹ In material advantage the Athenians did not gain much by the victory, for though they destroyed twenty-one of the allied ships, they lost fifteen of their own. But the moral effect was great; they had once more proved their superiority at sea. They ceased to depreciate themselves or to think much of their enemies' seamanship. In the city the news of the victory was received with delight; the Athenians could hardly believe their good fortune. Their spirits rose; once more they began to have hopes of victory, and their immediate anxiety was greatly lessened on finding that the Peloponnesian ships were summoned by Mindarus from Euboea to the Hellespont. After repairing their ships, the fleet captured eight more of the enemy's fleet, and recovered Cyzicus.²

Alcibiades now returned from Aspendus, declaring that he had made Tissaphernes a firmer friend of the Athenians than ever. Tissaphernes, however, finding that the Peloponnesians were resenting his conduct in Tissaphernes. every way, thought it prudent to follow them to the Hellespont and explain; it was not to his advantage that Pharnabazus should succeed where he had failed. His first step was to visit Ephesus and offer sacrifice to Artemis.³

The fleet from Euboea did not reach Mindarus without very serious loss, owing to a storm.⁴ It was followed by a

¹ Thuc. viii. 104, 105. See the plan in Goodhart's *Thuc.* viii. p. 164.

² Thuc. viii. 107.

³ The history of Thucydides breaks off with the arrival of Tissaphernes at Ephesus.

⁴ Diod. xiii. 41 states that Epicles and Hippocrates, whom Mindarus sent to bring away Hegesandridas and his fleet, sailed back with fifty ships, which were entirely lost, except twelve men, of whom Hippocrates must have been one, for we hear of him again.

small detachment of Athenian vessels, which were no longer required at home, and a slight engagement took place. Soon afterwards Dorieus brought up his ships from Rhodes. The Athenians attacked him as he entered the Hellespont, and a general engagement followed. The event was still undecided when Alcibiades arrived with eighteen ships from Samos, upon which the Peloponnesians broke and fled to Abydos. When they reached the shore, they were vigorously supported by Pharnabazus, who rode his horse into the sea, calling on his soldiers, horse and foot, to follow him and beat off the enemy. The Athenians sailed back to Sestos, taking with them thirty of the enemy's ships, and those which they had lost in the previous engagement. The greater part of the fleet then dispersed to collect money. Thrasyllus was sent to Athens to report and ask for reinforcements.¹

5. Tissaphernes, on arriving in the Hellespont, was at once visited by Alcibiades, who brought presents and tokens of friendship. The Persian replied by arresting him, declaring that he had orders from the King to make war on the Athenians. Alcibiades was taken to Sardis, and there remained for thirty days, when he escaped to Clazomenae. He subsequently rejoined the Athenians at Cardia, whither they had retired to avoid an attack from Mindarus, and on hearing that the Peloponnesians had gone to Cyzicus, he resolved to attack them there. Crossing over to Sestos, where the fleet was instructed to meet him, he was on the point of setting out, when he was joined by two detachments of ships, one under Theramenes from Macedonia, the other under Thrasybulus from Thasos.²

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 1; Diod. xiii. 45, 46; Plut. *Alcib.* 27.

² After helping to arrange the new constitution at Athens, Theramenes had been sent to the Euripus, where he vainly endeavoured to prevent the completion of a mole, joining Euboea and Boeotia. He then visited the islands, levying contributions, and restoring democracy at Paros; subsequently he aided Archelaus of Macedonia in besieging Pydna, whence he sailed to the Hellespont (Diod. xiii. 47, 49). The Four Hundred were deposed in August or September

Alcibiades was anxious to come upon the enemy before this addition to his force was known. When, on the next day, he arrived at Proconnesus, he found that Mindarus, supported by Pharnabazus, had captured Cyzicus. He remained in the island for the rest of the day, keeping under strict control all the craft, down to the smallest boat, and forbidding any one to cross to the mainland under pain of death. Next morning he assembled his men and addressed them, pointing out that they had no supplies, while the enemy was supported in abundance by the Persians; whatever the conditions, they must fight—on sea, on land, and if necessary against walls and fortifications. In the midst of a storm of rain and a heavy fog he set sail for Cyzicus, The battle of Cyzicus.

but as he approached the town the sky cleared, and he saw the Peloponnesian fleet exercising at a distance from the harbour, to which his ships prevented their return. The Peloponnesians, when they saw themselves cut off from the town by a superior force, hastened to land, and forming their ships into a compact line, defended themselves against the Athenian attack. Alcibiades now withdrew twenty ships from his line, and passing behind it, put the crews on shore in order to take the Peloponnesians in the rear. He was met by Mindarus, who also disembarked a number of his men, but Mindarus was slain, and his soldiers put to flight. The whole fleet fell into the hands of the Athenians, except the ships of the Syracusans, which were set on fire. Alcibiades returned with his prizes to Proconnesus.¹

From Proconnesus he again advanced to Cyzicus, intending to attack the town, but the inhabitants, finding themselves abandoned by Pharnabazus and the Peloponnesians, admitted him without resistance. Once more master of the sea, he used his power to recruit the finances of Athens. From

411, and the battle of Cyzicus was fought in March 410—so that little time can have been devoted by Theramenes to the new constitution.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 1. 13 ff. Diodorus, xiii. 49-51, gives a different account, and Plutarch also in some points, *Alcib.* 28.

Cyzicus, where he remained twenty days, he exacted large sums; then he sailed to the Bosphorus, collecting money on the way from Perinthus and Selymbria. At Alcibiades collects supplies. Chrysopolis, opposite Byzantium, he built a fortress and custom house, after which he returned to the Hellespont, leaving Theramenes with thirty ships to collect the dues and keep the strait open.¹

6. The Peloponnesians were for a time paralysed by their defeat. Hippocrates, the second in command, sent home a message of despair, which never reached Sparta, but was intercepted and carried to Athens: "Our ships are gone: Mindarus is dead: the crews are starving: we know not what to do." From this helpless plight they were roused by the energy and faithfulness of Pharnabazus. To every soldier he gave a cloak and money sufficient for two months. The sailors he equipped in heavy arms, and bidding them take no heed of the loss of timber while their lives were safe, he dispersed them to guard the coast of his satrapy. He then assembled the generals of the various contingents in the Peloponnesian fleet, and bade them build triremes at Antandrus as many as they had lost.² Wood they could get from Ida, and money he would supply. But though the Syracusans seem to have replaced their twenty ships in a short time, it was many months before the Peloponnesians were again in possession of an adequate fleet.³

The success of the Peloponnesians since the renewal of the war had not been such as to make a warlike policy popular at Sparta. It was true that Agis was master of Attica, and that the Asiatic cities of the Athenian empire were in revolt; but Athens could still keep a fleet on the sea, and she had triumphed over domestic faction, her greatest danger.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 1. 20 f.; Diod. xiii. 52, 64.

² The Antandrians had obtained a garrison from the Peloponnesians on their arrival in the Hellespont to protect them against the oppression of Tissaphernes and the treachery of his lieutenant Arsaces; Thuc. viii. 108. For the previous fortunes of the town see *supra*, p. 234.

³ Xen. *Hell.* i. 1. 23-26.

Tissaphernes had proved a faithless friend; Alcibiades was again an Athenian general; Astyochus had shown himself incompetent and dishonest. The reports brought home from the fleet, the conflicting statements of Tissaphernes, Astyochus, Hermocrates, and the envoys from the sailors, had opened the eyes of the Spartans: they now understood why their fleet had remained inactive for months at Rhodes; and why Astyochus had taken no advantage of the distracted state of the Athenians at Samos. Since the fleet had gone to the Hellespont, in spite of the active aid of Pharnabazus, one disaster had followed on another, and now came the tidings of its utter destruction. If peace could be had on tolerable terms, peace was desirable. So Endius (*supra*, p. 370) appeared at Athens, proposing a *uti possidetis* so far as the cities ranged on either side were concerned; a withdrawal of troops from the garrisons, and an exchange of prisoners, man for man. The

The Spartans
propose peace;
Athens rejects
it.

Spartans, no doubt, greatly exaggerated the distress to which they had reduced Athens by the desolation of Attica, the liberation of Euboea, and the cutting off of supplies from the cities of the empire; and Endius is said to have pointed out that peace was needed quite as much in the interests of Athens as of Sparta. They were quickly undeceived. So far from being cast down by misfortune, the Athenians were elated by their victory; their constitution was being restored to them; their revenues were much improved, and they had hopes of recovering their empire. On Cleophon's motion the proposals for peace were rejected.¹

7. The misfortunes of the Peloponnesian fleet were increased

¹ Xenophon does not mention this proposal; Diodorus, xiii. 52, 53. The terms are: τὰς μὲν πόλεις ἔχειν, ὥς ἑκάτεροι κρατοῦμεν, τὰ δὲ φρούρια τὰ παρ' ἀλλήλοις καταλύσαι, τῶν δὲ ἀιχμαλώτων λυτροῦντες ἀνθ' ἑνὸς Ἀθηναίου λαβεῖν ἓνα Λάκωνα. In the archonship of Theopompus (411-410), Philochorus, *frag.* 117. Diod. gives us the speech of Endius, and his account is supported by Nepos and Justin. For Cleophon, who from now till his death in 404 was among the leaders of the democracy, see *supra*, p. 422, and *infra*, p. 450. He was a lyre-maker by trade.

by the loss of Hermocrates and his colleagues. Though not less unsuccessful than the rest in the recent conflicts, they had displayed more capacity and resolution; but they had lost their ships, and to this they probably owed the loss of their position. During the absence of Hermocrates from Syracuse the extreme democrats, with Diocles at their head, had risen to power, and as Hermocrates was not in Banishment of favour with the party or their leader, they did Hermocrates. not let the opportunity slip. He was banished with his colleagues, and new generals were sent out to take his place.¹ Hermocrates communicated the decision of his government to his soldiers, and at their request he remained in office till his successors arrived. In the interval the new vessels were finished, and they were sent to join the new generals at Miletus. Hermocrates himself repaired to Pharnabazus, with whom he visited the court of Susa. We shall hear of him again in Sicily, but he takes no further part in the Peloponnesian war.²

Meanwhile Thrasyllus was raising a force at Athens. He had returned to the city shortly before the battle of Cyzicus. The success of the fleet was greatly in his favour, and he was able to convince the Athenians of his personal capacity by obtaining a slight advantage over Agis, who, venturing Thrasyllus too near the walls of the city, was repulsed at Athens. with loss. He took out a fleet of fifty ships, with a thousand heavy-armed and a hundred horse. Soldiers were needed now no less than sailors, for the victories of the fleet had enabled the Athenians to attack the revolted cities on land. That the Athenians should have been able to furnish such a force is truly wonderful; the fleet was still in the Hellespont, it was still necessary to keep watch on the walls of Athens day and night, and no supplies could be drawn from Attica and Euboea. With reason might Agis

¹ *Infra*, p. 481.

² Xen. *Hell.* i. l. 27-30. For the journey to Susa, cp. Thuc. viii. 85, *infra*, p. 434. In a short time the Syracusans found it necessary to withdraw their ships from the Aegean for use at home.

exclaim, as he saw the corn ships sailing past from Pontus to the Peiræus, that it was of little use for him to remain at Decelea, if Athens could be fed from the north. At his request Clearchus, who must have been recalled (*supra*, p. 424), was sent back with a few ships, collected from Megara and other allies, to the Hellespont. He succeeded in escaping from the Athenians with some loss, and once more established himself at Byzantium.¹

8. In the summer of 410 Thrasyllus set sail from Athens. He had come to the city to collect forces for the support of Alcibiades in the Hellespont, but the subsequent victory of Cyzicus made this unnecessary, and he directed his course to Ionia. After defeating the Milesians at Pygela, and obtaining possession of Colophon, he made an incursion into Lydia, where the corn was now ripe, and collected a large amount of spoil, burning the villages and devastating the country. He then attempted an attack on Ephesus. Dividing his forces into two detachments, he landed his heavy-armed at the foot of Mount Coressus, He is defeated at Ephesus. to the south of the city, the light troops and cavalry on the marsh to the north. In both divisions he was severely defeated; the Ephesians being greatly assisted in their defence by the Syracusans, whose twenty ships had by this time been completed and placed under the command of the new generals, together with five additional vessels, and by troops brought up by Tissaphernes, who had received warning of the intended attack. Thrasyllus retired to Lesbos. While lying at anchor at Methymna, he caught sight of the Sicilian vessels sailing back to the Hellespont, and at once put to sea in pursuit. Five of the ships he Thrasyllus in the Hellespont. captured with their crews; the remainder he pursued to Ephesus.² He now joined Alcibiades at Sestos,

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 1. 35, 36. According to Diodorus, Clearchus was present at the battle of Cyzicus, *l.c.* c. 51.

² The captives were placed in the stone quarries of Peiræus, but in the following winter they dug their way out, and escaped, some to Decelea, others to Megara.

and the whole fleet crossed to Lampsacus, to winter quarters. But when Alcibiades wished to combine the squadron of Thrasyllus with his own, his soldiers refused to unite with men who had been recently defeated, and it was not till they had joined in a successful engagement with Pharnabazus that the two sections became one army. The winter was spent at Lampsacus, in fortifying the town and in making incursions into the King's country.¹

During this winter (*i.e.* October 410-April 409) the Lacedaemonians at length succeeded in driving the Athenians out of Pylus. Xenophon merely informs us that "the Helots who had deserted from Malea to Coryphasium" were allowed by the Lacedaemonians to go out on terms. From Diodorus we learn that the Athenians, on hearing that Pylus was closely invested, sent Anytus with thirty triremes to relieve it, but he was prevented by contrary winds from passing Malea, and returned home. Eager to bring the siege to an end, the Lacedaemonians seem to have offered favourable terms, which were accepted. Whether Anytus was to blame, or not, he was put on his trial on his return, and only escaped conviction by bribing his judges.² Another misfortune which befell Athens about this time was the loss of Nisaea. With the help of the Megarians the Syracusan prisoners who had escaped from Peiraeus, and perhaps at their instigation, the Megarians, by a sudden attack, recovered their port. The Athenians at once came up with a considerable force, and succeeded in

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 2. 1-17; Diod. xiii. 64; Plut. *Alc.* 29. I have put the expedition of Thrasyllus in 410 in spite of the difficulty about the rebuilding of the twenty Syracusan ships, which were finished between the battle of Cyzicus (spring) and some little time before the battle of Ephesus (summer). If we put the expedition in 409, we have to account for (1) the long delay of Thrasyllus at Athens (from the beginning of 410 to May 409), and (2) for the inaction of Alcibiades during these months. But see Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* ii. 79, note, and his paper in *Philol.* 43, p. 293 f.

² Xen. *l.c.* 2. 18; Diod. xiii. 64; *Ath. Pol.* 27. Anytus is said to have been the first who succeeded in bribing a jury. Afterwards he became notorious as one of the accusers of Socrates.

defeating the Megarians, but their success was in vain. Nisaea passed out of their hands.¹ The Spartans also had their losses. From the first their colony at Heraclea had been a source of disaster to them, and now, owing to the treachery of the Achaeans, their harmost Labotas was slain with 700 men in a conflict with the neighbouring Oetaeans.²

9. In the spring of the following year (409) the Athenians advanced to Proconnesus, with the intention of carrying on the war in the Bosphorus. Their first operations were at Chalcedon. The Chalcedonians, who had been informed of their approach, had collected their movable property, and placed it for safety with their friends and neighbours the Thracians of Bithynia. Alcibiades at once marched to the Bithynian frontier with a small force of horse and foot, supported by the fleet, and demanded the property. The Thracians were unable to refuse the request, and Alcibiades returned to Chalcedon laden with spoil. He

Alcibiades at
invested the city by drawing a trench and Chalcedon.
palisade round it from the Bosphorus to the Propontis, and where the work was intersected by the river Chalcedon (?) he fortified the banks on either side as securely as the nature of the ground permitted. The Lacedaemonian governor of the town, Hippocrates, offered battle within the lines, while Pharnabazus appeared with a large force outside the city. The issue was doubtful for a time, but when Alcibiades brought up reinforcements, the Chalcedonians fled into the city, with the loss of their commander, and Pharnabazus retired to his camp. Alcibiades then left for the Chersonese to collect money, placing the army in the command of Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus. In his absence these
Agreement
with
Pharnabazus.
generals came to terms with Pharnabazus, who agreed to pay the Athenians twenty talents, and to conduct their ambassadors to the King. The Chalcedonians on their part pledged themselves to pay the ordinary

¹ Diod. xiii. 65. Xenophon does not mention this incident.

² Xen. *Hell.* i. 2. 18. For Heraclea, see *supra*, p. 275. The Lacedaemonians seem to have recovered the place from the Boeotians.

tribute¹ to Athens, with all arrears; and the Athenians undertook not to make war on Chalcedon till the return of the embassy. The convention was subsequently ratified by Alcibiades on behalf of Chalcedon, after which Pharnabazus retired to Cyzicus, bidding the envoys meet him there. The embassy, which consisted of five Athenians and two Argives, was joined by envoys of the Lacedaemonians, including Pasippidas, the admiral chosen to succeed Mindarus, together with Hermocrates and his brother Proxenus. When the winter came on, they had advanced no further than Gordieum, in Phrygia, where for the present they remained.²

Alcibiades, who had not only collected large supplies in the Chersonese on his previous visit, but had captured Selymbria, and even made an attempt on Byzantium, had taken the oaths to Pharnabazus by proxy at Chrysopolis in the Bosphorus. He now led the fleet to the European coast to attack Byzantium, which was held by Clearchus with some Laconian, Megarian, and Boeotian troops (*supra*, p. 431). The assault soon passed into a siege, and Clearchus did not hesitate to reserve what food there was for the use of the garrison. He then left the city in the care of the Megarian and Boeotian commanders, and repaired to Pharnabazus to collect money and ships—for the Lacedaemonian fleet was now being restored: a few ships had been left in the Hellespont by Pasippidas; others had been built at Antandrus; others were off the coast of Thrace in command of Agesandridas,³ all which Clearchus hoped, with the help of Pharnabazus, to collect, organise, and make efficient. In his absence a party in Byzantium betrayed the city to the Athenians to save the inhabitants from starvation. The garrison were surprised, and compelled to surrender.⁴

¹ This implies that the duty on exports (*supra*, p. 338) had been removed and the old system revived—in certain places, at any rate.

² Xen. *l.c.* i. 3. 1-14. For Pasippidas, who had fallen under a suspicion of treacherous dealings with Tissaphernes while collecting ships at Thasos, see Xen. *l.c.* i. 1. 32.

³ Xen. *Hell.* i. 3. 17.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* i. 3. 18-22.

and the Athenians thus acquired possession of both sides of the Bosphorus.

10. In the next spring (408) Pharnabazus and the envoys went forward from Gordieum on their way to Susa. They were met by a former embassy of Lacedaemonians, Boeotius and others,¹ returning from Susa, who informed them that their mission was useless; the Lacedaemonians had carried every point with the King. With them was Cyrus, the King's younger son, who had been sent to take the command on the coast, and aid the Lacedaemonians in the war.² He carried with him a royal letter addressed to all the cities of the coast, and bearing the King's seal, by which he was appointed "Caranus, or chief, of all the forces which muster at Castolus." The Athenian envoys on hearing this wished to go on at once to Susa, or to return home; but at the request of Cyrus, Pharnabazus detained them, and it was three years before they were set at liberty. The Lacedaemonians, Argives, and Syracusans in the embassy were not, of course, subject to any restraint.

Cyrus is sent down to the coast.

With the exception of Abydus, the whole of the Hellespont was once more a part of the Athenian empire. The city was in possession of an all-powerful fleet, and her resources had been largely increased. This had mainly been the work of Alcibiades, and the time seemed to have come when he might return to Athens with safety. The fleet had been divided into three portions. Thirty ships had been sent to Thrace under Thrasybulus to collect money; twenty Alcibiades took to Samos and Caria, where he collected no less than a hundred talents immediately after the conquest of Byzantium; the remainder returned to Athens in the care of Thrasyllus. From Caria, Alcibiades sailed to Samos, and from thence to Paros, with a

Alcibiades prepares to return home.

¹ This embassy has not been mentioned before by Xenophon, and nothing more is known about it.

² Xen. *Hell.* i. 4. 3: *κάρανον τῶν εἰς Καστωλὸν ἀθροιζομένων*. Both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were now subject to Cyrus.

small part of his force, and hearing that the Lacedaemonians were preparing a new fleet of thirty vessels in their dock at Gytheum, he at once sailed thither to satisfy himself of the fact. He was also anxious to receive news from his friends at Athens, being still uncertain of the feeling towards him in the city. He now learned that he had been elected one of the generals for the year, and without further delay he sailed to the Peiraeus. Seven years had elapsed since he had left the city, in the pomp of the great Sicilian expedition—years in which he had done great good and great evil to his state. He had become the foremost man in Hellas. At Sparta and at Sardis, no less than at Athens, he had carried all before him. At his approach the Athenians crowded to the port, eager to catch a glimpse of their great citizen. Some were his ardent partisans, who declared that his banishment had been unjust, the work of enemies who wished to bring about his destruction for their own purposes. Others still looked on him as the chief source of evil in the past, and of danger in the future. So apprehensive was Alcibiades that some attack would be made upon him that he refused to go ashore, till he caught sight of his cousin Euryptolemus and other friends, to whose protection he could trust. Meetings were held of the Council and Assembly, at which he declared that he was the victim of injustice, and guiltless of the sacrilege laid to his charge. He carried the people with him, and without a protest from his enemies he was elected general with full powers, as the one man who could save Athens and restore her empire.¹

II. Alcibiades arrived at Athens on the day of the Plynteria, on which the statue of Athena was disrobed and

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 4. 10, Diodorus, xiii. 68, and Athenaeus, xii. 49 give a highly coloured account of the return of Alcibiades, which becomes more highly coloured still in the hands of Duris; but the historians of the fourth century are more restrained. Alcibiades no doubt brought with him the hundred talents from Caria, but the spoils and captured vessels had already been conveyed to Athens by Thrasyllus, and helped to turn the tide in favour of Alcibiades.

cleansed. It was a solemn day in the Athenian calendar, on which business was suspended; and this was afterwards remembered as ominous of the later fortunes of Alcibiades. He remained in the city three months or more, and made amends to the Eleusinian deities, whose rites he had profaned, by conducting the procession to Eleusis at the time of the mysteries by land, which the Athenians had not ventured to do since Agis had occupied Decelea. In October he set sail with a large armament, 1500 heavy-armed, 150 horse, and 100 ships. After an attack on Andros, which had revolted, he returned to Samos, and found that in his absence changes were taking place of the first importance.

Return of
Alcibiades
to Ionia.

Cyrus, as we have seen, had been sent down in the spring of the year to take command of the forces on the coast. He spent the summer, we do not know how or where, for it was not till late in the year that he arrived at Sardis. Here he was visited by Lysander, who, shortly before the return of Alcibiades, had come out as admiral of the Lacedaemonian fleet, in the place of Cratesippidas, who had succeeded Pasippidas. Lysander had employed the interval in collecting ships, and before approaching Cyrus, he was master of a fleet of seventy vessels. The meeting of the two men was the turning-point in the war. Sparta had at last found the right man for her work, and her action was no longer to be crippled by the vacillating and treacherous policy of Tissaphernes.¹

Lysander
sent out as
navarch.

Cyrus had brought a large sum of money with him, and was also prepared to spend his own resources, even to melting down the throne on which he sat. But when Lysander asked for a drachma a day for his sailors, he replied that his instructions from the King would not allow such a rate of pay. Half a drachma (3 obols) and no more would be paid to each man, but the Lacedae-

Lysander and
Cyrus.

¹ That Cyrus came to the coast early in the year is clear from Xenophon, *Hell.* i. 4. 3, for the envoys actually saw him.

monians might maintain as many ships as they pleased. Lysander was not to be foiled. After the banquet, when Cyrus drank to him, and asked how he could gratify him, he replied, "By adding an obol to the sailors' pay." This was done, and the timely liberality roused the greatest enthusiasm among the Spartan fleet. The Athenians were proportionately discouraged. They endeavoured, with the help of Tissaphernes, to bring Cyrus back to the old plan of wearing out each combatant upon the other, but Cyrus would not listen to the suggestion. A new policy was on foot, and Alcibiades must have been bitterly conscious of the change: He was no longer a power with the Persians.

12. Lysander returned to Ephesus, where he remained for the winter (408-407), quietly refitting and repairing his fleet. Alcibiades, who had hitherto remained inactive at Samos, now sailed to the help of the Athenians at Notium. Thrasybulus, who was fortifying Phocaea, leaving his pilot Antiochus in command, with instructions not to attack Lysander. Moved by curiosity or contempt, Antiochus sailed with his own ship and one other into the harbour of Ephesus, and passed under the prows of Lysander's vessels. This led to an engagement, in which Lysander bringing his whole fleet to bear upon the Athenians, who hastened up in detachments, defeated them, and destroyed fifteen of their ships. Alcibiades at once returned to Samos and offered battle, but Lysander refused, as his fleet was by no means equal in numbers to that of the Athenians¹ (407).

When this reverse became known at Athens, the popular feeling turned against Alcibiades. He had done nothing to realise the great hopes entertained at his election; he had failed in the negotiations through Tissaphernes; and he was now accused of negligence in his command, and deposed. In his room ten generals were elected, whose names are connected with one of the most melancholy passages in Greek history—Conon,

Alcibiades is
deposed from
his command.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 5. 1-15.

Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Arches-tratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenes.¹ Alcibiades retired to a fortress which he had built in the Chersonese, near Bisanthe. His place at Samos was taken by Conon, who was despatched from Andros where he had been left by Alcibiades, with the twenty ships under his command. He at once reorganised the fleet, selecting seventy of the best ships, and manning them with the most efficient sailors. With this force, though less by forty ships or more than the fleet of Alcibiades, he was able to make descents on the territory of the enemy.²

Conon's place at Andros was taken by Phanosthenes, with a small squadron of four triremes. On his way thither he overtook two Thurian ships, which he captured with their crews. Among the prisoners was Dorieus of Rhodes, a famous athlete, who having been banished from Rhodes by the sentence of the Athenians—in the period when Rhodes was still a subject ally of the Athenian empire—had settled at Thurii, and taken command of Thurian ships against Athens.³ When he was brought to Athens, the citizens decided by public decree to treat him with the respect due to an

¹ Xen. i. 5. 16-17; Plut. *Alcib.* 36; Diod. xiii. 73. That he was deposed is clear from Lysias, 21. 7. Xenophon mentions Aristocrates and Adimantus as generals chosen with Alcibiades to act on land when he left Athens, *Hell.* i. 4. 21. Thrasybulus and Conon were also generals for this year, *ib.* i. 4. 10, and probably Thrasyllus. If so, Conon, Androcles, and Thrasyllus were continued in office; Thrasybulus, Alcibiades, and Adimantus deposed. It is doubtful whether the elections of generals were always held at the ordinary time in these later years of the war, or whether the ten were always elected at one time. Before Alcibiades returned to Athens, he, Conon, and Thrasyllus were chosen; this may have been at the ordinary time. Then Alcibiades seems to have received full power by a later election or confirmation; and the election of Aristocrates and Adimantus is not mentioned till Alcibiades is leaving Athens. The date of the battle of Notium is uncertain, but it would seem to have taken place late in the summer of 407, for the generals elected after it are in office in autumn 406, when the battle of Arginusae was fought.

² *Hell.* i. 5. 18-21.

³ Thuc. iii. 8; viii. 35, 84, *supra* p. 426.

Olympian victor; the rest of the captives were sold, but he was set at liberty.¹

Before entering on the final crisis of the war, we may turn aside for a moment to listen to a conversation which, as Xenophon tells us, Socrates held with Pericles the younger, the son of the statesman (*supra*, p. 132), about the time when he was looking forward to becoming one of the generals of Athens.

We cannot of course be precise about the year, but we may fix it at no long time before the battle of Arginusæ.

After dwelling on the glorious actions of Athens in old days, Pericles continues:—

The wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came to decline.

Soc. I think we are the victims of our own success. Like some athlete, whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians, in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are become degenerate.

Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?

Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the institutions of our forefathers—applying them to the regulation of our lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like success; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs to-day, adopting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival their excellence, or by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim at, rise superior.

You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; as, for instance, when will Athenians, like the Lacedæmonians, reverence old age—the Athenian who hates his own father as a starting-point for the contempt he pours upon grey hairs? When will he pay as strict an attention to the body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, but laughs to scorn those who are careful in the matter? When shall we Athenians so obey our magistrates—we who take a pride, as it were, in despising authority? When, once more, shall we be united as a

The decline of the Athenian character.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 5. 19.

people, we who, instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening each other's characters, envying one another more than we envy all the world besides; and—which is our worst failing—who, in private and public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension, and are caught in a maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbours' difficulties rather than to render mutual assistance? To make our conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better than if they were the concerns of some foreign state; or make them bones of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hot-bed is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly and cowardice, and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear.

Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to believe that the Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you not observe their discipline in all naval matters? Look at their prompt and orderly obedience to the superintendence at the gymnastic contests, their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the training of our choruses.

Yes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all these good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens in excellence of manhood, should be so entirely unamenable to discipline.¹

13. In the following spring (406), Lysander, who seems to have remained inactive at Ephesus during the winter, was succeeded as admiral by Callicratidas.² When handing over his ships, Lysander reminded his successor of the victory which he had won, and claimed for his fleet the supremacy at sea. Callicratidas bade him take the fleet to Miletus, passing between Samos and the mainland, and give it into his charge there; he would

Callicratidas
succeeds
Lysander.

¹ Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5. 13 ff. Dakyns' translation.

² The time is fixed by Xenophon's mention of an eclipse of the moon, which is, no doubt, that of April 15, 406—unless, indeed, this notice of time is spurious; see Wilkins, *Mus. Phil. Cant.* i. 555, and Beloch, *l.c.* Callicratidas had probably been appointed admiral in the preceding autumn.

then allow that the Peloponnesians were masters of the waters. This Lysander refused to do, as he was no longer admiral of the fleet. Callicratidas immediately increased his fleet to 140 ships with the intention of attacking Conon; but he found that he was the object of a conspiracy on the part of Lysander's adherents, who loudly complained of the folly of the Lacedaemonians in changing their admirals, and sending out inexperienced men to replace those who had acquired a thorough knowledge of their ships and crews. Callicratidas met them with the plain statement that he was not the maker of the laws of his city; it was his business to obey them. This he intended to do, and while he held his office he would make the best of it, but it was for them to say whether they wished him to stay or return home and explain the position of affairs. Other difficulties were in store for him. Lysander had paid back to Cyrus all the money remaining in his hands, and when Callicratidas repaired to Sardis to ask for supplies, he was kept waiting at the doors of Cyrus with designed humiliation. Exasperated at the indignities put upon him, he returned to Miletus, resolved, if ever he reached Lacedaemon again, to bring about a reconciliation between Athens and Sparta, and put an end to the discreditable relations now existing between Greeks and barbarians. From Miletus he sent to Lacedaemon for supplies, and summoning an assembly of the Milesians, asked for contributions to enable him to make use of his force.

The Milesians, in spite of their partiality to Lysander, could not refuse to contribute, and, having also procured a sum of money from Chios, Callicratidas was able to sail to Methymna, which was protected by an Athenian garrison. He took the town by storm, but of the captives he sold only the Athenian garrison and the slaves; the rest he set at liberty, declaring that no Greek should be sold into slavery while he was in command. To Conon, who had sailed up from Samos to the aid of Methymna, he sent word that he would put an end to his adultery with the sea, and when he saw him putting out on his return, he

Callicratidas
at Lesbos.

intercepted his ships and pursued him to Mytilene, with his whole fleet consisting of one hundred and seventy vessels. Conon, with whom were Leon and Erasinides, was compelled to fight at the harbour's mouth, and lost thirty out of his seventy ships before reaching the town. Here he was blockaded by Callicratidas, who summoned forces from Methymna and Chios, and was now supplied with money by Cyrus.

The position of the Athenians was indeed alarming; Mytilene was without provisions, shut in on every side, and unless intelligence could be conveyed to Athens, Conon blockaded Conon had no hope of relief. Selecting two of at Mytilene. the swiftest vessels, he prepared them for four days, and on the fifth, at mid-day, when the enemy's vigilance was relaxed, he sent them out of the harbour, one towards the Hellespont, the other across the open sea. Pursuit was immediate, and before sunset the second vessel was brought back. The other escaped and carried the news of the siege to Athens.

14. If Conon and what remained of his fleet were to be saved, immediate action was necessary, and that on no small scale. In thirty days the Athenians prepared and launched a fleet of one hundred and ten vessels. All who were of age to serve, whether slave or free, and even a large number of the class of the knights, were compelled to go on board. On reaching Samos, the fleet added ten Samian vessels to the number, and more than thirty others were collected from the allies. The generals were now in command of a force of more than one hundred and fifty ships, with which they sailed to the islands of Arginusae, opposite Lesbos, and there took their evening meal. Callicratidas, who had advanced to meet them with one hundred and twenty ships, leaving Eteonicus to blockade Conon with fifty, when he saw their fires, attempted to surprise them by a night attack, but was prevented by a storm. Towards morning the weather cleared, and he sailed at daybreak to Arginusae.

The battle which followed was the greatest fought in the whole course of the war. For Athens it was a decisive battle; if she was defeated, the war was at an end; she had ventured

her last stake. The Athenians had the advantage in numbers, but their fleet had been hastily prepared, and was manned by inexperienced sailors; they were conscious that it was incapable of the skilful manœuvres for which they had long been famous. It was drawn up in two massive wings, each of sixty vessels; the centre, which apparently lay on the islands of Arginusae, was formed by a single line. On the left wing, which put out towards the open sea, Aristocrates and Diomedon were in command in the first line, Pericles and Erasinides in the second, each with fifteen ships; the centre was occupied by the Samians and other allies; on the right, between the islands and the shore, were Protomachus and Thrasyllus, supported by Lysias and Aristogenes, each with fifteen ships as on the left. The Peloponnesians were drawn up in a single line: they were old sailors, and wished to take whatever advantage of their skill they could.¹

The pilot of Callicratidas, observing the disparity of numbers, advised him to decline battle, to which he replied that he was by no means a necessary man at Sparta, and it would be disgraceful to retreat. The battle was hotly contested, but when Callicratidas, who commanded the right, was hurled into the sea by the force of his impact on an enemy's ship and drowned,² and the left wing was defeated by Protomachus, the whole fleet turned to flight, some to Chios, but most to Phocaea. The Athenians returned to Arginusae. They had lost twenty-five vessels and their crews, but in the Peloponnesian fleet at least seventy ships had been destroyed, including nine ships out of ten in the Lacedaemonian contingent. The victory was complete, and at once restored to Athens the control of the Aegean.³

Immediately after the battle, the Athenian generals issued orders to Theramenes and Thrasybulus to collect the crews

¹ *Hell.* i. 6. 29 ff. See Zeune's note.

² For Callicratidas, see Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, v. 496 f., 503 f.

³ *Hell.* i. 6. 34. The battle was fought in the archonship of Callias (406-405), *Ath. Pol.* c. 34; and not long before the *Apaturia* (November).

from the floating wrecks, and were about to sail with the rest of the fleet to relieve Conon when the storm of the previous night again broke over them and rendered any movement impossible. Eteonicus, ^{Escape of Eteonicus.} however, was able to take advantage of the delay to escape from Mytilene. A despatch-boat brought him the news of the defeat, but he at once bade the sailors leave the harbour without a word, and return with crowns proclaiming the victory of Callicratidas and the destruction of the Athenian fleet. On their arrival, Eteonicus offered sacrifice openly for the good news. He then despatched his triremes with all haste to Chios, for which the wind was favourable, and himself led his army into camp at Methymna. When the wind moderated, Conon sailed to meet the Athenians, who were advancing from Arginusae, and informed them of the escape of Eteonicus. After an ineffectual movement to Mytilene and Chios, the fleet returned to Samos.¹

15. The victory of Athens had not been gained without loss, and in this case the loss fell not only on hired crews and slaves, but on Athenian citizens who had been compelled to serve as sailors. The Athenian general who risked or lost the lives of his citizens could not rely on the generosity of the people to save him from the attacks of rivals and enemies; his success was too often forgotten, and his failure punished with unjust severity. When it became known that the survivors had not been saved from the wrecks after the battle, the city was filled with indignation. All the generals, except Conon, were deposed and ordered home. Two of them, Protomachus and Aristogenes, did not return, but Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasinides appeared at Athens to answer the charges against them.²

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 6; Diod. xiii. 98.

² The tenth general, Archestratus, seems to have died at Mytilene before the battle; Diod. xiii. 101; Lysias, 21. 8. Why we should have Lysias in this list and among those who commanded in the battle, while Leon is mentioned among the generals of the year, is not clear. In Xen. i. 6. 16, Leon is said to have accompanied Conon to Mytilene, and his name is not mentioned again.

At this time the leader of the people at Athens was Archedemus, "a man with a clever tongue in his head."¹ Having brought Erasinides into court on a charge of speculation, he seized the opportunity to attack him for his conduct as general. The Council took the matter up, and when the generals made their report, it was proposed that they should be arrested and the case referred to the people. In the Assembly which followed, the chief accuser was Theramenes. Together with Thrasybulus he had been directed to save the men on the wrecked ships, and the guilt of abandoning them, if it could not be brought home to the generals, would rest on these two. In the despatch written by the generals immediately after the battle, they had been exempted from any blame; the violence of the storm had rendered it impossible to save the survivors. The generosity of the generals availed them little. Theramenes had felt the public pulse, and saw that some victim would be demanded in the present state of excitement. That victim he was resolved not to be. He declared that the generals must explain why they had abandoned the sailors to their fate. In a brief reply—for the legal privilege of making a speech was denied to them—each general stated the facts: that they had intended to sail against Eteoniceus, and left the recovery of the sailors to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were competent and experienced commanders, but the storm was so severe that nothing could be done.² The Assembly was convinced of the

¹ Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 2; cp. *Mem.* ii. 9. 4, where he says that he was poor because he would not make money by dishonest means. He was employed by Crito to keep the sycophants at bay. Aristophanes, if he is speaking of the same man, takes a different view (*Frogs*, 417):

ὅς ἐπ' ἑτέρας ὧν οὐκ ἔφυσε φράτορας,
 νυνὶ δὲ δημαγωγεῖ
 ἐν τοῖς ἄνω νεκροῖσι
 κἄστιν τὰ πρῶτα τῆς ἐκεῖ μοχθηρίας.

² Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 1 ff., 5: οὐ γὰρ προὔρεθ' ἑσφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον. The words are ambiguous; they may mean what is said in the text; or, "according to the law under which they were being judged," i.e. some law relating to cases tried in the Assembly, "they were not allowed to make a set speech."

truth of their plea, and many came forward to offer bail for them, but as it was now too late to see the show of hands, the decision was deferred till another meeting. The generals were sent back to prison, and the Council were ordered to arrange a plan for their trial.

The Assembly did not meet again till after the Apaturia—a festival at which, as at our own Christmas, the members of families gathered together. At such a time the gains and losses of the past year were noted; and after the recent battle there could not fail to be many vacant places. Theramenes and his party did not let the opportunity slip. A number of men were kept ready to appear in the Assembly, clad in mourning for lost relations, and in the Council an indictment against the generals was prepared by Callixenus. When the Assembly met, he proposed that, as the case of the generals had already been discussed, the Athenians should at once proceed to vote on it. Two urns were to be placed for each tribe, one for condemnation, the other for acquittal, and if condemned, the generals should be put to death and their property confiscated. Discussion was thus silenced; at the same time the robes of mourning were to be seen everywhere in the Assembly, and at length a man who had saved his life by clinging to a meal-tub came forward declaring that his dying companions had charged him, if he escaped, to tell the Athenians that the generals had abandoned those who had done their duty to their country. Under such circumstances there was little doubt what the sentence of the meeting would be. Euryptolemus, a kinsman of Pericles, attempted to stay proceedings by indicting Callixenus for illegal proposals, but at this the people became infuriated, and declared that it was “monstrous if the demos might not do as it pleased.” It was even proposed to include Euryptolemus and his supporters in the same vote with the generals if they did not withdraw their indictment. They were frightened into submission. For a time the prytanes refused to put the vote to the people in this illegal way; but they too were overawed, with

the exception of Socrates, who refused to the last to act contrary to the law.¹

Euryptolemus then appealed to the people. He proposed that the generals should be tried either under the decree of Cannonus—a severe enactment by which the criminal was brought before the people, not before a law-court, in chains, and, if condemned, his body was cast out unburied, and his property confiscated—or under the law against traitors and sacrilegious persons, but in either case let there be a fair trial. Let each general be heard separately; with a proper division of the day into a time for accusation, defence, and voting. In his opinion the generals were not to blame; it was not due to any negligence on their part that the men were not saved, but to the violence of the storm. “Do not then turn victory into defeat; do not visit inevitable misfortune with cruel punishment; do not treat inability as treachery. It would be far more just to honour the victorious generals with crowns than to punish them with death at the instance of scoundrels.” Euryptolemus ended by proposing that the prisoners should be tried under the decree of Cannonus, but one by one, as against the proposal of the Council to decide upon them by a single vote.²

The Assembly were inclined to follow him, but Menecles interposed, and on a second voting the proposal of the Council **Condemnation of the generals.** was adopted. The eight generals were condemned to death, and the six who had returned to Athens were executed. Afterwards the Athenians were seized with remorse, and turned upon those who had misled them, and though by a fortunate accident they escaped prosecution, Callixenus was regarded with universal hatred, and died of starvation.³

¹ Cp. Plato, *Apol.* 32 B.; Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 18; iv. 4. 2, and the ironical reference in Plato's *Gorgias*, 473 E, when Socrates says that his conduct created great amusement; he did not know how to put a question to the vote.

² The words δίχα ἑκαστον in Xen. i. 7. 34 do not refer to the decree of Cannonus.

³ Xen. i. 7. The points which Xenophon marks as illegal are:

Our knowledge of the details of the trial and condemnation of the generals is derived from Xenophon; a contemporary witness, whose account may be accepted as true in the main. While exulting over the great victory which had once more given Athens the command of the sea, the Athenians were suddenly reminded of the loss of kindred and friends. Brave men had perished, and many of them through the culpable negligence of their commanders, or so at least it was asserted. In their fury they turned upon the generals—they would listen to no defence, and insisted on immediate punishment. It must be confessed that there were times when the Athenian people went mad, and blindly followed the advice which appealed to their worst passions. At such a time a wise citizen would exert any influence which he possessed to soothe the prevailing excitement, and bring the people into a better mood. Theramenes did just the reverse. He availed himself of every means in his power to rouse the passions of the mob, and to him the disastrous sentence is mainly due. Whether he wished to save himself—for the fault, so far as there was one, lay between him and the generals—or whether he had aims in view which the success of the generals would defeat, we cannot tell, but whatever his motive, his conduct on this occasion admits of no excuse or justification.¹

(1) i. 7. 5: οὐ γὰρ προὔτεθ' ἡ σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον, but see *supra*;
 (2) the proposal of Callixenus to vote on all the generals at once, i. 7. 12, 14, 25. Cp. Plato, *Apol.* 32 C.: παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσι ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. It was also illegal to prevent Euryptolemus from following up his indictment of Callixenus for illegality. Fränkel, *Die Geschworn. Gericht.* p. 79 ff., endeavours to clear the Athenians from the charge of illegality in this matter. It is true that the trial did not take place in a law-court, but in the Assembly, and the forms of law which prevailed in a court cannot be applied to it. The fact that the Council were asked to prepare a form of procedure seems to imply that there was no fixed rule in these trials.

¹ As a boat was able to reach Eteonicus immediately after the battle, and Eteonicus himself escaped from Mytilene, the generals may have allowed some precious time to elapse before giving their orders to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. But nothing is said of this in the accusation; and the boat may have left before the worst of the

16. While thus executing their ablest commanders, the Athenians haughtily rejected the overtures for peace which once more came to them from Lacedaemon. The terms offered were a *status quo*, and the withdrawal of the Lacedaemonian troops from Decelea. Some of the more moderate citizens were inclined to accept them, but Cleophon, by his violence, carried the people with him. He came into the Assembly intoxicated, and wearing his cuirass, and declared that he would not allow any peace to be made unless the Lacedaemonians restored the cities of the Athenian empire which were in their possession.¹

The fleet remained at Samos for the winter, making descents on the enemy's country, but without any attempt to follow up their victory by a further attack on the remains of the Peloponnesian fleet.²

Chios was again the rendezvous of the Peloponnesians. There may have been some sixty vessels in all, the crews of which, with the soldiers, would amount to a total of twelve thousand men. To feed such a multitude was no easy task; to pay them was impossible. So long as the summer lasted, the men could earn money by working in the fields; and the produce of the country sufficed for their maintenance; but with the approach of winter they found themselves as ill-fed as they were ill-clad and ill-paid. In their distress they formed a conspiracy to seize the city of Chios, and that they might be known to each other, the conspirators agreed to distinguish themselves by carrying a reed. Before any definite step was taken, information of the plan was brought to Eteonicus. His position was difficult. The conspirators were so numerous

Eteonicus
suppresses
a conspiracy
at Chios.

storm. It must be remembered that the generals had no motive whatever for neglecting to rescue the survivors, and that they consistently maintained that rescue was impossible.

¹ *Ath. Pol.* c. 34. Cleophon had already opposed peace after the battle of Cyzicus (*supra*, p. 429), and was to oppose it again just before the fall of Athens.

² *Xen. Hell.* i. 6. 36-38: οὐδὲν διαπραξάμενοι ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Σάμῳ. *Diod.* xiii. 100.

that an attack upon them was by no means certain to succeed. If it failed, the city would fall into their hands, and the prospects of the Peloponnesians, already sufficiently low, would be ruined. If, on the other hand, it succeeded, the conspiracy could not be crushed without slaughter of the allies who were serving in the Peloponnesian army. Eteonicus extricated himself with the same resourcefulness which he had shown at Mytilene. Collecting a band of fifteen men, armed with daggers, he passed through the streets of Chios, and on meeting a conspirator cut him down on the spot. A crowd gathered round, inquiring why the man was slain. "Because he was wearing a reed" was the answer, and no sooner was this known than every one who was wearing a reed made haste to throw it away. The conspiracy thus broken up, Eteonicus called the Chians together, and urged them to supply him with funds to pay his sailors, who would otherwise mutiny. The Chians agreed, upon which Eteonicus, ordering the sailors to go on board, visited each trireme in turn, and carefully concealing his knowledge of the recent conspiracy from the crews, presented them with a month's pay.¹

17. The Athenians still remained inactive. Two additional commanders were sent out to join Conon—Adimantus, a former colleague at Andros, and Philocles; Adimantus was an oligarch, subsequently suspected of traitorous communications with the enemy, Philocles a democrat, who was prepared to outstrip Cleon in his cruel punishment of conquered enemies (see *infra*, p. 458). Such officers, even if competent, were not likely to work harmoniously together, and the opportunity of reviving the fortunes of Athens in Ionia was allowed to slip.

The Ionians
ask for Ly-
sander to be
sent out.

Eteonicus remained unmolested at Chios, while the cities of the coast annoyed, rather than alarmed, by the petty inroads of the Athenians, gathered fresh courage. It was resolved to despatch envoys to Sparta with a request that Lysander should be sent out to take command of the fleet. His name

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 1 f.

was all-powerful in the cities of Ionia, and he was also the personal friend of Cyrus, who indeed sent ambassadors of his own to support the request of the Greeks.¹

The laws of the Spartans did not permit the same man to serve as admiral twice, but this difficulty was overcome by electing Aracus as admiral, and Lysander as his *epistoleus* or lieutenant. Aracus was nobody, and intended to be nobody; indeed it is doubtful whether he left Sparta at all. The command of the fleet was given to Lysander, who arrived at Ephesus in the spring of 405.²

In this instance, as so often, we see the vast importance of personal influence in Greek history. Lysander had no sooner arrived in Asia than the war took a new turn. Lysander and Cyrus. He summoned Eteonicus from Chios to Ephesus, collected and repaired any vessels which had taken refuge elsewhere, and arranged to build new ships at Antandrus. Then he applied to Cyrus for the money, without which operations were impossible, and Cyrus—though nothing was now left of the money given to him by the King—supplied him from his own resources so liberally that Lysander was able to pay all arrears due to his sailors, and fit his ships for action. The Athenians advanced to Chios and Ephesus in the hope of engaging with Lysander, but failing to prevent the union of the enemy's fleet, they contented themselves with putting their ships in order and awaiting the event.³

The Athenians, meanwhile, were listening to the *Frogs* of Aristophanes, and laughing over the adventures of Dionysus. The "Frogs" of when journeying to Hades in search of a tragic Aristophanes. poet to take the place of Sophocles, who had recently died. The play is, to a large extent, a condemnation of Euripides, but the poet has seized the opportunity to tell the Athenians some home truths about the political

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 6, 7; Diod. xiii. 100. For Cyrus and Lysander, see Isocrates, *Panath.* 39.

² Xen. *Hell.* l.c., where see Underhill's note on the admiral; Plut. *Lys.* 7. See also Beloch, *Rhein. Mus.* 34. 117 ff.

³ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 10-12; Diod. xiii. 104.

situation at the moment. The dissensions of the Four Hundred, in spite of the excellent constitution which followed, had left bitter memories behind them. Many citizens had been deprived of their franchise; others had been driven into exile. Aristophanes counsels reconciliation and unity.

"We ought to put all the citizens on an equality," he says, "and remove their apprehensions. If any one was thrown by the tricks of Phrynichus, those who slipped then ought to be allowed to purge their offence, and put away their misdeeds. No one in the city ought to be deprived of his franchise; it is disgraceful that those who have fought in one battle, and one only, should forthwith be 'Plataeans' and masters after being slaves,¹ though I am far from saying that this arrangement is not a good one—in fact, it is the only sensible thing that you have done; but surely those who, like their fathers before them, have often fought at our side, and are, moreover, our kinsmen, ought to be forgiven this one offence. Relax your wrath, you who are naturally the wisest of men, and let us gladly make every one who will fight on our side a kinsman and a citizen with full rights. If we behave ourselves in this proud and froward spirit when our city is in the trough of the seas, we shall be found some day to have made a great mistake."²

From other passages in the play we see that the conduct of Theramenes at the trial of the generals had made a deep impression on the city. "Always to take the easier place is the mark of a man of ability, a born Theramenes." "A clever man is Theramenes, and quick at all points. If a comrade gets into a scrape, and he is standing by, he quickly falls clear of the mischief—no Chian but a Cean."³ Cleophon also, who took a foremost part in rejecting the terms of

¹ The slaves who fought at Arginusae were allowed to become "Plataeans," i.e. Athenian citizens with a limited franchise, like the survivors of the Plataeans after the destruction of their city in 427.

² Aristoph. *Frogs*, 687 ff.

³ Aristoph. *Frogs*, 541, 965. Chios was the name given to the worst throw at dice; Ceos was the birthplace of Theramenes.

peace with Sparta, comes in for a share of abuse, as he always does in the comedies of Aristophanes. "On his chattering lips the Thracian swallow mourns and raves, perched on foliage of alien growth, and twitters a melancholy nightingale strain, that he will be lost even, even if the votes are equal."¹

In 407 a new and debased coinage, of gold, had been introduced into the city, in the foolish hope of lightening the financial strain. Aristophanes speaks of this new coinage with great contempt in comparison with the old pure silver coinage; urging the Athenians to cling to the old coins and throw what is new and worthless aside. So also must they cling to men of the old true stamp. "The only hope of Athens lies in the employment of those good and worthy citizens, who are now as it were out in the cold, and the one hero of them all, round whom the scattered forces of the city may still rally, is a man whom they half love, half hate, yet with whose services they cannot dispense—the exile Alcibiades."²

18. Cyrus was now called away to visit his father, Darius II., who had fallen sick and felt his death to be at hand. Before leaving Sardis, he sent for Lysander and created him his vicegerent in his absence. Placing in his hands his surplus funds, and assigning to him the revenue of his cities, he charged him strictly to spare no expense in building ships, and not to engage with the Athenians, unless his forces were far superior in number.³

Lysander's plans went beyond the reconstruction of the Peloponnesian fleet. He was resolved that a Lacedaemonian empire should take the place of the Athenian empire, and as a necessary step to this end, democratical government must

¹ Aristoph. *Frogs*, 679 ff. The language is intentionally grotesque. Cleophon was not a native Athenian. Lysias speaks of Cleophon in a different tone, 30. 10 ff. It was the rule to acquit a criminal if the votes were equal, but the misdeeds of Cleophon were too patent.

² Merry's *Frogs*, *Intro.* p. 6; *ib.* l. 720 ff.; 1418 ff.

³ Plutarch, *Lys.* 9, adds that Cyrus promised to bring up additional ships from Phoenicia and Cilicia, which may be true, but these "Phoenician ships" were always coming, and never came.

be rooted out. Wherever it was possible, he removed his opponents and established a strictly oligarchical government under the control of decarchies and harmosts. As soon as he could leave Ephesus, he repaired to Miletus, where his oligarchical friends had already endeavoured to force a revolution on the people, but without success. Both parties were by this time prepared to forget the quarrel, and Lysander, who pretended to agree in this reconciliation, publicly threatened the authors of the revolution with punishment. When he had thus induced the democrats to remain in the city, he attacked them at the festival of the Dionysia, and cut down more than three hundred of them; the rest of the party, to the number of a thousand, found refuge with Pharnabazus.¹

Lysander was now in a position to treat the Athenian fleet with the contempt which it deserved. Regardless of its presence, he sailed down the coast to Caria, and then struck across the Aegean to Aegina and Attica. The cities of the archipelago saw with astonishment a Peloponnesian fleet cruising at will in the waters which Athens had so long claimed as her own domain. In Attica he had an interview with Agis, in which the course may have been fixed upon which he finally took for the destruction of Athens. Agis had already called the attention of the Lacedaemonian authorities to the supplies which reached Athens through the Bosphorus, and rendered useless his own efforts to reduce the city. If the corn-ships which sailed out of the Pontus in large numbers just before the autumn equinox were allowed to reach the Peiraeus, the city would easily bear a protracted siege. The cities of Ionia were indeed secured, but Byzantium and Chalcedon, Sestos and Lampsacus were still in the hands of Athens: it was there that the blow must be struck, if the efforts of so many long years were at last to be brought to a successful conclusion. From Attica, Lysander

Lysander at
Miletus.

Lysander
in Attica:
he sails to
Abydos,

¹ Diod. xiii. 104; Plut. *Lys.* 9.

seems to have carried his fleet back to Rhodes, whence as the summer went on he sailed northwards as far as Abydus.¹

19. On hearing that Lysander had sailed to the Hellespont, the Athenians chose three additional generals—Menander, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus²—and followed him from Chios with their whole fleet of one hundred and eighty vessels, keeping well out to sea as the coast was now hostile to them. Before they arrived, he had already passed from Abydus to

Lysander at Lampsacus, which he took by storm and gave over to his soldiers to plunder, for, in spite of the previous capture by the Athenians, Lampsacus was still a wealthy city, and filled with supplies of all kinds. The news of this disaster was brought to the Athenians immediately after their arrival at Elaeus; they at once re-embarked for Sestos, and after obtaining supplies there, advanced to the harbour of Aegospotami, opposite Lampsacus,³ where Lysander was still stationed with his ships. The hostile fleets were now in full view of each other, for the Hellespont is at this point not quite two miles broad. As it was too late for an engagement, the Athenians went on shore for the night, according to the custom of Greek sailors, and took their evening meal. Early on the following morning, Lysander put his men on board, and made complete and minute arrangements for a battle, giving orders at the same time that no one should stir from his post, or put his ship out to sea. The Athenians also embarked at sunrise, and drew up their ships at the mouth of the harbour of Lampsacus, but after waiting the whole day without any forward movement on Lysander's part, they returned to Aegospotami. When they retired, Lysander sent his swiftest vessels to watch their movements; and till these returned he

The Athenians
at Aegospo-
tami.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 15, 16; Plut. *Lys.* 9; Diod. xiii. 104. Diodorus speaks of a pursuit of Lysander by the Athenian fleet. Of the visit to Attica, Xenophon says nothing.

² Xenophon's language would lead us to believe that the fleet chose these generals, and so Gilbert takes it, *Beiträge*, p. 390.

³ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 15-21; Plut. *Lys.* 9; Diod. xiii. 104.

kept his men on board. For four days in succession these manœuvres were repeated, for Lysander would not put to sea, and the Athenians dared not attack him under cover of the land. The delay which was of no importance to one fleet was fatal to the other. Lysander, lying close to Lampsacus, had ample stores of all kinds at hand; his crews were kept together, and could go on board at a moment's notice, but the Athenians were stationed in a desert harbour, where the sailors had to fetch their provisions from Sestos, nearly two miles distant. Each day that Lysander refused to meet them, they grew more contemptuous of the enemy, and wandered farther from their ships. The danger of the situation did not escape Alcibiades, who watched the movements from one of his fortresses (*supra*, p. 429). Riding up to the Athenian camp, he begged the generals to remove their ships to Sestos, offering at the same time to obtain for them the assistance of the Thracian princes — Medocus and Seuthes — who were his friends. The advice was wise, and it was given by one who knew by bitter experience the tactics of Lysander; the value of it is not lessened if we suppose that Alcibiades wished to secure his own return home, or believe Diodorus, who asserts that he asked for a share in the command. But it was rejected; the generals, with Tydeus and Menander at their head, bade him depart: the fleet was in their charge, not in his.¹

On the fifth day the Athenians advanced as before, prepared to attack, and Lysander, as usual, refused to meet them. But he gave orders to the ships which followed them to the shore to sail back as soon as they saw them disembarked and scattered along the Chersonese, and raise a shield when in midchannel. On seeing the signal he ordered his fleet to advance with the utmost speed upon the enemy, while the land forces, under the command of Thorax, marched along the coast to be in readiness, if needed. Of the Athenian

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 22-26; Plut. *Lys.* 10; *Alc.* 36, 37; Diod. xiii. 105.

generals Conon alone appears to have been on the watch, and he at once gave the signal for action. But the crews were scattered; in some vessels there were rowers enough for two banks of oars, in others for one; others were entirely empty; only Conon's own ship with seven others and the *Paralus* were fully manned. These escaped; the rest of the fleet Lysander captured before they had time to put to sea, all the crews being taken except those who escaped to the fortresses in the neighbourhood. Conon with his eight ships fled to join Evagoras in Cyprus; the *Paralus* returned to Athens with the news of the destruction of her last fleet.¹

20. Lysander returned with his prizes to Lampsacus. Before the day closed he despatched Theopompus, a Milesian freebooter, to Sparta with the news of his victory, and so great was the speed of the pirate's vessel, that it reached the city on the third day. Lysander then assembled the allies to deliberate on the fate of the captives, and the opportunity was not lost. Many and bitter were the accusations against the Athenians; old and new iniquities were charged against them, and among the most recent a resolution which they had passed, on the proposal of Philocles, to strike off the hand of every prisoner,² and the action of Philocles himself in dashing from the rocks the entire crews of two triremes which had fallen into his hands. It was resolved to put to death all the Athenian prisoners, except Adimantus, who had opposed the decree to mutilate the

¹ Xen. *l.c.* 27-29; Plut. *Lys.* 11; *Alcib.* 37. Diodorus, xiii. 106, gives a somewhat different account. According to him, Philocles, who was in command for the day, ordered the trierarchs to man their vessels and follow him. He put out speedily with thirty vessels, before the rest were ready, and Lysander on hearing of this at once attacked. Philocles was defeated; the rest were unprepared; and at the same time the Lacedaemonian infantry under the command of Eteonicus were put on shore and captured part of the Athenian camp. Lysander then completed the destruction of the fleet. Lysias, 21. 11, speaks of twelve ships which escaped, in which the eight ships under Conon are not included.

² Plut. *Lys.* 9.

captives; or, as some said, had betrayed the fleet to Lysander. The remainder, to the number of three thousand, were slain on the spot, beginning with Philocles, who, though blood-thirsty and incompetent, was a man of high spirit. When asked by Lysander what penalty a man ought justly to suffer, who had urged his citizens to exercise such cruelty upon Greeks, he bade him make no accusations where there were no judges to hear them; now that he was victorious, let him do as he would have been done by had he been conquered. Then after taking a bath and putting on his best attire, he led the way to the place of slaughter.¹ The bodies of the slain were cast out unburied, in defiance of the deepest sentiments of Greek religion and the universal practice of Greek warfare.²

Thus without the loss of a single ship Lysander captured the enemy's fleet, and put an end at once to the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian war. The contest, so long and stoutly maintained, was decided almost without a blow; the city, whose courage had overcome the disaster of Syracuse, fell a victim to the incompetence of her own generals, and in less than a year from the battle of Arginusæ, in which she seemed to have swept her enemy from the sea, Athens was left with hardly a trireme to call her own. Plutarch, moralising on the success of Lysander, remarks that in many minds the achievement was regarded as superhuman, and tells us of omens and portents which preceded the event. But the defeat of Aegospotami was brought about by causes which are as common as they are human. Lysander conquered in the Hellespont by the same tactics by which he had conquered at Notium; he refused to fight till he had beguiled the enemy into security and could take him at an advantage. He may have been assisted by the treachery of his opponents, though

¹ Theophrastus, in Plut. *Lys.* 13.

² Xen. *Hell. l.c.*; Plut. *Lys.* 11. For the treachery of Adimantus, besides Xenophon see Lysias, 14. 38. Gilbert denies it, *Beiträge*, p. 340. For the disregard of burial, Pausanias, ix. 32. 9. Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mentions this. The date of the battle is about September 405; cp. *Ath. Pol.* 34. 2, where it is placed in the archonship of Alexias.

the only ground for this accusation is the clemency shown to Adimantus, for which a sufficient reason was given at the time; but if their treachery is uncertain, the gross incompetence of the generals is plain to every eye. It is shown not only at Aegospotami by their rejection of the warning of Alcibiades, but even more by the carelessness with which they had allowed precious time to slip past while stationed at Samos. At the last, it is true, they seem to have wished to engage with Lysander, who, in spite of their efforts, sailed to and fro as he pleased; but they made no attempt to destroy his fleet before it had become formidable. The crews of the Peloponnesian fleet repaired their vessels, Lysander with thirty-five ships sailed into Ephesus, and collected help from far and near till his ships equalled the Athenians' in numbers, while the Athenians occupied their fleet with inroads upon the Asiatic cities, which may have provided some necessary supplies, but certainly exasperated the inhabitants into more active opposition. Lysander, as they well knew, had unlimited means at his disposal; he could afford to wait for the favourable moment, without diminishing the efficiency of his ships and crews; but the cost of the Athenian fleet was a terrible strain on a city exhausted in money and men. Every month, every week, was of importance, yet the summer passed away and nothing was done, till Lysander struck a blow at the Hellespont, the last source from which Athens could draw supplies.

21. Lysander had no thought of making an immediate attack on Athens, but as in winning his victory, so in his use of it he followed a definite and preconceived plan. Knowing well that the walls of Athens were impregnable, and that if the people resisted, by starvation alone could they be brought to surrender, he resolved to drive back to Athens every Athenian whom he found in the cities of her empire, in order that the number of her inhabitants might be increased, and the effects of famine be more quickly felt. He was also aware that his work was but half done, so long as Sestos, Byzantium, and Chalcedon

Lysander in
the Bosphorus
and Hellespont.

remained Athenian, especially as Alcibiades was at hand to take advantage of the situation. To these cities, after arranging the affairs of Lampsacus, he directed his course. Sestos was taken after a slight resistance; at Byzantium and Chalcedon he was received without opposition. The Athenian garrisons were dismissed on condition of returning to Athens; if found elsewhere, any Athenian would be put to death. Sthenelaus, a Lacedaemonian, was then placed in charge of the cities as harmost, and Lysander returned to Lampsacus to refit his ships. When he had got together a fleet of two hundred vessels, he sailed to Lesbos, where he established harmosts and decarchies in all the cities of the island.¹ Eteonicus was despatched to the Thracian coast to bring over the cities there, a task which he easily accomplished. For the whole of the remaining allies of Athens now revolted from the city, with the single exception of Samos, where the demos, repeating the events of 412, massacred any notables who had remained in the city or returned to it, and kept the power in their own hands. From Lesbos, Lysander announced to Agis at Decelea and the authorities at Sparta, that he was advancing upon Athens. The second king, Pausanias, at once called out all the Peloponnesians, except the Argives, and marched to the city, where, uniting with the forces from Decelea, they encamped in the "Academy," the gymnasium beyond the Ceramicus. Lysander on his voyage collected as many of the Aeginetans, Scionaeans, Melians and other exiles as he could, and restored them to their respective cities. Then he appeared at the Peiraeus with one hundred and fifty ships, blockading the harbours, and entirely preventing the importation of food.²

The return
of Lysander:
siege of Athens.

It was night when the *Paralus* reached Athens with the news of the destruction of the fleet. The dreadful words passed from lip to lip, till the wail of lamentation spread from

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 1, 2, 5; Diod. xiii. 106.

² Plut. *Lys.* 13, 14. Diod. xiv. 3 gives a hundred ships. Xen. *l.c.*: Isocr. *adv. Call.* § 61.

the Peiræus to the city, and "for that night no one slept." Sorrow for the dead was mingled with fear for the future, for the day of vengeance was at last come, and full measure would now be exacted for the wrongs inflicted on the helpless allies—on Aegina, Scione, Melos, and others. Yet even in this dire crisis, the courage of the Athenians did not fail. If there was no prospect of a successful resistance, there was at least a hope of obtaining better terms, should the enemy feel that they had still something to conquer. On the next day an Assembly was held, at which it was resolved to prepare for a siege by filling up the mouths of all the harbours but one, repairing the walls where necessary, and manning them. They had expected to see Lysander enter the Peiræus every hour, and when his coming was delayed, they recovered a little from their consternation.

It was not long before they discovered the meaning of the delay. Fugitives poured in from one city after another, swelling the multitude which had to be fed. Meanwhile Agis had marched up from Decelea and Pausanias from the Peloponnesus, and at last Lysander appeared. By land and sea the hostile forces closed round the doomed city. But the walls of Themistocles could neither be stormed nor destroyed; the vast array of force was helpless against them, and as Lysander had foreseen, it was necessary to await the effect of famine. Pausanias returned to Sparta, Agis to Decelea, Lysander's fleet remained off the Peiræus to cut off supplies. Athens was left to starve.¹

22. The feeling that all were involved in a common calamity, that the city needed the help of all who could help her, promoted harmony for the moment among the various sections of the citizens. Old enmities were forgotten; and many who had been deprived of the franchise were now restored to their rights.² Ere long

¹ Diod. xiii. 107; Plut. *Lys.* 14.

² This was done on the motion of Patroclides, see Andoc. *Myst.* 73 ff.; *Lys.* 25, 27. Perhaps it was little more than a movement to give power to the oligarchical section in the city.

the inevitable evil appeared: food began to run short. Envoys were sent to Agis, intimating that Athens would join the alliance of Sparta, if she might retain the Long Walls and Peiraeus. Agis bade them apply to Lacedaemon, but when they reached Sellasia, on the borders of Laconia, they were stopped by the ephors, who informed them that they must come with more reasonable proposals.¹ These tidings caused the greatest despair in the city. Slavery was the doom to which all looked forward; and even while a second embassy was being arranged, many would die of famine. Yet when Archestratus suggested that ten stadia of the Long Walls should be destroyed, as the Lacedaemonians demanded, he was at once thrown into prison, and on a motion, probably due to Cleophon, who declared that he would cut the throat of any citizen who so much as mentioned peace, it was forbidden by public decree to support any proposal of the kind. Theramenes now came forward and suggested that he should go to Lysander and discover what the Lacedaemonians really meant by their demand. To Lysander accordingly he went, and remained with him three months, by which time Athens was reduced to such a plight that any terms must be accepted.² Even when he returned, he merely reported that Lysander had referred him to the home government for terms. Ten envoys, of whom he was one, were at once despatched with full powers to Sparta, where an Assembly of the allies was summoned by the ephors to discuss the terms of peace. The envoys of Thebes and Corinth were against making any terms at all; they wished to see Athens utterly destroyed, but Sparta nobly refused to enslave a

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 11 f., who says that, though many died of starvation, no mention was made of reconciliation, and it was only when the supply of food was exhausted that the proposals were made. This is inconsistent with the fact that the city held out for more than three months longer.

² Where Lysander was at this time it is not easy to make out; it appears that he did not go to Samos till after the capitulation; and yet he cannot have remained all the time with his fleet off the Peiraeus

Greek city, "which had rendered great service to Greece in her hour of danger." If Athens would destroy the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiraeus, receive back the exiles, surrender all her ships of war except twelve, withdraw from all the cities of her empire, and join the Lacedaemonian confederacy, Sparta would grant peace, and allow the city to retain her independence. At Athens the ground had been cleared in the meantime by the removal of Cleophon, who was brought to trial on a charge of desertion and executed. When Theramenes returned, a multitude gathered round him, eager to learn their fate. Had he failed in his mission, and was the famine still to rage in the city? Or what were the terms on which Athens was to purchase her existence? The next day an Assembly was summoned at which the envoys made their report, and Theramenes advised that the terms should be accepted. Even at this last moment there were some who

The
capitulation. urged resistance, but this was mere insanity; the people, by a large majority, were in favour of peace. Lysander at once sailed into the Peiraeus, and, amid great rejoicing, "to the sound of flutes," the work of destruction was begun. That day was thought to be the dawn of freedom for Greece (Munychion 16=April 404).¹

23. After the capitulation, Lysander sailed to Samos, which was still independent. Successful resistance to such a force

Lysander at
Samos. as he had at command was hopeless, yet the Samians held out for a time, and at length were allowed to leave the island uninjured. The oligarchs were restored to their homes and their property, but the

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 15-23; Plut. *Lys.* 14, who gives the text of the resolution of the ephors; Diod. xiii. 107; *Ath. Pol.* 34. In her first proposals, Sparta was willing to allow Athens to retain Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, but afterwards this concession was withdrawn; similarly, the destruction of ten stadia of the Long Walls is increased to the destruction of the Long Walls and fortifications of Peiraeus. For the opposition of Cleophon, see Lysias, 13, 8 f., who also puts the conduct of Theramenes in a very unfavourable light. Among those who resisted to the last were the generals Strombichides and Dionysodorus. According to Plutarch, Lysander went to Samos during the siege, but Xenophon does not mention this.

government was placed in the hands of a decarchy of Spartans, with Thorax as harmost.¹ As his work—the destruction of the Athenian empire and of democracy—seemed now to be complete, Lysander dismissed the various contingents of the allied fleet to their respective cities, while with the Lacedaemonian squadron he returned to Laconia, taking with him the prows of the captured vessels and the navy of Athens. He also brought the crowns which he had received from grateful cities as gifts to himself, and a sum of 470 talents in silver, the surplus of the tribute-money assigned to him by Cyrus for the conduct of the war, and other property gained in his successes, all which he delivered to the Lacedaemonians “at the end of the summer.”²

Athens was at peace with Sparta, but she was not at peace with herself. We have seen that in 411 there were three distinct parties in the city: oligarchs who Factions at Athens. would have nothing but oligarchy, even if they were kept in power by Sparta; moderates, who would make the franchise co-extensive with civic duties; and the extreme democrats, who maintained that Athens was the Athenian people. From the *Constitution of Athens* we learn that the same parties reappeared on the present occasion. No sooner had Lysander departed than Athens was disturbed by civic contention. The constitution under which the Athenians were to live had not been precisely fixed when peace was made. The democracy wished to preserve the constitution unaltered;³ the notables, who could rely on associations or clubs, were eager for oligarchy, while others, who, though without the support of clubs, claimed to be among the leading men of the state, wished for ἡ πατριος πολιτεία, a modified

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 6; Diod. xiv. 3; Plut. *Lyc.* 14. Thorax had been in command of the Lacedaemonian army at Lampsacus and Aegospotami.

² Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 7 ff. Plutarch (*Lys.* 16) differs from this; in his account Lysander sails from Samos to Thrace, and Gylippus takes the money home, appropriating some on the way—in which, however, he is detected. Cp. Diod. xiii. 106.

³ *Ath. Pol.* 34: διασώζειν τὸν δῆμον.

democracy, like that of Clisthenes, with a restriction of the franchise.¹

The numbers of the oligarchical party were increased by the exiles, who, on the proposal of Theramenes, were allowed to return immediately after the conclusion of peace.² Foremost among these was Critias, the son of Callaeschrus, who, since his banishment in 406, had lived in Thessaly, the chosen land of those who found the existence of a law-abiding citizen intolerable.³ While there, he had occupied himself with organising a rebellion of the Penestae against their masters, from a restless spirit of faction rather than a love of freedom or democratical government,⁴ for he was himself a warm admirer of the Spartan system, and had even written a treatise on it. Other members of the extreme party were Satyrus, by whom Cleophon was brought to execution, Charmides, Theognis, and Eratosthenes. Alcibiades either could not or would not return. He was too deeply implicated in hostility to Sparta to come back at a moment when Spartan influences were all-powerful. After the conclusion of peace he left the Chersonese for the court of Pharnabazus, who soon afterwards caused him to be assassinated, perhaps at the request of Critias.⁵ The head of the moderate party was Theramenes, with whom were associated Anytus, Clitophon, Archinus, Phormisius, and others; in the ranks of the popular party were the generals

¹ Diodorus repeats, but with less precision, the account given in the *Ath. Pol.* In both it is assumed that it was one of the conditions of peace that the Athenians should retain ἡ πατρίος πολιτεία, but Diodorus says that the phrase was differently interpreted—by the oligarchs as ἡ παλαιὰ κατὰστασις (i.e. the constitution before Solon), and by the moderates as ἡ τῶν πατέρων πολιτεία (i.e. the constitution of Clisthenes). Xenophon fails us at this point; he says not a word of events between the capitulation and the establishment of the Thirty, οἱ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους συγγράψουσι.

² Lysias, 12. 77; Xen. ii. 3. 42.

³ Plato, *Crito* 53.

⁴ Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 24.

⁵ See Plut. *Alc.* 38 ff.; Beloch, *G.G.* ii. 118 f.; Critias probably took the same view of Alcibiades now as Phrynichus had done in 411.

Strombichides and Eucrates, and Thrasybulus of Steiria, and they were afterwards joined by many of the moderates such as Archinus and Anytus.

Immediately after the conclusion of the peace the associations on which the oligarchs chiefly relied began to show activity. Five ephors were elected by them to promote the interests of their party in any way that seemed expedient. These are not to be regarded as public magistrates like the Probuli, who preceded the former change of the constitution; they were the servants of their party, not the servants of the state. The public election of such officers—whose number and name are so significant—would imply a greater change in the constitution than we have a right to assume at a time when the democracy was still in existence.¹ Perhaps it was by the secret influence of these officers that the oligarchs were able to get rid of the leaders of the democratic party. Strombichides, Eucrates, and others were accused of conspiracy, and put in prison, though their execution was not carried out till the Thirty came into power.²

24. The disputes were brought to an end by the appearance of Lysander, who was summoned to decide the question. In the *Constitution of Athens* we are briefly informed that the oligarchs carried the day with the support of Lysander, and, on the proposal of Dracontides, it was resolved to elect thirty commissioners to draw up a constitution. Diodorus, who seems to follow the same authority, gives more details. As the leader of the moderate party, Theramenes opposed the proposals of the oligarchs and Lysander, and remonstrated against the attempt to rob the city of her freedom, calling his attention to the clause in the treaty which allowed the Athenians to enjoy their hereditary con-

Lysander
returns: the
Thirty are
established.

¹ Lysias, 12. 43, who alone mentions these officers, says expressly that they were elected *δημοκρατίας ἐν ὄψει*. As Critias was one of them, they cannot have been elected before the return of the exiles, i.e. before peace was concluded.

² Lysias, 13. 23 ff., 36; 30. 14.

stitution. Upon this Lysander declared that the terms of the truce had already been violated, because the walls had not been destroyed within the fixed time, and even threatened Theramenes with the loss of his life, if he opposed the wishes of the Lacedaemonians. The account in Lysias is quite different. Theramenes is here the arch-traitor, to whom all the miseries of Athens are due. It was he who sent for Lysander, and at the Assembly everything was so arranged that none of the popular speakers could say a word. Theramenes then got up and moved that thirty commissioners should be elected to arrange the constitution, as Dracontides had proposed. His speech was received with shouts of disapprobation, but he persisted in his course. The noise was nothing to him, he said; and what he was doing had the approval of Lysander. Then Lysander spoke, charging the Athenians with violating the terms of the truce, and declaring that, if they did not follow the advice of Theramenes, it would be no longer a matter of the constitution, but of the existence of the city. This reduced the patriotic party to silence; some of them were content to remain in the Assembly and say nothing; others went away, resolved that they, at any rate, would not give their votes against their consciences. And so the bill of Dracontides was passed by the votes of a treacherous minority.¹ (After Midsummer, 404.)

It is clear from the oration of Lysias that there were many in Athens who did not take his view of the conduct of Theramenes on this occasion. So far from regarding him as the chief author of the misfortunes of Athens, they considered that he had conferred many benefits on the city, and it is with the aim of dispelling this feeling that the orator attacks him. That Theramenes became one of the Thirty is no proof that he was on the side of the extreme oligarchs, and he subsequently lost his life in endeavouring to put an end to their excesses. Here, as in the previous

¹ *Ath. Pol.* c. 34. The Thirty were established in the archonship of Pythodorus, 404-403. Lysias, 12. 71-76; Diod. xiv. 3.

revolution, he seems to have taken a middle course, which, though it brought upon him the hatred of both extremes at the moment, commended itself to the more impartial judgment of the historians who wrote at a later date. In spite of his previous failure he still dreamed of a constitution in which the franchise should be coextensive with the ability to serve as a heavy-armed citizen-soldier, and in order to bring about this end he may have acquiesced in calling in the help of Lysander, even though in doing so he acted with men whose principles he did not approve. On the other hand, he was a statesman with a policy, and when the oligarchs showed themselves to be mere selfish tyrants, he reverted to popular support. He had to bear the reproach of throwing over his friends on either side; he lived long enough to share in some of the iniquities of the Thirty, and died too soon to have a part in the glory of deposing them.¹

With the establishment of the Thirty at Athens the triumph of Sparta was complete. The walls were now entirely destroyed, and Lysander withdrew his fleet, carrying with him all the Athenian triremes but twelve. For the moment democracy was at an end in Hellas. Everywhere the "few" were in power, supported by Sparta, whose harmosts and decarchies were in every state where there was the least fear of a popular rising. This was the "liberation" for which, as she said, Sparta had gone to war; this, the "freedom" which dawned on Hellas with the fall of Athens; this was the gain won by thirty years of desolation and bloodshed, by a war which was the ruin of Hellas.

25. The Thirty were elected to draw up a new constitution, but before entering on their task they took care to fill the Council and the public offices with friends of their own. The

¹ According to Lysias *l.c.* ten of the Thirty were chosen by Theramenes, ten by the ephors, and ten from those present in the Assembly, but no other authority mentions this. It is possible that Theramenes may have had some understanding with Sparta about the form of constitution at Athens. In Xen. *Hell.* iii. 4. 2 we read, of the decarchies established by Lysander, ἐκπεπτακυίας διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας περιγέειλαν.

Eleven were selected with especial care; at their head was Satyrus, who had already secured the condemnation of Cleophon. Ten officers were also chosen to manage the Peiraeus. With their help they got the leaders of the people, who had already been arrested, condemned and executed.¹ Together with these, some citizens of evil reputation, informers and the like, were put to death to satisfy the public conscience. Towards the object for which they were elected, the Thirty did little or nothing beyond simplifying the ordinances of Solon, cancelling the laws by which the Areopagus was deprived of its authority, and limiting the power of the law-courts.² This moderate behaviour did not long continue. Uncertain of their power, and conscious that they were contemplating measures which would not meet with the approval of the people, the Thirty applied to Sparta for a garrison, on whose help they could rely in removing unsuitable citizens, and seven hundred hoplites were sent under the command of Callibius.

Then followed a reign of terror, of which we have a graphic picture in the speech of Lysias against Eratosthenes. At once Tyranny of the Thirty. greedy and hypocritical, the Tyrants looked round to see what rich citizen—not of their own order—or alien they could murder for his wealth, and excused their conduct by the pretence of clearing the city of undesirable persons, or aiding the poor in the distress which the war had caused. In a short time no less than fifteen hundred persons are said to have fallen victims to their rapacity, and numbers were leaving the city every day to find a refuge in Thebes³ or Megara. To Theramenes such excesses were repugnant; he remonstrated with Critias against the removal

¹ Lys. 13. 36. The accused were not brought into a court, but before the Council—ἐν δὲ λόγῳ, ὅσοι εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα εἰσηλθόν κριθησόμενοι, πάντων θάνατος κατεγγινώσκετο. See further, *Ath. Pol.* 36.

² *Ath. Pol.* 35; *Xen. Hell.* ii. 3. ii. 12.

³ A very few months sufficed to show the Thebans that they would gain nothing by Sparta's victory. Hence a complete change in their feelings towards the Athenians.

of men whose only fault was their eminence or wealth. If men like Leon of Salamis, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias (who had never shown any sympathy with democracy), were put to death, their friends, who were now inclined to support the oligarchical party, would become hostile to it.¹ Critias retorted that a tyranny needs equal watchfulness, whether the tyrants be thirty or one. Theramenes then pointed out that the basis of power was too small; they must associate with their rule a sufficient number of men to give them a real superiority in power. The Thirty, to prevent Theramenes from becoming the centre of a party, prepared a list of three thousand persons to whom they were willing to give a share in the constitution, and when he declared that the number was insufficient, they deprived all the citizens, outside their list, of their weapons. They were now above all fear; they robbed and murdered as they pleased, and bade Theramenes do the same, but he refused, saying that such conduct was worse than that of the sycophants whom they had put to death. It was now clear to the more violent members of the party that they must rid themselves of Theramenes. In a meeting of the Council, Critias attacked him for his criticism of their conduct, and demanded his execution. At Sparta, the best governed of all cities, no one was allowed to criticise the government under the severest penalties. If Theramenes were spared, he would inspire their opponents with a spirit of rebellion; if he were put to death, his execution would destroy the hopes of all the malcontents within the city or without. Theramenes defended himself in a manner which won the audience, and there was little doubt that he would be acquitted if the decision were left to the Council. For this Critias was prepared. He had gathered together a number of men armed with daggers to support him in any

¹ For Leon see Plato's *Apol.* 32. Socrates with four others was bidden by the Thirty to bring him from Salamis to Athens for execution; *Οἷα καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέτατον βουλόμενοι ὥς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν*. Socrates refused to go, though the other four went.

act of violence, and these he now summoned to the entrance of the Council room. He then came forward and addressed the Council: "Among our recent laws is one which, while
Execution of forbidding the execution of any member of the
Theramenes. Three Thousand without your vote, permits the Thirty to put to death by their own sentence any one outside that list. I, therefore, with the consent of my colleagues strike off Theramenes from the list of the Three Thousand; and we shall order his execution." Theramenes sprang to the altar of Hestia, and called on those present for help. "Any one of your names," he cried, "can be struck out of the list as easily as mine." The appeal was in vain. The precincts of the Council room were filled with men who were known to be armed, and no one dared lift a hand to help. The Eleven were summoned. They came, led by "the shameless and insolent" Satyrus, and Critias bade them arrest Theramenes, "who had been sentenced according to the law," and deal with him as was fit. Satyrus and his attendants tore Theramenes from the altar in spite of his resistance and cries, and carried him through the market-place, loudly protesting against the iniquity of his condemnation. "Be quiet," said Satyrus, "or you will suffer for it." "If I am quiet," retorted Theramenes, "shall I not suffer?" When drinking the hemlock he threw a portion of the draught away as in a game of cottabus, saying: "This to Critias, the fair."¹

26. By the death of Theramenes the Thirty seemed to have removed all opposition, and to make themselves yet more secure they allowed no one but those who were on their

¹ Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. In the *Ath. Pol.* c. 37, Theramenes is condemned not only under the law quoted by Xenophon, but also under another which forbade any of those who had taken part in the destruction of Eetionea (*supra*, p. 416) to share in the constitution of the Thirty. The order of events is also different: the citizens are not deprived of their arms till after the death of Theramenes, whose execution takes place after the arrival of Thrasybulus at Phyle. There is a similar difference with regard to Callibius and the garrison from Lacedaemon. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 14; Plut. *Lys.* 15; *Ath. Pol.* 37.

list to enter the city. But a reaction had begun. With a body of seventy exiles, Thrasybulus (*supra*, p. 407) advanced from Thebes and seized Phyle, a border fortress Thrasybulus at Phyle. on Mount Parnes. The Thirty sent a force of cavalry to dislodge him, but in vain. A blockade was rendered impossible by the weather (it was now winter, 404-403), and when the Lacedaemonian garrison marched out from Athens to check the predatory excursions of the exiles, they were surprised and put to flight with considerable loss. The Thirty became alarmed. They resolved to secure for themselves a refuge at Eleusis, in the event of their being unable to maintain the city. The population of the town was arrested and handed over to the Eleven; on the next day, by a forced vote of the Three Thousand, they were condemned to death to the number of three hundred.¹

Thrasybulus was now in command of one thousand men. With these, by a rapid march through the night, he entered the Peiraeus, and established himself at Munychia. He advances to Peiraeus. Death of Critias. The Thirty at once attacked him, but they were defeated, Critias being slain in the conflict.² When giving back the bodies of the slain, the opposing parties were brought into contact, and Cleocritus, the herald of the mysteries, a man of large stature and commanding voice, addressed the citizens from the city, begging them to renounce allegiance to the Thirty, who for the sake of their own gain had slain more Athenians in eight months than the Peloponnesians had done in ten years. Let all unite and put an end to this shameful war, detestable alike to gods and men, in which the very conquerors wept over the slain. The words were not without effect. The Three Thousand were no longer of one mind, and after some discussion, they deposed the Thirty, and elected a body of Ten,³ one from each tribe. The Thirty retired to Eleusis.

¹ Xen. *l.c.* ii. 4. 8 f.; Lys. 12. 52; 13. 44; cp. Diod. xiv. 32. Some citizens from Salamis were included in the condemnation.

² Xen. *l.c.* 10-19.

³ Xen. *l.c.* 20-24. In *Ath. Pol.* two bodies of Ten are mentioned.

in the city was at liberty to migrate to Eleusis, which was established as an independent community, and so remained for two years (403-401). A general law of amnesty was carried, under which the past was to be forgotten; the only persons excepted being the Thirty Tyrants, the Eleven, and the Ten; and even these might claim the benefit of the law, if they would submit to the legal scrutiny of their office.¹ Pausanias returned with his army to Sparta. Lysander and Libys were completely foiled; Athens was delivered from the Tyrants, and democracy was still alive in Greece.

¹ Xen. *l.c.* 24-29, who specifies the Ten in the Peiræus (*supra*, p. 470); *Ath. Pol.* c. 38-39, in which the Ten who first succeeded the Thirty (*supra*, p. 473) are meant. Andoc. *De Myst.* § 81 ff. The reconciliation took place in the archonship of Euclides, 403-402; *Ath. Pol.* c. 39.

CHAPTER XIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
ATHENIAN ARMAMENT TO THE PEACE WITH CARTHAGE,
413-405.

I. After the departure of Gylippus and the allied forces from Syracuse, Hermocrates (*supra*, p. 232) was by far the most prominent man in the city. It was due to him that Syracuse had enlarged and improved her navy, and won those great victories which had cut off the retreat of the Athenians by sea; he had also taken a large share in the Hermocrates. final destruction of the Athenian army. Eager to carry out to the end the work which he had so successfully begun, he persuaded his countrymen to send him out with a fleet in 412 to join the Peloponnesians in completing the ruin of the Athenian empire, which he with the rest of the Grecian world believed could not be long delayed.¹

In spite of his noble patriotism, and the eminent services which he had rendered to his nation, Hermocrates had won neither the confidence nor the affection of the Syracusans. He was an oligarch, when the tide of feeling was setting strongly to democracy, and as at Athens after Salamis, so now at Syracuse, the triumph of the fleet threw increased power into the hands of the people. It was only by his success as a general that he maintained his ground. In his absence the people asserted their power, and the constitution of Syracuse was rearranged on more purely democratic lines. The change was mainly due to Diocles—the popular leader of

¹ Thuc. viii. 26, towards the end of the summer. Thucydides mentions twenty-two ships. Diodorus, xiii. 63, speaks of thirty-five.

the day; whether or not he was Diocles the legislator is doubtful—who persuaded the city to introduce the lot in the election of officers, and to appoint a commission to draw up a new constitution.¹

When the Syracusan fleet was destroyed at Cyzicus, the enemies of Hermocrates had no difficulty in depriving him and his colleagues of their office, and driving them Hermocrates is banished. into exile. He received the intelligence at Antandrus, and though assured of the sympathy and support of his officers, he did not attempt to resist the decree of his city. After giving up the fleet to his successors, he retired to the court of Pharnabazus, and soon afterwards joined the Spartan embassy to Susa (*supra*, p. 430), intending, when an opportunity offered, to win his way back to Syracuse.

2. Sicily now became the scene of a conflict even more terrible than that from which she had just emerged, and, as before, the mischief began with the quarrels of Segesta and Selinus. The success of Syracuse, which Selinus and Segesta. supported Selinus, the annihilation of the Athenians, who were the allies of Segesta, could not fail to affect the mutual relations of the cities. Selinus was able to carry everything with a high hand; Segesta feared that by resistance she might bring upon herself the vengeance of Syracuse. She voluntarily retired from the territory which had been in dispute, but when the Selinuntians pushed their encroachments still further, she sent envoys Segesta appeals to Carthage. to Carthage, begging for assistance, and offering to place herself in the hands of Carthage. After some discussion the Carthaginians decided to send help, and appointed Hannibal, the grandson of Hamilcar who perished at Himera, general of the forces.² Hannibal sent envoys with

¹ Diod. xiii. 35, who ascribes to this Diocles what was true or thought to be so of the older statesman. Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, iii. 442, 722.

² Cp. vol. ii. p. 446; Diodorus says that his father, Gisco, ended his life at Selinus, having been banished from Carthage owing to Hamilcar's defeat.

the Segestaeans to Syracuse to complain of the conduct of Selinus, and the Syracusans, who after the exhaustion of the previous war were in no mood to enter on a new one, voted to remain at peace with Carthage, though they would not renounce their alliance with Selinus.¹

The Carthaginians upon this despatched a small force to the aid of Segesta, and the Selinuntians, who in the confidence of superior power had spread through the country, looting and destroying, were at length taken off their guard, and severely defeated, with the loss of all their spoil. Both sides now applied for help, the Selinuntians to Syracuse, the Segestaeans to Carthage. War between Sicily and Carthage was inevitable, and Hannibal, who was eager to wipe out from his race the blot of Himera, spent the winter in collecting forces.²

3. In the spring of 409 Hannibal landed on the promontory of Lilybaeum, at the head of a large force well equipped
Hannibal lands with arms and siege-engines.³ He drew his
in Sicily.

ships ashore in the bay of Motye to show the Syracusans that he had no intention of sailing against their city, and marched with his forces to Selinus. The city was ill prepared for an attack. Though she had joined in the previous war, taking the part of the Carthaginians against Gelo, in two generations of peace her walls had been allowed to fall out of repair. Her energies had been absorbed in building the vast temples whose ruins attest the prosperity of Selinus,—temples still unfinished when the invader fell upon the city. Yet in the hope that succour would come from Syracuse she determined to resist. Hannibal brought
Destruction up his engines, but nine days elapsed before
of Selinus. a breach was made in the walls sufficient to admit of a successful assault. Even then the town was

¹ Diod. xiii. 43.

² Diod. xiii. 44. He informs us that in the force which came to the aid of Segesta were a number of Campanians who had been hired by the Chalcidian cities to support Athens.

³ About the numbers ancient authors were in dispute. Ephorus mentioned 200,000 foot and 4000 horse; Timaeus not much more than 100,000.

not captured without a good deal of hard fighting in the streets. It was given over to the soldiers, who slew without distinction of age or sex, and carried off everything of value from the houses and temples. Only those women were spared who had fled with their children to the temples, and they were spared not for mercy's sake, but lest in despair they should set fire to the sacred places and destroy the treasures in them—spared, too, for outrage and slavery. Six thousand persons are said to have perished; five thousand were carried captive into Africa; about half that number escaped to Agrigentum. The very corpses of the dead were mutilated; the savage conquerors went about with strings of hands round their bodies, and heads spitted on their spears. The walls of the city were levelled to the ground.¹

When the envoys from Selinus applied for assistance, the Syracusans were at war with Naxos and Catana. They at once came to terms with these cities; and on hearing of the siege of Selinus they sent out a force of 3000 heavy-armed under Diocles to relieve it. The army had only reached Agrigentum when they heard that Selinus was taken. Thereupon they sent envoys to Hannibal, begging him to allow the captives to be ransomed, and to spare the shrines of the gods. Hannibal replied that the Selinuntians had failed to preserve their freedom, and must therefore submit to slavery; the gods, he added, had already left the city in resentment at the conduct of the inhabitants. Yet he received with kindness the aged Empedion, who came to him as an envoy from the fugitives, and not only restored to him his own lands, but set at liberty any of his kinsmen who were among the captives. Empedion had not changed with his city; he had maintained the Carthaginian cause, and urged Selinus to open her gates to Hannibal. The citizens who had escaped were subsequently allowed to return and cultivate the soil on condition of paying a rent to Carthage.²

4. Hannibal now advanced to Himera, the city which was

¹ Diod. xiii. 54-57.

² Diod. xiii. 59.

the scene of his grandfather's defeat and death, and which, therefore, above all others, was marked out by him for vengeance. Part of his army he placed on some hills at a little distance from the city; with the rest he encamped round it. He battered the walls with engines, and drove mines under them, supporting the roof of his mines with beams, which he set on fire when the work was finished. The Himeraeans, aided by the army of Diocles, now amounting to about 5000 men, defended themselves with courage and energy; they repaired their shattered walls, and even drove the Carthaginians back to their camp on the hills, but only to be defeated with great slaughter by Hannibal. Diocles, alarmed for the safety of Syracuse by a report that Hannibal was about to march on that city, resolved to take his forces back at once; and though the Sicilian ships, which had been recalled from Ionia at the approach of war with Carthage, appeared off Himera, the town was unable to hold out longer. A considerable number of the women and children were carried away by these ships to a place of security, but before the whole population could be thus saved, a new breach was made in the walls, through which the irresistible Iberians in Hannibal's army fought their way. The same indiscriminate slaughter began as at Selinus, but Hannibal put an end to it: he wished to take as many captives as he could. The houses he gave up to the soldiers as spoil; the temples he plundered and burnt, the city he razed to the ground, the women and children he placed in the camps; but the men, to the number of three thousand, he "led to the place where Hamilcar had been executed by Gelo," and there put them to death with torture and mutilation.¹ He then returned in triumph to Carthage (409).

5. Since his exile, Hermocrates had been preparing for his

¹ αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε, Diod. xiii. 62. According to the Carthaginian story (and Herodotus) Hamilcar was not executed by Gelo, but Diodorus follows some other version of his death (Hdt. vii. 165).

return to Syracuse, and he had received liberal support from Pharnabazus towards his object. He was now (408) at Messene, where he built himself five triremes, and took into his pay a force of a thousand hoplites. With these, and as many more of the fugitive Himeraeans, he endeavoured to make his way into Syracuse. The moment seemed favourable. It was clear that the military administration had not been improved by the recent changes in the city. Diocles had accomplished nothing, and was quite incapable of meeting Hannibal in the field; Hermocrates was known to be an able commander. But the attempt was made in vain; the opposition was still too strong. Hermocrates then marched through the island to Selinus, rebuilt a portion of the walls, summoned back the inhabitants who could be collected, and made the town a base of operations against the Phoenicians. He laid waste the country of Motye and Panormus, carrying off abundant spoils, and defeating the enemy with great loss. When his success became known at Syracuse, the demos were more inclined to receive him, but Diocles was still able to prevent his return. To gain their good will yet more, he repaired to Himera (407), and, encamping in the suburbs of the ruined city, collected the bones of the Syracusans who had fallen there. These he placed on wagons richly adorned, and sent them on their way to Syracuse. As an exile he could not enter the city, but the arrival of the wagons caused the outburst of faction which he expected. Diocles, who was responsible for abandoning the bodies unburied and now opposed the reception of the relics, was driven into exile, and the remains of the dead were honoured by a public funeral. Even after this service Hermocrates was not admitted to the city, so deeply rooted was the fear that he would make himself tyrant. He retired to Selinus; but not long afterwards, on the invitation of friends, he came again to Syracuse, and forced his way with a few adherents into the town. He had reached the market-place, when he was overpowered and cut down.

Return of
Hermocrates
to Sicily.

Death of
Hermocrates.

Of his supporters, a few owed their escape to the belief that they were slain, and among these was Dionysius.¹

6. The Carthaginians, encouraged by their success, and perhaps irritated by the action of Hermocrates, resolved to attempt the conquest of the whole of Sicily. Hannibal was

Hannibal again chosen general, and when, owing to his
prepares for a age, he begged to decline the office, Himilco, of
new campaign. the same family, was appointed to support him.

Troops were collected from every quarter, allies from the Mauretanians and Nomads as far as the borders of Cyrene, mercenaries from Iberia and Campania, until a total force of at least 120,000 was reached.² Forty triremes, which were sent on in advance, were defeated with a loss of fifteen vessels off the coast of Sicily; but, in spite of this disaster, Hannibal succeeded in carrying over his army. He had no sooner arrived in Sicily than he marched upon Agrigentum³ (406).

Agrigentum was the second city of Sicily. It was strongly placed, and the advantages of natural position had been increased by art. The country round was fertile, and in expectation of the war, large quantities of produce had been conveyed into the town.

Siege and capture of Agrigentum. On his arrival, Hannibal made two divisions of his army, as he had done at Himera. One division was encamped on the adjacent hills, the other close to the town. He then sent envoys to the city asking the Agrigentines to become his allies, or at least to remain neutral—requests which were rejected at once. The siege began. In his description of it, Diodorus, our only authority, gives us but little help in regard to the topography. One camp of the Carthaginians, as we have seen, was pitched close to the city, and we may place it to the south-west, on the right bank of the Hypsas. On this side of the city walls the generals, after a careful

¹ Diod. xiii. 63, 75. The chronology is uncertain.

² Diod. xiii. 80. So Timaeus, but here again Ephorus gives a larger number—300,000.

³ Diod. xiii. 80-85, who here digresses into a long account of Agrigentum.

examination, directed their attack. Two wooden towers were constructed, from which for a whole day the Carthaginians carried on the assault, till they were recalled at nightfall by the sound of a trumpet. Before morning the towers had been burned by the besieged. Hannibal now resolved to attack the wall at several points, and in order to obtain material for raising mounds against it from which the besiegers could carry on operations (χώματα, *supra*, p. 137), he gave orders for the destruction of the tombs which lay outside the city. His orders were being rapidly carried out when the work received a sudden check. A thunderbolt struck the monument of Thero at the moment when it was being pulled down, and the soothsayers forbade any further disturbance of the sepulchre. A plague also broke out in the camp, causing intense suffering. Hannibal himself was one of the victims, and Himilco, seeing his army distressed with superstitious terrors, not only countermanded any further destruction of the tombs, but even sacrificed a child to Cronos (Moloch) after the Carthaginian manner, and plunged victims into the sea to propitiate Poseidon. He did not, however, relax his efforts in the siege, but completed the mounds with the help of other materials, and placed his engines upon them.

The Agrigentines were aided by Dexippus, a Lacedaemonian, at the head of 1500 mercenaries, and by 800 Campanians, who in the previous campaign had been in Hannibal's pay, but had left him in disgust at the close. The Syracusans, who now fully recognised the danger which threatened Sicily, sent large reinforcements,¹ which were joined on the way by contingents from Camarina, Gela, and elsewhere, till the whole force is said to have amounted to 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, and they were supported by a fleet of thirty ships. The army had crossed the Himeras, when it was met by a detachment of the Carthaginians. These it severely defeated

¹ Agrigentum had refused to aid Syracuse against Athens (*supra*, p. 341).

and pursued towards Agrigentum, capturing the camp on the hills, in which Daphnaeus, the Syracusan general, took up his quarters. The Agrigentines were eager to sally out and complete the destruction of the enemy, but their generals refused, and the fugitives found safety in the camp by the city. When the Syracusan soldiers joined those in the city, there were loud complaints of the conduct of the generals. A meeting was called, which ended in a tumult; four of the Agrigentine generals were stoned to death, the fifth being spared on account of his youth. Even Dexippus was suspected of treachery.

Daphnaeus now contemplated an attack on the camp of the Carthaginians, and for a time succeeded in reducing them to such distress that the soldiers were on the eve of a mutiny, when Himilco, bringing up ships from Motye and Panormus, fortunately captured a Greek fleet laden with stores for the city. The situation was now entirely changed: the Agrigentines had consumed their stores so lavishly that there was little or nothing left; and it became clear to the auxiliaries that there was no hope of saving the city. The Campanians went over at once to Himilco; Dexippus was suspected of bribery, and at any rate refused to remain. Agrigentum was abandoned to its fate. After the departure of these troops, the Agrigentines, leaving the infirm and aged behind, slipped away to Gela under cover of night, in terror of the enemy, in sorrow for their friends and lost homes, in utter misery and despair. Himilco seems to have made no attempt to attack them; he was satisfied to gain the city without the risk and loss of a battle. The fugitives were allowed by the Syracusans to settle at Leontini.¹

When Himilco entered Agrigentum there was the same ruthless slaughter of the helpless, the same desecration and destruction of temples as at Selinus. The amount of spoil was enormous: Agrigentum was one of the richest of Greek cities; from the day of its foundation it had never

¹ Diod. xiii. 89.

been captured, and the inhabitants took a pride in acquiring the costliest furniture and the finest works of art. The choicest pictures and statues were sent to Carthage, among them the famous bull of Phalaris. The siege had lasted eight months, and came to an end in December 406. Himilco remained in the city for the rest of the winter.¹

7. The fall of Agrigentum created the greatest consternation throughout Sicily. The inhabitants of the country sought shelter in Syracuse, and sent their families and their goods to Italy. The Syra-<sup>The rise of
Dionysius.</sup> cusan generals were severely blamed for abandoning the city, but no measures were taken and merely formal accusations were brought against them by the Agrigentines till Dionysius, who had greatly distinguished himself at Agrigentum, came forward in the Assembly and attacked them as traitors; in punishing such men, he said, they ought not to wait for the legal sentence of condemnation, but to take the matter into their own hands at once. For this speech Dionysius was fined, as an incendiary, but the fine was at once paid by Philistus, the famous historian of his country, who urged Dionysius to go on as he had begun, and he would pay his fines the whole day long, if necessary. Dionysius then charged the generals with receiving bribes. He advised the people no longer to choose their generals from the rich, who were always ready to increase their own wealth at the expense of their country, but from the poorer citizens, who could be trusted. He had already resolved to make himself tyrant of Syracuse; and after the feeble and disastrous campaign which had just closed, it was not difficult to persuade the people that a strong hand was needed, if the war with Carthage was to be carried on with success. Daphnaeus and his colleagues were deposed, and other generals chosen, among whom was Dionysius himself. But he refused to act in concert.

¹ Diod. xiii. 90. The bull with other treasures was restored to Agrigentum by Scipio 260 years after the siege, and was to be seen there in the time of Diodorus. Timaeus, who lived in the interval, doubted its existence.

with his colleagues, and secretly spread reports that they were in communication with the enemy. To strengthen his position, he persuaded the Syracusans to recall the exiles—men of the party of Hermocrates, who were opposed to the democracy, and had no hope of regaining their position while it remained in power. Among these he would find friends as long as he could satisfy their demands.

His schemes were aided by an appeal for help from Gela, which was in immediate danger of attack by Himilco.

Dionysius at Gela. The city was under the command of Dexippus, to whose support Dionysius was sent with a moderate force. He found the city distracted by faction, and at once joining the party of the poor, he brought the rich to trial, got them condemned and their property confiscated. The money thus obtained he spent in paying the soldiers, and returned to Syracuse the idol of the army. There also he excited the poor against the rich, who, he declared, were neglecting the protection of the city at a time of the greatest danger. One plan, and one only, could save them; as in the days of Gelo their army must be led by a general with full powers. The people assented, and he was elected to the office.

He had still much to fear. His opponents were many, and the city began to be suspicious. He knew the democratic instincts of the Syracusan people, among whom it was not safe openly to take a step towards tyranny. As general he ordered the military population, under forty years of age, to march out to Leontini, with provisions for thirty days. Leontini at this time was full of fugitives from Agrigentum, of exiles and strangers. There he encamped, and in the night he seized the Acropolis of the city, pretending that the step was necessary to protect himself against assassination. Next day an Assembly was called, consisting for the most part of soldiers and fugitives, and by their vote he was allowed to have the security of a bodyguard of six hundred men of his own selection. With this support he was able to throw off the mask and appear as tyrant. He got his rivals

Daphnaeus and Damarchus executed; Dexippus he dismissed to Hellas, as he found him unwilling to fall in with his schemes. He also strengthened his connection with the oligarchical party by marrying the daughter of Hermocrates, and giving his sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of Hermocrates. By this means Dionysius, "who began life as a scribe and a common citizen, became tyrant of the greatest city in Greece, a position which he retained till his death thirty-eight years afterwards."¹

8. In the spring (405), Himilco, after destroying what remained of the carved work of the temples at Agrigentum, and levelling the city with the ground, advanced into the territory of Gela and Camarina. Himilco attacks Gela. After devastating the territory, he sat down before Gela in an entrenched camp, and began his attack on the city. The Geloans defended themselves bravely, and Dionysius came to their aid with a large force from Syracuse.² At first he pitched his camp near the sea, and attempted to cut off the enemy's supplies; afterwards he divided his army into three sections, and delivered an attack. Some slight success was gained, but the day ended in disaster, and Dionysius was driven back into the city with great loss.

A council was held, at which it was decided that Gela was not the place where a decisive battle could be fought. Dionysius asked for a truce on the following day in order to bury the dead, but, under cover Dionysius fails to relieve Gela. of night, he sent the people out of the city early in the night to Camarina, and afterwards withdrew himself, leaving two thousand light-armed to kindle fires, and so deceive the enemy into the belief that the city was occupied. These troops also were to leave at dawn. Gela was abandoned to the Carthaginians. At Camarina he compelled the women and children and the helpless part of the population to retire with the Geloans at once to Syracuse.

¹ Diod. xiii. 96.

² Diod. xiii. 109. As before, the numbers are differently given by different historians.

It was a mournful exodus. The fear of the Carthaginians overpowered every other feeling; the highborn was mingled with the meanest; the maiden was forced to renounce her retirement and travel wearily on foot, in the eyes of all men. Some left all they had, satisfied if they could save their lives; some, under the burden of age and sickness, were unable to go at all.

Dionysius was now as thoroughly hated as the men whom he had deposed and executed. If they had been bribed, **Exasperation at Dionysius.** he had allowed the enemy to conquer in order that he might establish his power over the terrified cities. The contingents from Italy returned home. The cavalry, on finding that they could not slay Dionysius on his way back to Syracuse, owing to the presence of his bodyguard, not one of whom, it was observed, had perished in the battle, rode back to the city, and revenged themselves by burning his house and ill-treating his wife till she died. Dionysius, who suspected what was taking place, got together a few troops, on whom he could rely, and hastened home. He arrived at Achradina in the night and found the gates closed against him. These he burned, and rushed to the market-place, where his mercenaries shot down the knights who attempted to check him. He lost no time in executing or banishing all his opponents, and thus became master of the city. The Geloans and Camarinaeans, who suspected his action towards them, joined the Agrigentines at Leontini.¹

Though victorious, Himilco was unable to continue the campaign. He had lost more than half his army by the **Peace with Carthage.** plague, and could no longer remain in his camp. He offered terms to Dionysius, which were readily accepted. The Carthaginians were to retain all their old colonies; the Sicanians, Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum were to be given up to them; Gela and Camarina were to pull down their walls and pay tribute. Leontini, Messene,

¹ Diod. xiii. 112 ff.

and the Sicels were to be independent, Syracuse was to be subject to Dionysius; the captives and any ships which had been taken on either side were to be restored. Thus the war ended. The Carthaginians returned to Carthage, carrying the plague with them, which raged for some time in the city and among the allies, till the state was brought to the brink of destruction.¹ Sicily, though at a heavy cost, had got rid of the invading host, but Syracuse was once more in the hands of a tyrant. In the West, as in the East, democracy had been found unequal to the task imposed upon her.

¹ Diod. xiii. 114. See Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, vol. iii. c. 9, for a minute account of the invasion. Our authority is Diodorus, who perhaps drew from Philistus—at first or second hand.

CHAPTER XIV.

LITERATURE, ART, SOCIETY, ETC.

I. At the beginning of the Fifth Century, lyric poetry was not only the prevailing mode of poetical composition, but, in the hands of two great masters, it was attaining a higher development than at any previous period. The odes of Simonides of Ceos (558-468) and Pindar of Thebes (520-440) were the acknowledged masterpieces of lyric art. Of Simonides we have unfortunately nothing but a few lyric fragments, and short elegiac poems, commemorative of some person or event, but even in what we have we find a depth of feeling and a felicity of expression unsurpassed in Greek poetry. Simonides before all things knew when he had said enough. It is this which makes his famous couplet on the Spartans who fell at Thermopylae so unapproachable.¹ With Pindar we have been more fortunate, at least in regard to his Epinician odes. Of these a considerable number has come down to us, many of which rank among the most splendid compositions of the kind. It is indeed difficult to realise the full effect of the performance of one of these wonderful poems, owing to the difficulty of the language and our ignorance of Greek metres and music. As the Olympic victor was raised for the moment above all mortal men, so was his victory celebrated by a unique combination of music and verse, elaborated with the greatest skill, that each art might give her full support to the other.²

¹ ὦ ξείν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

² Pindar's poems are ἀναξίφορμιγγες ὕμνοι. However intricate the

Besides these two poets, there were others of lesser note, such as Bacchylides, the nephew of Simonides, of whose poems a considerable portion has recently been discovered; and Timocreon of Rhodes, already known to us by his bitter attack on Themistocles (vol. ii. 287). But by the middle of the century the day of lyric poetry was over. The spirit of the time required something more comprehensive. Lyric poetry expresses a mood or celebrates an event, and, though Simonides and Pindar introduced ethical elements into their poetry, they did not get further than detached "gnomes" or thoughts; they never worked out an ethical situation. There were also other reasons why lyric poetry failed to satisfy the age. It was the poetry of a class—a cultivated and generally a wealthy class—who paid the great lyric poets for their services. The praises of the rich and mighty men, which we find in Pindar, were not spontaneous; they were purchased, and, what was worse, purchased by an individual. But after the Persian war, class feeling was discredited at Athens, and though dramatic poets were rewarded for success, it was one thing to be paid by Hiero, or Arcesilaus, or Lampon, and quite another to receive an honorarium from the people for providing them with the best of entertainments. In the Fifth Century, also, Athens became the centre of literary activity in Greece, and Athens, amid all her literary wealth, could never boast of a lyric poet of the first rank. During the short period of their rule, the tyrants endeavoured to supply the deficiency by importing lyric poets from other cities, but the style never took root.¹ That Athenian poets were not deficient in the gift of lyric song is amply proved by the beautiful odes which we find in the tragedians and in Aristophanes.

music and metre, the words rang out in the ears of the audience. It is just this which we find so difficult to understand.

¹ Only two of the Epinician odes of Pindar are in honour of Athenians, and they are but meagre specimens of his art.—*Pyth.* vii.; *Nem.* ii. The fact that the dithyramb was superseded by the drama may also have had some effect on lyric poetry at Athens, at least in the fifth century.

2. However this may be, lyric poetry was now supplanted by dramatic poetry, which, though it had its origin in Dorian cities, was quickly domiciled at Athens, where it rose to a height which has never been surpassed. Dramatic performances were indeed no novelty in the city at the beginning of the Fifth Century, when Aeschylus was twenty-five years old. In the time of Pisistratus, Thespis had brought upon himself the reproaches of the aged Solon, who saw in his "plays" the corruption of the Athenian people (vol. i. 462). Since that time considerable progress had been made, and when Phrynichus, after the fall of Miletus in 494, made the calamity of the chief city of Ionia and colony of Athens the subject of a drama, the whole audience were moved to tears—a proof of the power of the poet and the susceptibility of the people. Phrynichus was fined for his too successful realism, and the subject was forbidden for the future. A play must be a play, and deal with themes sufficiently remote and general to touch common chords of human sympathy only, unless, indeed, the drama were used to celebrate some glorious achievement of the sons of Hellas.

For us the founder of Greek tragedy is Aeschylus (525-460 ?), in whose lifetime the drama became a part of the public Dionysiac festivals, and the arrangements for the competition of the poets (*infra*, p. 500), the awarding of the prizes, and the maintenance and training of the chorus were introduced. From the plays of Aeschylus himself we can see what progress was made in dramatic composition in the first forty years of the century. To the single actor, who hitherto had been allowed to appear in dramas, he added a second, by this means making possible the conflict of two opposing forces, irrespective of the chorus, and the introduction of a story, in which the chorus took but a subordinate part. He was thus able to diminish the action of the chorus, and depose it from the prominent position which it occupied in older dramas, and in his own *Suppliants*. Further improvements were intro-

The develop-
ment of the
drama.

Aeschylus.

duced by his younger contemporary Sophocles, of which Aeschylus did not hesitate to avail himself, such as the introduction of a third actor, by which the plot became more intricate, and the interaction of characters more subtle. But though in technique he moved onwards with the time, he preserved to the end the spirit of the great days in which his early manhood was passed, for he took a personal part in the battles of Marathon and Salamis. The fall of the tyrants, the calamities which overtook Croesus and Xerxes, left a deep impression on the minds of the Greeks, leading them to reflect profoundly on the uncertainty of human prosperity. That justice was paramount in the ordering of human life, that evil overtook the wicked, that man must not contend with the gods, that he was often misled by some "power not himself" into the commission of evil—these were moral ideas which had slowly accumulated in the Greek mind; but in the age of Aeschylus a new belief was gaining ground, the belief that even without the commission of evil, by mere unalloyed prosperity, man brought upon himself the wrath of the gods. This is the doctrine of "Nemesis," which appears in Pindar, and more clearly still in Herodotus, who illustrates it by the famous story of the ring of Polycrates. Aeschylus took a nobler view; he would not allow that the gods were envious; "the house of the righteous is at all times happy in its children"; but prosperity may breed a spirit of rebellion, by which men are brought within the fatal meshes of wrong-doing, and hence evil falls upon them. In the same way he refined upon another doctrine familiar to the Greeks—the doctrine of an "inherited curse." A curse pursues a family from generation to generation, not by mere inheritance, as was commonly believed, but because one generation after another put themselves under its operation. So it was with Eteocles, who cannot be restrained from meeting his brother at the gate of Thebes, and bringing upon both the curse of Oedipus; and so it was with Agamemnon, who brought upon himself the curse of the House of Atreus by sacrificing his daughter. From in-

stances such as these we see that Aeschylus took a lofty view of the poet's vocation, and by the re-creation of old myths sought to bring his audience face to face with the problems of his age. He worked on broad lines, extending his argument through the three plays which custom demanded that the poet should bring out at the same time.¹ As a playwright, that is, in the composition of his plots, he cannot be ranked high. In the *Prometheus Vinculus* there can hardly be said to be any plot at all; Prometheus is a fixed figure, to which a number of persons—the chorus, Oceanus, Io—are brought without any good reason for their coming. In the *Agamemnon* the idea of the beacon service between Greece and Asia, an idea prominent at the time of the Persian invasion,² is worked into the Homeric situation, on which the play is founded, in such a manner as to create extraordinary confusion. And to the last, in spite of the improvements which he introduced, Aeschylus never succeeded in reducing the chorus to the limits required for the best development of the plot. Yet, in spite of imperfections in technique, the *Prometheus Vinculus* and the *Agamemnon* will always retain a place among the grandest efforts of human genius.³

3. Sophocles (495-405) is the poet of the Periclean age—the age of the Parthenon and the sculptures of Phidias.

Sophocles. There is nothing in him of the rugged splendour of his predecessor, nothing superhuman or daemonic; we move within narrower limits, in which all is subdued and perfected with consummate art. In some respects Sophocles loses by this self-restraint; we cannot, for instance, compare his conception of Clytemnestra with that of Aeschylus; but what he loses in one respect he gains in another; his plots, at least in some of his plays, are admirable, each scene is evolved out of what has gone before—in this respect the *Oedipus Rex* is a masterpiece of dramatic art—and the

¹ The history of the "trilogy" is not accurately known, but it seems doubtful whether any poet but Aeschylus composed trilogies.

² Herod. ix. 3.

³ For Greek criticism of Aeschylus, cp. Aristoph. *Frogs*, 768 ff.

chorus and the "argument" are brought into the proper relation to each other. So also are the characters and the "incidents." It is an artistic rendering of particular situations which he presents to us, and often no answer is given to the graver questions which arise. Of him too it may be said with the greatest truth, that he "saw life steadily and saw it whole." It was in his boyhood that the Persians were driven back in ruinous defeat from the shores of Greece; he watched the growth of the Athenian empire, and took a part in establishing it as a general in the Samian expedition; and as his days were protracted almost to the end of the Peloponnesian war, he also saw Athens brought low by the Sicilian disaster, and torn by faction at the Revolution of the Four Hundred. Through these changes he preserved a serenity and cheerfulness which not only endeared him to his countrymen, but left him peculiarly receptive to the influence of art.

Sophocles wrote no trilogies. Each of his plays was complete in itself, and even when he composed plays on the same theme, they were brought out at different times, and were not always consistent with each other.

4. The third great tragic poet of the century is Euripides (480-406), about whose plays opinions greatly differed in the poet's lifetime, and have differed ever since.

It is, indeed, difficult to write about him with Euripides. consistency, for he is inconsistent with himself. He was the poet of the new movement at Athens, dear to Socrates and his school, the prophet of the enlightenment, whose verses were listened to throughout Greece with eager attention; but he was also the author of the *Bacchae*, in which he pleads for the ritual and worship of Dionysus. He is capable of writing scenes of touching simplicity, such as the death of Alcestis, but at other times he avails himself of the most wretched resources to excite compassion. In the *Helena* Menelaus is brought before us after his shipwreck clad in a piece of sailcloth; and the "rags of Telephus" have been rendered notorious by Aristophanes. His language is often

of extraordinary beauty, simple or splendid as suits the context, but there are also passages of misplaced rhetoric, false antithesis, and meaningless repetitions. And as fortune has preserved to us nearly three times as many plays of Euripides as of his predecessors, there is in his case wider scope for criticism; we do not judge of him merely from a choice selection of his best plays.

But whether we like him or dislike him—whether we follow Aristophanes, who was never weary of exposing his weaknesses, or see in him the poet who, whatever may be said of him as a playwright, is certainly a master in creating tragic situations, it is impossible to deny that Euripides took the most important step that has ever been taken in the history of tragedy. It is human nature as he saw it round him and human passion, which, under thin disguises, are the motives of his tragedies. He interprets the old myths in the light of his own time, and the result is often sadly realistic. The illusion is completely swept aside: Apollo is the meanest of men; Aphrodite the worst of women; Agamemnon and Menelaus are just such kings of Sparta as we read of in Herodotus. When we remember the Homeric conception, the new presentment jars upon us. And yet it is a step forwards; poetry is brought nearer to her great office of holding up the mirror to nature. By taking this step, Euripides introduced a new life into tragedy, and through his plays there breathes the same spirit which animated Shakespeare—the same, yet different, for in Euripides there is no sense of humour, and no Greek was a comic as well as a tragic poet.

Besides these great tragic poets—all of whom, it must be especially noticed, were Athenians—there were numerous others; in fact by the end of the century Greece swarmed with fledgling tragedians whose twitterings were heard in the intervals of nobler strains. The most eminent was Agathon, a well-known figure in the Socratic circle, of whom Aristophanes gives us an amusing caricature in the *Thesmophoriazusee*. He is there represented as a creator of

effeminate characters, who endeavours, so far as possible, to resemble his own creations, but at a later time when Agathon was dead, the comedian spoke more seriously, describing him as a "good poet, and regretted by his friends."¹

5. More characteristic still of Athens, of city life and democratic feeling, was the rise of comedy. This was said to be of Dorian origin, as was perhaps the case with tragedy also in the last resort, but this Comedy. merely means that the Dorians were the first to make an artistic use of elements which had long been in existence.² The first to attain greatness in comedy was Epicharmus, who was neither an Athenian, nor brought out plays at Athens, but a native of Cos, who in his childhood was carried to the Sicilian Megara and thence to Syracuse in the time of the tyrant Gelo (vol. ii. p. 441). We can form but an imperfect judgment of his work, for only fragments remain—and those very short and disconnected. Plato speaks of him as the greatest of comic poets—a verdict not altogether impartial, for Epicharmus was a philosopher as well as a comedian. Living in the days of the tyrants, he could not, of course, make Sicilian politics the theme of his comedy; he took his subjects partly from the social life of the people and partly from mythology, which he burlesqued.

The series of great comic poets at Athens begins with Cratinus. Only fragments of his works remain, but we have enough to prove that in his time comedy had Cratinus
and Eupolis. already established her claim to deal with persons and questions of the day. He was one of the fiercest of the opponents of Pericles and Aspasia, and in his *Panoptae* he ridiculed the sophists. He was followed by

¹ Aristoph. *Frogs*, 84. The *Symposium* of Plato is supposed to take place in the house of Agathon.

² The origin of literary comedy can hardly be traced, or of tragedy either. Aristotle seems to know nothing of Susarion or Thespis, the reputed authors of comedy and tragedy respectively in Attica; he derives the first from the phallic songs, of which we have a sample in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes (235 ff.); and the second from the dithyrambs.

Eupolis, Crates, Phrynichus, Pherecrates, Hermippus, Aristophanes, and many more. The plays of all these poets but Aristophanes have perished, an irreparable loss to the student of Athenian manners and history. Eupolis especially, so far as we can form an opinion from the fragments, appears to have taken a wide and statesmanlike view of public affairs; at any rate he estimated Pericles more accurately than Aristophanes, and from the sketches in his "Cities" of the various states which composed the Athenian empire, we glean something of their condition and relation to Athens.¹ Of the plays of Aristophanes eleven have been preserved, some of which deal with politics, others with more general subjects. In the *Acharnians*, which was brought out in 425, he laughs at the war-party, and ventures to say a word Aristophanes. for the Lacedaemonians; in the *Knights* (424) he ridicules Cleon, who was then in the flush of his triumph at Pylus, and endeavours to diminish his influence over the Athenians; in the *Wasps* (422) he attacks the system of the law-courts, and the Athenian love of litigation. In the *Peace* (421) he hails the return of happier days with hopes which were doomed to disappointment. The *Lysistrata* also (411) must be ranked among the political plays. At the time when this play was acted, owing to the absence of the fleet at Samos, Athens may be said to have been left in the charge of the women and old men; and on this situation Aristophanes has founded his plot, in which the women seize the Acropolis and insist on putting an end to the war. The boldness with which the extreme oligarchy are here and there assailed on the eve of the revolution is creditable to the poet. In the *Clouds* (423) Socrates is caricatured. Whether Aristophanes misjudged him to the extent which the play implies may be doubted, but to a comedian all was grist that came to his mill, and Socrates in his appearance and his life

¹ There were also earlier comic poets at Athens than Cratinus; Aristotle (*Poet.* 5) mentions Chionides and Magnes. Of the first we know hardly anything, of the second there is a criticism in Aristoph. *Knights*, 518 ff. For Cratinus, see *ibid.* 526; for Crates, 537 ff.

was too good a subject to be lost through any scruples about justice to the man. The subject also allowed the poet to display his genuinely Athenian contempt for natural science and "materialistic ontology." In the *Birds* (416) there is nothing but pure fancy and delightful far-away echoes of political worries "refined away to fairy music in the enchanted air" of Cloud Cuckoo Town. In the *Thesmophoriazusae* (410) he directs his satire against Agathon and Euripides, not without smart hits at the murdered Hyperbolus and the baffled oligarchs. After the battle of Arginusae and the execution of the generals, politics were no longer a subject for comedy. The *Frogs* (405) is a criticism on the three great dramatic poets of the century. Sophocles and Euripides being both dead, Dionysus is in want of a poet, and goes in search of one to the shades, where he finds a contest raging between Euripides and Aeschylus for the first place. Where politics are touched it is in a grave and serious tone, as in the *Lysistrata*. In the *Ecclesiazusae* (392) we have a picture of Athens as she might be under the "regiment" of women, and a thoroughgoing socialism. The theme of the *Plutus* (388) is the old story of the blind god of wealth, and his restoration to sight. The play is far removed in subject and style from the *Acharnians* of 425. Greece is now on the eve of the Peace of Antalcidas, and Athens, though prosperous beyond her hopes, is no longer the great city of the previous century. From this short notice of his existing plays, it will be seen how closely Aristophanes keeps to the politics and society of his time. Often he is only too realistic, but in spite of much that startles and shocks us, the incomparable grace of perfect Attic art is spread over his compositions, and among the songs introduced into his plays are some which are unsurpassed in Greek lyric.

6. In connecting the growth of the drama with the development of democracy, we may seem to have forgotten the lessons of modern history. England was not a democracy in the days of Elizabeth and James I., nor was France in the days of Louis XIV. Yet these were the days of Shakespeare

and Molière, poets who owed not a little to the favour of their sovereigns. But the Greek drama—so far at least as the representation of the plays went—was altogether different from the modern. It was not the affair of a company of actors and playwrights who lived by the stage, and brought forward such pieces as would be most likely to attract an audience. The Greek plays were a part of the festival of

Representation
of plays at
Athens.

Dionysus, and were acted before the whole population of Athens, and as many strangers as chose to visit Athens at the time. Originally, tragedies were acted only at the Great Dionysia in the spring, and they were brought out by poets who competed with one another. Each of the three poets whose plays had been thought worthy of a chorus by the archon, came forward with three tragedies and a satyric drama, and their dramas were ranged in order of merit by judges chosen for the purpose. Comedies were brought out, not only at the Great Dionysia, but also at the Lenaea, in the winter, and here also the poets competed, but with one drama each only. For this reason the drama stood in a far closer relation to the people and to city life in its ancient than in its modern form, and as the tragedians in the choruses and speeches of their plays often sought to correct and elevate the popular notions of ethics and religion, so the comedian was permitted in the peculiar form of chorus known as the *parabasis* to come forward and tell the audience some home truths about himself or the city.¹

The poems of Homer were still recited at the Panathenaic festival, but just for the reason that Homer was by this time established as the epic poet of Greece, there was no attempt to compose in his style. The epics which still continued to be written were genealogical or descriptive, such as the *Heracleis* of Panyasis of Halicarnassus, a relative of Herodotus, and the *Founding of Elea* by Xenophanes (vol. ii. 512 f.). Antimachus, a native of Colophon, also composed a *Thebaid* in twenty-four books.

¹ See Haigh, *The Attic Theatre*, c. 1, § 11 ff.; Aristoph. *Frogs*, 1051 f.

7. The beginnings of prose writing in Greece do not appear to go back beyond the Sixth Century. There could not, of course, be prose literature of any extent without facilities for writing, and though this art had probably been known for centuries to the Greeks, and the Phoenicians, from whom the art came, could readily supply materials for writing—if they were wanted, for bark and skins were to be got in Greece as plentifully as elsewhere—the Greeks do not seem to have used it in literature till a comparatively late period. The sayings of the “wise men” were expressed in a brief, sententious form, which made it easy to commit them to memory, and in philosophy verse was the medium for anything like a formal treatise. But with the expansion of Greece, the development of commerce, and still more perhaps with the growth of national feeling, there arose the desire to record travels or write down the founding and early history of colonies. Towards the end of the Sixth Century a number of “Logographers,” as they were called, had endeavoured to describe, even to the making of a map, the world as they conceived or knew it, and to reduce to some kind of order the confused mass of legends which were current about the past history of the cities of Greece. Of these men Hecataeus of Miletus was the most remarkable. He has already come before us in connection with the Ionic revolt, when, unfortunately for themselves, his countrymen refused to be guided by his sagacious counsels (vol. ii. 51). His works on geography and history attained the widest reputation—such at least is the conclusion which we draw from the constant allusions of Herodotus to “Ionian writers.” In one point, the expulsion of the Pelasgians from the city, we find him dealing with the history of Athens. His works are said to have been written with some elegance of style, but the fragments which we possess do not allow us to form any precise judgment of his matter or his manner.¹

¹ See Forbes, *Thuc.* i., xlv. f., where some extracts are given; Müller, *Frag. Hist. Graec.* i., ix. ff., 1 ff. He wrote in pure Ionic; and his style is described as καθαρός καὶ σαφής, ἐν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ἡδὺς οὐ

8. Herodotus (485-426 ?), like Hecataeus, was an Asiatic—a Dorian of Halicarnassus, but Ionian in all but birth. His work, both in range and conception, was far in advance of anything which preceded it. He is the historian of the great Persian war, or rather of the great Persian invasion, for his history ends at the siege of Sestos in 478; but the history of the war is only a portion of his work, which is intended to save from oblivion the great and wonderful things that have been done in the world, and trace from its origin the cause of the long conflict between East and West. In his youth he took part in the politics of his native city, aiding in the expulsion of the tyrant Lygdamis, after which he spent his time in travelling through the East. The closing years of his life were passed at Thurii, where he settled with the Athenian colonists; but from the legends of his life, which are confirmed by his book, we may infer that he continued till his death to be in close connection with Athens. In structure his work closely resembles the *Odyssey*; in the earlier books we are carried to all the distant regions of the world—to Babylonia, Egypt, India, Libya, and Scythia—but after the fifth book the narrative becomes more and more concentrated on the duel between Greece and Persia: in conception it belongs to the age before the “sophists.” Not that Herodotus is wanting in critical power; he is often led by his own observation and thoughts to differ from the opinions current in his time. He is moved to laughter at the sight of the Ionian maps, in which the earth is circular as “if turned out of a lathe,” and surrounded by the ocean stream. Reason and research have convinced him that such a theory is untenable, and that the river Oceanus does not exist. Though a deeply religious man, who sees in everything the touch of a superhuman power, a firm believer in retribution (τίσις)

μετρίως. The introduction to his work on genealogies ran as follows: Ἐκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὡςδε μυθεῖται· τὰδε γράφω, ὥς μοι ἀληθέα δοκεῖ εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοὶ τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἶσιν.

and divine envy (*νέμεσις*), he has the Ionian interest in natural philosophy; he regards the sun as a mass of floating vapour, blown to and fro by the winds; he is averse to mysticism; he will not accept the doctrine of a future life, at any rate as he finds it current in Egypt and Thrace; and what is more remarkable still, he seems to have doubts whether any god has ever assumed a human form, or that any man is the descendant of a god and a human mother.¹ Of all Greek authors he is the one of whom we know the most; wherever he goes he takes us with him, talking as it were by the way, and bringing before us the thoughts, beliefs, and aspirations of his age.

9. A younger contemporary of Herodotus was Hellanicus of Mytilene, whom Thucydides mentions as almost the only historian who had treated of the period subsequent to the Persian wars. Thucydides blames ^{Hellanicus.} him for a want of chronological accuracy in his arrangement of events—a criticism which is the more important because chronology was the subject to which, above all others, Hellanicus devoted his powers. Taking the list of the priestesses at the Heraeum in Argolis for his basis (vol. i. p. 237), he carried his dates up to a remote past. Thus he fixed the accession of Cecrops in a year corresponding to 1606, the fall of Troy at 1209, and the Return of the Heraclids in 1149, dates which continued to compete with those subsequently founded on the list of the Spartan kings.²

Thucydides also may be called the younger contemporary of Herodotus, though the difference between the two historians

¹ Thus he is driven to believe in Heracles the god, and Heracles the man, the son of Amphitryon and Alcmene, and though he speaks of Perseus as the son of Danae and Zeus (vii. 61), he seems to hesitate to accept the story (vi. 53). In Egypt no god had appeared in human form for three hundred and forty-five generations. On the other hand, Hecataeus traced his family to a divine ancestor in the sixteenth generation (ii. 143); cp. iv. 5, where Herodotus refuses to accept the statement that Targiteus was the son of Zeus and of the daughter of the Borysthenes.

² See Brandis, *De temp. Graec. antiq. rationibus*, Bonn, 1857.

tempts us to assign them to different generations. He was an Athenian, and his work bears the stamp of Athenian thought as strongly as that of Herodotus bears the stamp of Ionian "enquiry." The curiosity of the traveller whose attention is distracted by any strange custom or new belief is replaced by an intense application to the great subject which the writer has chosen as the work of his life. Thucydides is the historian of the Peloponnesian war: with that in view he studied the early history of Greece; with that in view he availed himself of every opportunity of ascertaining the precise events of the war, and the motives which weighed with the belligerents. On the one hand he estimates the effect of the war on character in Hellas, and on the other he shows how national characteristics contributed to success or failure. In the details of their criticism, Herodotus and Thucydides are at times not unlike each other; both have a distrust of the poets; both are guided by *τεκμήρια* or indications in forming an opinion on the events of past history; but in the general principles which they follow they are far asunder. In the place of the religious feeling which dominates the earlier historian we have in Thucydides the economical and political conception of life. It is not *τίσις* or *νέμεσις* which guides him in his interpretation of events—such a phrase as *χρῆν αὐτῷ κακῶς γενέσθαι* would be impossible in his mouth—but the power of wealth, which enabled cities to build walls and ships and put down piracy; the ambition which seeks to acquire empire, and the pride which defends what has been won at any cost. He does not wish to astonish his readers by descriptions of what is vast or strange; he does not measure the importance of things by their remoteness; he perceives the greatness of the events which are taking place round him, and seeks to interpret them for all time. In his eyes the task of the historian is not only to tell what has happened—that is, to record events with the greatest possible accuracy—but to explain why it happened. Herodotus is impressed with the mutability of things, the decline of the great, and the rise of

the insignificant—and this is the inference which we naturally draw from a first acquaintance with history. Thucydides believes that the motives which influence mankind are at all times and everywhere much the same; and thus by a study of the past and present we may advance forearmed to the future. From this point of view he is the first and perhaps the greatest of historians, and as History moves onward in the accomplishment of her task, she will follow more strictly in his footsteps.¹

10. The Greeks were at all times keenly sensitive to the power of eloquence; from Homer downwards “shapeliness” of words never failed to win favour with a Greek audience. As we have seen (*supra*, ^{Oratory.} p. 57), a great development of the art of oratory took place in Sicily about the middle of the Fifth Century; and it was not long ere the teachers of the art carried their skill to Old Greece, where it received a ready welcome. It was mainly owing to his eloquence that Pericles maintained his ground at Athens so long, and every young Athenian who wished to come forward in public life began by acquiring skill in speech. Those who would not or could not attend the new masters became jealous of those who did attend them, and perhaps this is one reason for Cleon’s abuse of the clever speakers of his time. Here, as everywhere, native force and acquired dexterity were in conflict; and “What is it that you young men want?” was a question asked at Athens as well as Syracuse.² Yet even in the Peloponnesian war, when Antiphon defended himself in a speech which Thucydides describes as the best of its kind spoken in Athens down to that time, Athenian oratory was immature, and it was not till the next century that eloquence was raised to its greatest height in the speeches of Lysias and Demosthenes.

¹ See Forbes, *Thuc.* i. Introd. Thucydides may be attacked in details: he omits much that we should like to know; he is not precise, even when vivid, in his descriptions, etc., but what would we not give for a Thucydides in the great periods of our own history?

² *Thuc.* vi. 38.

The same was the case with the prose of science. In the Fifth Century no writer on morals or physics can be compared in respect of style with Plato, who belongs to the next generation. But this must not blind us to the real progress which was being made during the century in speculation on the nature of the universe.

II. The early Ionian philosophers had endeavoured to explain the origin of the world by assuming some primary element from which, by a variety of changes, all existing phenomena arose. Thales of Miletus (vol. i. 427) fixed on water as this primary element, to which he may have been led partly by observation, and partly perhaps by the example of older cosmogonies, in which Oceanus and Tethys were the parents of all things. However this may be, by assuming as his basis a material element, changing apparently by some innate force of its own, Thales separated himself from the older cosmologies, in which the world was created by divine agencies, and with him begins the series of Greek philosophers. A farther step was taken by Anaximander, also of Miletus (611-545), who was otherwise famous as the constructor of the first map. He assumed as the primary element an *ἄπειρον* or "illimitable," something unlimited in extent and imperishable, out of which all things, plants, animals, and men, were developed through a series of gradations. This theory had the advantage over that of Thales in so far as the *ἄπειρον* was abstract rather than concrete, and therefore more easily conceived as assuming different forms.¹

As the power of thought deepened, these attempts at an explanation of the universe were found unsatisfactory. It was difficult by such means to explain the qualities found in things, and no account was given of the cause of the changes which were assumed. By degrees also it became clear that there was a contrast between the universal and the particular,

¹ See Windelband in Iwan Müller's *Handbuch*, v. 1; Zeller, *Outlines of Greek Philosophy*; Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*.

between reality as conceived by the mind, and actuality as apprehended by the senses. The one led to unity, the other to change. So physical inquiries passed into metaphysical, and two great schools arose, the school of the Eleatics and the school of the Heracliteans.

The founder of the Eleatic school was Xenophanes (c. 590-500), who emigrated from Colophon to the west, and finally settled at Elea (vol. ii. p. 512). With him the principle of change, so necessary in the Milesian philosophy, disappeared. The world was One, was God, without beginning, without change, without end. From such a principle the variety of the existing world could not of course be explained, but in regard to physical phenomena Xenophanes seems to have taken over, with some inconsistency, the views of Anaximander.¹ Thus the principle of unity was brought forward and held a place beside the early principle of change, without any attempt at reconciliation. The philosophers who came after Xenophanes adopted one or other of these principles without regard to the opposite. Heraclitus of Ephesus (540-470)

The Eleatic
School.
Xenophanes.

maintained the principle of ceaseless change; his philosophy was expressed in the phrase πάντα ῥεῖ. He disregarded altogether the unchangeable principle which Xenophanes had introduced into philosophy, for neither in the created world nor beyond it could he find a trace of such a principle. Yet he does not, like the Milesians, merely assume a primary substance, which changes into created things; and if he chooses fire as a symbol of his principle, it is not "real fire that crackles and burns,"² but fire as a process in which change is always going on. Parmenides (515-440 ?) took up the opposite principle.

Heraclitus.

Parmenides.

What Xenophanes had expressed vaguely and in language half theological he developed into a metaphysical theory. "Being" alone exists, for it alone is the object of thought, and being is unchangeable in quality and time. In the

¹ See Windelband, *l.c.* p. 146.

² See, however, Burnet, *l.c.*

hands of Zeno, the friend and pupil of Parmenides,¹ the difficulties and contradictions to which the ordinary opinions of the plurality and changeability of things give rise were stated from a purely logical point of view. Motion for instance was disproved by the infinitesimal division of time and space—just as an instantaneous photograph represents a rapidly moving wheel at rest. These logical paradoxes became the admiration of the Greeks, and as “dialectic” Zeno’s method was a powerful instrument of discussion.²

12. On the principles of Parmenides and Heraclitus physical philosophy could hardly continue to exist. Some *via media* must be found by which the world of phenomena could be brought into relation to the world of thought. Hence the philosopher who in his teaching, if not in his date (for he was slightly the older man of the two), came after Empedocles of Agrigentum (vol. ii. p. 465), Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (500-428, *supra*, p. 57), and the atomists Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, attempted in various ways to combine the principle of unity with the principle of change. The great Sicilian had explained the universe on mechanical principles. All matter consisted of the four elements, earth, water, air, fire, which were set in motion by two opposing powers, Love and Hatred (attraction and repulsion). These elements were mixed together in a vast orb or sphere, which was whirled round by the energy of the contending powers. By attraction air and fire

Empedocles.

¹ From the first those who devoted themselves to science or philosophy seem to have gathered as pupils round some eminent teacher, and formed a school. And so we can speak of the schools of Miletus, Elea, and Abdera. This had always been the case in medicine, and we observe it in poetry and art also. It was a feature of Greek life to unite into *θίαστοι*. See Windelband, *l.c.* p. 132. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 28.

² For Heraclitus and Parmenides, see Grote’s *Plato*, vol. i. c. 1; also Zeller’s *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*. Specimens of the Zenonian dialectic will be found in Grote, *l.c.* i. p. 94 ff. (ed. 1888). It was the same instrument which proved so powerful in the hands of Socrates. The influence of the two great lines of thought is shown in an interesting manner in Pater’s *Plato and Platonism*, cc. i. ii.

were drawn into the outer parts of the sphere, and formed the atmosphere and the luminaries; earth and water sank to the middle. Anaxagoras improved upon this system; instead of four elements he assumed the existence of "things" (*χρήματα*), equal in number to the qualities of which we have perception; and by the union and separation of these the objects of sense came into being. In everything there was a portion of everything, but not of course an equal portion, and hence arises the difference between one thing and another—between flesh and blood, earth and water, etc. In order to account for this union and separation, Anaxagoras assumed a moving and directing "Mind," which was of a nature separate and distinct from everything

Anaxagoras.

else; by the action of "Mind" the original mass or mixture was separated and arranged. Yet Anaxagoras did not succeed in escaping from the difficulties which beset his predecessor. Just as in Empedocles the existence of "Love" and "Hate" is a mere assumption made to explain the world, so it is with the "Mind" of Anaxagoras: he required a motive power for the creation of objects of sense, and therefore assumed the existence of a cause, the origin and nature of which he cannot explain. Other difficulties arose from the qualitative nature of the elements assumed by Anaxagoras. Democritus following in the steps of Leucippus, his master at Abdera, sought to give a still more simple, and more purely mechanical, account of the origin of the universe.

The atomists.

He discarded the qualitative difference of the elements or "atoms," which were, however, of various shapes and sizes, and indivisible. Moving downward through the "void," these atoms impinged on each other, and thus becoming entangled formed masses larger or smaller, more or less dense or rough. From these primary qualities arose the secondary qualities of taste, smell, etc. Besides atoms and "void" there was nothing; by them and them only was explained the whole world of matter and mind. Such was the great physical system of Democritus; in his own age it was disregarded, at any rate at Athens; Socrates

turned away from it to his dialectic, Plato to his "ideas." More than a century afterwards, Epicurus made it the foundation of his philosophy; and in modern times it has been adopted in a slightly different form as the basis of natural science.¹

Finally the Pythagoreans, some of whom, after the dispersion of the societies in Magna Graecia (vol. ii. p. 488), found a home at Thebes, brought their theory of numbers to bear upon the difficulty of unity and change. The Pythagoreans. The leader of the school was Philolaus, who published his views in a treatise, of which fragments remain. "All is number," they maintained; for in all things number exists as a defining principle. Numbers were the original forms of which things were copies. The odd and even were identified with the limited and unlimited, and all things could thus be arranged into two great categories, which, however, run up into the one, a number both odd and even. In this way paths were projected through the multiplicity of objects, and the contrast of change and unity reconciled in a higher harmony.²

13. Such speculations were little appreciated at Athens. Anaxagoras was thrown into prison, the books of Protagoras were burnt, and though Democritus paid a visit to the city, his teaching was disregarded. The feeling of the older citizens strongly condemned the sophists and all their works. Yet of some of these writers it must be said that they made greater contributions to moral science than Plato himself. The "sophists" were among the first to protest against slavery, an honour which Euripides shares with them, and to Protagoras we owe the wise saying that punishment is inflicted for the reformation of the offender, not for the satisfaction of revenge or the adjust-

¹ See Grote, *l.c.* vol. i. 67 ff.; Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, vol. ii.; Windelband, *l.c.* 205 ff. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*. Leucippus is in other accounts a native of Elea or of Miletus; but in any case he must be considered the master of Democritus.

² See Grote, *l.c.* i. p. 9 f.; Pater, *l.c.* c. iii.

ment of the balance of fault and retribution. In other respects, we must allow, the views of Protagoras were less advanced: he maintained that might was right, which was inconsistent even with his own condemnation of slavery. His most famous doctrine was expressed in the words, "Man is the measure of all things"—which, if it meant that there was no knowledge outside the human mind, was true enough, but far from true if it implied that every man was entitled to have his own rule of right and wrong. He refused to enter into any arguments about the existence or nature of the gods on the ground that the human faculties were inadequate, and human life too short for such discussions, views which naturally brought him into disrepute as an atheist. In his metaphysical speculations he seems to have been a follower of Heraclitus (*supra*, p. 507), and, in fact, his teaching on the nature of knowledge implies a theory in which all things are in constant change.¹ Of the ethical

Democritus.

teaching of Democritus, the greatest representative of the school of Abdera, we have many interesting fragments. Sometimes he speaks as a utilitarian: "Pleasure and disgust are the criteria of good and evil"; which is, however, but another way of saying that a properly trained nature will hate evil and love good. The highest virtue is to fulfil all duty to the state—it is in the state that a man's nature becomes realised, and he shows his qualities, good or bad. Duty must be done for its own sake, without thought of the gods or of a future existence, for which indeed there is no room in the system of Democritus. From the consciousness of duty fulfilled arises that peace of mind which is the true human felicity. This peace is neither the rapture of the mystic nor the dream of the idealist; it is the calm satisfaction of the man who does not seek his pleasures in what is mortal, or undertake tasks which are too high for him, for the old sayings *μηδὲν ἄγαν, γνῶθι σεαυτόν* are still among the best guides in life. The greatest help towards attaining

¹ See *Protagoras* in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopædie*.

this peace is education, of which Democritus nobly says, that it is an ornament to the prosperous and a refuge to the unfortunate. There is also no greater pleasure for a man than the contemplation of great actions and the investigation of truth; and for his own part, Democritus would rather be the discoverer of a single new truth than sit on the throne of the Great King. The soul is the home of the genius which shapes our lives, and chance is but a phantom invented by mankind to excuse their own folly.¹

14. The beginnings of political science also go back to the Sixth Century. The Pythagorean societies had drawn upon Political science. themselves the hatred of the cities in which they were formed because their principles seemed hostile to civic life. In other cases, we find philosophers taking a leading part in the political movements of their cities. Empedocles and Parmenides were remembered with honour at Agrigentum and Elea. As time went on, the various constitutions were classified, and their merits discussed; in the time of Herodotus there were already three types—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—though he strangely places the discussion of them in the mouths of the Persian conspirators.² A further step was taken when men who were in no way connected with practical politics drew up ideal constitutions. The first to do this was Hippodamus of Miletus (*supra*, p. 19), who wished to introduce something like mathematical precision into his state, and, led perhaps by some knowledge of Athenian juries, wished that the sentences of the popular juries should be revised by a supreme court. The sophists, of course, gave much attention to such subjects. Protagoras was inclined to maintain the authority of the state; he regarded justice as the uniting principle in politics, and a knowledge of justice, he said, comes insensibly to any one who has been bred in a civilised state—a common-sense doctrine which does credit to the "sophist." Other teachers

¹ See Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* i. 626 f., and the quotations there given from Democritus.

² Herod. iii. 80 f.

held more dangerous doctrines. Much was made of the difference between convention and nature. Thrasymachus in the *Republic* of Plato regards justice as the outcome of a social compact which limits the natural rights of man. Hippias considered those laws only as divine which were universal. But what is to become of the state if "nature" is only another name for "force"—especially as it became more and more clear, in the transformation of Greek politics, "that the government of a state must have force at its back"? During the later period of the Peloponnesian war, the opposition of oligarchy and democracy became an all-absorbing interest, and as Sparta gained in the contest, her institutions attracted more attention, and greatly influenced the political speculation of the time.¹

15. The views of the philosophers, if they had become popular, would have destroyed the orthodox religion. In the system of Democritus the gods were allowed to exist, but only as spirits who took no part in the ordering of the world; Anaxagoras put intellect in the place of divine power, and Protagoras was an "agnostic." It was only in the teaching of the Pythagoreans that religion maintained a place, and their religion was not that of the common people. There was also an opposition between the philosopher and the citizen; the man who, as a rule, was without family ties, who wandered from his native city, or did not hesitate to criticise her institutions, was regarded with suspicion by the citizen whose life was passed within his native walls, and who thought it the highest virtue to have the same friends and the same enemies as his state. But the Greeks were not readers, though it is probable that almost every Athenian could read, and for a long time the speculations of philosophy were either written down in books, or discussed in narrow circles. In Athens, at any rate, philosophy and religion did not diverge so widely as among the bolder thinkers of Ionia and Thrace. This was due, in a

¹ See Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i. Introd. p. 380 ff.

great measure, to the influence of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus (469-399), who, discarding physical inquiries altogether, devoted himself to moral and mental speculation and criticism. He was an Athenian of the Athenians, so great a lover of his city that he never left it except to serve in the battlefield, and when condemned to death, refused to save his life by disobedience to the laws under which he suffered; a man of so religious a nature that he claimed to be guided in all his actions by a divine voice. He took up the questions opened by the wandering sophists, so far as they related to ethics or politics, and endeavoured to find answers to them based on deeper investigation. A sculptor by trade, he was satisfied with the barest pittance of wages, and spent his time in talking to any one whom he could find ready to enter into discussion with him. Asking no fee for his instruction—if instruction it could be called when he always insisted that he was the most ignorant of the company—he associated with rich and poor, till he gathered round him a band of disciples, who shaped the philosophy of the next century. He wrote nothing, nor did he attempt to frame any system of ethics, or to teach in any regular course. His power lay in conversation; by a series of subtly contrived questions, he led the discussion this way and that, till his opponent had become involved in inextricable difficulties, or downright contradictions. Professing to know nothing himself, he was always convincing others of their ignorance, and at the same time stimulated them to a sure foundation of knowledge and virtue. Among those who listened to him was Xenophon, who, in the simple memorials which he has written down of his master's conversation, has given us an accurate picture of Socrates as he might be seen in the market-place of Athens, or at a barber's shop, or in the house of a friend, day by day, asking questions and tearing to pieces the answers which he received, till he exposed their superficiality, if he did not attain to the truth beyond them. Plato, also a disciple, made the conversations of Socrates the basis of his dialogues. Through his

genius, Socrates has become the best-known figure among the philosophers of the world, and the account which he has given of his master's closing days is little less than a canonisation. For Socrates, whose whole life was passed in the performance of duty, fell a victim to the religious and political susceptibilities of the Athenians; he was accused of atheism, and of perverting the young men with whom he associated, and, when more than seventy years of age, he was condemned to death (399).

16. Through Socrates, Athens became a centre of philosophy, so far as it concerned ethics and politics. In the department of science she had, as we have said, but little share. Hippocrates, the great Medicine. physician of the century, was a native of Cos, and what may be called the medical schools of the time were to be found in that island and at Epidaurus, Cnidus, and Croton. To Croton also belonged Democedes (vol. ii. 38), and in the next generation Alcmaeon, who was the founder of anatomy. From Cnidus came Euryphon, and Ctesias, who was physician to Artaxerxes Mnemon at the close of the century. The writings of Hippocrates were the "classics" of the art. Disease was no longer regarded as due to supernatural influence, and to be cured by charms and incantations, or by dreams in the temple of Asclepius. Hippocrates maintained that all diseases have a natural cause, and natural means must be taken for their cure. Nature must be aided where possible, and when she cannot be aided, she must be left to herself. "What drugs cannot cure, the knife must heal; where the knife fails, fire must be tried; and if fire fails, there is no cure."¹

In the kindred sciences of botany and biology little was done, though Democritus laid a foundation for future studies in his treatises on the causes of seeds, plants, and fruits, and on the structure of animals. More attention was paid to

¹ See Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* i. 605; Pauly, *Real-Encycl.* Hippocrates. The treatise, *De acre et aquis*, is still valuable for the acute observations recorded in it of the influence of climate on health.

mathematics; in the Platonic system they occupied the foremost place among studies preparatory to philosophy—a position due not so much to the teaching of Mathematics. Socrates as to Plato's sympathy with exactness of thought. Yet no Athenian seems to have attained great eminence as a mathematician, except perhaps Meton, who arranged the calendar on a new and more accurate system (432), based on a cycle of nineteen years, by which the solar and lunar years were brought into closer connection with each other. Other mathematicians and astronomers of the Periclean age were Oenopides of Chios, Hippocrates also of Chios, Anaxagoras, Hippodamus of Miletus, and Theodorus of Cyrene.¹

In geography, both scientific and descriptive, the Greeks took the liveliest interest. In his *Prometheus Vinculus* the poet Aeschylus makes an opportunity to give Geography. his audience a sketch of the wanderings of Io; and, as we have seen, geographical works were among the first efforts in prose. The Pythagoreans advanced so far as to conceive of the earth as a cone, and Parmenides, following this up, invented a theory of zones; but the current view in the Fifth Century was still that of the Ionians, who regarded the earth as a flat plate floating on air in the middle of the universe. This view seems also to have been held by Herodotus, though he discards the notion of an ocean stream and of a circular earth. The general form of the Mediterranean was pretty well known, but measurements were inaccurate, and therefore conflicting. Whether Libya was surrounded by the sea, or the Caspian closed at the northern end were still open questions. Little or nothing was known of the west or north of Europe—for what the Phoenician traders had discovered they kept as a trade secret—or of India, in spite of the voyage of Scylax.²

¹ For Meton's cycle see Pauly, *l.c.* iii. 141 f. Anaxagoras is said to have occupied himself when in prison with the quadrature of the circle. Windelband, *l.c.* 130; Burnet, *l.c.* 281.

² Herod. iv. 44.

17. In all the departments of fine art, though not equally in all, a new impulse seems to have stimulated Greece in the Fifth Century. The art of painting had long been employed in a subordinate manner for the Painting. decoration of houses and of marble tombs, and on a smaller scale for the decoration of vases. Of pictures in the modern sense—pictures on wood—we hear of one executed at the command of Mandrocles, of the bridge built by him over the Bosphorus, and placed in the Heraeum at Samos. There is also the legend of the picture of the battle with the Magnes painted by Bularchus for Candaules of Lydia, who paid for it with its weight in gold.¹ At the end of the Sixth and beginning of the Fifth Century there was a remarkable development in vase painting, the black figures which had long been in use being discarded for red. But the creator of painting as a fine art was Polygnotus of Thasos, who, in Polygnotus. Cimon's time, decorated the walls of the Painted Porch at Athens. The most famous of his works were the paintings in the porch of the Cnidians at Delphi, in which he depicted the underworld and the destruction of Troy, of which, fortunately, Pausanias has given us a minute description.² The skill of Polygnotus was shown, not so much in his colouring, as in the expression which he gave to the face and figure, and in the composition of his pictures. "He knew how to breathe into the old forms and rules a higher intellectual life, and develop from them a higher artistic beauty."³

A painter who did much to improve the decoration of the stage was Agatharchus of Samos, the younger contemporary of Polygnotus, and as a good scene could hardly be painted without some knowledge of perspective, we may suppose that Agatharchus made this his study.⁴ But the greatest of

¹ Herod. iv. 88; Plin. *N. H.* vii. 126; xxxv. 55.

² Paus. x. 25-31.

³ Brunn. See the article "Malerei" in Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, vol. ii., by Von Rohden.

⁴ It was Agatharchus whom Alcibiades compelled to paint his

Greek painters were Zeuxis of Heraclea and Parrhasius of Ephesus, who belong to the end of the century. Of the works of Zeuxis and Parrhasius. of Zeuxis we have no details, with the exception of his *Centaur Family*, which is described by Lucian. In the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes there is an allusion to the Eros which he painted in the temple of Aphrodite at Athens—"a beautiful boy crowned with roses." Aristotle says of him that his art was such that he could make even the impossible credible, but his paintings were deficient in the expression of character, being in this respect the reverse of those of Polygnōtus.¹ Parrhasius was the contemporary and rival of Zeuxis. About twenty of his paintings are mentioned: among them the *Healing of Telephus*, the *Madness of Odysseus*, *Philoctetes on Lemnos*, and *Prometheus*, which show an inclination towards subjects in which strong emotion was expressed without loss of dignity. The story of the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius is well known. Zeuxis painted grapes with such fidelity that the birds came to pluck them. Confident of success, he went to the studio of Parrhasius, and seeing his picture, bade him draw the curtain which concealed it. But the curtain was the picture, and Zeuxis acknowledged that Parrhasius had won.

18. In sculpture, the artists of the Fifth Century attained an eminence which has never been surpassed. By what Sculpture. inspiration of genius and sleight of hand they were able to pass at once from the heavy, insipid forms of the previous century, so rigid in their attitude, so vacant in expression, so coarse in the colouring, to the graceful and animated perfection of the age of Pericles, cannot be explained. As it was in the drama, so it was in sculpture; great masters appeared who carried the art forward with astonishing rapidity. The progress was not confined to

house by shutting him up in it, and bidding him either finish the work and come out with a handsome payment, or break out as best he could.

¹ Luc. *Zeuxis*. Arist. *Ach.* 955; Arist. *Poet.* 6. See the article on Zeuxis in Pauly's *Real-Encyclop.*

Athens, but spread through the cities round the Saronic gulf, with the exception of Corinth. Canachus of Sicyon, and Hageladas of Argos were widely known quite early in the century; the first was pre-eminent in working in bronze, and his success in this material greatly influenced the work in stone. He also made a statue of Aphrodite in ivory and gold for her temple in Sicyon. At Aegina the sculptures of the temple of Athena belong to this period; the chief master here was Onatas, whose works were thought equal to those of the greatest sculptors of the Attic school.¹ In Athens, soon after the Persian war, Critius and Nesiotes executed statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton, to replace those which Xerxes had carried off to Susa.² These artists were followed by Calamis and Myron, whose bronze figures of animals were among the finest efforts of Greek plastic art. Greater still was Phidias, in whose hands the human form was rendered with a dignity and perfection which Phidias. is still the wonder and despair of the sculptor. His material was generally marble; the figures in the pediments of the Parthenon, by which his style is best known, were necessarily of this material, but he also wrought in bronze, and, in his finest efforts, in gold and ivory. The statue of Zeus at Olympia, which was regarded in antiquity as something almost superhuman, and the statue of Athena in the Parthenon, were executed in these materials. In estimating the effect of such statues, we must remember that they were placed in the dimly lighted cellae of temples, where the brilliance of the colouring would be much subdued.³ After the death of Phidias the primacy in art passes from Athens Polyclitus. to Argos, where Polyclitus executed work only second, and not in all respects second, to the Athenian

¹ See Pauly, *Real-Encycl.* Onatas, and Paus. viii. 42. 7; v. 25 *ad fin.*

² Lucian, *Philosoph.* c. 18; Paus. i. 8. 5, who ascribes the statues to Critius only.

³ See Beloch, *G. G.* i. 586, who compares the use of gold mosaics in basilicae. Myron was a native of Boeotia, but naturalised at Athens; both he and Phidias were pupils of the Argive Hageladas.

master. The *Argive Hera* was thought worthy to rank with the *Olympian Zeus*, and in his *Amazon* Polyclitus carried off the prize from his rival. Other very famous statues were the *Diadumenus*—a youth binding the chaplet of victory on his brow, of which a copy still exists in the Villa Farnese—the *Doryphorus*, and the *Apoxyomenus*.

19. In architecture the advance was not so great as in sculpture, though here also the finest efforts of the art belong to this

century and were to be found at Athens. To
 Architecture.

the two styles already in use—the Doric and the Ionic, of which the Doric was employed in Old Greece, the Ionic in Asia,—a third, the Corinthian, was added with its richly carved capital, but the innovation was not received with much favour. It was even a departure from the severer styles which had hitherto prevailed, when the Erechtheum was rebuilt on the Acropolis, towards the end of the century, with Ionic pillars and Caryatids. The great temples were all Doric: the Parthenon, the Theseum, so-called, the best-preserved piece of Athenian architecture, the temple at

Bassae, the temples of Aegina and Olympia, of
 Temples.

Agrigentum and Selinus, though varying in detail, are all of this style. The great architect of the age was Ictinus, the builder of the Parthenon (completed in 438), and of the temple of Apollo Epicurius at Bassae (see *supra*, p. 127), but he was ably supported by others—by Callicrates, who was joined with him in building the Parthenon, and Mnesicles, the architect of the Propylaea (437-432). Athens now became incomparably the most beautiful city of Greece, a city which every one wished to see, and which those who had seen wished to see again. In other parts of Attica also, temples arose at the bidding of Pericles—at Eleusis, where the temple of the Holy Goddesses was rebuilt on a much larger scale; at Sunium, which is still crowned by the columns of the ruined temple of Athena; and at Rhamnus, where the temple to Nemesis was rebuilt. In Sicily, also, Hiero of Syracuse and Thero of Agrigentum vied with each other in building great temples to celebrate the deliverance

of Sicily from the attack of the barbarians. Agrigentum now became, owing to its wealth and prosperity (see *supra*, p. 484), the "fairest of the cities of men"; and among the many temples which adorned the town, the temple of Olympian Zeus rose conspicuous, "surpassed in magnitude by no Grecian building of the kind, except that of Diana at Ephesus."¹ At Selinus, also, temples, hardly less splendid, were erected, and in both cases the work seems to have been interrupted by the Carthaginian invasion (c. xiii.). At Segesta, too, are the remains of a temple—"one of the most perfect and striking ruins in Sicily"—which appears to have been left unfinished.

At Athens, Pericles did not occupy himself with temples only. To the south of the Acropolis, a little eastward of the theatre of Dionysus, he built an Odeum or ^{other} music-hall, for the performance of musical con- ^{buildings.} tests, a detached circular building with a dome-shaped roof, supported by numerous pillars in the interior, a copy it was said of the tent of Xerxes.² With the help of Hippodamus, he laid out the Peiræus in the approved mode of straight streets crossing each other at right angles, and the work of Hippodamus was commemorated by the market-place which bore his name.³ More important by far was the addition of the second of the Long Walls which connected Athens and Peiræus. It ran parallel to the wall already built (vol. ii. p. 327), to the south of it, and was apparently erected soon after the ostracism of Thucydides, when Pericles ruled without a rival. When this wall was completed, that joining Athens and Phalerum became of little use, and was allowed to fall into decay.⁴

20. Yet in spite of this great expenditure in temples and

¹ See Bunbury in Smith's *Dict. of Geog.* sub voc. Agrigentum.

² Plut. *Per.* 13. The building seems to have attracted attention: the comedians compared it to the peculiarly shaped head of Pericles, Paus. i. 20. 4: In Theophrastus, *Charact.*, the ἀδολέσχης asks: πόσοι εἰσὶ κίονες τοῦ Ὀδείου;

³ See Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, Peiræus, 1198 a.

⁴ Plut. *Per.* 13; Plato, *Gorg.* 455 E.

public buildings, little was done for the comfort and convenience of the residents in the city. We can hardly be Condition of wrong in supposing that Athens was better cared Athens. for than most Greek towns ; yet what a picture do we get of the streets from the comedians and the orators ! The old men who visit their fellow-juror in the early morning, in the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, grope their way through the gloom by the light of a few lanterns carried by boys. "Hold the lantern lower," cries one, "that we may not do ourselves a mischief on a stone." "Take care," replies the boy, "and step clear of the mud." Conscious of their own danger, they imagine that their friend is unable to join them because he is suffering from some accident of this kind. Water used in the house was thrown into the street at evening without ceremony, a cry of warning being thought enough for the protection of the passers-by. From a scene in the *Ecclesiastusæ* it is clear that no rules of decency were observed in the streets at night.¹ To these natural dangers and disgusts were added others arising from a love of practical jokes, or the wildness of Athenian youth. The mutilation of the *Hermæ* is a notorious instance of the outrages which could be perpetrated in the public streets with little fear of detection ; and Lysias gives us a graphic description of a disreputable street row, which only came to an end when every one engaged had got a broken head.² Bands of young men roamed the street—*Triballi* or *Autolekythi*, or whatever the name of the society might be—and any one who fell into their hands had reason to remember his misfortune. Or at the breaking up of an entertainment, the more excited of the party would burst open the doors of a mistress or a companion and bring the night to a close there. The less frequented parts of the town were the resorts of the worst characters, and no one could be found there without some risk to his reputation. The *astynomi*, who were in charge of the city, do not seem to have taken any measures for the preservation

¹ *Wasps*, 246 ff. ; *Acharn.* 590 f. ; *Eccl.* 321 f.

² In *Simon.*

of order, at least we never hear of any organised night police or watchmen. The only remedy for outrage was the law-courts, in which a victory might be worse than Cadmean if obtained by the poor man against the rich.

21. We have already seen (*supra*, p. 55) how sensitive the Greeks were to any innovations in religious teaching, and this was peculiarly the case at Athens. There were, no doubt, some who had their doubts Greek religion. and their heresies, but as a whole the people wished to worship the gods as their fathers had done, and regarded them from the traditional point of view. The Greek deities were originally personifications of natural forces and phenomena, and, to the last, traces of their origin clung about them. Zeus was lord of the sky, and Poseidon ruled the sea. But impulses and emotions also gained a place among divine powers, and the gods themselves were swayed by them. There were also numerous local deities, and spirits without any special name, who influenced men for good and evil. From the first, too, there was an ethical element in Greek religion, as may be seen, for instance, from the fact that oaths were placed under divine sanction, and Ethical however great the resistance which faith offered progress. to philosophy, it was inevitable that the higher minds should from time to time find something to criticise in the beliefs of older generations. We have seen how Xenophanes attacked the current ideas of the deities, and insisted on a higher conception of their moral nature (vol. ii. p. 514). How difficult it was to take such a step is clear from the example of Pindar and Aeschylus, who, great poets though they were, and filled with noble conceptions of the divine nature, yet accepted the ordinary mythology so far as to ascribe the worst vices to the supreme Deity. The old ideas and the new continued to exist side by side; and, indeed, such inconsistencies seem inseparable from the history of religion.

Still, much was gained, and this was not the only point in which progress was made. By slow degrees the idea of one

deity began to prevail over Polytheism. Not only did Zeus rise above the rest of the deities—that conception is as old as Homer—but he becomes almost the only object of veneration—at least to the noblest minds, such as Aeschylus.¹ And besides the *θεοί* of popular belief, the divine power, regarded as the operation of divine beings apart from the intervention of a personal deity, is denoted by the abstract and impersonal expression, *τὸ θεῖον*. That this tendency did not, however, shake the public faith in polytheism, is shown, on the one hand, by the numerous temples which were erected in the Fifth Century, and on the other, by the last acts of Socrates, who was careful before he left the world to compose poetry in obedience to the oracle, and pay his offering to Asclepius; and by the last play of Euripides, who atoned for the rationalism of earlier years by writing the *Bacchae*! Nor was the grossness of the old conceptions purged away. The attitude of the comedians towards the deity shows that in their opinion at any rate the “gods love a joke,” without much caring whether it was indecent and made at their own expense or not.² It is significant, also, that Aristotle in the next century speaks of the temples as places where pictures may still be seen which it is not good for the young to see.³ There was a sacredness about such primitive representations which sank deep into the popular mind. We need only remember the intense excitement caused at Athens by the mutilation of the *Hermæ*.

Two other movements characteristic of Greek religion may be noticed in the Fifth Century: the growing popularity of mystic rites, and especially of the mysteries of Eleusis, and the introduction of foreign rites into Greece.

(1.) In mysticism religion cleared itself to some degree of the polytheism of the poets and cosmographers.⁴ Not only was

¹ *Agam.* 74 f., *Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν*. Cp. *Suppl.* 90 f., 524 ff.

² Plato, *Crat.* 406 C.: *φιλοπαίσμονες γὰρ καὶ οἱ θεοί*.

³ Arist. *Pol.* vii. 17. 10=1336 b.

⁴ See Windelband, *l.c.* p. 134.

the circle of the mystic deities very limited, but it was the individual soul and its fortunes in the future life with which the rites were concerned. The ethical element *might* at least become predominant; for what-
The mysteries.
 ever the nature of the ritual, there was at least some idea of guilt and retribution accompanying it. In some way or other it was well with those who had been initiated, and so widely was this belief diffused that the ordinary Greek would not willingly die without the rite.¹ The attempt of Pericles to make the mysteries a centre of Greek religious life, and the necessity of rebuilding the temple of Eleusis on a larger scale, are evidence of the increasing numbers which flocked to the annual commemoration.²

(2.) The Greeks who settled on foreign shores were always hospitable to the deities whom they found in their new abodes; and in their own country they allowed
Foreign rites.
 the slaves who were imported in great numbers from the north and east to practise the ceremonies and ritual which they brought with them. By degrees the more important of these, which naturally appealed to the curiosity of the Greeks, were recognised by the state. Soon after the Persian war, a shrine was built in the market-place at Athens for the Magna Mater of Phrygia.³ From Phrygia also came the wine-god Sabazius, who is mentioned in the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, and in a few years became a popular deity, as might be expected from his nature.⁴ The Thracian goddess Bendis had a temple in the Peiræus at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Ammon was by that time worshipped in Laconia; and Lysander, when checked by Pausanias at Athens, went to consult his oracle in Libya. Among the women of Athens the worship of Adonis, an importation

¹ Aristoph. *Pax*, 370. 1.

² *Supra*, p. 25. The mysteries of Samothrace were also becoming more popular, but initiation in them was the exception rather than the rule: cp. Aristoph. *Pax*, 277 f.: ἀλλ' εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἐν Σαμοθράκη τυγχάνει μεμνημένος, κ.τ.λ.

³ See Beloch, *G. G.* ii. 5, n. 3.

⁴ Aristoph. *Wasps*, 9, 10; *Lysistr.* 388: οἱ πυκνοὶ Σαβάζιοι.

from Cyprus, was much in vogue; at the time when the expedition to Sicily was being discussed, the ominous cry of the lament for Adonis was heard in the Assembly.¹ Other rites, introduced from Phrygia or Thrace, were of a kind which appealed to the dregs of the people. Noisy processions rushed along the streets to the sound of fife and drum; while at night the faithful gathered together for the initiation of some neophyte, and availed themselves of the opportunity to indulge in excesses of every kind.²

Thus at the time when in one direction religious feeling in Greece was struggling upwards to a higher conception of the deity, it was sinking in another into the utter degradation which for centuries to come left its mark on the nation.³

22. Down to the time of their disastrous revolt, the Ionian cities of Asia were the centres of Greek trade. The ships of Miletus were known from the Cimmerian Bosphorus to Naucratis in Egypt; the city was on friendly terms with Eretria in Euboea, and with Sybaris in Italy. The Phocaeans opened the trade to the far west; the Samians were known at Cyrene; the Dorian city of Cnidus was in close relations with Croton. Through these Ionian cities the products and wares of the interior of Asia were shipped to Greece. After the suppression of the revolt and the outbreak of hostilities between Persia and Old Greece all this was at an end. For twenty years (500-480) Grecian ships were excluded from the eastern Aegean, and "all beyond Delos seemed as far off as the pillars of Hercules." The altered relations with Persia would doubtless check the trade with the interior, at least for a time, and, their power and prosperity lost, the cities fell into the second rank.

Much of the trade which they lost passed into the hands of Athens. At the time when Xerxes crossed the Helles-

¹ Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 389 f. *Supra*, p. 305.

² See the lively description in Beloch, *G. G.* ii. 7.

³ On Greek religion as represented in literature, see Professor Campbell's *Religion in Greek Literature*.

pont she was importing corn from the Euxine; and after the liberation of Ionia and the Hellespont, trade would be free to follow the natural channels, and gather round the city which now became the ^{Trade of Athens.} centre of the Greek world. Under the shadow of the Delian League, the trade of Athens became firmly rooted. She not only entered into treaties with numerous emporia in the Aegean—even in the far east—but she felt herself sufficiently strong to impose “navigation laws” on many cities which traded with her. In the importation of corn, more especially, the most stringent precautions were taken to secure an ample supply at a moderate price. By the conquest and final destruction of Aegina, she got rid of a powerful rival; and though the trade with the west still remained chiefly in the hands of Corinth, the commerce of Athens was so firmly established that even the capture of the city by Lysander failed to destroy it.

It was otherwise with agriculture. From the days of Pisistratus till the outbreak of the war, with the exception of the invasion of Xerxes, Attica had enjoyed ^{Agriculture.} unbroken security. The land was not only tilled wherever tillage was possible—and used as pasture in the wilder parts—but the owners of the soil lived on their farms, built themselves handsome houses, and enjoyed to the full the quiet and independence of a country life. All this was changed by the Peloponnesian war. Those who had lived in comfort and abundance were driven into Athens to find shelter where they could, and, by the end of the war, most of them were ruined. Of the straits to which they were reduced we have melancholy proof in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. In the *Plutus* of Aristophanes also, which belongs to the period after the war, we get a picture of dire poverty. In the earlier plays the poor man complains of the aggression of the rich, and of their monopoly of the good things of the state, but it is not wealth which he covets so much as power. He is happy enough on three obols a day if only he can show his contempt for the rich. To have the great man

at an advantage, to make him cringe and cog—this is marrow to the jurymen who see highly paid offices going into the hands of the “son of Coesyra.”¹

23. When we attempt to form any general conception of the social life and character of the Greeks, we are met at the outset by some facts of the first importance. The institution of slavery divided every city and every household into two sections, of which one was supposed to exist for the comfort and convenience of the other. It may be true that slaves were kindly treated in daily life by the Greeks, but their legal position was intolerable: in his own house every man was a tyrant, with more than a tyrant’s power over those around him. The moral dangers of such relations are obvious, and they must also have been fatal to a great extent to elevation of character. The slave-owner alternated between a self-sufficient pride when he compared himself with the “living tool” which he employed, and an ever-present

Society. apprehension that his tools might combine against him. Society was on an insecure basis, and though the difficulties which attend the opposition of labour and capital were avoided, even trade and industry were greatly injured by the system. Again, there were no professions in Greece, and even if their place may have been taken to some slight extent by the various societies so popular among the Greeks, the profound influence which professions now exercise on character was not brought to bear in shaping the life of the Greek.² Once more, as we have seen, women were not admitted into society at Athens, and though in some other cities, as at Sparta, they were not so strictly secluded, social life in the modern sense did not exist.

¹ Aristoph. *Plut.* 535 ff.; cp. *Wasps*, 546 ff., where the juror ends the description of his office with the words: ἀρ’ οὐ μεγάλη τοῦτ’ ἐστ’ ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καταχρῆνη.

² Perhaps an exception ought to be made in favour of medicine, but even this art was largely practised by slaves. The army at Sparta, and the navy at Athens, were also useful in bringing men together, and diffusing an *esprit de corps* among them.

The Greeks were proudly conscious of certain broad distinctions which separated them from the "barbarians" (vol. ii. p. 25), but they were not less conscious of the endless variety of types to be found in their different cities. Not only did Ionian differ from Dorian, but each city, and almost each village, had its characteristics. The Argives were sots and thieves; the Tirynthians were given to incontrollable laughter; the Boeotians, as a nation, were dull, but while Thebes was the home of "insolence," Tanagra was a very pleasant place for a stranger to visit. The bearded Carystian was regarded as dangerous to the peace of families. Even in Attica a distinction was drawn between the Attici and the Athenians; the first were meddlesome, prying sycophants; the second of a noble, generous nature.¹ If we confine ourselves to Athens, we find in the plays of Aristophanes "all sorts and conditions of men": the coarse countryman who hates the sophist-taught citizen, the carefully nurtured and educated boy, the dissolute youth who has discarded the old teaching for the new (*supra*, p. 59). We conclude that there was much that was good, and much that was bad; and, in the fearlessly outspoken language of comedy, the bad seems to predominate. Yet there is something of an ideal beauty about the fine conception of youth which Aristophanes has sketched in the *Clouds*, and even in his *Trygaeus* and *Dicaeopolis* there is a soundness which redeems the coarser elements. Of Athenian women it would be monstrous to take our opinions from the comedians, though in Aristophanes, even in the *Lysistrata* and *Thesmophoriazusae*, there are some pleasant glimpses of domestic life. And if in the Fifth Century Greece declined somewhat from that wonderful age in which Arete and Nausicaa, Penelope and Andromache had their birth, Athens was at least still capable of admiring an Alcestis and an Antigone.

¹ See Pseudo-Dicaearchus in Müller, *F. H. G.* ii. 255 (Frazer, *Paus.* i. xliii.); Theophrastus, *ap. Athen.* vi. 261, d.

APPENDIX I.

EXPENDITURE ON THE WAR.

It is impossible, with the evidence at our command, to give any accurate account of the cost of the Peloponnesian war, though the attempt has been made more than once. The statements about the income of Athens are vague and inconsistent, the account of expenditure incomplete.

1. Xenophon asserts that the total income of Athens at the beginning of the war amounted to 1000 talents; Aristophanes, in 422, puts it at 2000¹; Thucydides gives no annual total, but informs us that the Athenians had a reserve of 6000 talents at the beginning of the war, and that the annual income from the allies was 600 talents. From inscriptions we learn that the Athenians borrowed 4730 talents in the seven years between 433-427 from the sacred treasury of Athena²; but whether this sum is wholly included in the 6000 talents of reserve, is not clear.

2. Confining ourselves to Thucydides, we find that the Athenians set apart 1000 talents at the beginning of the war, leaving a sum of 5000 available for expenditure. From this we may perhaps deduct another thousand for the expense of Potidaea, after the beginning of the war. To the 4000 thus remaining we have to add, in the autumn of 428, the income for three and a half years, which, at 600 talents a year, would amount to 2100 talents. Yet these resources were so far diminished that an extra tax was then found necessary. We need not of course assume that the treasury was bankrupt in 428, but if a year's income (600 t.) was in hand, the expenditure had amounted to no less than 5500 talents in three and a half years, supposing that the ordinary income of Athens covered her ordinary expenditure. At this rate the average expense of the war was about 1600 talents a year. It is clear from Thucydides that the Athenians began by paying their soldiers at an extravagant rate, which they were unable to maintain, and even in 425 the war was regarded as a fruitful

¹ Arist. *Wasps*, 660; Xen. *Anab.* vii. l. 27.

² *C. I. A.* i. 193.

source of income to those who took service in it. Envoys and generals are particularly mentioned for the high pay which they drew. And we are perhaps justified in regarding the extravagant expenditure as a cause of the popularity of the war.¹ But the immediate reason for the imposition of the war-tax at the time of the revolt at Mytilene was probably the prospect of a siege which experience had proved so costly, and the danger of further revolt. And Cleon, who was now a power in the state, might take advantage of this to throw an extra burden on the rich.

3. Once more, if we ask how Athens, if her reserve was so nearly exhausted in 428, was able to continue the war, the reply seems to be: (1) that the war-tax was continued, and this, with the income of the allies, would produce about 800 talents per annum in addition to the ordinary income; (2) that in 427 and 426 operations were not carried on on any great scale; (3) and that in and after 425 the tribute was raised,² till the yearly amount reached 1200 talents.

¹ This is clearly the view of Aristophanes in the *Acharnians*.

² On this subject, see Jowett, *Thuc.* i. p. lxxviii. ff.; Kirchhoff, *Zur Gesch. des Athen. Staatsschatzes*, Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1876, p. 54 f.; also Beloch, *Rhein. Mus.*, Bd. 38; Boeckh, *Staatsh.* p. 360, ed. 3, and Fränkel, note 471. I have left out of the calculation the ordinary receipts of the city, say 400 talents, and the ordinary expenditure; and anything which might be borrowed from the revenues of the temples, an amount which cannot be calculated with any accuracy. The average yearly sum of 1600 talents for expenditure is, I think, as low as can be reckoned at the beginning of the war. But we must admit that our ignorance of the relation in which the sums borrowed from the treasurers of Athena (*C. I. A.* i. 193) stand to the 5000 talents of reserve, introduces an element of uncertainty into the whole calculation. The question of the raising of the tribute is discussed by Jowett, *l.c.* p. xlv. ff. There is no reason to doubt that the amount of tribute received after 425 was much larger than before, and it may by degrees have reached 1200 talents, the sum mentioned by Andocides (*De Pac.* 9), and Aeschines (*F. L.* 186). The rise was probably due to Cleon; it certainly was not due to Alcibiades, as Andocides (*in Alcib.* 11) says, if made in 425, for Alcibiades had not then come forward in public affairs. Cp. also Forbes, *Thuc.* i. lxxxvii. lxxxviii.

APPENDIX II.

THE REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED.

1. We learn from Thucydides that the movement which ended in the establishment of the Four Hundred began in the Athenian camp at Samos, and had its origin partly in the feeling of the trierarchs and leading men in the fleet, who were dissatisfied with the existing form of government—under which the heaviest burdens fell on them, as wealthy men—and partly in the overtures of Alcibiades, who let it be known that he would be glad to return and make Tissaphernes the friend of Athens, but this was possible on one condition only: “they must establish an oligarchy and abolish the villainous democracy which had driven him out” (viii. 47, 48).

From the camp at Samos the matter was introduced at Athens by Pisander and his fellow-envoys, who were sent by the conspirators to the city to get Alcibiades recalled and the democracy suppressed, and finally to make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians (*supra*, p. 394).

Of all this there is not a word in the *Athenaion Politeia*. The author never mentions Samos or Alcibiades. He merely says, c. 29, “when the Lacedaemonians had gained the upper hand through their alliance with the King of Persia, the Athenians were compelled to abolish the democracy, and establish in its place the constitution of the Four Hundred”—and at once goes on to give an account of the meeting at which the change was proposed. He adds: “The real argument which persuaded the majority was the belief that the King of Persia was more likely to form an alliance with them, if they should establish an oligarchy”—(Kenyon’s translation).

2. In the account of Thucydides the change in the constitution was first proposed at Athens by Pisander and the envoys on their arrival from Samos. See the graphic description in viii. cc. 53, 54 (*supra*, *l.c.*), in which we notice the following points:—

1. The opening speech of Pisander.
2. The furious opposition.

3. The pertinent question of Pisander put to individual citizens.
4. His final declaration, "after which, partly in fear and partly in hope that it might be hereafter changed," the people gave way.
5. The passing of the decree that Pisander should go to Samos with ten others and negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.
6. The deposition of Phrynichus and Scironides from their office as generals, and the sending out of Leon and Diomedon to take their places.
7. The visit of Pisander to the clubs, "one after the other," which he exhorts to unite and put down the democracy.

The author of the *Politeia* ignores these details. He begins his account of the change with a description of a meeting held at Athens, which is quite distinct from the meeting convened to hear Pisander and the envoys. "The speech recommending the change before the vote was made by Melobius, and the motion was drawn up by Pythodorus (but the majority were persuaded by the belief that the King would be more likely to enter into an alliance with an oligarchy). The motion was to the following effect: 'The popular Assembly was to elect twenty persons over forty years of age, who, in conjunction with the existing ten members of the Committee of Public Safety, should take an oath that they would frame such proposals as they thought best for the state, and should then draw up proposals for the public safety. In addition, any other person was to be free to make any proposition he liked, so that the people might be able to choose the best of all the courses suggested to them.' Clitophon concurred with the motion of Pythodorus; but proposed that the committee should also investigate the ancient laws drawn up by Clisthenes when he created the democracy, in order that they might have these too before them in deciding on what was the best; his suggestion being that the constitution of Clisthenes was not really democratical, but closely akin to that of Solon," c. 29, K.¹

Not one of these three names is mentioned by Thucydides in connection with the Four Hundred, and, as we shall see, by the time

¹ Melobius is mentioned as one of the Thirty in Lysias 12. 12, and this is no doubt the same person. Pythodorus is mentioned as one of the Four Hundred by Diogenes Laertius, ix. 8. 54. He may be the same Pythodorus who in 414 landed on the coast of Laconia. For Clitophon see Aristoph. *Frogs*, 967, where Euripides claims him as a pupil along with Theramenes.

that the commissioners were appointed to report on the constitution, it was impossible to hope for alliance with Persia.

3. Thucydides informs us that Pisander and his colleagues were compelled to break with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes on their return to the East. But though they lost the hope of help from Persia, they determined to go on with the revolution. (Thuc. viii. 63; *supra*, p. 400.) So Pisander and half the envoys were sent back to Athens to carry out the scheme (which was also extended to the subject cities). On their arrival they found the revolution more than half accomplished by the oligarchical clubs, who had created a Reign of Terror. And meanwhile a public programme had been put forward:

1. That no one ought to receive pay who was not on military service.
2. That not more than five thousand should have a share in the government—those namely who were best able to serve the state in person and with their money (*supra*, p. 402).

In the *Politeia* the two points mentioned in the "programme" are included in the recommendations of the commissioners appointed under the proposal of Pythodorus. Beyond this not a word is said of the means by which the oligarchs went to work to secure their object.

4. From Thucydides we learn that when Pisander and his colleagues arrived at Athens (this was, of course, his *second* visit), they "at once set to work and prepared to strike the final blow." They began by calling an Assembly and proposing the election of *ten* commissioners, who should have full powers to frame for the city the best constitution they could, and were to report to the people by a given day (viii. 67, *supra*, p. 402).

As we have seen, the nomination of commissioners is said in the *Politeia* to have taken place at the *first* meeting convened to discuss the subject—at any rate no previous meeting is mentioned or suggested.¹

5. When the day arrived which had been fixed for the report, so Thucydides continues, Pisander and his party convened an Assembly at Colonus, but the commissioners merely moved that any Athenian

¹ The number of commissioners in the *Politeia* is thirty; in Thucydides ten. The *Politeia* is supported by Androtion and Philochorus, cp. Harpocration, *s.v.* συγγραφείς, who notices the contradiction and identifies the ten commissioners mentioned by Thucydides with the ten Probuli. Thucydides may be right; it was easy for later authors to confuse these commissioners with the Thirty tyrants.

should be allowed to make any proposal that he pleased, and threatened with severe penalties any one who indicted the proposer for unconstitutional action (*supra*, p. 403).

In the *Politeia* we are told that the commissioners made two preliminary proposals :

1. The Prytanes were to be compelled to put to the vote any motion offered on behalf of the public safety.
2. All indictments for illegal proposals were abolished, all impeachments and public prosecutions, in order that every Athenian should be free to give his counsel on the situation, if he chose ; and they decreed that if any person imposed a fine on any other for his acts in this respect, or prosecuted him, or summoned him before the courts, he should, on an information being laid against him, be summarily arrested and brought before the generals, who should deliver him to the Eleven to be put to death.

They then drew up the constitution in the following manner :

1. The revenues of the state were not to be spent on any purpose but the war.
2. All magistrates should serve without remuneration as long as the war should last, except the Nine Archons and the Prytanes for the time being, who should each receive three obols a day.
3. The general franchise was to be restricted, so long as the war should last, to all Athenians who were most capable of serving the state personally or pecuniarily, to the number of not less than Five Thousand.
4. The Five Thousand to have full powers, even of making treaties with whomsoever they willed.
5. Ten men, over forty years of age, were to be elected out of each tribe to draw up the list (*καταλέγουσι*) of the Five Thousand (c. 29, K.).

In this account Thucydides and the *Politeia* agree so far as the "preliminary" measures are concerned, but while in the *Politeia* the rest of the measures proposed are all said to be the work of the commissioners ("these were the proposals put forward by the Committee," c. 30), Thucydides draws a distinction between the proposals of the Commissioners and the decrees of the Assembly. After describing the proposals of the commissioners as given above he goes on :

"The whole scheme now came to light. A motion was made by Pisander (Thuc. viii. 68).

- "1. To abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment of magistrates.
- "2. To choose a presiding board of five; these five to choose one hundred; and each of the hundred to co-opt three others.
- "3. The Four Hundred thus chosen to meet in the Council chamber; to have absolute authority to govern as they thought best.
- "4. The Five Thousand to be summoned by them whenever they chose (viii. 67)."

6. In the *Politeia* we are informed that after the proposals of the Committee had been ratified, the Five Thousand (who must therefore have been enrolled¹) elected a hundred commissioners from their own numbers to draw up the constitution. These framed two constitutions, one for the future, in which there is not a word about a Council of Four Hundred, and another for the present. In this last there was to be a Council of Four Hundred, as in the ancient constitution, forty from each tribe, chosen out of candidates of more than thirty years of age, selected by the members of the tribes. This Council was to appoint the magistrates, and draw up the form of oath which they were to take; and in all that concerned the laws, in the examination of official accounts, and in other matters generally, it might act according to its discretion. It must, however, observe the laws that might be enacted with reference to the constitution of the state, and had no power to alter them or to pass others.

The generals were to be provisionally elected from the whole body of the Five Thousand, but so soon as the Council came into existence it was to hold an examination of military equipments, and thereon elect ten persons, together with a secretary, and the persons thus elected should hold office during the coming year with full powers, and should have the right, whenever they desired it, of joining in the deliberations of the Council.

The Five Thousand were also to elect a single Hipparch and ten Phylarchs; but for the future the Council was to elect these officers according to the regulations above laid down (c. 31, K.).

¹ Cp. Lysias, *Orat.* 20, which is in defence of Polystratus, one of the *καταλογοίς*. Polystratus claims to have put nine thousand citizens on the list in eight days, after which he left for Eretria to take part in the battle. This implies that the selection of the Five Thousand was one of the last, not one of the first, acts of the Four Hundred.

No office might be held more than once, except that of councillor and general.

Comparing this account with Thucydides we see that there is a discrepancy (a) in the account of the Five Thousand, who in Thucydides are only to be summoned when the Four Hundred shall think fit, and in the *Politeia* are definitely chosen, and in turn choose the commissioners under whose arrangements the Four Hundred come into power; (b) in the account of the election of the Four Hundred. In the *Politeia* it is not stated by whom the Four Hundred are chosen, but they are chosen equally from the ten tribes, out of candidates previously selected by the tribes. In Thucydides they are chosen by co-optation—and practically five men are responsible for the whole Four Hundred.

7. From Thucydides we learn that after the assembly at Colonus, the Four Hundred were installed in the Council-Chamber. Of this he gives a full and graphic account (*supra*, p. 404).

In the *Politeia* we are told that when the constitution as just stated had been drawn up by the Commissioners, and had been ratified by the general voice, the existing Council was dissolved before it had completed its term of office. It was dissolved on the fourteenth day of the month Thargelion, in the archonship of Callias (May 411), and the Four Hundred entered into office on the twenty-first (c. 32, K.).

8. Finally, we are told in the *Politeia* that when the constitution had been established, *the Five Thousand were only nominally selected*, and the Four Hundred, together with the ten officers on whom full powers had been conferred, occupied the Council-Chamber, and really administered the government. They began by sending ambassadors to the Lacedaemonians, proposing a cessation of the war on the terms of the *status quo*, but as the Lacedaemonians refused to listen to them unless they would also abandon their maritime empire, they dropped the negotiations (c. 32 K.).

Thucydides informs us that when the Four Hundred had installed themselves in the Council-Chamber, they elected Prytanes by lot of their own number, and did all that was customary in the way of prayers and sacrifices to the gods at their entrance into office, but in a short time they wholly changed the democratic system, and governed the city with a high hand. They also sent heralds to Agis at Decelea, wishing to conclude peace with him—and finally, on his advice, to Lacedaemon, but without effect. Thus, at the cost of contradicting himself about the Five Thousand, who he now says

were only nominally selected, whereas they have hitherto been a working part of the constitution, the author of the *Politeia* comes into agreement with Thucydides. Both authors also agree that the leading spirits in the oligarchical revolution were Antiphon, Pisander, and Theramenes, but Phrynichus is not mentioned in the *Politeia*.

Of the reaction by which the government of the Four Hundred was suppressed, we have a full and graphic account in Thucydides. Here also the movement begins in Samos, and the democratic party go back to the point where the oligarchs had begun, the recall of Alcibiades and alliance with the Great King (Thuc. viii. 73 and 74). Thucydides traces the return to democracy step by step, and shows us how the counter-revolution was rendered possible and accomplished. His chief points are :

1. The Four Hundred send ten commissioners to Samos, who, however, on hearing of the reaction there, advance no further than Delos (viii. 72).
2. The oligarchy at Samos is overthrown, mainly owing to the exertions of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, Leon, and Diomedon. The Samians and Athenians unite, after hearing the exaggerated reports of Chaereas, and resolve to oppose oligarchy and carry on the war (viii. 74, 75).
3. Alcibiades is recalled, and elected general (viii. 82).
4. The envoys from Athens now go on to Samos. They declare that all the citizens are in turn to be members of the Five Thousand, and make other explanations (viii. 86).
5. Message of Alcibiades to the Four Hundred (*ibid.*).
6. Return of the Commissioners to Athens. The message of Alcibiades stimulates the moderate oligarchs, led by Theramenes and Aristocrates. They maintain that the Five Thousand should be established in reality and not in name, and the constitution made more equal. They are afraid (*a*) of Alcibiades, (*b*) of their extreme colleagues, who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon. These were Antiphon, Phrynichus, Aristarchus, and Pisander (viii. 89, 90).
7. The extremists fortify Eetionea, and negotiate with Lacedaemon (viii. 90).
8. The moderate party alarmed. Theramenes takes the lead. Assassination of Phrynichus, and demolition of Eetionea. "Let the Five Thousand rule." (The popular party feared that the Five Thousand might actually exist. The Four

Hundred did not wish the Five Thousand to exist, or to be known not to exist, viii. 92.)

9. Negotiations between the popular party and the Four Hundred, who promise that they will publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that the Four Hundred shall be elected out of those in turn in such a manner as the Five Thousand may think fit (viii. 93).¹
10. The approach of the Lacedaemonians puts an end to negotiations. Battle of Eretria (viii. 94, 95).
11. On the news of the loss of Euboea the Four Hundred are deposed, and the constitution placed in the hands of the Five Thousand. "This number was to include all who could furnish themselves with arms. No one was to receive pay for holding any office, on pain of falling under a curse. This government, during its early days, was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my memory," viii. 97 (cp. *supra*, p. 418).

To compare with this vivid account we have in the *Politeia* no more than the following meagre statement:—"After the loss of the naval battle of Eretria (when the Four Hundred had been in office about four months), and the revolt of the whole of Euboea except Oreus, the indignation of the people was greater than at any of the earlier disasters, since they drew far more supplies at this time from Euboea than from Attica itself. Accordingly they deposed the Four Hundred, and committed the management of affairs to the Five Thousand, who consisted of persons possessing a military equipment. At the same time they voted that pay should not be given for any public office. The persons chiefly responsible for the revolution were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who disapproved of the action of the Four Hundred in retaining the direction of affairs entirely in their own hands, and referring nothing to the Five Thousand. The constitution of the state seems to have been admirable during this period, since it was a time of war, and the franchise was in the hands of those who possessed a military equipment" (c. 33, K.).

When we compare these two authorities, we cannot doubt that in the history of Thucydides we have the account of a contemporary who had studied the movement thoroughly in its rise and fall, and

¹ Is this the basis of the constitution "for the future" given in *Ath. Pol.* c. 30?

accounted for every step. In the *Politeia* we have details which are partly confused, and partly, so far as we can tell, mere propositions which were never carried out. The meeting at which Melobius spoke may have taken place in the interval between the first and second visits of Pisander, but it is confused in part with the meeting held after his second arrival. The Five Thousand are spoken of as the Four Hundred may have spoken of them "when they wished them neither to exist nor to be known not to exist." In two points there is a direct conflict of testimony: in Thucydides we have ten Commissioners, in the *Politeia* thirty; and the election of the Four Hundred is quite different in the two accounts. In both points I am inclined to think Thucydides the safer guide.

The differences between the account of the Thirty Tyrants in the *Politeia* and in Xenophon are noticed in the notes to the text. We cannot, of course, give the same weight to Xenophon as we do to Thucydides.

INDEX.

(The references are to Chapter and Section; the numbers in parentheses give the date of the event mentioned.)

A

ACANTHUS, receives Brasidas (424), viii. 5.
 Acarnania, alliance of Athens with, i. 22;
 organised attack on, by the Ambraciots and
 Lacedaemonians (429), v. 15.
 Acarnanians, their quarrel with Demosthenes,
 vii. 3; aid the Argives against the Am-
 braciots (426), vii. 4.
 Achaea, brought into alliance with Sparta and
 made more oligarchical (418), ix. 12.
 Actium, battle of (435), iii. 3.
 Adimantus, appointed Athenian general (406),
 xii. 17; and Lysander (405), xii. 20.
 Adonis, festival of, at Athens on the day
 when the expedition to Sicily was finally
 decreed (415), x. 6.
 Adramyttium, the Delians settled at (422),
 viii. 18.
 Aeginetans, inhabitants expelled from (481), v. 6;
 fame of the island, Herodotus' feeling to-
 wards the Aeginetans, Pindar's praises of
 them, viii. 1.
 Aeginetans, massacre of the (424), viii. 1.
 Aegitium, Demosthenes defeated at (426), vii. 8.
 Aegospotami, battle of (405), xii. 19.
 Aeschylus, xiv. 2.
 Aetolia, invasion of, by Demosthenes (426),
 vii. 8; the Aetolian tribes described, *ibid.*;
 their territory, *ibid.*
 Agatharchus, a Syracusan general (418), x.
 31.
 Agatharchus of Samos, xiv. 17.
 Agathon, the tragedian, xiv. 4.
 Agis, succeeds Archidamus as King of Sparta
 (427), vii. 1; leads out the Peloponnesian
 troops, "no one knows whither" (419), ix.
 8; invades Argolis (418), ix. 9; concludes

peace with the Argives, *ibid.*; censured for
 his conduct in the Argive campaign, ix. 10;
 ten commissioners sent out with, *ibid.*; at
 Argos, destroys the unfinished Long Walls
 (417), ix. 14; invades Attica (418), x. 22;
 fortifies Decelea, *ibid.*; at Decelea, marches
 against the Oetaeans and neighbouring
 tribes, xi. 2; negotiates with Euboea and
 Lesbos, *ibid.*; advances on Athens (411),
 xi. 16; (405), xii. 21.
 Agriculture, i. 14; xiv. 22.
 Agrigentum, refuses aid to Syracuse (418), x.
 24; Diocles at (409), xiii. 8; escape of the
 Selinuntians to, *ibid.*; siege of (406), xiii. 6;
 abandoned to the Syracusans, *ibid.*; destruc-
 tion of the city, *ibid.*; given up to Carthage
 at the peace in 405, xiii. 8; temples at, xiv.
 19.
 Ἀκραῖον λένας, the, in Sicily, x. 33, *note*.
 Alcamenes, appointed "hardest" of Lesbos
 (413), xi. 2; slain, xi. 8.
 Alcetas, son of Alexander, i. 19.
 Alcibiades, and Pericles, iii. 1; comes to the
 front at Athens, ix. 5; his hereditary friend-
 ship with Sparta, *ibid.*; negotiates with
 Argos, *ibid.*; outwits Nicias, ix. 6; general
 in 419, ix. 8; in Achaea, *ibid.*; in Epidauria,
ibid.; persuades the Argives to renew the
 war with Sparta, ix. 10; after Mantinea,
 ix. 13; at Argos (416), ix. 14; eagerly sup-
 ports the expedition to Sicily, x. 8; ap-
 pointed one of the generals to Sicily (415),
ibid.; his speech on the Sicilian expedition,
 x. 5; his extravagance and success at
 Olympia, *ibid.*; no evidence to prove that
 he was connected with the affair of the
 Hermæ, x. 7; guilty of profanation of the
 mysteries, *ibid.*, *see note*; demands to be put

- on his trial before leaving for Sicily (415), *ibid.*; he is allowed to go, *ibid.*; endeavours to gain Messene, x. 10; his plan of campaign in 415, *ibid.*; plot of his enemies at Athens, x. 11; the *Salaminia* sent to Sicily to bring him home, *ibid.*; he escapes at Thurii, *ibid.*; at Sparta (414), x. 13; his advice to the Spartans, *ibid.*; his influence at Sparta, and with Endius (412), xi. 8; sails to Ionia (412), xi. 4; revolt of Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae, *ibid.*; at Chios, *ibid.*; sails to Miletus, and causes the city to revolt (412), *ibid.*; estranged from Spartans, xi. 11; escapes to Tissaphernes (411), *ibid.*; intrigues for his return to Athens, xi. 12; proposes an oligarchical revolution in Athens, *ibid.*; approached by Athenians at Samos (411), xi. 19; elected general, *ibid.*; reply to the Commissioners of the Four Hundred, xi. 20; decree passed for his recall, xii. 2; dealings with Tissaphernes, xii. 3, 5; at the battle of Cyzicus (410), xii. 5; collects supplies for the Athenians, *ibid.*; invests Chalcedon (409), xii. 9; ratifies convention with Pharnabazus, *ibid.*; besieges Byzantium, *ibid.*; returns to Athens (408), xii. 10; sails to Samos with a large force (408), xii. 11; deposed from his command by Athenians (407), xii. 12; returns to the Chersonese, *ibid.*; his advice to the Athenians at Aegospotami, xii. 19; leaves the Chersonese for the court of Pharnabazus (404), xii. 23; assassinated, *ibid.*
- Alcidas, a Spartan admiral (428-427), iv. 3; in the Aegean, vi. 6, 7; his cowardice and cruelty, vi. 7; his return from the Aegean, *ibid.*; at Coreyra (427), vi. 15.
- Alcinous, sacred wood of, at Coreyra, vi. 13.
- Alciphron, an Argive, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, ix. 9.
- Alexander of Macedonia, i. 18; his sons, i. 19.
- Allies, Athenians, compelled to destroy their walls, i. 17; "who tax themselves," or have been "enrolled by private citizens," i. 20; of Sparta, in the Peloponnesian war, iv. 4; of Athens, in the Peloponnesian war, *ibid.*; Athenian, revolt of, after the Sicilian expedition (413), xi. 2 f.
- Ambraciots, the, seize Amphilochean Argos, driven out by Phormio, i. 22; organise an attack on Amphilochean Argos (430), v. 11; invade Amphilochean Argos (426), vii. 4; great slaughter of the, at Idomene, vii. 5.
- Ammon, xiv. 21.
- Amorges, son of Pissuthnes, xi. 2.
- Amphipolis, foundation of (437), i. 20; and Argilus, taken by Brasidas (424), viii. 5; is not surrendered by Clearchus after 421, ix. 1.
- Amyntas, son of Philip of Macedonia, v. 20.
- Anactorium, betrayed to Corinth, iii. 6; acquired by the Athenians (425), vii. 14.
- Anaea, Samian oligarchs at (439), i. 16; attack Lysicles (428), vi. 5; remonstrate with Alcidas, vi. 7.
- Anaxagoras, and Aspasia, ii. 8; and Pericles, ii. 4; and Lampon, *ibid.*; attack on, he is imprisoned, but escapes, ii. 8; his philosophy, xiv. 12.
- Anaximander of Miletus, xiv. 11.
- Andocides, sent to Coreyra (438), iii. 5; his oration on the mysteries, x. 11.
- Androcles, the leading democrat in 415, opposed to Alcibiades, x. 7.
- Angites, valley of the, i. 20.
- Antandrus, Lesbian exiles at, viii. 3.
- Anticles, general at Samos, i. 16.
- Antimachus of Colophon, an epic poet, xiv. 6.
- Antiphon, arrested and put to death (411), xi. 23; his oratory and character, *ibid.*
- Apaturia, the festival of, xii. 15.
- Apodoti, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3.
- Apollo Maloeis, temple of, at Mytilene, vi. 1; Pythaeus, temple of, at Argos, ix. 8.
- Arbitration, the Athenians ask for, before going to war, iii. 12; cf. iii. 10.
- Arcadia, Plistonax in, ix. 4.
- Archidamus, king of Sparta, his speech on the war, iii. 10; attempts further negotiations before invading Attica, v. 3; invades Attica in June 431, v. 4; at Oenoe, *ibid.*; repulsed, *ibid.*; at Acharnae, *ibid.*; at Plataea (429), v. 13; his death, vii. 1.
- Architecture, xiv. 19.
- Argilus, discontent at, owing to the foundation of Amphipolis, viii. 5.
- Arginusae, battle of (406), xii. 14; loss of Athenian crews at, *ibid.*
- Argives, invade Epidauria (419), ix. 8; maintain the same day in the calendar, *ibid.*; take the field against Agis (418), ix. 9; come to terms with Agis, *ibid.*; persuaded by Alcibiades to renew the war with Sparta (418), ix. 10; the Select Thousand in their army at Mantinea, *ibid.*; the, at Miletus as auxiliaries of Athens (412), xi. 8; they return home, *ibid.*
- Argolis, coast of, attacked by the Athenians (430), v. 8.

- Argos, Select Thousand in the army, iv. 5, ix. 2; her attitude to Sparta in 422, viii. 16; flourishing condition of in 421, ix. 2; urged by the Corinthians to take the lead in the Peloponnese, *ibid.*; a democracy, *ibid.*; forms alliance with Mantinea, Elis, Corinth, and Chalcidice in 421, ix. 8; and Boeotia, unsuccessful negotiations between (421), ix. 4; and Sparta in negotiation (420), ix. 5; Alcibiades negotiates with, *ibid.*; and Athens (420), ix. 6; alliance between Argos, Elis, Mantinea, and Athens, *ibid.*; and Epidaurus, quarrel between (419), ix. 8; and Sparta in 418, ix. 9, 10; and Sparta, alliance between (after Mantinea), ix. 12; renounces her alliance with Athens, Mantinea, and Elis, *ibid.*; the oligarchs put down the democracy (418), *ibid.*; evacuates Epidauria, ix. 18; the democratic party aided by Athens renounces the Spartan alliance (417), ix. 14; Alcibiades at (416); he seizes a number of the oligarchical party, *ibid.*; supplies troops to Athens (413), x. 22.
- Argos, Amphiloehian, i. 22; at war with Ambracia, *ibid.*; attack on (480), v. 11; invasion of (426), vii. 4.
- Ariapithes, king of Scythia, i. 19; murdered by Spargapithes, i. 21; his sons, *ibid.*
- Aristarchus, an Athenian general (411), xi. 23.
- Aristeus, of Corinth, takes help to the Potidaeans, iii. 7; escapes from the city, *ibid.*; seized by Sitalces and given up to the Athenians (430), v. 12.
- Aristophanes, his caricature of the sophistic teaching, ii. 6; his view of the causes of the war, iii. 1; his view of the orators at Athens, vi. 9; his advice to the Athenians after Arginusae, xii. 17; views upon Tharmenes, Cleophon, and Alcibiades, *ibid.*; remarks upon the new coinage, *ibid.*; his plays, xiv. 5.
- Army, decline of the Athenian, i. 2, viii. 4; of Athens, iv. 4; of the Peloponnesian confederacy, *ibid.*; the Argive, a standing force of a thousand men, ix. 2.
- Arnae, a town in Chalcidice, viii. 5.
- Arrhibaeus, Brasidas comes to terms with, contrary to the wishes of Perdiccas, viii. 5.
- Artaphernes, a Persian envoy, arrested (425), vii. 14.
- Artas, chief of the Messapians (413), x. 26.
- Artaxerxes, death of (425), vii. 14.
- Artemon of Clazomenae, i. 16, *note*.
- Asopius, in Western Greece (428), vi. 5; his death, *ibid.*.
- Aspasia, ii. 8; and the Sophists, ii. 7; attacked by Hermippus, the comedian, ii. 8; her fugitive slaves received by the Megarians, iii. 1.
- Assembly, Athenian, a source of difficulty in the management of the Empire, iv. 2; and generals, *ibid.*; reopening of a subject already discussed, vi. 8, x. 4; cf. Mytilene.
- Assinaria, the, a festival at Syracuse, x. 84.
- Assinarus, Nicias reaches the river, x. 34.
- Astacus, v. 5.
- Astyochus, the Spartan admiral, at Lesbos, xi. 7; arrives at Chios, *ibid.*; attacks Pteleum and Clazomenae (412), xi. 9; suggests an expedition to Lesbos, *ibid.*; quarrels with Pedaritus, and returns to Miletus, *ibid.*; engagement with Athenians, xi. 10; sails to Chios (411), xi. 15; and Pharnabazus, xii. 3; returns to Sparta, *ibid.*
- Atalanta fortified by the Athenians (431), v. 5.
- Athena, of the Brazen House, the curse of, iii. 12.
- Athenagoras, leader of the democrats at Syracuse, in 415, denies that the Athenians will come, x. 9.
- Athenian, empire, destruction of the walls of the allied cities, i. 17; the Carian and Ionian district divided in 442, reunited in 436, *ibid.*; changes in the "Thracian district," i. 20; fleet, movements of, in 431, v. 5; in the Euripus, *ibid.*; sent round the Peloponnesus (430), v. 8; empire, a tyranny (Pericles), v. 9; Mytilenaeans view of, vi. 3; fleet, at Pylus (425), vii. 10; attacks the Peloponnesian, at Pylus, *ibid.*; part of their forces too late for Mantinea, ix. 13; besiege Epidaurus, *ibid.*; envoys visit Segesta (416), x. 8; deception practised upon, *ibid.*; fleet, in Sicily, at Naxos, Catana, and Syracuse, x. 10; sails into the Great Harbour of Syracuse (414), x. 16; opposes the Four Hundred (411), xi. 18; unites with Samians (411), *ibid.*; generals, trial of (406), xii. 15; condemned, *ibid.*; democracy, liable to sudden passion, *ibid.*; fleet, leaves Chios (405), xii. 19; captured at Aegospotami, *ibid.*; generals, gross incompetency of, xii. 20. See Empire.
- Athenians, the, superstitious, ii. 4; at war with Perdiccas, iii. 7; their reply to the charges of Corinth at Sparta, iii. 9; defence of their empire, *ibid.*; character of the,

iv. 1; leave the country for the town (431), v. 3; their exasperation at the invasion, v. 4; occupy Aegina, v. 6; their dissatisfaction with Pericles (430), v. 9; arrange with Sitalces to make an attack on the Chalcidic cities, but fail to keep their appointment (429), v. 20; action on hearing of the revolt of Lesbos, vi. 1; at Mytilene, vi. 2; their energy in 428, vi. 4; their finances, vi. 5, *see* Appendix 1; their cruelty, vi. 8; sail to Sicily (427), vi. 17; inconvenient neighbours, vii. 5, *see* Heraclea; the, resolve to send a large fleet to Sicily, in 426, vii. 6; their duplicity in regard to the Spartan fleet, vii. 10 f.; the, in Sicily (425), vii. 15; the, capture Nisaea (424), viii. 2; attempt on Megara foiled by Brasidas, *ibid.*; the, leave Sicily (424), viii. 8; the, defeated at Delium (424), viii. 4; their anger at Scione, viii. 9; view of their empire expressed in the Melean dialogue, ix. 15; in Sicily, advance from Catana to the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12; the, encamp on the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse (415), *ibid.*; their first engagement with the enemy, *ibid.*; their fear of the Syracusan cavalry, *ibid.*; retire from Syracuse to Catana, for the winter of 415, *ibid.*; send to Athens for horsemen and money, *ibid.*; the, in Sicily, visit Messene, x. 14; leave Catana for Naxos, *ibid.*; the, at Camarina, *ibid.*; negotiates with Sicily (415-414), *ibid.*; the, send envoys to Carthage and Etruria, *ibid.*; at Syracuse, first year, *ibid.*; arrival of reinforcements from Athens (414), x. 15; obtain cavalry from Athens and Segesta, *ibid.*; the, destroy the first Syracusan counter-wall (414), x. 16; the, destroy the second counter-wall of the Syracusans, *ibid.*; at Syracuse, their prosperous condition (414), x. 17; their fortunes at Syracuse begin to sink, x. 18; a trireme captured by the Syracusans, *ibid.*; their miserable condition at Syracuse (414), x. 20; the, resolve to send a second expedition to Syracuse (414), x. 21; the second expedition to Syracuse delayed, x. 22; suffer greatly by the occupation of Declea, *ibid.*; their first battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse (413), x. 24; lose Plemmyrium, *ibid.*; their transports captured, *ibid.*; second engagement in the Great Harbour of Syracuse; they are defeated (413), x. 25;

engage with the Corinthians off Erineum (413), x. 26; their reinforcements arrive under Demosthenes, *ibid.*; their third engagement with the Syracusans in the Great Harbour (413), x. 29; their defeat, *ibid.*; last engagement in the Great Harbour (413), x. 30, 31; the, refuse to go on board their ships after their last defeat, x. 32; their retreat from Syracuse (413), x. 33 f.; number of those who retreated, *ibid.*; number of the prisoners taken at Syracuse (413), x. 34; their fate, x. 35; the, incredulous of the result of the Sicilian expedition, xi. 1; the measures then taken, *ibid.*; the, discover the plans for revolt among their allies (412), xi. 3; the, send ships to Asia, xi. 4; the, at Miletus, xi. 8; their fleet assembled at Samos, *ibid.*; moves to Miletus, and then returns to Samos, *ibid.*; agree to an oligarchical constitution (411), xi. 13; submit to the Government of the Four Hundred (411), xi. 16; their courage after Aegospotami (405), xii. 21; the, religion, xiv. 15; disregarded physical science, xiv. 12, 15, 16.

Athens, change of policy at, i. 2; and her allies, *ibid.*; parties at, after 445, i. 4; ruled by right of superiority, i. 8; and the West, i. 9; and the Messapians, i. 12; and Neapolis, *ibid.*; and the North, i. 18 f.; and Macedon, *ibid.*; her policy towards Perdiccas and Sitalces, i. 21; supports Philip, endeavours to gain the friendship of Sitalces, *ibid.*; forms an alliance with Perdiccas, *ibid.*; and Western Greece, Amphiloehian Argos, i. 22; makes an alliance with Acarnania, *ibid.*; and Corinth, *ibid.*; parties in, after 445, ii. 1; religion at, ii. 4; sophists and sophistic teaching at, ii. 6; at variance with Megara, iii. 1; and Corinth, iii. 2; envoys from Corcyra and Corinth, at, iii. 4; her policy towards Corcyra, iii. 4, 5; enters into a defensive alliance with, iii. 5; sends ten and afterwards twenty ships to protect her, *ibid.*; her ships at the battle of Sybota, iii. 6; they prevent a second engagement, *ibid.*; insists that Potidaea shall raze her wall, iii. 7; and Sparta contrasted, iv. 1 f.; her fleet in 431, iv. 4; her army, *ibid.*; financial position of, at the beginning of the war, iv. 6; and Plataea, vi. 11; concludes a truce with Sparta for a year (423), viii. 8; and Sparta,

alliance between, in 421, ix. 1; and Argos (420), ix. 6; in alliance with Mantinea and Elis, *ibid.*; sends forces to aid the Argives in Epidauria (419), ix. 8: politics at, after Mantinea, ix. 13; aids the democratic party in Argos, ix. 14; her attempt to gain a footing in Sicily, in 422, a failure, x. 2; prosperity of, after the peace of Nicias, x. 3; an ally of Segesta, *ibid.*; visited by envoys from, *ibid.*; fear of conspiracy at, in 415, x. 11; alarm at, on the revolt of Chios (412), xi. 4; the reserve fund now employed, *ibid.*; in danger from the Peloponnesian fleet, xi. 23; siege of, by Lysander (405-404), xii. 21; surrender of, to Sparta (404), xii. 22; state of the city, xiv. 20; trade of, xiv. 22; Pericles' ideal of, see Funeral speech.

Atomists, the, xiv. 12.

Attica, Pericles' measures for the security of, v. 5; invaded (431), v. 4; (430), v. 8; (428), vi. 1; proposed second invasion in the same year, vi. 4; invaded (427), vi. 6; (425), i. 8.

B

BACCHYLIDES, xiv. 1.

Bacis, ii. 4.

Bassae, temple of Apollo at, xiv. 19.

Bendis, a Thracian deity, xiv. 21.

Biology, xiv. 16.

Bisaltia annexed by Macedon, i. 18.

Boeotia, popular movement, and organisation of a rising (424), viii. 4; and Corinth, in 421, ix. 4; forms an alliance with Sparta, *ibid.*

Boeotians, have a truce terminable at ten days' notice with Athens in 421, ix. 1; unwilling to join Argos in 421, ix. 3.

Bosphorus, importance of corn-supplies from, xii. 18.

Botany, xiv. 16.

Bottiaens, the, aid the Potidaeans, iii. 7.

Brasidas, opposition to his policy, iv. 8; at Methone, v. 5; with Cnemus in the Corinthian gulf, v. 17; adviser of Alcidas, vi. 15; at Pylus, vii. 9; appointed to Thrace, viii. 2; in the Megarid (424), *ibid.*; marches to Chalcidice, viii. 5; and Perdiccas, *ibid.*; at Acanthus, *ibid.*; at Amphipolis, *ibid.*; his policy in Thrace, viii. 6; sends to Sparta for reinforcements, and begins building ships on the Strymon (424), viii. 7; at Torone, *ibid.*; at Scione, viii. 9; he refuses to give up the

city, *ibid.*; receives Mende (423), *ibid.*; his mistake on leaving Chalcidice to invade Lyncestis, *ibid.*; joins Perdiccas in the invasion of Lyncestis, his retreat, and breach with Perdiccas, viii. 10; commissioners sent to (423), viii. 11; unsuccessfully attempts Potidaea (423), viii. 12; why absent from Torone when Cleon arrived? viii. 13; defeats Cleon at Amphipolis (422), viii. 14; his death and the honours paid to him, *ibid.*; his strategy, viii. 15; the helots who served in his army, settled at Lepreum (421), ix. 4; present at the battle of Mantinea, ix. 10.

Bricinniae, a fortress in the Leontine territory visited by Phaeax (423), x. 2.

Budorum, a fort on Salamis, v. 19.

Byzantium, revolts from Athens (440), i. 15; returns to her allegiance, i. 17; joins the Peloponnesians (411), xii. 3; besieged by the Athenians (409), xii. 9; captured by them, *ibid.*; taken by Lysander (405), xii. 21.

C

CACYPARIS, Nicias reaches the river, x. 33.

Calamis, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 8.

Calendar, Greek, ix. 8.

Callias, an Athenian general at Potidaea, iii. 7.

Callicrates, xiv. 19.

Callicratidas, appointed Spartan admiral (406), xii. 13; his relations with Lysander and Cyrus, *ibid.*; his humane treatment of Greek captives, *ibid.*; drowned at Arginusae (406), xii. 14.

Callistratus, an Athenian hipparch at Syracuse, x. 34.

Callixenus, xii. 15.

Camarina, plot to betray the city to Syracuse (425), vii. 15; and Gela (424), vii. 8; visited by the Athenian fleet (415), x. 10; Hermocrates at (415), x. 14; the Athenians at, *ibid.*; sends aid to Syracuse (413), x. 24; abandoned to the Carthaginians (405), xiii. 8.

Canachus of Sicily, xiv. 18.

Cannonus, decree of, xii. 15.

Carian district, i. 2; defection of allies in, i. 15; defections in 441-436, i. 17.

Carthage, Athenians contemplate an attack on (?), x. 13; the Athenians send envoys to (415-414), x. 14; and Segesta, xiii. 2; concludes peace with Dionysius (405), xiii. 8; terms of the peace, *ibid.*; plague at, *ibid.*

- Carthaginians in Sicily (409), xiii. 3; their brutality at Selinus, *ibid.*; Carthaginian invasion of Sicily (406), xiii. 6.
- Catana, the Athenian fleet sails to, x. 10; the Athenian army returns to, in 415, x. 12; the Athenians return to, from Naxos, x. 14; the Athenian army leaves for Epipolae, x. 15.
- Centoripa, acquired by the Athenians, x. 15.
- Cephalonia, becomes an ally of Athens, v. 5.
- Ceramicus, Athenians buried in the, v. 7.
- Cercinthis, Lacus, i. 20.
- Chaeronea, a rising contemplated at (420), viii. 4.
- Chalce, Athenian fleet at (411), xi. 14.
- Chalcedon, siege of (409), xii. 9; convention at, *ibid.*; occupied by Lysander (405), xii. 21.
- Chalcideus, a Spartan commander (413), xi. 2; appointed to command at Chios, xi. 3; at Teos, xi. 4; at Chios, *ibid.*; sails to Ionia, *ibid.*; his alliance with Tissaphernes, xi. 5.
- Chalcidians, the, become allies of Argos in 421, ix. 3; terms respecting, in the peace of 421, viii. 17.
- Chalcidice, threatened by Sitalces (429), v. 20; application to Sparta for help (424), viii. 2; Brasidas marches to (424), viii. 5; success of Brasidas in, and weak defence of the Athenians, *ibid.* and ff.; Cleon in (423-422), viii. 18 f.
- Chaonians, aid in attacking Amphilocheian Argos (430), v. 11; aid Cnemus in attacking Acarnania, v. 15; their defeat at Stratus, *ibid.*
- Charicles, a member of the commission to investigate sacrilege (415), x. 7; general with Demosthenes (413), x. 22; collects troops at Argos, *ibid.*
- Chians, the, compelled to pull down their walls (425), vii. 14; send to Sparta wishing to revolt (413), xi. 2; supply seven ships to Athens, ix. 13 f.; their revolt delayed, *ibid.*; activity of, xi. 5; they bring over Lebedos and Erae, *ibid.*; attempt to bring over Lesbos to Sparta (412), xi. 7.
- Chios, sends ships against Samos, i. 16; and Lesbos, send fifty ships to the Athenian fleet (430), v. 8; Chalcideus appointed to the command in, xi. 3; revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4; devastation of, by the Athenians (412), xi. 7; great prosperity of the island down to this time, *ibid.*; their mistake as to the power of Athens, *ibid.*; under Pedaritus, xi. 9; desperate condition of, during Athenian occupation, xi. 10; completely invested by the Athenians (411), xi. 14; conspiracy among Peloponnesian fleet at (406), xii. 16.
- Chrysopolis, xii. 5.
- Cimon, change in Athenian policy after his death, i. 2; his liberality, ii. 1.
- "Circle," the, on Epipolae, x. 15; attacked by the Syracusans, and barely saved by Nicias, x. 16.
- Clazomenae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4; returns to its allegiance, xi. 7.
- Cleandridas at Thuri, i. 12.
- Clarechus, appointed to the command of the Hellespont (413), xi. 3; at Byzantium (410), xii. 7.
- Clearidas, established in Amphipolis (423), viii. 11; refuses to give up Amphipolis, in 421, ix. 1; he is recalled home, *ibid.*
- Cleomenes, regent for Pausanias, leads the invasion into Attica (427), vi. 6.
- Cleon, chief of the demagogues at Athens, ii. 7; supports Pericles in his war policy, *ibid.*; said to have attacked Anaxagoras, ii. 8; supports the war party, ii. 9; his proposal about the Mytilenaeans (427), vi. 8; his speech, *ibid.*; his view of the Athenian empire, *ibid.*; his view of the "orators" at Athens, vi. 9; attacks Paches, vi. 10; his extravagant demands after the seizure of Pylus, vii. 10; his attack on the generals about Pylus, vii. 11; he is sent there, *ibid.*; and Demosthenes (425), vii. 12; his conduct at Pylus, vii. 13; sails to Chalcidice (423), viii. 13; he takes Torone, *ibid.*; his ability as a general shown at the capture of Torone, *ibid.*; at Eion, viii. 14; captures Galepsus, *ibid.*; marches on Amphipolis (422), *ibid.*; discontent of his army at, viii. 14, 15; his defeat and death, viii. 14; his conduct at Amphipolis examined, viii. 15.
- Cleophon, leader of the extreme democratic party at Athens, xii. 2; opposes peace with Sparta (410), xii. 6; opposes peace with Sparta after Arginusae (406), xii. 16; views of Aristophanes on his character, xii. 17; again resists proposals for peace with Sparta, xii. 22; brought to trial and executed, *ibid.*
- "Cleruchs" at Lesbos, vi. 10.
- Clouds (of Aristophanes), scene from, ii. 6.
- Clubs at Athens, their nature and aims, xi. 14.
- Cnemus, a Spartan admiral (430), iv. 8; in Acarnania (429), v. 15; defeated by Phormio (429), v. 17, 18; his proposed attack on the Peiraeus, v. 19.

- Cnidus, expedition to, by Hippocrates (412), xi. 9; a school of medicine at, xiv. 16.
- Coinage, new, at Athens (407), xii. 17.
- Colonus, meeting of Athenian assembly at (411), xi. 16.
- Colophon, revolution at (430), v. 12; in the hands of the Persians, vi. 7.
- Comedy, xiv. 5.
- Congress (proposed) of the Greeks, i. 18.
- Conon, stationed at Naupactus (418), x. 26; one of the ten generals (406), xii. 12; blockaded at Mytilene, xii. 18.
- Corcyra, and Corinth, iii. 2; navy of the Corcyraeans, *ibid.*; her action in the Persian war, *ibid.*; her colony at Epidamnus, iii. 3; defeats Corinth at sea (435), *ibid.*; the oligarchs of Epidamnus appeal to and are received, *ibid.*; the Corcyraeans besiege Epidamnus, *ibid.*; sends envoys to Athens, *ibid.*; defeated at Sybota, iii. 6; but saved from further disaster by the Athenians, *ibid.*; sends fifty ships to Athens (431), v. 5; change in her attitude to Athens, vi. 13; envoys sent to Athens, *ibid.*; sedition at, vi. 13, 14; after 433, *ibid.*; help sent to Athens, *ibid.*; end of the sedition (425), vi. 16; the rendezvous of the Sicilian expedition in 415, x. 8.
- Corinth, her relations with Athens, iii. 2; with Corcyra, *ibid.*; adopts Epidamnus as her colony and sends aid, iii. 3; preparations for war with Corcyra, *ibid.*; battle off the Ambracian gulf, and defeat of the Corinthians, *ibid.*; sends envoys to Athens, iii. 4; her war with Corcyra a mistake, iii. 5; prepares for a second conflict, iii. 6; the battle of Sybota, *ibid.*; defeats Corcyra at Sybota, and takes many captives, *ibid.*; excitement at, owing to the affairs of Potidaea, iii. 8; complains of the conduct of Athens at Sparta, *ibid.*; and Boeotia in 421, ix. 4; unable to take a leading part in the Peloponnesus, ix. 14; Syracusan envoys at (415), x. 13; proposes destruction of Athens to Sparta (404), xii. 22.
- Corinthia, Nicias makes a descent on (Solygea) (425), vii. 14.
- Corinthian war, the, iii. 3 f.; fleet, movement of, in 431, v. 5; ships, arrive at Syracuse (414), x. 18.
- Corinthians, their action at the time of the Samian revolt, i. 16; their view of the Athenians, iii. 8; threaten to seek a new alliance if Sparta will not help them, *ibid.*; speech before the allies at Sparta on the war, iii. 11; their skill in adapting their navy to new conditions, iv. 5; refuse to accept the peace of 421, viii. 16; urge Argos to take the lead in the Peloponnesus, ix. 2 f.; become allies of Argos, in 421, ix. 3; wish to be on a truce with Athens terminable at ten days' notice, Athens refuses, *ibid.*; refuse to join in the alliance with the Athenians (420), ix. 6; their naval engagement with the Athenians off Erineum (418), x. 26; wait for the Isthmian games before sailing (413), xi. 8.
- Coronta, Phormio at (429), v. 19.
- Cos, a school of medicine, xiv. 16.
- Cratinus, xiv. 5.
- Crestonice, annexed by Macedon, i. 18.
- Critias, his life in exile, xii. 23; returns to Athens (404), *ibid.*; his work as member of the Thirty, xii. 25; brings about the execution of Theramenes, *ibid.*; death of (403), xii. 26.
- Critius, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 18.
- Crotona, unfriendly to Athens (413), x. 26.
- Cuneiform alphabet, the, Persian despatches written in, vii. 14.
- Cynossema, battle of (411), xii. 4.
- Cyrus, sent to take command on the coast and to aid the Lacedaemonians (408), xii. 10; and Lysander, xii. 11; supplies Lysander with resources (405), xii. 17; leaves Sardis (405), xii. 18; makes Lysander his vice-regent, *ibid.*
- Cythera, capture of, by Nicias (424), viii. 1; restored by the Athenians in 421, ix. 1.
- Cyzicus, recovered by the Athenian fleet, xii. 4; battle of (410), xii. 5.

D

- DAMARCHUS, a Syracusan general, executed (406), xiii. 7.
- Damon, his advice to Pericles, ii. 2; ostracised, ii. 8.
- Daphnaeus, a Syracusan general at Agrigentum (406), xiii. 6; deposed, xiii. 7; executed, *ibid.*
- Daphnus, the Athenians from Clazomenae take refuge in, xi. 7.
- Dascon, a promontory on the shore of the Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12.
- Declea, Alcibiades advises the occupation of, x. 13; effect of the occupation on Athens, x. 22.

- Delians, the, expelled from their island and settled by Pharnaces at Adramyttium (422), viii. 13; restored to their island in 421, ix. 8.
- Delium, the Athenians fortify the temple (424), viii. 4; the battle of, *ibid.*; the temple captured, *ibid.*
- Delos, earthquakes at, v. 3; purification of the island and restoration of the games (426), vii. 7.
- Delphi, the oracle and Thuri, i. 10, 12; attitude of the oracle towards Sparta about the war, iii. 11; funds at, iv. 6; stipulations about, in the truce of 423, viii. 8; the temple not impartial, *ibid.*, note; terms respecting, in the peace of 421, viii. 17.
- Delphinium, fortress in Chios seized by Athenians (412), xi. 9.
- Demeter Thesmophoros, i. 14.
- Democracy, supported by Athens, i. 8; established at Samos (439?), i. 16, note; at Argos, ix. 2; and Mantinea, ix. 3; on its trial at Athens (413), xi. 1; established at Samos in 412, xi. 6; destroyed in Greece (404), xii. 24; at Syracuse, xiii. 1; and the drama, xiv. 5, 6.
- Democritus, his physical philosophy, xiv. 12; his ethical philosophy, xiv. 13.
- Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, in Lencadia, vii. 3; in Aetolia, *ibid.*; he is defeated, *ibid.*; contemplates an invasion of Boeotia (426), *ibid.*; unwilling to return to Athens after his defeat, *ibid.*; at Olpae (426), vii. 4; his strategy, *ibid.*; at Idomene, vii. 5; returns to Athens, and accompanies the fleet (425), vii. 8; and Cleon (425), vii. 12; employs light-armed troops on Sphacteria, *ibid.*; his conduct at Pylus, vii. 13; in the Megarid (424), viii. 2; sent to Naupactus to arrange for an attack on Siphæ, viii. 4; sent to Epidaurus to bring the Athenian troops away (418), ix. 13; appointed to command in Sicily, x. 21; and Charicles erect a fort in Laconia (418), x. 22; his voyage to Syracuse (418), x. 26; his arrival at Syracuse, x. 27; he attempts the counter-wall of the Syracusans, *ibid.*; his attack by night on Epipolæ, *ibid.*; wishes to carry the Athenian forces back to Athens, x. 28; or to move to Thapsus and Catana, *ibid.*; his proposal after the last defeat of the Athenians (413), x. 32; surrender of his army, x. 34; attempts his own life, *ibid.*, note; *cp. note* to x. 35; put to death at Syracuse, x. 35.
- Demostratus, urges Nicias to fix the amount of troops needed for Sicily, x. 6, and note.
- Dercyllidas, a Spartan, xi. 15.
- Derdas, nephew of Alexander, king of the Elimiotes, i. 19.
- Dexippus, a Lacedaemonian at Agrigentum (406), xiii. 6; dismissed from Sicily, xiii. 7.
- Diitrephes, conducts Thracian mercenaries from Athens (413), x. 23.
- Diobelia, paid out of state funds, xii. 2.
- Diocles, the democratic leader at Syracuse, xii. 1, and note; sent to relieve Selinus (409), xiii. 3; aids the Himeraeans, xiii. 4.
- Diocles, gives information about the profanation of the mysteries, x. 11.
- Diodotus, opposed to Cleon, vi. 9.
- Diognetus, a member of the commission to investigate sacrilege (411), x. 7.
- Diomedon, recovers Teos in part for Athens, xi. 5.
- Dionysius, the "copper" at Thuri, i. 10.
- of Syracuse, attacks the Syracusan generals for their conduct at Agrigentum (406), xiii. 7; at Gela, *ibid.*; elected general with full powers, *ibid.*; at Leontini, *ibid.*; allowed to have a bodyguard, *ibid.*; marries the daughter of Hermocrates, and becomes tyrant of Syracuse, *ibid.*; recognised as tyrant of Carthage (405), xiii. 8; attempts to relieve Gela, but fails, *ibid.*; hatred of, owing to his failure at Gela, *ibid.*; ill-treatment of his wife, *ibid.*; his return to Syracuse, *ibid.*; he concludes peace with Carthage (405), *ibid.*
- Diotiphes, attacks Anaxagoras, ii. 8.
- Diotimus, at Neapolis, i. 12.
- Dorians, at Thuri, i. 12; and Ionians, iv. 1.
- Dorion of Rhodes, leads Thurian vessels to Cnidus (412), xi. 9; captured by Athenians (407), xii. 12; liberated by them, *ibid.*
- Dracontides, attacks Pericles, ii. 9; (?) proposes election of the Thirty at Athens, xii. 24.
- Drama, development of the, xiv. 2; the, its connection with democracy, xiv. 5, 6.

E

- EARTHQUAKES in 426, vii. 1.
- Eclipse of the moon, the Athenians deterred by, from leaving Syracuse (413), x. 28.
- Eetionea, fortification of, xi. 21; destruction of the fortification (411), xi. 22.
- Elon, saved from Brasidas by Thucydides (424), viii. 5.

- Eleans, the, refuse to accept the terms of the peace of 421, viii. 16; withdraw from the allied army (418), ix. 10.
- Eleatics, the, xiv. 11.
- Eleusis, i. 14; the Greeks invited to bring offerings to, *ibid.*; seized by the Thirty (403), xii. 26; established as independent (403-401), *ibid.*
- Elis, joins the alliance with Argos, ix. 3; quarrels with Sparta, *ibid.*; and Athens in alliance (420), ix. 6; and Lepreum, ix. 7; sends troops to Mantinea which arrive too late and take part in the siege of Epidaurus (418), ix. 13.
- Ellomenus in Leucadia, vii. 3.
- Elpinice, and Pericles, i. 17.
- Empedocles, xiv. 12.
- Empire, the Athenian, i. 6; it ensured the safety of the Aegean, i. 7; and diffused civilisation, *ibid.*; a tyranny which failed to satisfy Greek feeling, i. 6-8; the rule of the superior, i. 8; supported democracy, *ibid.*; defence of, iii. 9; its extent, a source of difficulty, iv. 2; managed through the Assembly, *ibid.*; want of consistent policy, *ibid.*; a tyranny, vi. 8; view of, ix. 15; defence of, at Camarina, x. 14. *See* Athenian.
- Endius, ephor at Sparta (413), xi. 2; and Alcibiades, xi. 3; envoy from Sparta to Athens (410), xii. 6.
- Ephors, the Spartan, visit Pylus (425), vii. 10; at Athens (404), xii. 23.
- Ephorus, his account of the origin of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 1.
- Epic poetry in the fifth century, xiv. 6.
- Epicharmus of Cos, xiv. 5.
- Epidamnus, applies for help to Corcyra, iii. 3; asks advice at Delphi, *ibid.*; applies to Corinth, *ibid.*; a colony of Corcyra, *ibid.*; government of, *ibid.*; factions at, *ibid.*; besieged by the Corcyraeans, *ibid.*; capitulates, *ibid.*
- Epidaurus, and Argos, quarrel between (419), ix. 8; siege of (418), ix. 13; a school of medicine, xiv. 16.
- Epidaurus Limera, ravaged by the Athenians (414), x. 21, 22.
- Epipolae, seized by the Athenians (414), x. 15; attack of the Athenians on (418), x. 27.
- Epitadas, commander of the Spartans in Sphacteria, vii. 9, and vii. 12.
- ἐπιεικισμός. *See* Heraclea, Decelea, Pylus, Minoa.
- Erae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 5.
- Eretria, battle of (411), xi. 22.
- Erineum, battle off (413), x. 26.
- Erineus, Nicias reaches the river, x. 34.
- Erythrae, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4.
- Eteonicus, escapes from Mytilene (406), xii. 14; suppresses a conspiracy at Ohios (406), xii. 16.
- Etruria, the Athenians send envoys to (415-414), x. 14; three ships from, come to Syracuse (414), x. 17.
- Euboea, sends to Agis wishing to revolt (418), xi. 2; revolts from the Athenians (411), xi. 22.
- Eucles, an Athenian general at Amphipolis (424), viii. 5.
- Euphemus, his speech at Camarina (415), x. 14.
- Eupolis, the comedian, his remark on Pericles, ii. 2; xiv. 5.
- Euripides, popularity of, in Sicily, x. 35, xiv. 4; condemns slavery, xiv. 13.
- Euryelus, on Epipolae, x. 15.
- Eurylochus, a Spartan general (426), vii. 3; in Acarnania and Amphilocheian Argos, vii. 4.
- Eurymedon, an Athenian general at Corcyra (425), vi. 16; at Pylus, vii. 8; in Sicily, vii. 15, viii. 3; fined, *ibid.*; appointed to command in Sicily, x. 21; sent to Sicily (414), *ibid.*
- Eurytanes, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3.
- Enthydemus, chosen to support Nicias, x. 21.
- Evarchus, tyrant of Astacus, v. 5.

F

- "FESTIVAL-MONEY," the, ii. 2.
- Finance, at Athens, iv. 6, vi. 5, *see* App. 1; drain of the Athenian finances (414-413), x. 22, 23; measures for economy at Athens after the Sicilian expedition, xi. 1.
- Fire-signals, at Salamis, v. 19; at Plataea, vi. 5.
- Five Thousand, the, establishment of (411), xi. 23.
- Fleet, Athenian, at Samos, amounts to more than two hundred ships, i. 16; of Athens, iv. 4; of Sparta, *ibid.*; of Sparta, acquired by the Athenians, vii. 10.
- Four Hundred, the, establishment of (411), xi. 16; nature of their rule, *ibid.*; intrigues with Agis, xi. 16; send commissioners to Samos, xi. 20; divisions among them, xi. 21; send embassy to Sparta, *ibid.*; are deposed, xi. 23.
- Funeral speech of Pericles, v. 7.

G

- GALEPSUS, captured by Cleon (422), viii. 14.
 Gela, and Camarina (424), viii. 3; the congress of, *ibid.*; sends aid to Syracuse (413), x. 24; abandoned to the Carthaginians, xiii. 8; besieged by Himilco (405), *ibid.*
 General, relation of, to the Assembly, iv. 2.
 Generals, afraid of sacrificing the lives of the citizens, iv. 2; at Syracuse the number reduced to three, x. 13.
 Geography, scientific and descriptive, xiv. 16.
 Glanis, "the elder brother of Bacis," ii. 4.
 Glaucou, sent to Corcyra, iii. 5.
 Gongylus, a Corinthian commander, brings the news of the coming of Gylippus to Syracuse, x. 18.
 Gorgias, comes to Athens as an envoy, vi. 17.
 Grapnels in the Athenian ships at Syracuse, x. 30.
 Great King, envoys to, from Lacedaemon, vii. 14; from Athens, *ibid.*; from Persia to Sparta, *ibid.*. See Persia.
 Greece, divided by the peace of 445, i. 3; in 421-415, ix. 14; feeling in, after the Sicilian expedition, xi. 2.
 Greek character, varieties of, xiv. 23.
 Grundy, G. B., his view of the geography of Pylus, vii. 10, *note*.
 Gylippus, appointed to take the command in Sicily (415), x. 13; at Leucas, x. 17; his voyage to the west, *ibid.*; collects forces at Himera, and marches on Syracuse (414), *ibid.*; ascends Epipolae, his ultimatum to the Athenians, x. 18; captures Labdulum, *ibid.*; sets out to collect reinforcements, x. 20; captures Plemmyrium, x. 24; brings reinforcements to Syracuse (413), *ibid.*; brings reinforcements to Syracuse, x. 28; his address to his men before the final battle in the Harbour, x. 30.

H

- HAGELADAS of Argos, xiv. 18.
 Hagnon, general at Samos, i. 16; founds Amphipolis, i. 20; his proposal about Pericles, ii. 9; and Sitalces, v. 20.
 Haliets, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8.
 Hannibal, grandson of Hamilcar, appointed Carthaginian general, xiii. 2; sends envoys to Syracuse, *ibid.*; lands in Sicily (409), xiii.

- 3; destroys Selinus, *ibid.*; destroys Himera, xiii. 4; returns to Carthage, *ibid.*; invades Sicily for the second time (406), xiii. 6; besieges Agrigentum, *ibid.*; dies of the plague, *ibid.*
 "Harmost," the title first mentioned in 413, xi. 2.
 Hecataeus of Miletus, xiv. 7.
 Hellanicus, xiv. 9.
 Hellas, feeling in favour of Sparta in the war, v. 3; opinion that it would be ended in two or three years, *ibid.*
 Hellenism, destroyed by the Peloponnesian war, v. 21.
 Hellespont, the, Clearchus appointed commander to, xi. 3; recovered by the Athenians (408), xii. 10.
 Helots, Lacedaemonian dread of, vii. 13; the Spartan fear of, viii. 2; iniquitous massacre of the, *ibid.*
 Heraclea, founded by Sparta (426), vii. 1; seized by the Boeotians (420), ix. 7.
 Heraclitus of Ephesus, xiv. 11.
 Hermae, the mutilation of the, at Athens (415), x. 7; possible explanations of, *ibid.*
 Hermaeondas of Thebes, at Mytilene, vi. 2.
 Hermione, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8.
 Hermippus, attacks Aspasia, ii. 8.
 Hermocrates of Syracuse, his speech at Gela (424), viii. 3; has information of the coming of the Athenian fleet, x. 9; he proposes to go to meet them, *ibid.*; chosen general at Syracuse, x. 13; deposed by the Syracusans (414), x. 17; deceives Nicias, and secures the roads and passes near Syracuse (413), x. 32; and Tissaphernes, xi. 8; arrives at Miletus from Sicily, *ibid.*; goes as envoy to Sparta (411), xii. 3; banished by the Syracusans (410), xii. 7; repairs to Pharnabazus, *ibid.*; returns to Sicily (408), xiii. 5; at Himera (407), *ibid.*; attempts to return to Syracuse and is slain, *ibid.*
 Herodotus, xiv. 8.
 Hesiod, his death, vii. 3.
 Himera, Athenians not received at (415), x. 12; Gylippus at (414), x. 17; Hannibal at, xiii. 4; destruction of, *ibid.*
 Himilco, general with Hannibal (406), xiii. 6; at Agrigentum, *ibid.*; attacks Gela (405), xiii. 8.
 Hippas, (1) of Notium, vi. 7; (2) the sophist, xiv. 14.
 Hippocrates, an Athenian general in the Megarid (424), viii. 2; in Boeotia, viii. 4; defeated at Delium, *ibid.*

Hippocrates, the physician, xiv. 16.
 Hippodamus, architect of Thurii, i. 10; and of the Peiræus, *ibid.*, xiv. 14.
 Hipponicus, his wife married to Pericles, ii. 3.
 Hybla Galeatis, attacked unsuccessfully by the Athenians (415), x. 12.
 Hyccara, captured by the Athenians (415), x. 12; sale of the slaves taken at, *ibid.*
 Hyperbolus, ostracised, ix. 13; assassinated at Samos (411), xi. 17.

I

IALYSUS, refuses tribute in 440 (?), i. 17.
 Iasus, captured by the Peloponnesians (412), xi. 8.
 Iberians, in Hannibal's army, xiii. 4.
 Ictinus, xiv. 19.
 Idomene, battle of (426), vii. 5.
 Illyrians, their attack on Brasidas (423), viii. 10.
 Imbrian, the, "cleruchs" serve in the Athenian army, vii. 11.
 Impiety, charges of, against Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Aspasia, ii. 8.
 Independence, Greek desire of, vi. 11.
 "Ionia unfortified," i. 17.
 Ionian, district, i. 2; philosophy, ii. 5.
 Ionians, and Dorians, iv. 1; Athenians and Asiatic Ionians, *ibid.*
 Italy, attitude of the cities in, to the Sicilian expedition (415), x. 8.

K

KINGS, Spartan, did not command the fleet, iv. 3; both the, leave Sparta at the same time, ix. 10, 11.
 Knights, the Athenian, unwilling to serve under Cleon in Chalcidice (422), viii. 15.

L

LABDALUM, a fort built by the Athenians on Epipolæ (414), x. 15; captured by Gylippus, x. 18.
 Lacedæmonians, arrange to send forty ships to Lesbos, vi. 4; determine to increase their navy (427), vi. 15; colonise Heraclea (426), vii. 1; treachery of, after the defeat of Olpæ, vii. 4; their retreat, *ibid.*; at Pylus

(425), vii. 9; refuse to aid the Aeginetans (424), viii. 1; send forces to aid the Epidaurians (419), ix. 8; also send forces by sea, which is regarded as a breach of the treaty, *ibid.*; the Athenian view of their policy, ix. 15; resolve to build a fleet (419), xi. 2. See Sparta and Spartans.

Lacedæmonius, son of Cimon, sent to Coreyra with ten ships (438), iii. 5.

Laches, an Athenian general, sent to Sicily (427), vi. 17; recalled from Sicily, and put on his trial, vii. 6; proposes that the terms of the truce be accepted in 423, viii. 8; slain at Mantinea (418), ix. 11.

Laconia, the Athenians land on, contrary to the terms of the peace (414), x. 21; the Athenians erect a fortress in (413), x. 22.

Lamachus, appointed one of the generals to Sicily (415), x. 3; his plan of campaign in 415, x. 10; slain in battle at Syracuse, x. 16.

Lampon, takes part in the founding of Thurii, i. 10; his report on Eleusia, i. 14; and Anaxagoras, ii. 4.

Lampsacus, taken by Lysander (405), xii. 19.

Lebedos, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 5.

Lecythus, at Torone, viii. 7; taken by Brasidas, *ibid.*

Lemnian, the, cleruchs serve in the Athenian army, vii. 11.

Leon, an Athenian general (412), xi. 7.

Leontini, at war with Syracuse (427), vi. 17; factions at, x. 1; the oligarchs seek the aid of Syracuse, *ibid.*; the city broken up, *ibid.*; two fortresses occupied on the territory of, *ibid.*; recognised as independent at the peace in 405, xiii. 8.

Lepreum, Neodamodes settled at, ix. 4; quarrel between Elis and Sparta about, ix. 7.

Lesbian, the, exiles settle at Antandrus, viii. 3.

Lesbos, sends ships against Samos, i. 16; and Chios send fifty ships to the Athenian fleet (430), v. 8; revolt of (428), vi. 1; received into the Peloponnesian alliance, vi. 4; divided into lots and occupied by Athenian cleruchs, vi. 10; sends to Agis wishing to revolt (413), xi. 2; the Chians attempt to bring the island over to Athens, xi. 7; remains Athenian, *ibid.*; treatment of, by Lysander, xii. 21.

Leucadia, Demosthenes in (426), vii. 3.

Leucas, attack on (428), vi. 5.

Leucippus, xiv. 12.

- Lichas, sent as commissioner to investigate conduct of Astyocheus (412), xi. 10; quarrels with Tissaphernes, *ibid.*
- Light-armed troops, their value recognised in the course of the war, iv. 5; at Spartolus, v. 14; their mode of fighting, vii. 8; employed on Sphacteria, vii. 12.
- Lindus, refuses tribute in 440 (?), i. 17.
- Liparaean islands, Athenian attack on (427), vi. 17.
- Locri, opposed to the Athenians in 415, x. 8; Gylippus at, x. 17.
- Locrians, the, at Messene, x. 1; revolt among the colonies of Locri, *ibid.*
- Logographers, the, xiv. 7.
- Long Walls at Athens, destroyed by Lysander (404), xii. 22.
- Lucanians, the, destroy the Sybarites, i. 12.
- Lyncestis, invaded by Perdiccas and Brasidas (428), viii. 9, 10.
- Lyric poetry, did not flourish at Athens, xiv. 1.
- Lysander, appointed admiral by Sparta (408), xii. 11; his relations with Cyrus, *ibid.*; succeeded as admiral by Callicratidas (406), xii. 13; sent out as lieutenant of the fleet (405), xii. 17; at Ephesus, *ibid.*; made vice-regent by Cyrus (405), xii. 18; his attitude to democracy and Athenian empire, *ibid.*; destroys democrats at Miletus, *ibid.*; sails to Aegina and Attica, *ibid.*; returns to Abydos, *ibid.*; takes Lampsacus (405), xii. 19; captures Athenian fleet at Aegospotami, *ibid.*; massacres all Athenian prisoners after Aegospotami, xii. 20; takes cities in the Bosphorus and Hellespont, xii. 21; at Lesbos, *ibid.*; advances upon Athens and blockades the Peiræus, *ibid.*; destroys the Long Walls (404), xii. 22; sails to Samos and restores the oligarchy, xii. 28; returns to Laconia, *ibid.*; assists in the establishment of the Thirty (403), xii. 24; goes to Athens as harmonist, xii. 26; decline of his influence at Sparta, *ibid.*
- Lysicles, sent to collect money in Caria (428), vi. 5; his death, *ibid.*
- M**
- MACEDONIA, history of, after the Persian wars, i. 18; partition of the kingdom, i. 19; invaded by Sitalces (429), v. 20.
- Magna Graecia, Themistocles' views on, i. 9.
- Malea, a promontory on Lesbos, vi. 2.
- Mantineia, at war with Tegea (428), viii. 12; alliance with Athens (420), ix. 6; battle of (418), ix. 10, 11; rejoins the Spartan confederacy, and concludes a peace for thirty years, abandoning her claim to supremacy in Arcadia, ix. 12.
- Mantineans, the, at Olpae, vii. 4; join Argos in 421, ix. 3; their aggression in Arcadia checked by the Spartans (421), ix. 4.
- Massacres at Corcyra (427), vi. 14, 15.
- Mathematics, xiv. 16.
- Medicine, xiv. 16.
- Megara, invaded by the Athenians (481), v. 6; Megarian oligarchs at Pegae, viii. 2; popular party negotiates with Athens (424), *ibid.*
- Megarian, exiles allowed to live at Plataea, vi. 12; decree, the, a cause of the war, iii. 1; to what was it due? *ibid.*
- Megarians, their complaints at Sparta of the conduct of Athens, iii. 8; their exclusion from the trade of Athens, iii. 12; have forty ships at Nisaea, v. 19; refuse to accept the peace of 421, viii. 16.
- Megarid, the, invaded by the Athenians, iii. 1.
- Melaneridas, a Spartan admiral (413), xi. 2.
- Meleas of Lacedaemon, at Mytilene, vi. 2.
- Melesander, sent to collect tribute in Lycia (430), v. 11; his death, *ibid.*
- Melissus, commander of the Samians, i. 17.
- Melos, attacked by the Athenians (426), vii. 2; assessed by Athens in 425, ix. 15; conference between the Melians and the Athenians, *ibid.*; attack of the Athenians on (416), *ibid.*; massacre of the inhabitants, *ibid.*
- Menander, chosen to support Nicias, x. 21.
- Mende, revolts to Brasidas (428), viii. 9; recovered by the Athenians, viii. 11.
- Menedaeus, a Spartan general, vii. 4.
- Menelaus, son of Alexander, i. 19.
- Mercenaries, from Peloponnesus, viii. 3, 4; Thracian, at Athens, x. 23.
- Messapians, and Athenians, i. 12; friendly to the Athenians, x. 26.
- Messene, taken by the Athenians, vii. 6; lost to Athens (425), vii. 15; factions at, x. 1; Alcibiades visits (415), x. 10; unsuccessful attempt to win, by the Athenians, x. 14.
- Messenian troops, the, at Sphacteria, vii. 12; established at Pylus (425), vii. 13.
- Messenians of Naupactus, propose an invasion of Aetolia (426), vii. 3.

Methana, Nicias at (426), vii. 14.
 Methone, attack on, by Athenian fleet (431), v. 5; repulsed by Brasidas, *ibid.*
 Methymna, remains loyal to Athens, at the revolt of Lesbos (428), vi. 1; attacked by Mytilene, vi. 4; taken by the Peloponnesians (406), xii. 13.
 Meton, the Athenian mathematician, xiv. 16; his cycle, *ibid.*
 Miletus, quarrels with Samos (440), i. 15; applies to Athens, *ibid.*; revolts from Athens, xi. 4; battle of (412), xi. 8; oligarchy at (411), xi. 15; joins the Lacedaemonians, *ibid.*; the Milesian school of philosophers, xiv. 11.
 Mindarus, succeeds Astyochus as Spartan admiral (411), xii. 3; takes the fleet to the Hellespont, *ibid.*
 Minoa, occupied by Nicias (427), vi. 17.
 Minesicles, xiv. 19.
 Mycalessus, attack on, by Thracians, x. 23.
 Myron, xiv. 18.
 Mysteries, popularity of, i. 14; profanation of, by Alcibiades and others, x. 7; information about the profanation of, x. 11.
 Mysticism at Athens, xiv. 21.
 Mytilenaeans, revolt from Athens and organise Lesbos, vi. 1; defeated by the Athenians, and conclude an armistice to send envoys to Athens, vi. 2; also send to Lacedaemon; *ibid.*; at Olympia, vi. 3; received into the Peloponnesian alliance, vi. 4; attack Methymna, *ibid.*; Paches sent to Mytilene, *ibid.*; discussion of their fate at Athens, vi. 8; the Athenians cancel their severe decree, vi. 10; massacre of *ibid.*

N

NAUPACTUS, Phormio sent to (429), v. 11; Phormio defeats the Peloponnesians off, v. 18; the Aetolians wish to attack (426), vii. 8; saved by Demosthenes, *ibid.*; twenty ships sent to (414), x. 21.
 Naxos (in Sicily), attack on (425), vii. 15; the Athenian fleet sails to (415), x. 10; the Athenians encamp at, x. 14.
 Neapolis and Athens, i. 12.
 Neodamodes, the, settled at Lepreum (421), ix. 4; at the battle of Mantinea (418), ix. 10.
 Nesiotas, an Athenian sculptor, xiv. 18.
 Nicias, opposed to war, ii. 9; of Gortys, v. 17, *note*; occupies Menoa (427), vi. 17; at Melos, vii. 2; at Tanagra (426), *ibid.*; and Cleon, in 425, vii. 11; criticism of his conduct in the matter of Pylus, vii. 13; at Solygea (425), vii. 14; at Methana, *ibid.*; captures Cythera (424), viii. 1; at Mende and Scione, viii. 11; eager for peace in 422, viii. 16; his caution, and desire to be a safe general, *ibid.*; outwitted by Alcibiades, ix. 6; after Mantinea, ix. 13; blockades the ports of Perdiccas (416), ix. 14; appointed one of the generals to Sicily (415), x. 3; his speech about the expedition to Sicily, x. 4; his plan of campaign in 415, x. 10; divides the forces with Lamachus, after the departure of Alcibiades, x. 12; his excessive caution, *ibid.*; breaks up from Catana, and wins Epipolae (414), x. 15; his dangerous position in the "circle," x. 16; vainly attempts to intercept Gylippus, x. 17; his want of energy in the conduct of the siege, x. 18, *note*; begins to make use of the Athenian fleet (414), x. 19; seizes Plemmyrium, *ibid.*; endeavours to intercept the Corinthian contingent, *ibid.*; sends a letter to Athens (414), x. 20; refuses to return to Athens after the failure of the attack on Epipolae, x. 23; or to go to Thapsus, *ibid.*; deterred by an eclipse from leaving Syracuse (413), *ibid.*; his address to his men before the final battle in the Harbour, x. 30; deceived by Hermocrates into wasting time at Syracuse (413), x. 32; his heroism in encouraging the Athenians in their retreat, x. 33; reaches the Caecyparis, *ibid.*; the Erineus, x. 34; the Assinarus, *ibid.*; surrenders, *ibid.*; put to death at Syracuse, x. 35.
 Nicostratus, an Athenian commander, at Naupactus, vi. 13; at Coreyra, vi. 14; at Mende and Scione, viii. 11; slain at Mantinea, ix. 11.
 Nine Ways, the, i. 20, *note*.
 Nisaea, capture of, by the Athenians (424), viii. 2; retained by the Athenians in 421, vii. 17; recovered by the Megarians (410-409), xii. 8.
 Nomothetae, appointed to revise the laws, after deposition of the Four Hundred (411) at Athens, xi. 23, xii. 1.
 Notium, factions at, vi. 7; Paches visits, *ibid.*; defeat of Athenian fleet at (407), xii. 12.
 Nymphodorus of Abdera, brother-in-law of Sitalces, i. 21; invited to Athens (431), v. 6.

O

- OCTAMASADES, son of Ariapithes, i. 21.
 Odeum, the, at Athens, xiv. 19.
 Odrysian empire, growth of the, i. 19;
 under Sitalces, i. 21; its extent and
 revenues, *ibid.*
 Oeniadae, saved by floods from attack, v.
 19; Asopius attacks, vi. 5.
 Oeneon, Demosthenes at, vii. 3.
 Oenoe, Archidamus repulsed at (431), v. 4;
 captured by the Boeotians (411), xi. 23.
 Oetaeans, ravage the Trachinian territory,
 vii. 1.
 Oligarchies, establishment of, by Pisander,
 xi. 16.
 Oligarchs at Corcyra (431-427), vi. 13; escape
 to the mainland, vi. 15; final massacre (425),
 vi. 16.
 Oligarchy, at Samos, i. 15; suppressed by
 Athens, *ibid.*; restored, *ibid.*; spread of,
 after the battle of Mantinea, ix. 12; Nicias
 apprehends dangers from, x. 4; established
 by Lysander (405), xii. 18.
 Olpae, seized by the Ambraciots (426), vii. 4;
 battle of, *ibid.*
 Olympia, funds at, iv. 6; the Mytilenaeans
 at (428), vi. 3.
 Olympian festival (420), Spartans excluded
 from, ix. 7.
 Olympieum, a temple near the shore of the
 Great Harbour of Syracuse, x. 12; the
 Athenians encamped near, but leave it un-
 touched, *ibid.*
 Olynthus, becomes a common centre for the
 Chalcidian Greeks, lii. 7.
 Onatas of Aegina, xiv. 18.
 Ophioneis, the, an Aetolian tribe, vii. 3.
 Oracles, constant appeal to, even about
 trifles, ii. 4.
 Orator and general, iv. 2; orators at
 Athens, vi. 9.
 Oratory, growth of, xiv. 10.
 Orchomenus, surrenders to Argos (418), ix.
 10.
 Ostracism of Hyperbolus (417?), ix. 13.

P

- PACHES, sent to Mytilene (428), vi. 4; at
 Mytilene, vi. 6, 7; his treachery at
 Notium, vi. 7; brought to trial, slays him-
 self in the court, vi. 10.

- Pagondas, a Boeotian general (Boeotarch),
 viii. 4.
 Painting, the art of, xiv. 17.
 Panactum destroyed, ix. 4.
 Pangaeus, Mount, i. 20.
 Panhellenic schemes of Pericles, i. 13.
Panoptrae, the, a play of Cratinus, xiv. 5.
 Panyasis of Halicarnassus, an epic poet,
 xiv. 6.
 Paralus, son of Pericles, ii. 3; carried off by
 the plague (430), v. 10.
Paralus, the, escapes from Aegospotami (405),
 xii. 19.
 Parmenides, xiv. 11.
 Parrhasians, the, rescued from the Man-
 tineans by Plistoanax, ix. 4.
 Parrhasius, xiv. 17.
 Parthenon, the, ii. 2, xiv. 18, 19.
 Parties, in Athens after 445, ii. 1; later, ii. 9.
 Pasitellidas, established in Torone (423), viii.
 11; unable to maintain Torone for Brasidas,
 viii. 13.
 Patrae, Alcibiades causes the building of
 long walls at (419), ix. 8.
 Pausanias, king of Sparta, marches upon
 Athens (405), xii. 21; leads a force to
 Athens (408), xii. 26; dealings with Ly-
 sander, *ibid.*
 Payment of officers at Athens, abolition of
 (411), xi. 16.
 Peace, of 445, i. 1; envoys sent from Athens
 to Sparta about, but without result (430), v.
 9; proposals for, by the Spartans in 425,
 vii. 10; feeling at Athens in favour of (424),
 viii. 8; desire for, in 422, viii. 16; negotia-
 tions for (422-421), *ibid.*; the majority of the
 Spartan allies accept it, *ibid.*; of 421, terms
 of, viii. 17; of 421, unsatisfactory to both
 sides, and could not be lasting, *ibid.*, ix. 1;
 of 421, infringement of, by the Lacedae-
 monians (419), ix. 8; the terms of, infringed
 by Athens (414), x. 21; terms of surrender
 in 404, xii. 22. See Cyzicus, Arginusae.
 Pedaritus, governor of Chios (412), xi. 9;
 quarrels with the admiral Astyochus, *ibid.*;
 killed at Chios (411), xi. 14.
 Pegae, party of Megarian oligarchs at, viii. 2.
 Peiraem, the Peloponnesian ships driven on
 shore at (412), xi. 3; the Peloponnesian
 ships break out from, xi. 5.
 Peiraens, proposed attack on the (429), v. 19;
 architecture of, xiv. 19.
 Peithias of Corcyra, vi. 13.
 Pellene, a city of Achaea, on the side of
 Sparta, iv. 4, ix. 12.

Peloponnesian, confederacy, the allies invited to Sparta, iii. 8; confederacy, the allies formally summoned to discuss the question of war, iii. 11; speech of the Corinthians, *ibid.*; confederacy, in favour of war, *ibid.*; slowness and inactivity of, *ibid.*; war, plans of campaign, iv. 7; criticism of the plan of Pericles, iv. 8; war, excitement at the outbreak of, v. 3; signs and wonders, *ibid.*; war, the first year (431), v. 4-7; second year (430), v. 8-12; fleet, sent against Zacynthus (430), v. 11; war, third year (429), v. 13 to end; fleet, in 429, v. 16-18; war (428), vi. 1-5; war (427), vi. 6-17; war (426), vii. 1-7; war (426-425), vii. 8-15; fleet, acquired by the Athenians (425), vii. 10; fleet, given up to Athens, *ibid.*; ships return from Sicily (412), xi. 3; war (413-412), xi. 1-10; fleet to sail to Chios, Lesbos, and the Hellespont, xi. 3; at Petraeum, *ibid.* and 5; in Ionia, xi. 3 f., see Chalcidians; first treaty with Persia, xi. 5; fleet, at Lesbos, xi. 7, see Astyochus; at Miletus, xi. 9; second treaty with Persia, *ibid.*; fleet, at Cnidus, xi. 10; at Rhodes, *ibid.*; war (411), xi. 11-23, xii. 4; fleet returns to Miletus, xi. 15; third treaty with Persia, *ibid.*; fleet off Euboea, xi. 22; mutiny at Miletus, xii. 3; fleet in the Hellespont, see Mindarus, xii. 3; defeated at Cynossema (411), xii. 4; and at Cyzicus (410), xii. 5; recover Pylus, xii. 8; fleet, victorious at Notium, xii. 2, see Lysander, defeated at Arginusae (406), xii. 14; victorious at Aegospotami (405), xii. 18, 19; war (410), xii. 5-8; (409), xii. 9; (408), xii. 12; (407), *ibid.*; (406), xii. 13-17; (405), xii. 17-21; (404), xii. 21-25.

Perdiccas, son of Alexander, i. 19; becomes an ally of Athens, i. 21; expels his brother Philip, *ibid.*; supports the Potidaeans in their revolt, iii. 7; at war with Athens, *ibid.*; becomes an ally of the Athenians (431), v. 6; sends troops to aid Cnemus in Acarnania, v. 15; and Sitaces (429), v. 20; applies to Sparta for help (424), viii. 2; and Brasidas, viii. 5; visits Brasidas after the capture of Amphipolis (424), viii. 7; invades Lyncestis, with the support of Brasidas (423), viii. 9, 10; his retreat, *ibid.*; comes to terms with the Athenians (423), viii. 11; prevents reinforcements from reaching Brasidas, *ibid.*; friendly with Thessaly, *ibid.*; declared an enemy (416), ix. 14.

Pericles, secures empire by the peace of 445,

i. 2; supreme at Athens, i. 5; his imperial policy, i. 6; his Panhellenic schemes, i. 13, 14; at Samos, i. 15, 16; his conduct of the war at Samos, i. 17; his funeral speech after the Samian war, *ibid.*; his retort to Elpinice, *ibid.* note; his use of the money of the allies, ii. 2; introduces payment for service, *ibid.*; saves largely from the revenues, *ibid.*; his aim in paying the law-courts, *ibid.*; result of the payment, *ibid.*; ruler of Athens, *ibid.*; elected general year after year, *ibid.*; change of the people towards, ii. 3; his wife and children, *ibid.*; his connection with Aspasia, *ibid.*; and the new philosophy, ii. 4; and the sophists, ii. 7; his argument with Protagoras, *ibid.*; becomes unpopular, *ibid.*; his attitude towards the demagogues, *ibid.*; attacked through his friends, ii. 8; defends Aspasia, *ibid.*; charges brought against him, ii. 9; prepares for war, *ibid.*; his pecuniary difficulties a cause of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 1; could only govern Athens through the Assembly, iv. 2; his plan of campaign in the Peloponnesian war, iv. 7; was his plan the best? iv. 3; rejects overtures from the Lacedaemonians when they are in the field, v. 3; neglects to make proper arrangements for the countrymen in the city, *ibid.*; prevents the people from meeting, v. 4; maintains his policy, v. 5; takes measures for the security of Attica, *ibid.*; his funeral speech (431), v. 7; the Athenians exasperated against (430), v. 9; his speech to them, *ibid.*; he is deposed, and fined, v. 10; his sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, carried off by the plague, *ibid.*; his son by Aspasia made legitimate (430), *ibid.*; re-elected general (429), v. 14; the death of (429), v. 21; effect of this at Athens, *ibid.*; ideals of, *ibid.*; he left no successor, *ibid.*

Pericles, the younger, son of Pericles, ii. 3, note; made an Athenian citizen (430), v. 10.

Persians, war with, discontinued, i. 2; treaty with Sparta, xi. 15; second treaty with Peloponnesians (412), xi. 9; estrangement from Spartans, xi. 10; third treaty with the Peloponnesians (411), xi. 15.

Phaeax, sent to Sicily (422), x. 2; at Lecri, Camarina, Agrigentum, and Gela, his mission a failure, *ibid.*

Phalaris, the bull of, sent to Carthage, xiii. 6.

Pharnabazus, sends envoys to Sparta (413),

- xi. 2; induces the Peloponnesians to sail to the Hellespont (411), xii. 3; supports the Peloponnesians after Cyzicus, xii. 6; makes an agreement with Athenians at Chalcedon, (409), xii. 9.
- Pharnaces, the Persian satrap of Phrygia, (422), viii. 13.
- Phaselis in Lycia, a centre of trade, v. 11.
- Phea, the Athenian fleet at, v. 5.
- Phidias, attack on, he is thrown into prison, where he dies, ii. 8; his peculations a cause of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 1, xiv. 18.
- Phigalea, the plague at, v. 8; the temple at, *ibid.*
- Philip, son of Alexander, i. 19; expelled by Perdiccas, takes refuge with Dardas, i. 21; supported by Athens, *ibid.*; brother of Perdiccas, an ally of the Athenians, iii. 7.
- Philistus, the historian of Syracuse, x. 34, 35, notes; supports Dionysius, xiii. 7.
- Philocles, appointed Athenian general (406), xii. 17; his dealings with captives (406), xii. 20; executed by Lysander, *ibid.*
- Philosophers and sophists, ii. 5.
- Philosophy, physical, disliked at Athens, ii. 4; of Ionia, ii. 5; development of, xiv. 11 f.; and religion, xiv. 15.
- Phoenician fleet, expected at Samos, i. 16.
- Phormio, general at Samos, i. 16; at Amphiloehian Argos, i. 22; helps to blockade Potidaea, iii. 7; sent against the Chalcidians, v. 6; sent to Naupactus (480), v. 11; reinforcements sent to, but ordered to go to Crete, v. 17; his victories in the Corinthian gulf (429), v. 16-18; at Astacus, Stratus, and Coronta, v. 19; returns to Athens (428), *ibid.*; his death (?), *ibid.*
- Phrynichus, his opposition to Alcibiades, and intrigues with Astyochus, xi. 12, 13; removed from his command (411), xi. 13; envoy to Sparta (411), xi. 21; assassinated, *ibid.*
- the tragedian, xiv. 2.
- Phyllis, i. 20, note.
- Pictures, famous, xiv. 17.
- Pindar, xiv. 1.
- Piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean (480), v. 11.
- Pisander, a member of the commission to investigate impiety, x. 7; advocates oligarchical revolution in Athens, and return of Alcibiades (411), xi. 13; intrigues with political clubs, xi. 14; negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades (411), *ibid.*; returns from Samos to Athens (411), xi. 16; proposes the government of the Four Hundred, *ibid.*
- Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, aids Samos in revolt, i. 16; aids the Persian party in Notium (427), vi. 7; his rebellion suppressed by Tissaphernes, xi. 2.
- Plague, the, at Athens (430), v. 8; reappears at Athens (427), vi. 17; in the Carthaginian camp at Agrigentum, xiii. 6.
- Plataea, and Thebes, v. 1; seized by a party of Thebans (431), v. 2; the attack repulsed, *ibid.*; the Theban prisoners put to death, *ibid.*; perfidy of the Plataeans, *ibid.*; the Peloponnesians at (429), v. 13; the territory inviolable (?), *ibid.*; wall built round at, *ibid.*; escape of part of the garrison (428), vi. 5; surrender of (427), vi. 11; trial of the Plataeans by the Spartans, *ibid.*; position of, to Thebes and Sparta, *ibid.*; their appeal to Sparta, *ibid.*; retained by Thebes in 421, viii. 17.
- Plataeans, massacre of the, vi. 12; the survivors live at Athens and Scione, *ibid.*
- Plays, how represented at Athens, xiv. 6.
- Plemmyrium, captured by Nicias (414), x. 19; captured by Gylippus (413), x. 24.
- Plistoanax, his return from exile, vii. 1; king of Sparta, in favour of peace (422), viii. 16; in Arcadia, rescues the Parrhasians, and puts an end to the aggression of the Mantineaans (421), ix. 4; marches out to Tegea, at the time of the battle of Mantinea (418), ix. 11.
- Polemarchus, insubordination of, at the battle of Mantinea, ix. 11.
- Political, parties at Athens after the war, xii. 23; parties at Athens, their reconciliation after the Thirty, xii. 26; science, in Greece, xiv. 14.
- Polyclitus, xiv. 18.
- Polydamidas, a Lacedaemonian, commander of the garrison at Mende, viii. 11.
- Polygnatus of Thasos, xiv. 17.
- Portents, how interpreted (the one-horned ram), ii. 4.
- Potidaea, the revolt of, a cause of the Peloponnesian war, iii. 7; a Corinthian colony, and governed by officers from Corinth, but a subject ally of Athens, *ibid.*; applies to Lacedaemon for help, *ibid.*; Aristens at, *ibid.*; battle of, *ibid.*; blockaded, *ibid.*; siege of (431), v. 6; surrender of (480), v. 12; Brasidas makes an unsuccessful attack on (423), viii. 12.

Prasias, Athenian attack on (430), v. 8; ravaged by the Athenians (414), x. 21.
 Priene, cause of a quarrel between Samos and Miletus, i. 15.
 Proboli, a board of ten, established at Athens (418), xi. 1.
 Professions, absence of, in Greece, xiv. 28.
 Property-tax, iv. 6; at Athens imposed for the first time in 428, vi. 5.
 Propylaea, the, ii. 2.
 Prose writing in Greece, xiv. 7.
 Protagoras, at Athens, ii. 6; his argument with Pericles, ii. 7; banished from Athens, ii. 8, xiv. 13.
Protagoras of Plato, scene from, ii. 6.
 Ptychia, an island near Coreyra, vi. 16.
 Pydna, acquired by Macedon, i. 18.
 Pylus, seized and fortified by the Athenian fleet (425), vii. 8; the Lacedaemonians are unable to dislodge the Athenians, vii. 9; the Athenians at, *ibid.*; the Spartan ephors visit, vii. 10; armistice agreed upon, *ibid.*; long delay in the operations, vii. 11; criticism of the account of, vii. 13; Athens refuses to give up, in 421, ix. 1; the Athenians agree to withdraw the Messenians and Helots from (421), ix. 4; recovered by Lacedaemonians (410-409), xii. 8.
 Pyrrha, in Lesbos, acquired by Athens, vi. 8.
 Pythagoreans, the, xiv. 12.
 Pythen, the Corinthian commander, sails with Gylippus, x. 17; at Syracuse (413), x. 31.
 Pythodorus, sent to Sicily (426), vii. 6; in Sicily, *ibid.*, viii. 3; is exiled on his return to Athens, viii. 8; lands in Laconia (414), x. 21.

R

RELIGION, at Athens, ii. 4; and philosophy, xiv. 15; ethical progress in, xiv. 21; monotheism, *ibid.*; mysticism, *ibid.*; foreign rites, *ibid.*
 Reserve fund of a thousand talents at Athens (431), v. 5; used after the revolt of Chios (412), xi. 4.
 Responsibility at Athens, iv. 3, vi. 9.
 Revenues of Athens, large savings from, ii. 2; after the peace of Nicias, x. 3.
 Rhegium, gives little support to the Athenians in 415, x. 8; the Athenian generals discuss their plans of campaign at, x. 10; the Athenian fleet at, *ibid.*; the ships sent to make inquiries at Segesta, return to, *ibid.*

Rhetoric in Sicily, ii. 5.
 Rhodes, joins the Peloponnesian alliance (412), xi. 10; harbours Peloponnesian fleet (411), *ibid.*
 Rhoteum, viii. 3.

S

SABAZIUS, a Phrygian deity, xiv. 21.
 Sacrilege at Athens, commission to investigate, x. 7.
 Sadocus, son of Sitalces, becomes an Athenian citizen (431), v. 6.
 Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian envoy at Mytilene, vi. 5; gives arms to the populace of Mytilene, vi. 6; put to death, vi. 8.
Salamina, the, sent to Sicily to bring home Alcibiades, x. 11.
 Salamis overrun by the Peloponnesians, v. 19.
 Samos, internal factions at, i. 15; quarrel with Miletus (440), *ibid.*; Pericles at, *ibid.*; democracy established, *ibid.*; reaction and revolt, *ibid.*; the Samians defeated by Pericles, i. 16; capitulates, *ibid.*; terms of capitulation, *ibid.*; was a democracy established? *ibid.*; cost of the siege, *ibid.*; importance of the island to Athens (412), xi. 6; popular revolt at, *ibid.*; the island allowed to be independent, *ibid.*; becomes the Athenian headquarters in Ionia (412), xi. 8; attempted oligarchical revolution at (411), xi. 15; overthrow of attempted oligarchical government (411), xi. 17; attitude to the Four Hundred, xi. 18; alone remains faithful to Athens after Aegospotami (405), xii. 21.
 Satyrus, xii. 25.
 Scelone, revolts to Brasidas after the truce is signed (423), viii. 9; blockaded by the Athenians (423), viii. 11; capture of, and massacre of the inhabitants (421), ix. 8.
 Sciritae, the, in the army at Mantinea, ix. 10.
 Sculpture, xiv. 18.
 Scyles, son of Arapithes, i. 21; his love of Greek customs, *ibid.*; he is initiated in the Dionysiac rites, *ibid.*; deposed, *ibid.*; put to death by Octamasades, *ibid.*
 Sea, the, regarded as the territory of the Athenians, ix. 8.
 Segesta, envoys from, at Athens, i. 9; her quarrel with Selinus in 416, x. 3; her alliance with Athens, *ibid.*; seeks the aid of Athens, *ibid.*; Athenian envoys visit, and report upon, *ibid.*; deception practised

- upon them, *ibid.*; discovery of the fraud practised on the Athenian envoys at, x. 10; the Athenian fleet sails to (415), x. 12; a body of horse from, joins the Athenians, x. 15; and Selinus, xiii. 2; and Carthage, *ibid.*
- Selinuntians, the, defeat of, xiii. 2.
- Selinus, her quarrel with Segesta in 416, x. 8; seeks the aid of Syracuse, *ibid.*; and Segesta, xiii. 2; destruction of (409), xiii. 3.
- Sestos, taken by Lysander (405), xii. 21.
- Seuthes, the nephew of Sitalces, marries Stratonicæ, sister of Perdicas, v. 20.
- Sicanus, a Syracusan general (413), x. 31.
- Sicels, the Athenians negotiate with (415-414), x. 14; destroy a body of reinforcements on their way to Syracuse (413), x. 24.
- Sicilian, fleet, vii. 15; expedition, causes of the failure of, x. 21.
- Sicily, Athenian passion for, i. 3; growth of rhetoric in, ii. 5; the Athenians send ships to (427), vi. 17; affairs in, in 426, vii. 6; ships sent to, in 425, detained at Pylus, vii. 8-10; affairs in, in 425, vii. 15; affairs in 424, the congress of Gela, viii. 3; after the congress of Gela, x. 1; attempt of the Athenians to gain a footing in, in 422, x. 2; Athenian interest in the island, x. 3; the Athenians resolve to send an expedition to Sicily (415), *ibid.*; Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed generals, *ibid.*; first armament sent to (415), x. 6; departure of the great expedition, x. 8; reinforcements sent to, from Peloponnesus and Boeotia, x. 22; from Athens, x. 26; effect of the disaster in, at Athens (418), xi. 1; return of the Peloponnesian ships from Sicily (412), xi. 3.
- Sicyon, the constitution rearranged on a more oligarchical basis (418), ix. 12.
- Siege, of Plataea (480), v. 13; engines used at Samos (?), i. 16, note; at Plataea, v. 13.
- Simonides, xiv. 1.
- Siphæ, a rising contemplated at (424), viii. 4.
- Sitalces, son of Teres, i. 19; the kingdom of the Odrisians united in his hands, i. 21; receives Scyles, and exchanges him for Sparadocus, *ibid.*; Athens wishes to form an alliance with, *ibid.*; alliance with (431), v. 6; arrests the Peloponnesian envoys on their way to the Great King, and gives them up to Athens (430), v. 12; invades Macedonia (429), v. 20; his levy, *ibid.*
- Slavery, condemned by the sophists, xiv. 23; in Greece, *ibid.*
- Slaves, the, at Athens, desert to Decelea, x. 22; number of, in Sicily after the defeat of the Athenians, x. 35.
- Society, at Athens, ii. 3; in Greece, xiv. 23.
- Socrates, and Aspasia, ii. 3; his views on the decline of the Athenian character, xii. 12; his conduct as one of the prytanes, xii. 15, xiv. 15; his death, *ibid.*
- Sollium, capture of, by Athens, v. 5.
- Solygea, Nicias at (425), vii. 14.
- Sophists, and philosophers, ii. 5; their wandering life, *ibid.*; their teaching at Athens, ii. 6; disliked at Athens, ii. 7; the, xiv. 13.
- Sophocles, an Athenian general, at Corcyra (425), vi. 16; at Pylus, vii. 8; in Sicily (425), vii. 15, viii. 3; exiled on his return to Athens, *ibid.*, xiv. 3.
- Sparadocus, son of Teres, expelled by Sitalces, takes refuge in Scythia, given up to Sitalces, i. 21.
- Spargapithes, king of the Agathyrsi, i. 21.
- Sparta, her conduct in 446, i. 1; decision of the Assembly about the war, iii. 10; negotiations with Athens in the hope of avoiding war, iii. 12; her demands, *ibid.*; and Athens contrasted, iv. 1 f.; her fleet in 431, iv. 4; her army, *ibid.*; without any well-defined *casus belli* in 431, v. 3; assembles her troops at the Isthmus, *ibid.*; and Lesbos, vi. 2; bids the Mytilenæan envoys appear at Olympia, vi. 3; proposes peace after the seizure of Pylus, vii. 10; concludes a truce with Athens for a year (428), viii. 8; short-sighted policy of, in 423, *ibid.*; her attitude to Argos in 422, viii. 16; her indifference to the interests of her allies in the peace of 421, viii. 17; and Athens, alliance between (421), ix. 1; her position as head of the Peloponnesian league severely shaken by the peace of 421, ix. 2 ff.; forms an alliance with Boeotia (421), ix. 4; and Argos (420), ix. 5; her citizens excluded from the Olympian festival (420), ix. 7; and Argos, in 418, ix. 9, 10; and Argos, alliance between (after Mantinea), ix. 12; short duration of her alliance with Argos, ix. 14; Syracusan envoys at (415), x. 13; the Chians and Erythraeans send to, proposing to revolt, xi. 2; the Spartans inclined to abandon the Athenian allies (412), xi. 3; overtures to, by the Four Hundred (411), xi. 21; magnanimity towards Athens, xii. 22.
- Spartan, confederacy, difficulties in the way of action, iv. 3; jealousies and enmities,

- ibid.*; confederacy, financial position of, iv. 6; pay a contribution but have no public funds, *ibid.*
- Spartans, characteristics of, slowness and deliberation, iii. 10; the common Greek opinion of, iv. 1, *note*; retained even incompetent officers in command, iv. 8; send commissioners to Onemus, v. 17, *see* Brasidas; cut off in Sphacteria, vii. 9; send envoys to Athens to treat for peace (425), vii. 10; on Sphacteria, surrender, vii. 12; astonishment of Greece at this, vii. 13; carried captive to Athens from Pylus, *ibid.*; their fear of the Helots, viii. 2; iniquitous massacre of the Helots, *ibid.*; their despondency in consequence of defeat (424), establish a force of cavalry, and send out garrisons into various parts of the country, *ibid.*; obtain a clear *casus belli* against the Athenians (414), x. 21; invade Attica (413), x. 22; propose peace after the battle of Cyzicus (410), xii. 6; after Arginusæ (406), xii. 16.
- Spartolus, defeat of the Athenians at (429), v. 14.
- Sphacteria, the island of, vii. 9; geographical difficulties connected with, vii. 10; blockade of, vii. 10, 11; attack on the island, vii. 12; the captives taken at, restored by Athens in 421, ix. 1.
- Spindle, the=arrow, vii. 13.
- Sthenelaidas, ephor of Sparta, his speech on the war, iii. 10.
- Stone quarries, the, at Syracuse, the Athenians placed in, x. 35.
- Stratus, defeat of the Chaonians at (429), v. 15.
- Strombichides, an Athenian general (412), xi. 4.
- Strymon, geography of the lower, i. 20.
- Styphon, commander of the troops on Sphacteria, vii. 12.
- Superstition, of the Athenians, ii. 4; fear of eclipses, x. 28.
- Sybaris, refounded and destroyed by Croton, i. 20.
- Sybarites, the remnant destroyed by the Lucanians, i. 12.
- Sybota, battle of, iii. 6.
- Syke, the, on Epipolæ, x. 15.
- Syracusans, outwitted by the Athenians, who are able to transfer their fleet from Catana to the Great Harbour, x. 12; exhibit contempt for the Athenians, *ibid.*; their first engagement with the Athenians on the shore of the Great Harbour (415), *ibid.*; excellence of their cavalry, *ibid.*; their preparations in the winter of 415, x. 13; send envoys to Corinth and Lacedæmon, *ibid.*; enclose the Temenites (415), x. 14; place garrisons in the Olympieum and Megara, *ibid.*; their first counter-wall (414), x. 16; destroyed by the Athenians, *ibid.*; their second counter-wall, *ibid.*; destroyed by the Athenians, *ibid.*; despondency of, x. 17; depose Hermocrates, *ibid.*; contemplate surrendering (414), x. 18; prevented by the arrival of Gongylas, *ibid.*; their third wall, *ibid.*; under Gylippus, defeated, but afterwards victorious and carry their third wall past the Athenian line, x. 19; resolve to attack the Athenians at sea, x. 24; the first engagement (413), *ibid.*; capture Athenian transports, *ibid.*; their second engagement in the Great Harbour, they are victorious (413), x. 25; their third naval engagement with the Athenians (413), x. 29; their victory, *ibid.*; dangerous enemies to the Athenians because like them, x. 29; close the mouth of the Great Harbour (413), x. 30; last engagement in the Harbour, x. 30, 31; their triumphant return from the Assinarus to the city (413), x. 34; their treatment of the Athenian prisoners, x. 35.
- Syracuse, at war with Leontini (427), vi. 17; aid of, sought by Leontini, x. 1; news of the Athenian expedition carried to, x. 9; a general dismisses the Assembly, *ibid.*; the Athenians send ten ships into (415), x. 10; ten Athenian ships enter the Great Harbour, *ibid.*; the whole Athenian fleet enters, x. 12; the army encamps on the shore, *ibid.*; Alcibiades advises help to be sent to, x. 13; the Athenian fleet sails into the Great Harbour (414), x. 16; arrival of the Corinthian ships at, x. 19; retreat of the Athenians from, x. 33 f.

T

- TAENARUS, the curse of, iii. 12.
- Tanagra, attacked by Nicias (426), vii. 2.
- Tegea, at war with Mantinea (423), viii. 12; refuses to join Argos, ix. 3; the allied armies propose to attack (418), ix. 10; Agis marches to the relief of, *ibid.*; and Mantinea, quarrel about the water, ix. 10.
- Temples, built in the fifth century, xiv. 19.
- Tenedos, hostile to Mytilene, vi. 1.

- Teos, revolts from Athens (412), xi. 4; Diomedon partially recovers, for Athens, xi. 5.
- Terentum, opposed to the Athenians in 415, x. 8.
- Teres, king of the Odrysians, i. 19; death of, *ibid.*; his sons, *ibid.*
- Teucer, gives information about the profanation of the mysteries, x. 11.
- Teutiapius of Elis, his advice to Alcidas, vi. 7.
- Thales of Miletus, xiv. 11.
- Theban tactics, a line twenty-five deep, at Delium, viii. 1.
- Thebans, their conduct in the Persian war, vi. 11, 12; their relations to Plataea, v. 1 ff, vi. 12; insist on the destruction of the walls of Thespiæ (428), viii. 12; *see* Plataea.
- Thebes, wealth of, iv. 6; and Plataea, v. 1; proposes destruction of Athens to Sparta, xii. 22.
- Themistocles, and Magna Græcia, i. 9.
- Theodorus of Cyrene, a mathematician, xiv. 16.
- Thera, pays tribute, iv. 4, *note*.
- Theramenes, the Spartan, makes second treaty with Persians (412), xi. 9; lost at sea, *ibid.*
- son of Hagnon, his position in the Four Hundred, xi. 21; breaks with the Four Hundred (411), xi. 22; at Arginusæ, xii. 14; accuses the generals at Arginusæ (406), xii. 15; views of Aristophanes upon him, xii. 17; visits Lysander (404), xii. 22; sent as envoy to Sparta, *ibid.*; proposes return of the exiles, xii. 23; his part in the election of the Thirty, xii. 24; his policy, *ibid.*; opposes the conduct of the Thirty, xii. 25; attacked by Critias and executed (404), *ibid.*
- Therma, acquired by Macedon, i. 18; restored to Perdiccas (431), v. 6.
- Thero, monument of, at Agrigentum, xiii. 6.
- Thespiæ, the walls pulled down by the Thebans (428), viii. 12.
- Thespians, the, arrive at Syracuse (413), x. 24; on Epipolæ, x. 27.
- Thessalians, allies of the Athenians, v. 4.
- Thessalus, refounds Sybaris (?), i. 10; son of Cimon, impeaches Alcibiades for profaning the mysteries, x. 11.
- Thessaly, political feeling in the country, viii. 5; on friendly terms with Perdiccas, viii. 11.
- Thirty, the, election of, at Athens (404), xii. 24; character of their government, xii. 25; apply for Spartan garrison (404), *ibid.*; seize Eleusis (403), xii. 26; defeated by Thrasybulus, *ibid.*; deposed, *ibid.*
- Thrace, growth of the Odrysian empire, i. 19.
- Thracian, "district," i. 2; changes in, i. 18; from 437, i. 20; mercenaries, at Athens (413), x. 23.
- Thrasybulus, general of Athenian fleet, xi. 18; at Arginusæ, xii. 14; makes terms with oligarchs (403), xii. 26; attacks the Thirty from Phyle, *ibid.*; marches to Peiræus, *ibid.*
- Thrasyllus, an Argive general (418), ix. 9; at the battle of Cynossema (411), xii. 4; sent to Athens, *ibid.*; raises a force at Athens (410), xii. 7; defeated at Ephesus (410), xii. 8; in the Hellespont, *ibid.*
- Thrasymachus, the sophist, xiv. 14.
- Thronium, captured by the Athenians (431), v. 5.
- Thucydides, the son of Melesias, ostracism of, i. 4; general at Samos, i. 16; said to have accused Anaxagoras of treason, ii. 8.
- the historian, a general (424), at Thasos, viii. 5; fails to relieve Amphipolis, *ibid.*; an exile from Athens, viii. 6; his remarks on the Sicilian expedition, x. 21; his opinion as to the best Athenian government, xi. 23; his judgment on Antiphon, *ibid.*, xiv. 9.
- Thuril, foundation of, i. 10; construction of the town, *ibid.*; dissensions at, i. 11; fresh colonists invited, *ibid.*; date of the foundation, *ibid.*, *note*; Cleandridas at, i. 12; becomes Dorian and secedes from Athens, *ibid.*; refuses to join Gylippus, x. 17; the Thurians become allies of the Athenians (413), x. 26.
- Thyreatis, Agelustans settled in the, v. 6, viii. 1.
- Timocreon of Rhodes, xiv. 1.
- Tissaphernes, sends an envoy to Sparta (413), xi. 2; his alliance with Chalcideus, xi. 5; obtains possession of Amorges, xi. 8; provides pay for the Peloponnesian fleet, *ibid.*; makes second treaty with the Peloponnesians (412), xi. 9; quarrels with Lichas, xi. 10; receives Alcibiades (411), xi. 11; reduces pay of Peloponnesian fleet, *ibid.*; concludes a third treaty with the Peloponnesians (411), xi. 15; follows Peloponnesians to the Hellespont, xii. 4; arrests Alcibiades (410), xii. 5.
- Tlepolemus, general at Samos, i. 16.

Torone, captured by Brasidas (424), viii. 7; recovered for Athens by Cleon (422), viii. 13.

Trachinians, their country ravaged by the Oetaeans, vii. 1.

Trade, effect of the Ionian revolt on, xiv. 22; of Athens, *ibid.*

Tragia, battle of, i. 16.

Tribute, diminution of, in 450-440, i. 2; of the allies in Caria, i. 15; collected in Lycia (430), v. 11; raising of the, by Athens in 425, vii. 16; *see* App. 1; of the Asiatic cities, reckoned as due to the Great King, xi. 2.

Triremes, a hundred set apart at the beginning of the war, v. 5.

Troezen, Athenians attack, in 430, v. 8.

Tyrrhenians, in the Athenian army at Syracuse (418), x. 29.

V

VASE-PAINTING, xiv. 17.

W

WAR, parties for and against, at Athens, ii. 9; causes of the Peloponnesian, Thucydides'

views, iii. 1; the Megarian decree, *ibid.*; the peculations of Phidias, *ibid.*; the Peloponnesian, due to the peculations of Pericles, *ibid.*; the cost of, iv. 6; largely met by private expenditure, *ibid.*; savage nature of the Peloponnesian, even in 430, v. 12.

Warfare, mode of, among the Athenians and Spartans, contrasted, iv. 5; difficulties of, *ibid.*

West, the, and Athens, i. 9; Athenian view of conquest in, x. 13.

Women, their life at Athens, ii. 3; at Athens, xiv. 23.

X

XANTHIPPOS, son of Pericles, ii. 3; carried off by the plague (430), v. 10.

Xenocritus, takes part in the founding of Thurii, i. 10.

Xenophanes of Elea, xiv. 11.

Z

ZACYNTHUS, attack on (430), v. 11.

Zeno, xiv. 11.

Zeuxis, xiv. 17.



00036116

Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to Her Majesty
at the Edinburgh University Press

Digitized with financial assistance from



HT Parekh
FOUNDATION

An Initiative by



WITH YOU, RIGHT THROUGH

on 27 November, 2018

